# Ritesh Agrawal v. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 3 ILRA 1943
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-03-07
- **Case number:** Writ -C No. 9403 of 2023
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/ritesh-agrawal-v-commissioner-devi-patan-mandal-gonda-ors-51587
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article
226-U.P.Revenue
Code,2006Section 210,116-The petitioner challenged
the order dated 24.08.2023 passed by
commissioner which set aside the SDM's
status quo order dated 4.08.2023 in a
property division dispute-Held, the SDM's
status quo order qualifies as an injunction
order,
making
an
appeal
u/s
207
appropriate rather than a revision u/s
210-The
comissioner's
order
is
set
aside.(Para 1 to 30)

The writ petition is allowed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

## Text

3 All. Ritesh Agrawal Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors.
1943
punishment
awarded
was
shockingly disproportionate to the offence
which required the interference by the
Tribunal under Section 11A of Act of 1947.
28. Thus, I find that the Tribunal was not
justified in modifying the punishment
awarded by the disciplinary authority
having been confirmed by the Appellate
Authority as well as by the Division Bench
of this Court in Special Appeal No.251 of
2006 from that of dismissal to compulsory
retirement with superannuation benefits.
29.
Considering
the
facts
and
circumstances of this case, I find that the
impugned
award
dated
22.08.2016
published on 05.09.2016 is unsustainable in
the eyes of law and the same is hereby set
aside. The order passed by disciplinary
authority dismissing respondent No.2 from
services
stands
confirmed.
30. The writ petition succeeds and is hereby
allowed.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1943
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Writ -C No. 9403 of 2023

Ritesh Agrawal ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rajeev Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Raj Mishra, Pankaj Gupta, Ratnesh
Singh, Shivam Srivastava

Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article
226-U.P.Revenue
Code,2006Section 210,116-The petitioner challenged
the order dated 24.08.2023 passed by
commissioner which set aside the SDM's
status quo order dated 4.08.2023 in a
property division dispute-Held, the SDM's
status quo order qualifies as an injunction
order,
making
an
appeal
u/s
207
appropriate rather than a revision u/s
210-The
comissioner's
order
is
set
aside.(Para 1 to 30)

The writ petition is allowed. .(E-6)

List of cases cited:

1. Jean Marc Nken, petitioner Vs Eric H. Holder,
Jr., Attorney General(2009)556 U.S 418

2. Weinberger Vs Romero-Barcelo(1982) 456
U.S 305 (1982)

3. Chamundi Mopeds Ltd Vs Church of South
India Trust MANU/SC/0501/1992: JT 1992 (3)
SC 98

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, Shri Dharm Raj Mishra and Shri
Ratnesh Singh, learned counsel for the
respondents and Shri Hemant Kumar
Pandey, learned State Counsel.

2. By means of the present
petition, the petitioner has assailed the
order
dated
24.08.2023
passed
by
respondent
No.1-Commissioner,
Devi
Patan Mandal, District-Gonda in the
Revision instituted under Section 210 of
U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (in short "Code
of 2006"), registered as Case No.1201 of
2023, (Rahul Agrawal vs. Ritesh Agrawal).

3. The brief facts are to the effect
that in a Case No. 5244 of 2023 (Ritesh
Kumar vs. Rahul Agrawal& Others),
Computerized Case No. 20230815050244,
instituted under Section 116 of the Code of
1944 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2006, the revenue court of first instance,
namely,
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate,
Payagpur,
District-Bahraich
(in
short
"S.D.M.")
passed
the
order
dated
04.08.2023,
whereby
the
authority
concerned directed the parties to maintain
status-quo. The order dated 04.08.2023
being relevant on reproduction reads as
under:-

