# Rohit Agarwal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 967
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-17
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 11844 of 2025
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/rohit-agarwal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52948
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

12 All. Rohit Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
967
(2025) 12 ILRA 967
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ - C No. 11844 of 2025

Rohit Agarwal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
(i)
Whether
an
application
for
execution/implementation of a judgment and
decree passed under Section 229-B of the U. P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
is maintainable at the instance of the legal heir
of the original plaintiff under Section 146 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and
(ii) Whether revisional authority committed
illegality in rejecting application on the ground
that the order was administrative and revision
not maintainable.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India - Art. 226 - U. P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950
- S. 229-B - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - S.
146
-
Application
for
implementation
of
judgment and order dated 29.01.1979 passed in
proceedings under Section 229-B - Application
moved by the legal heir of the original plaintiff -
Objection that the petitioner was not a party to
the original proceedings and therefore had no
locus standi - Distinction between applicability
of Order XXII Rule 10 CPC to pending
proceedings
and
Section
146
CPC
after
conclusion of proceedings - Rejection of
application on the ground that the order was
administrative and revision not maintainable -
Correctness of orders rejecting the application
and refusing to exercise jurisdiction.
HELD:
The provisions of Order XXII Rule 10 CPC
would apply in a situation where the
proceedings are pending and necessary
substitution can take place during those
proceedings, but once the proceedings
stand concluded, it is only in exercise of
powers under Section 146 CPC that
appropriate action subsequent to the
judgment and order can be passed at the
behest of the person so claiming under the
plaintiff/respondent. The provisions of
Section 146 CPC have to be given an
expansive interpretation to protect the
interest of persons who are claiming
under
the
original
plaintiff
or
the
respondent. In exercise of powers under
Section 146 CPC, the application for
execution was maintainable at the behest
of the petitioner, who claimed himself to
be the sole legal heir of the original
plaintiff. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate
incorrectly
appreciated
the
law
and
rejected the application of the petitioner.
The revisional order, not interfering with
the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
was also illegal and arbitrary and was set
aside. [Paras 13, 15, 17] (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
Saila Bala Dassi v. Nirmala Sundari Dassi, 1958
SCC OnLine SC 140;
Varadarajan v. Kanakawalli & Ors., Civil Appeal
No. 5673 of 2009;

List of Acts
Constitution of India;
U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950;
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keyword
Section 146 CPC; Legal heir; Execution of
decree; Claiming under plaintiff; Declaratory
decree; Section 229-B Z.A. & L.R. Act; Locus
standi;
Beneficent
provision;
Liberal
interpretation.

CASE ARISING FROM
Challenge to the order dated 12.03.2024
passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Nawabganj,
Barabanki,
rejecting
the
application
for
implementation
of
judgment dated 29.01.1979 passed under
Section 229-B of the U. P. Z.A. & L.R. Act,
and
the
consequential
order
dated
30.09.2025 passed by the Additional
968 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Commissioner (Judicial), Ayodhya Mandal,
affirming the same.

Appearances for Parties
Advs
For
Petitioner:
Ajay
Pratap
Singh,
Mohammad Ehtesham Khan
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C., Mohan Singh,
Rohit Agarwal

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ajay Pratap Singh ands
Sri M.E. Khan, learned counsel for
petitioner as well as learned Standing
Counsel on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to
5 and Sri Mohan Singh, learned counsel for
respondent Nos. 6 & 7.

2. It has been submitted by learned
counsel for petitioner that a suit U/S 229B
of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act was filed by
Subhash Chandra Agarwal, the late father
of the petitioner with regard to Gata No.
2630 area 10-4-0 situated at Village Badel,
Paragana and Tehsil - Nawabganj, District
Barabanki on 03.08.1977 and the said suit
was allowed in favour of father of the
petitioner by means of judgment and order
dated 29.1.1979 by the Pargana Adhikari,
Nawabganj,
now
the
Sub-Divisional
Officer, Nawabganj, Barabanki, it was
directed that the name of Subash Chandra
be recorded with regard to Gata No. 2630
in Village Badel, Paragana and Tehsil -
Nawabganj, District Barabanki. Subsequent
to the said judgment and order, the father of
the petitioner was continued to be in
occupation of the said land subsequent to
which the petitioner claims to be in
possession.

3. It has been submitted that the
order dated 29.01.1979 could not be executed
and therefore the name of the father of the
petitioner could not be recorded in the
revenue records. It has further been stated
that subsequently one stranger to the
proceedings, namely, Govind Prasad had
moved an application for restoration of the
order dated 29.01.1979 which was rejected
on 02.11.2012 by the Sub-Divisional Officer.
It has been submitted that Subhash Chandra
died on 22.10.2018 leaving behind the
petitioner as the sole legal heir.

4. It is the case of the petitioner that
it is after the death of his father that he came
to know about the order dated 29.01.1979
and then he moved an application for
mutation of the aforesaid property and also
approached this Court by filing a writ petition
being Writ C No. 5009/2022 seeking a
direction to the revenue authorities to
implement the order dated 29.01.1979. This
Court by means of order dated 08.08.2022
disposed of the same by passing following
directions:

 "This petition has been filed with a
prayer to issue direction to the SubDivisional
Officer
and
Tehsildar
to
implement the judgment and decree said to
have been passed on 29.01.1979 by the SubDivisional Officer in a case under Section
229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act (Subhash Chandra
Agarwal Vs. Gaon Sabha Barail).

 If a declaratory decree has been
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer its
execution can also be sought before the
court
which
has
passed
the
order.
Accordingly, without entering into the
claim of the petitioners this petition is
finally disposed of with liberty to the
petitioners to approach the Court which
has passed the judgment and decree dated
29.01.1979 in a suit said to have been
instituted under Section 229-B of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act.
12 All. Rohit Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
969
 In case any such application
seeking execution of the said decree is
moved by the petitioners before the SubDivisional Officer, the same shall be
considered and decided with expedition.

 However, we make it amply clear
and direct as well that the Sub-Divisional
Officer while considering the application
which may be moved by the petitioners
under this order shall appropriately issue
notices to the Bhumi Prabandhak Samiti of
the Gram Panchayat concerned and shall
also verify the authenticity of the judgment
and decree dated 29.01.1979 passed by the
Sub-Divisional Officer on the basis of
which this petition has been filed.

 The Sub-Divisional Officer shall
also take into account as to whether after
lapse of a period of about 43 years from the
date the said decree was passed, any
Amaldaramad can be made on the basis of
such decree."

5. It has been submitted that it is in
the
compliance
of
the
order
dated
08.08.2022 passed by this Court that the
Sub-Divisional Officer had called a report
from the revenue authorities and also from
the
District
Government
Counsell
(Revenue). The Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Nawabganj,
Barabanki
rejected
the
application after noticing that original suit
proceedings were instituted by the Subhash
Chandra, and the father of the petitioner
and petitioner was not a party not the said
proceedings and accordingly no application
for
execution
/
implementation
was
maintainable at the behest of the petitioner
and consequently rejected his application
by means of order dated 12.03.2024.

6. Aggrieved by the order dated
12.03.2024 the petitioner had preferred a
revision
before
the
Additional
Commissioner (Judicial), Ayodhya Mandal,
Ayodhya who dismissed the revision as
being not maintainable holding that the
order
passed
by
the
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate was an administrative order
against
which
a
revision
was
not
maintainable and therefore in the aforesaid
circumstances by means of present writ
petition the petitioner has challenged the
order dated 12.03.2024 as well as order
dated 30.09.2025.

7.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner at the very outset submits that the
proceedings for implementation of the final
judgment passed in exercise of powers U/S
229B of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act can be
implemented by the legal heirs or any
person claiming his right from the original
plaintiff / decree holder. He submits that
the
petitioner
being
the
sole
legal
representative of Subhash Chandra was
fully entitled to move an application for
implementation
of
the
order
dated
29.01.1979
and
therefore
both
the
authorities below have committed manifest
error in not exercising the jurisdiction
vested therein in most illegal and arbitrary
manner. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for petitioner has relied
upon the provisions of Section 146 of the
Civil Procedure Code.