"पत्र वली प्रथतुत। व िी ररतेश कुम र पुत्र मह वीर द्व र
उ०प्र० र िथव सांदहत 2006 की ध र 116 के तहत धय य लय
उपदिल दधक री पय गपुर िनपि-बहर इच पर बटव रें क व ि ि यर
दकय गय है। इनके द्व र थथगन प्र थान पत्र भी दिय गय है। व िी
ररतेश कुम र पुत्र मह वीर द्व र थथगन प्र थान पत्र में कह गय है दक
प्र थी आर िी नां० ख त सां० 829 की ग ट सां० 1086/0.020
हे०, 1079दम०/0.005 हे०, 1085/0.0056 हे०,
1084/0.057 हे० व ख त सां० 790 की ग ट सां०
1087/0.304 हे० व ख त सां० 788 की ग ट
सां०1079दम०/0.005 हे० व ख त सां० 1189 की ग ट सां०
1079 दम०/0.009 हे० क सहसांक्रमणीय भूदमधर क श्तक र हैं
तथ ग ट सां० 1079 क कुल रकब 0.019 हे० है। दिसमें
दवपक्षी नां 1 र हुल अग्रव ल िो एक सरकस व िबरिथत दकथम के
व्यदि है। वे अपनी सरकसी के दबन पर प्रश्नगत व िग्रथत भूदम में
प्र थी/व िी के अांश की भूदम पर दबन दवदधक दवभ िन के िबररय
कब्ि करके प्र थी को कब्िे से बेिखल कर िेन च हते है तथ
दनम ाण कर लेन च हते है। दिसके दलए वे ईट, ब लू इत्य दि दनम ाण
स मग्री क इधति म कर रखे है। प्र थी के मन करने पर आम ि
िौिि री होते है। यदि वे अपने मकसि मे क मय ब हो गये तो
प्र थी/व िी की अपूणानीय क्षदत होगी। हमेश के दलए कब्िे से
बेिखल हो ि येग । दिसकी भरप ई भदवष्य में हो प न सम्भव न
होग । अधत में इनके द्व र कह गय है दक िौर न दवभ िन व ि
दवपक्षी नां०1 र हुल अग्रव ल को मन दकय ि वें दक िबतक
दवभ िन व ि क दनथत रण नही होत है, तबतक वे प्र थी/व िी को
िबररय प्रश्नगत व िीय भूदम उपरोि से कब्िे से बेिखल न करे तथ
िबररय दनम ाण न करे और मौके की यथ दथथत बन ये रखे।
धय य लय पर० उ०प्र० र िथव सांदहत 2006 की ध र
116 के अधतगात बांटव रे क व ि दवच र धीन है। धय यदहत में ग्र म
रूकन पुर दथथत भूदम क ग ट सां० 1086/0.020हे०,
1085/0.0056हे०, 1084/0.057हे० व ग ट सां०
1087/0.304हे० व ग ट सां०1079दम०/0.005 हे०,
1079दम०/0.005 हे० व 1079दम०/0.009 हे० ग ट सां०
1079 कुल क्षेत्रिल 0.019 हे० पर धय य लय में व ि
दवच र धीन रहते उभय पक्षों को दनिेदशत दकय ि त है दक मौके पर
यथ दथथत बन ये रखें। पत्र वली दिन ांक 01.09.2023 को पेश
हो।"

4. Being dissatisfied/aggrieved by
the order of status-quo dated 04.08.2023
passed by the S.D.M., the revision was
preferred and the revisional authority
namely, respondent No.1 after giving
opportunity of hearing to the parties
concerned, allowed the revision and
interfered in the order dated 04.08.2023
passed by S.D.M. The relevant portion of
the impugned order dated 24.08.2023 reads
as under:-

"मैंने दनगर नी की ग्र ह्यत के थतर पर उभयपक्षों द्व र
प्रथतुत तकों एवां दनगर नी पत्र वली पर उपलब्ध अदभलेखों क
गहनत पूवाक परीक्षण दकय । प्रश्नगत आिेश के अवलोकन से यह
थपष्ट है दक अवर धय य लय में उ०प्र० र िथव सांदहत की ध र -
116 के अांतगात ब मुकिम ररतेश कुम र बन म र हुल अग्रव ल के
व ि में ररतेश कुम र पुत्र मह वीर द्व र उ०प्र० र िथव सांदहत की
ध र 116 के अांतगात बांटव रे क व ि ि यर दकय गय थ , दिसमें
इनके द्व र थथगन प्र थान -पत्र भी दिय गय थ । व िी ररतेश कुम र ने
अपने थथगन प्र थान -पत्र में कह गय दक प्र थी आर िी नां० ख त
सां०
829
की
ग ट
सां0
1086/0.020
हे0,
1079दम0/0.005
हे0,
1085/0.0056हे0,
1084/0.0570 व ख त सां0 790 की ग ट सां0
1087/0.304हे० ख त सां0 788 की ग ट सां0
1079दम0/0.005 हे0 व ख त सां0 1189 की ग ट सां0
1079दम/0.009 हे० क सहसांक्रमणीय भूदमधर क श्तक र है
तथ ग ट सां0 1079 क कुल रकब 0.019 हे0 है, दिसमें
दवपक्षी नां० 1 र हुल अग्रव ल िो एक सरकस व िबरिथत दकथम के
व्यदि हैं। वे अपनी सरकसी के दबन पर प्रश्नगत व िग्रथत भूदम में
व िी के अांश की भूदम पर दबन दवदधक दवभ िन के िबररय कब्ि
करके प्र थी के कब्िे से बेिखल कर िेन च हते हैं तथ दनम ाण कर
लेन च हते हैं, दिसके दलए वे ईांट, ब लू, इत्य दि दनम ाण स मग्री
क इांति म कर रखे है। प्र थी के मन करने पर आम ि िौिि री
होते है। यदि वे अपने मकसि में क मय ब हो गये तो व िी की
3 All. Ritesh Agrawal Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors.
1945
अपूणानीय क्षदत होगी। हमेश के दलए कब्िे से बेिखल हो ि येग ,
दिसकी भरप ई भदवष्य में हो प न सम्भव न होग । अधत में कह
गय दक िौर न दवभ िन व ि दवपक्षी नां० 1 र हुल अग्रव ल को मन
दकय ि वे दक िबतक दवभ िन व ि क दनथत रण नहीं होत है
तबतक वे व िी को िबररय प्रश्नगत व िीय भूदम उपरोि से कब्िे से
बेिखपल न करे तथ िबररय दनम ाण न करें और मौके पर
यथ दथथदत बन ये रखें। इस पर अवर धय य लय ने प्रश्नगत आिेश
दिन ांक 04.08.2023 द्व र दवव दित भूदम पर उभयपक्षों को
यथ दथथदत बन ये रखने क आिेश प ररत करते हुए पत्र वली अदग्रम
दतदथ दनयत की गयी है, दिसके दवरूद्व दनगर नी आयुि धय य लय
में योदित की गयी है।
उभयपक्षों के तकों को सुनने एवां दनगर नी पत्र वली पर
उपलब्ध अदभलेखों के अवलोकनोपर धत यह थपष्ट होत है दक अवर
धय य लय ने प्रश्नगत आिेश प ररत करने से पूवा दनगर नीकत ा को
स क्ष्य एवां सुनव ई क समुदचत अवसर नहीं प्रि न दकय गय है,
दिस क रण प्रश्नगत आिेश प्र कृदतक धय य दसद्ध धत के दवपरीत होने
के क रण दनरथत होने योग्य है। अतः दनगर नीकत ा के तका में बल है
इसदलए दनगर नीकत ा द्व र प्रथतुत दनगर नी थवीक र दकये ि ने योग्य
है।
अतः उपरोि के पररप्रेक्ष्य में प्रथतुत दनगर नी थवीक र
करते हुए अवर धय य लय द्व र प ररत आिेश दिन ांक
04.08.2023 दनरथत दकय ि त है तथ पत्र वली अवर
धय य लय को इस दनिेश के स थ प्रदतप्रेदषत की ि ती है दक वह
प्रश्नगत व ि में उभयपक्षों को स क्ष्य सुनव ई क समुदचत अवसर
प्रि न करते हुए व ि क थपीदकांग आिेश द्व र अांदतम दनथत रण िो
म ह के भीतर सुदनदश्चत करें। उि आिेश की प्रदत सम्बदधधत
धय य लय को भेिी ि य। इस धय य लय की पत्र वली ि दखल िितर
हो।"