8. He has submitted that Section
146 is an expansive provision which has
been made only to facilitate the legal
representatives of the plaintiff/respondents
from initiating proceedings which could
have been initiated by the predecessor in
interest. He submits that Section 146
provides a robust mechanism for the
transferee to safeguard the interest in
ongoing legal proceedings ensuring that
property transaction and transfers do not
970 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
leave new party vulnerable to unforeseen
legal actions. Accordingly, he submits that
provisions of order 22 Rule 10 CPC would
apply in a situation where the proceedings
are pending and necessary substitution can
take place during those proceedings but
once the proceedings stands concluded then
it is only in exercise of powers U/S 146
appropriate action subsequent to the
judgment and order can be passed at the
behest of the person so claiming under the
plaintiff/respondent.

9. Learned Standing Counsel on
the other hand has opposed the writ petition
but does not dispute the aforesaid legal
provisions. He has also submitted that the
Division Bench while considering the
application of the petitioner in Writ C No.
5009/2022 had directed the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate to take into account the delay of
43 years in filing the application and also to
consider the antecedents of the petitioner
before deciding his application and submits
that in any view of the matter in case the
matter is remanded the Sub-Divisional
Magistrate would have to consider the
directions of this Court passed in Writ C
No. 5009/2022.

10. I have heard rival contention of
the parties and perused the record.

11. There is no dispute with regard
to the fact that Subhas Chand had instituted
regular proceedings U/S 229B of U.P. Z.A.
& L.R. Act in which proceedings it was
directed that in Khata No. 1050, Gata No.
2630, the name of the gaon sabha be
deleted and the name of Subhas Chand be
entered in its place in the revenue records.
Due to certain circumstances, the order
dated 29.01.1979 could not be implemented
and necessary correction in the entries in
the revenue records could not be made
during the lifetime of the plaintiff/Subhash
Chandra and it is due to this reason that
after his death the petitioner had moved an
application for implementation of the
judgment and order dated 29.01.1979.

12. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Nawabganj, Barabanki duly considered the
judgment of this Court dated 08.08.2022
and was of the considered view that the
petitioner does not have any locus standi to
move the application for implementation of
the order dated 29.01.1979 inasmuch as he
was not a party to the said proceedings and
being an stranger to the said proceedings
could not move any application in this
regard.
The
revisional
authority
has
considered the said proceedings to be mere
administrative proceedings and rejected the
revision.

13. The ground on which the
revision has been rejected by the revisional
authority is that the order dated 12.03.2024
is an administrative order and no revision
would be maintainable against such an
order.

14. It is noticed that Section 146
provides for initiation of proceedings by or
against the representatives where such
proceedings could have been taken by or
against any person claiming under him.

15. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
the case of Saila Bala Dassi Vs. Nirmala
Sundari Dassi, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 140
has interpreted the provisions of Section
146 CPC and held that it has to be given an
expansive interpretation to protect interest
of persons who are claiming under the
original plaintiff or the respondent. Merely
because the plaintiff or the respondent has
died or lost interest in the disputed property
would not render any person claiming
12 All. Rohit Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
971
under them or acquiring subsequent interest
in the property to be remediless with regard
to adjudication which had already taken
place between the parties pertaining to the
lis for which an application has been
claimed subsequently. The relevant portion
of the above mentioned case law is quoted
hereinbelow:-

 "8. It is next contended that
Section 146 authorises only the initiation
of any proceeding, and that though it
would have been competent to the
appellant to have preferred an appeal
against the judgment of P.B. Mukharji, J.,
she not having done so was not entitled to
be brought on record as an appellant to
continue the appeal preferred by the
second respondent. We are not disposed
to construe Section 146 narrowly in the
manner contended for by counsel for the
first
respondent.
That
section
was
introduced for the first time in the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 with the object of
facilitating the exercise of rights by
persons in whom they come to be vested
by devolution or assignment, and being a
beneficent provision should be construed
liberally and so as to advance justice and
not in a restricted or technical sense. It
has been held by a Full Bench of the
Madras High Court in Muthiah Chettiar
v. Govinddoss Krishnadoss [(1921) ILR
44 Mad 919] that the assignee of a part
of a decree is entitled to continue an
execution
application
filed
by
the
transferor-decree-holder.
Vide
also
Moidin Rutty v. Doraiswami [ILR 1952
Mad 622] . The right to file an appeal
must therefore be held to carry with it the
right to continue an appeal which had
been filed by the person under whom the
applicant claims, and the petition of the
appellant to be brought on record as an
appellant in Appeal No. 152 of 1955 must
be held to be maintainable under Section
146."

16. It is in this regard, it has been
observed that Section 146 provides a
robust mechanism for the transferee to
safeguard the interest in ongoing legal
proceedings
ensuring
that
property
transaction and transfers do not leave new
party vulnerable to unforeseen legal
action subsequently the said provision
came to be considered by another bench
of Hon'ble High Court in the case of
Varadarajan Vs. Kanakawalli & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5673 of 2009),
relevant portion quoted as under:-

 "8. We may state that Order 22 of
the Code is applicable to the pending
proceedings in a suit. But the conflicting
claims of legal representatives can be
decided in execution proceedings in view of
the principles of Rule 5 of Order 22. This
Court in a judgment in V. Uthirapathi v.
Ashrab Ali [V. Uthirapathi v. Ashrab Ali,
(1998) 3 SCC 148] held that the normal
principle arising in a suit?before the
decree
is
passed?that
the
legal
representatives are to be brought on record
within a particular period is not applicable
to cases of death of the decree-holder or
the
judgment-debtor
in
execution
proceedings. This Court held as under:
(SCC p. 153, paras 11-14) ?11. Order 22
Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure
reads as follows: ?12. Application of order
to proceedings.?Nothing in Rules 3, 4 and
8 shall apply to proceedings in execution of
a decree or order.? 12. In other words, the
normal principle arising in a suit ? before
the decree is passed ? that the legal
representatives are to be brought on record
within a particular period and if not, the
suit could abate, ? is not applicable to
cases of death of the decree-holder or the
972 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
judgment-debtor in execution proceedings.
13.
In
Venkatachalam
Chetti
v.
Ramaswamy Servai [Venkatachalam Chetti
v. Ramaswamy Servai, 1931 SCC OnLine
Mad 149 : ILR (1932) 55 Mad 352 : AIR
1932 Mad 73] a Full Bench of the Madras
High Court has held that this rule enacts
that the penalty of abatement shall not
attach to execution proceedings. Mulla's
Commentary on CPC [(Vol. 3) p. 2085
(15th Edn., 1997)] refers to a large number
of judgments of the High Courts and says:
?Rule 12 engrafts an exemption which
provides that where a party to an execution
proceeding dies during its pendency,
provisions as to abatement do not apply.
The Rule is, therefore, for the benefit of the
decree-holder, for his heirs need not take
steps for substitution under Rule 2 but may
apply immediately or at any time while the
proceeding is pending, to carry on the
proceeding or they may file a fresh
execution application.? 14. In our opinion,
the above statement of law in Mulla's
Commentary on CPC, correctly represents
the legal position relating to the procedure
to be adopted by the parties in execution
proceedings and as to the powers of the
civil court.? 13. In another judgment in
Suresh Kumar Bansal v. Krishna Bansal
[Suresh Kumar Bansal v. Krishna Bansal,
(2010) 2 SCC 162 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 365]
, this Court held as under: (SCC p. 167, para
20) ?20. It is now well settled that
determination of the question as to who is the
legal representative of the deceased plaintiff
or defendant under Order 22 Rule 5 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is only for the
purpose of bringing legal representatives on
record for the conducting of those legal
proceedings only and does not operate as res
judicata and the inter se dispute between the
rival legal representatives has to be
independently tried and decided in probate
proceedings. If this is allowed to be carried
on for a decision of an eviction suit or other
allied suits, the suits would be delayed, by
which only the tenants will be benefited.? 14.
In view of the aforesaid judgments, we find
that the appellant is the sole claimant to the
estate of the deceased on the basis of will.
The executing court has found that the
appellant is the legal representative of the
deceased competent to execute the decree. In
view of the said fact, the appellant as the
legal representative is entitled to execute the
decree and to take it to its logical end."