5. The main ground which has
been taken for interfering in the order dated
04.08.2023 is based upon the provisions
indicated in the Code of 2006 i.e. Section
207 and Section 209 of the Code of 2006.

6. Impeaching the impugned order
dated 24.08.2023 passed by respondent
No.1, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that in view of Section 207
particularly Sub-Section 2 (b) and (c), the
appeal was maintainable against the order
dated 04.08.2023 whereby the parties were
directed to maintain 'status-quo', and the
revision under Section 210 of the Code of
2006 was not maintainable and being so in
entertaining and allowing the revision, the
respondent
No.1
committed
material
illegality.

7. In continuation, he also stated
that an order directing the parties to
maintain 'status-quo' would fall under
Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and as
such in view of Section 207, which
indicates that an appeal shall lie against an
order of the nature specified under Order
43 Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said
Code namely Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (in short 'C.P.C.'), the appeal was
maintainable and not the revision. In this
regard, a reference has been made to the
Order 43 of C.P.C.

8. He further submitted that the
expression 'Stay' under Sub-Section 209(d)
is relevant. There is a difference between
expression 'Injunction' and 'Stay'. As per
settled principle of law, an 'Injunction'
order would relate to party or parties, as the
case may be, to the case/suit and 'Stay'
order
relates
to
the
Court/Authority
concerned. Accordingly, Section 209 would
not be available to the side opposite to say
that revision was maintainable.

9. Per contra, Shri D.R. Mishra,
based upon Section 209 (d) and 209 (h)
submitted that the interim order i.e. order
dated 04.08.2023 was an ex-parte order, as
such, in view of the Sub-Section (h) read
with Sub-Section (d) of Section 209, the
revision was maintainable. As such, no
interference in the matter is required.
Prayer is to dismissed the petition.

10. Considered the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties
and perused the record.
1946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
11. For the purposes of disposal of
the present petition, this Court finds it
appropriate to reproduce Section 207,
Section 209 as also Section 210 of the
Code of 2006.

12. Section 207 of the Code of
2006 reads as under:-

"First
appeal.-(1)
Any
party
aggrieved by a final order or decree passed
in any suit, application or proceeding
specified in Column 2 of the Third
Schedule, may prefer a first appeal to the
Court or officer specified against it in
Column 5, where such order or decree was
passed by a Court or officer specified
against it in Column 3 thereof.
(2) A first appeal shall also lie
against an order of the nature specified-
(a) in Section 47 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908; or
(b) in Section 104 of the said Code;
or
(c) in Order XLIII Rule 1 of the
First Schedule to the said Code.
(3) The period of limitation for
filing a first appeal under this section shall
be thirty days from the date of the order or
decree appealed against."

13. Section 209 of the Code of
2006 reads as under:-

"209. Bar against certain appeals.-
Notwithstanding anything contained in
sections 207 and 208, no appeal shall lie
against any order or decree-
(a) made under Chapter XI of this
Code;

(b)
granting
or
rejecting
an
application for condonation of delay under
section 5 of Limitation Act,
1963;
(c) rejecting an application for
revision;
(d)
granting
or
rejecting
an
application for stay;
(e) remanding the case to any
subordinate Court;
(f) where such order or decree is of
an interim nature;
(g) passed by Court or officer with
the consent of parties; or
(h) where has been passed ex-parte
or by default:
Provided that any party aggrieved
by order passed ex-parte or by default, may
move application for setting aside such
order within a period of thirty days from
the date of the order;
Provided further that no such order
shall be reversed or altered without
previously summoning the party in whose
favour order has been passed to appear
and be heard in support of it."

4. Section 210 of the Code of 2006
reads as under:-

"Power to call for the records.-(1)
The Board or the Commissioner may call
for the record of any suit or proceeding
decided by any sub-ordinate Revenue Court
in which no appeal lies, for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the legality
or propriety of any order passed in such
suit or proceeding, and if such subordinate
Court appears to have-
(a) exercised a jurisdiction not
vested in it by law: or
(b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction
so vested: or
(c) acted in the exercise of such
jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity:
the
Board,
or
the
Commissioner, as the case may be, may
pass such order in the case as it or he
thinks fit.
3 All. Ritesh Agrawal Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors.
1947
(2) If an application under this
section has been moved by any person
either to the Board or to the Commissioner,
no further application by the same person
shall be entertained by the other of them.
Explanation- For the removal of
doubt it is, hereby, declared that when an
application under this section has been
moved either to the Board or to the
Commissioner, the application shall not be
permitted to be withdrawn for the purpose
of filing the application against the same
order to the other of them.]
(3) No application under this
section shall be entertained after the expiry
of a period of [sixty days] from the date of
the order sought to be revised or from the
date of commencement of this Code,
whichever is later."

15. A perusal of the Section 207 of
the Code of 2006 indicates that an appeal
would lie against an order of the nature
specified in Section 104 and also against an
order of the nature specified in Order 43
Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the C.P.C.
and these provisions are relevant for
coming to the conclusion on the issues
involved and as such, the same are being
extracted hereinunder:-

"Section104. Orders from which
appeal lies-
(1) An appeal shall lie from the
following orders, and save as otherwise
expressly provided in the body of this Code
or by any law for the time being in force,
from no other orders:---
1 * * * * * 2
[(ff) an order under section 35A;
3[(ffa) an order under section 91 or
section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit
of the nature referred to in section 91 or
section 92, as the case may be;
(g) an order under section 95
(h) an order under any of the
provisions of this Code imposing a fine or
directing the arrest or detention in the civil
prison of any person except where such
arrest or detention is in execution of a
decree
(i) any order made under rules
from which an appeal is expressly allowed
by rules
2[Provided that no appeal shall lie
against any order specified in clause (ff)
save on the ground that no order, or an
order for the payment of a less amount,
ought to have been made.
(2) No appeal shall lie from any
order passed in appeal under this section."

"FIRST SCHEDULE
ORDER XLIII
Appeals From Order
1. Appeal from orders-An appeal
shall lie from the following orders under
the provisions
of Section 104, namely :--
(a) an order under Rule 10 of
Order VII returning a plaint to be presented
to the proper Court [except where the
procedure specified in Rule 10-A of Order
VII has been followed] ;
(b) [***]
(c) an order under Rule 9 of Order
IX rejecting an application (in a case open
to appeal) for an order to set aside the
dismissal of a suit ;

(d) an order under Rule 13 of
Order IX rejecting an application (in a case
open to appeal) for an order to set aside a
decree passed ex parte ;
(e) [***]