17.
It
is
in
the
aforesaid
circumstances, this Court finds that in
exercise of powers U/S 146 CPC the
application for execution was certainly
maintainable at the behest of the petitioner
who claimed himself to be the sole legal
heir of Subhash Chandra who was the
original plaintiff in Suit No. 107/29/30
Accordingly, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
has incorrectly appreciated the law and
rejected the application of the petitioner
and for this reason the order dated
12.03.2024 is set aside. The order dated
30.09.2025 not interfering with the order of
Sub-Divisional Magistrate is also illegal
and arbitrary and is also set aside. The
matter
is
remitted
to
Sub-Divisional
Magistrate to consider the application of
the petitioner afresh and would consider
that an application at the behest of the legal
heir of the plaintiff would be maintainable
to
implement
the
order
passed
in
proceedings U/S 229B of U.P. Z.A. & L.R.
Act. While proceeding with the matter, the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate shall follow the
directions issued by this Court in its
judgment and order dated 08.08.2022 in
Writ C No. 5009/2022.

18. In light of the above, the writ
petition stands allowed.
----------
12 All. M/S Kci Ltd. Formerly M/S Khemba Containers Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
973
(2025) 12 ILRA 973
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. SWARUPAMA
CHATURVEDI, J.

Writ - C No. 22383 of 2025

M/S
Kci
Ltd.
Formely
M/S
Khemba
Containers ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P.& Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
(i) Whether the respondent Authority could
retrospectively enhance the lease rent, in
absence of execution of a supplementary lease
deed, as expressly contemplated under the
lease deed, and justify such enhancement by
relying upon subsequent Board Resolutions,
including the 135th Board Resolution dated
15.06.2024, which was admittedly prospective in
nature;
(ii) Whether the petitioner, having commenced
production within the stipulated period and
remained a continuously functional industrial
unit, was entitled to early production incentive
rebate and waiver of penal/compound interest
in terms of the applicable scheme and office
order dated 05.12.2013; and
(iii)
Whether
the
revisional
order
dated
27.07.2023 passed by the State Government
under Section 41(3) of the U.P. Urban Planning
and Development Act, 1973, having attained
finality, was binding upon the respondent
Authority and required to be implemented in its
letter and spirit, and whether the impugned
order and consequential demands constituted
an impermissible attempt to circumvent or
nullify the said revisional order.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India - Art. 226 - U.P. Urban
Planning and Development Act, 1973 - S. 41(3)
- U.P. Industrial Development Act, 1976 - Lease
deed dated 26.02.2002 - Enhancement of lease
rent - Condition of execution of supplementary
lease
deed
-
Retrospective
enhancement
without supplementary deed - Validity -
Subsequent Board Resolutions - Prospective
operation - Whether can override concluded
contract - Early production incentive rebate -
Waiver of penal/compound interest - Office
order
dated
05.12.2013
-
Inordinate
administrative delay - Legitimate expectation -
Promissory estoppel - Binding nature of
revisional order - Administrative discipline -
Colourable exercise of power - Attempt to
nullify
revisional
order
-
Correctness
of
impugned demand orders and consequential
notices.
HELD:
Writ petition was filed challenging the order
dated
12.12.2024
raising
a
demand
of
₹5,28,85,639/- by retrospectively enhancing the
lease rent and levying penal/compound interest,
and rejecting the petitioner's claim for early
production incentive and waiver of interest.
Clause I of the lease deed, contemplates
enhancement of lease rent after every ten
years,
conditioned
upon
execution
of
a
supplementary lease deed. Admittedly, no such
supplementary lease deed was ever executed
between the parties. In the absence of
fulfilment of the contractual pre-condition,
unilateral enhancement of lease rent by the
respondent Authority, that too with retrospective
effect, was contrary to the express terms of the
lease and could not be sustained in law.
Contention of the Authority that execution of a
supplementary lease deed was merely a
consequential or ministerial act was not
accepted, as contractual stipulations governing
financial liabilities are required to be strictly
construed
and
scrupulously
adhered
to,
particularly by a statutory authority. Reliance
placed
by
the
respondent
Authority
on
subsequent Board Resolutions, including the
135th Board Resolution dated 15.06.2024, to
justify such enhancement was held to be
unacceptable,
the
said
resolution
being
prospective in nature. A Board Resolution,
howsoever authoritative, could not override or
rewrite the terms of a concluded contract, nor
could it be employed to retrospectively impose
financial burdens upon an allottee.
It was further held that the petitioner had
commenced
production
within
the
time
prescribed under the lease deed and had
remained
continuously
operational.
The