(f) an order under Rule 21 of Order
XI ;
(g) [***]
(h) [***]
1948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(i) an order under Rule 34 of Order
XXI on an objection to the draft of a
document or of an endorsement;
(j) an order under Rule 72 or Rule
92 of Order XXI setting aside or refusing to
set aside a
sale ;
[(ja)
an
order
rejecting
an
application made under sub- rule (1) of
Rule 106 of Order XXI, provided that an
order on the original application, that is to
say, the application referred to in sub-rule
(1) of Rule 105 of that Order is
appealable;]
(k) an order under Rule 9 of Order
XXII refusing to set aside the abatement or
dismissal of a suit ;
(l) an order under Rule 10 of Order
XXII giving or refusing to give leave ;
(m) [***]
(n) an order under Rule 2 of Order
XXV rejecting an application (in a case
open to appeal) for an order to set aside the
dismissal of a suit ;
[(na) an order under Rule 5 or Rule
7 of Order XXXIII rejecting an application
for permission to sue as an indigent person
;]
(o) [***]
(p) orders in interpleader-suits
under Rule 3, Rule 4 or Rule 6 of Order
XXXV;
(q) an order under Rule 2, Rule 3
or Rule 6 of Order XXXVIII ;
(r) an order under Rule 1, Rule 2,
[Rule 2-A], Rule 4 or Rule 10 of Order
XXXIX;
(s) an order under Rule 1 or Rule 4
of Order XL
(t) an order of refusal under Rule
19 of Order XLI to readmit, or under Rule
21 of Order XLI to rehear, an appeal;
(u) an order under Rule 23 [or Rule
23-A] of Order XLI remanding a case,
where an appeal would lie from the decree
of the Appellate Court ;
(v) [***]
(w) an order under Rule 4 of Order
XLVII granting an application for review."

16. The power to grant interim
order or temporary injunction is provided
under Order 39 of C.P.C. Under this Order,
the
Court
can
grant
the
interim
order/injunction and the Court can also
grant an ex-parte interim order/temporary
injunction and an order for injunction can
be discharged, varied or set aside by the
Court. Refereable Rules are Rule 1, Rule 2,
Rule 3 and Rule 4 of Order 39 of C.P.C.
The Court under this Order can also punish
for disobedience/breach of injunction as
appears from Rule 2A.

17. A conjoint reading of Order 43
Rule 1(r) and referred Rules of Order 39 of
C.P.C., indicates that the order passed
under Rule 1, Rule 2, Rule 3 and Rule 4 of
Order 39 of C.P.C. is appellable.

18. An appeal against an order
granting or rejecting an application for stay
would therefore be barred notwithstanding
anything contained under Sections 207 and
208. It is for the reason that Section 209
provides that certain orders or decrees are
not appealable, and clause (d) thereof refers
to an order granting or rejecting an
application for a stay.

19. Thus, the question now for
consideration is as to whether an order
granting or refusing to grant a temporary
injunction can be held to be an order
granting or rejecting an application for stay
so as to attract the bar under Section 209
and to hold such order to be nonappealable.
3 All. Ritesh Agrawal Vs. Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal, Gonda & Ors.
1949
20. The question with regard to the
effect of a stay order and its distinction
from an order of injunction fell for
consideration in the case of Mulraj vs.
Murti Raghonathji Maharaj; AIR 1967
SC 1386, wherein, it was held that an order
of 'Injunction' is generally issued to a party
by which it is forbidden from doing certain
acts whereas a 'Stay' order is addressed to a
court which prohibits it from proceeding
further. The distinction between a 'Stay'
order and an order of 'Injunction' was
drawn by observing as follows:-

"8...In effect therefore a stay order
is more or less in the same position as an
order of injunction with one difference. An
order of injunction is generally issued to a
party and it is forbidden from doing certain
acts. It is well settled that in such a case the
party
must
have
knowledge
of
the
injunction order before it could be
penalised for disobeying it. Further it is
equally well settled that the injunction
order not being addressed to the court, if
the court proceeds in contravention of the
injunction order, the proceedings are not a
nullity. In the case of a stay order, as it is
addressed to the court and prohibits it from
proceeding further, as soon as the court has
knowledge of the order it is bound to obey
it and if it does not, it acts illegally, and all
proceedings taken after the knowledge of
the order would be a nullity. That in our
opinion is the only difference between an
order of injunction to a party and an order
of stay to a court. In both cases knowledge
of the party concerned or of the court is
necessary before the prohibition takes
effect. Take the case where a stay order has
been passed but it is never brought to the
notice of the court, and the court carries on
proceedings ignorance thereof. It can
hardly be said that the court has lost
jurisdiction because of some order of which
has no knowledge......
9. It is argued that this view would
introduce
uncertainty
inasmuch
as
proceedings may go on and it may take
sometime - whether long or short - for
the stay order to reach the court. There is
in our opinion no question of uncertainty,
even if we hold that the stay order must
come to the knowledge of the court to
which it is addressed before it takes effect.
The court may receive knowledge either on
receipt of an order of stay from the Court
that passed it or through one party or the
other supported by an affidavit or in any
other way. There is in our opinion no
uncertainty by reason of the fact that the
court to which the stay order is addressed
must have knowledge of it before it takes
effect for it can always be proved that the
court to which the stay order was
addressed had knowledge of it and that is
not a matter which should really create any
difficulty or uncertainty. Once it is clear
that a stay order is in the nature of a
prohibitory order, knowledge of it by the
court which is prohibited is essential before
the court is deprived of the power to carry
on the proceedings. As was pointed out
in Bassesswari Chowdhurany case [(189697) 1 CWN 226] "the appellate court has
nothing to do with the execution of the
decree; the execution proceeds under the
direction of the court which made the
decree and it has full authority to execute
it. An order of stay does not undo anything
which has been done; its utmost affect is to
stop further action in the direction of
execution, but it would only have that effect
when it reached the court or person whose
duty it was to obey it".
10. As we have already indicated,
an order of stay is as much a prohibitory
order as an injunction order and unless the
court to which it is addressed has
1950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
knowledge of it, it cannot deprive that court
of the jurisdiction to proceed with the
execution before it. But there is one
difference between an order of injunction
and an order of stay arising out of the fact
that an injunction order is usually passed
against a party while a stay order is
addressed to the court. As the stay order is
addressed to the court as soon as the court
has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand; if
it does not do so, it acts illegally. Therefore,
in the case of a stay order as opposed to an
order of injunction, as soon as the court
has knowledge of it, it must stay its hand
and further proceedings are illegal; but so
long as the court has no knowledge of the
stay order it does not lose the jurisdiction
to deal with the execution which it has
under the Code of Civil Procedure."
(emphasis supplied)

21. The difference between an order
of 'Injunction' and an order of 'Stay' can
also be taken note of from the decision of
United States' Supreme Court in Jean
Marc Nken, petitioner Vs. Eric H.
Holder, Jr., Attorney General; 556 U.S.
418 (2009), wherein, after considering the
judgment passed in the case of Weinberger
vs. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982);
it was held that a 'Stay' and an 'Injunction'
were not synonymous since an 'Injunction'
refers to an order requiring a person to act
or refrain from acting and a 'Stay' is a
temporary suspension of legal proceedings.
It was observed as follows:-

"An injunction and a stay have
typically been understood to serve different
purposes. The former is a means by which
a court tells someone what to do or not to
do.
When
a
court
employs
"the
extraordinary
remedy
of
injunction,"
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, it directs
the conduct of a party, and does so with the
backing of its full coercive powers."

22. Thus, an order of 'Injunction'
and an order of 'Stay' are different. An
'Injunction' order is usually passed against a
party and operates in personam while a
'Stay' order is addressed to the Court and as
such 'Stay' order operates upon the judicial
proceedings.

23. In Chamundi Mopeds Ltd.
vs. Church of South India Trust;
MANU/SC/0501/1992: JT 1992 (3) SC
98, the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained
the effect of the interim order in the
following words:-

"While considering the effect of an
interim order staying the operation of the
order under challenge, a distinction has to
be made between quashing of an order and
stay of operation of an order. Quashing of
an order results in the restoration of the
position as it stood on the date of the
passing of the order which has been
quashed. The stay or operation of an order
does not, however, lead to such a result. It
only means that the order which has been
stayed would not be operative from the date
of passing of the stay order and it does not
mean that the said order has been wiped
out from the existence."

24. In the instant case, in the
application seeking interim relief filed in a
suit for division of holdings instituted
under Section 116 of the Code of 2006, the
petitioner herein sought the following
prayer:-

"vr% fuosnu gS fd nkSjku foHkktu okn
foi{kh ua0&1 jkgqy vxzoky dks euk fd;k tkos fd
tc rd foHkktu okn dk fuLrkj.k ugha gksrk gS rc
3 All. Ajmat Ullah Ansari & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1951
rd os izkFkhZ@oknh dks tcfj;k iz'uxr
oknh; Hkwfe mijksDr ls dCts ls csn[ky u djsa] rFkk
tcfj;k fuekZ.k u djsa vkSj ekSds dh ;FkkfLFkr cuk;s
j[ksA ftlls izkFkZh dks mfpr U;k; fey lds] d`ik
gksxhA"
25. The effect of the prayer, quoted
above, sought in the application seeking
interim relief is to maintaining status-quo
till the disposal of the suit filed under
Section 116 of the Code of 2006.

26. As per the averments made in
the
application
the
defendant/Rahul
Agarwal in the suit was adamant to forcibly
dispossess the petitioner from the property
in question and to raise construction over
the same, and in view thereof an order
directing status-quo was required.

27. The prayer sought in the
application seeking interim relief, quoted
above, also indicates that the same is not
for grant of a stay order to any court or
authority. The order dated 04.08.2023
passed on the application seeking interim
relief preferred by the petitioner indicates
that the parties to the proceedings were
directed to maintain status-quo. The
operative portion of the order dated
04.08.2023 reads as under:-

"न्यायालय पर० उ०प्र० राजस्व सांवहिा 2006 की
िारा 116 के अन्िगाि बांटवारे का वाि ववचारािीन है। न्यायवहि में
ग्राम रूकनापुर वस्थि भूवम की गाटा सां० 1086/0.020हे०,
1085/0.0056 हे०, 1084/0.057हे0 व गाटा सां0
1087/0.304 हे0 व गाटा सां० 1079 वम0 / 0.005हे0,
1079वम० / 0.005 हे0 व 1079वम0 / 0.009हे० गाटा
सांख्या 1079 कुल क्षेत्रफल 0.019हे0 पर न्यायालय में वाि
ववचारािीन रहिे उभय पक्षों को वनिेवर्शि वकया जािा है वक मौके पर
यथावस्थि बनाये रखें। पत्रावली विनाांक 01.09.2023 को पेर्श
हो।"

27. It would be apt to indicate that
a prayer to direct the parties to maintain
status-quo during the pendency of the suit
is an injunctive relief.

28. In the instant case, the interim
order
directing
the
parties
to
the
proceedings to maintain status-quo was
passed ex-parte on 04.08.2023 and, as such,
the order dated 04.08.2023 would fall
under Rule(s) 1 & 2 of Order 39 of C.P.C.
Thus, to the view of this Court, the appeal
under Section 207 of the Code of 2006
would
lie
against
the
order
dated
04.08.2023 and being so challenging the
order dated 04.08.2023 the revision filed
under Section 210 of the Code of 2006 was
not maintainable.

29. Accordingly, for the reasons
aforesaid, the impugned order dated
24.08.2023 passed in Revision No. 1201 of
2023,
Computerized
Case
No.C202308000001201 (Rahul Agarwal
vs. Ritesh Agarwal) by the respondent
No.1-Commissioner, Devi Patan Mandal,
Gonda, is hereby set aside.

30. The petition is allowed. No
order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 1951
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 06.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.
THE HON'BLE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA,J.

Writ-C No. 11080 of 2023

Ajmat Ullah Ansari & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Petitioners: