# Roshan Lal v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2022) 11 ILRA 471
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-10-20
- **Case number:** Appl. U/s 482 No. 8379 of 2017
- **Bench:** Shree Prakash Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/roshan-lal-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-parties-47840
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 323, 504 & 506 - The Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482
-
Inherent
power
-
Section
200
-
Examination of complainant , Section 202
- Postponement of issue of process ,
Section 204 - Issue of process , The
Limitation
Act
1963
-
Section
5
-
condonation of delay , provision 131 of the
Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 - period
of ninety days is the limitation for filing of
any revision under the Criminal Procedure
Code wherein the decree or order or
sentence is sought to be revised - if a
statute provides a specific mode or action
472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of law, the same has to be followed in the
manner prescribed.(Para - 20,21)

An application under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. -
applicant summoned - aggrieved - criminal
revision - revision time barred - instituted about
delay of nine months - revisional court
entertained - allowed revision - without
condoning delay - remanded matter back for
fresh adjudication by Magistrate concerned -
hence application . (Para -6 )

HELD:-No deeming provision for condonation of
delay and delay could be condoned only when it
is pleaded and prayed by the person concerned
or the court taking cognizance of the relevant
provision of Limitation Act 1963, decides the
issue. Order passed by revisional court is
erroneous, unlawful and against the settled
proposition of law.Order set aside. Matter
remitted back to revisional court. (Para -
21,25)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

11 All. Roshan Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
471
trial. The court may issue suitable
directions to balance the interests of both
sides." (emphasis supplied)

15. Therefore, in view of law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.
Gopalkrishnan's case (supra), it is clear that
a C.D. is also an electronic document.
Therefore, a copy of the same ought to be
supplied to the accused under Section 207
Cr.P.C. The supply of any such electronic
document could be denied only in the
exceptional case specified in para-50 of P.
Gopalkrishnan's case (supra) itself.

16. It appears that the learned trial court
has denied the applicant the copy of C.D. on
the ground that the process of cloning may
lead to deletion of data or may also lead to
tempering
with
the
same
which
is
hypothetical
and
without
any
basis.
Therefore, the same cannot be sustained
particularly keeping in view the fact that the
object behind incorporation of Section 207
Cr.P.C. is to enable the accused to defend
himself properly which is achieved by
supplying of vital documents only

17. In Sadhvi Ritumbhara v. State of
M.P., 1996 SCC OnLine MP 261, High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, while deciding a
criminal revision has held that a copy of
alleged audio/video cassettes containing
alleged objectionable speech is necessary to
be given to accused.

18. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
the impugned order dated 09.09.2022 passed
by the learned Additional District & Sessions
Judge/ Special Judge (POCSO Act), Court
No.11, Lakhimpur Kheri, insofar as it
declines the supply of copy of CD to the
applicant is not sustainable and deserves to be
quashed to that extent only.

19. Accordingly, the application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. stands allowed to the
extent indicated above.

20. The learned trial court is directed
to dispose of the application dated
03.09.2022 afresh by passing a reasoned
and speaking order in strict accordance
with law expeditiously particularly keeping
in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in P. Gopalkrishnan's case
(supra).
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 471
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHREE PRAKASH SINGH, J.

Appl. U/s 482 No. 8379 of 2017

Roshan Lal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Amrendra Nath Tripathi, Deepak Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Govt. Advocate, Prabhat Kumar, Vimal Shukla

(A) Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 323, 504 & 506 - The Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482
-
Inherent
power
-
Section
200
-
Examination of complainant , Section 202
- Postponement of issue of process ,
Section 204 - Issue of process , The
Limitation
Act
1963
-
Section
5
-
condonation of delay , provision 131 of the
Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963 - period
of ninety days is the limitation for filing of
any revision under the Criminal Procedure
Code wherein the decree or order or
sentence is sought to be revised - if a
statute provides a specific mode or action
472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of law, the same has to be followed in the
manner prescribed.(Para - 20,21)

An application under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. -
applicant summoned - aggrieved - criminal
revision - revision time barred - instituted about
delay of nine months - revisional court
entertained - allowed revision - without
condoning delay - remanded matter back for
fresh adjudication by Magistrate concerned -
hence application . (Para -6 )

HELD:-No deeming provision for condonation of
delay and delay could be condoned only when it
is pleaded and prayed by the person concerned
or the court taking cognizance of the relevant
provision of Limitation Act 1963, decides the
issue. Order passed by revisional court is
erroneous, unlawful and against the settled
proposition of law.Order set aside. Matter
remitted back to revisional court. (Para -
21,25)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. St. of U.P. Vs Gauri Shanker & ors., (1992) 29
ACC 523

2. P.K. Choudhary Vs Commander, 48 BRTF
(GREF), (2008) 13 SCC 229

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shree Prakash
Singh, J.)

1. Heard Amrendra Nath Tripathi,
learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Prabhat
Kumar assisted by Sri Vimal Shukla, learned
counsel for the opposite party no.2, Sri
Aniruddha Kumar Singh, learned A.G.A.-I
for the State, and perused the record.

2. Instant application has been filed by
the applicant, assailing the order dated
30.6.2016 passed by the Additional District
and Sessions Judge, Court No.1, District
Balrampur in Criminal Revision No. 36 of
2015. He has further challenged the entire
proceeding of Complaint Case No.860 of
2014 pending before the Judicial MagistrateI, District Balrampur.

3. Factual matrix of the case is that the
respondent no.2 had filed an application
under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. before
the Judicial Magistrate-I, District Balrampur.
The respondent no.2 levelled allegation
therein that the applicant executed registered
agreement to sale on 27th of September 2013
with respect to Gata No.465 having area
0.202 hectare and Gata No.628 having an
area 0.142 hectare situated at Village
Mathura, Police Stateion Lalia, District
Balrampur. The respondent no.2 has further
made allegation that the sale consideration
was fixed as Rs.2,40,000/- out of which
Rs.2,00,000/- was allegedly given in cash at
the time of execution of the said agreement
and the remaining amount was allegedly
agreed to be paid at the time of execution of
the sale deed. The allegation is that after the
aforesaid agreement, the said plot was soled
out to Ms. Shaheena and Mr. Kamruddin.
Further
allegation
is
that
when
the
complainant/revisionist went to the house of
the applicant on 10th of April 2014, the
applicant, who was sitting with the other
accused persons, started abusing and beating
her.

4. Vide order dated 22nd of May 2014,
the
Magistrate
treated
the
aforesaid
application as a complaint case and listed it
for recording the statement of respondent
no.2 under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. The
opposite party no.2 got her statement
recorded under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.
Further the statements of other two witnesses
were recorded under Section 202 of the
Cr.P.C. by the Magistrate.

5. After recording the statement of the
complainant as well as the witnesses, the
11 All. Roshan Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
473
Judicial Magistrate-I, vide his order dated
25th of July 2014, issued process under
Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. and summoned
the applicant under Sections 323, 504, 506
of the Indian Penal Code. A categorical
finding was also recorded by the Magistrate
that as per the version of the complaint and
the statements made under Sections 200
and 202 Cr.P.C., the case is made out only
under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. and
so far as the allegation with regard to
breach of the agreement and execution of
the sale deed is concerned, the same was a
civil dispute and no criminal offence is
made out in that regard.

6. Being aggrieved by the summoning
order dated 25th of July 2014, the opposite
party no.2 filed a criminal revision before
the learned Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Court No.1, District Balrampur,
which was registered as Criminal Revision
No.36 of 2015. The revision was time
barred as that was instituted about delay of
nine months but the revisional court
entertained and allowed the revision, vide
order dated 30th of June of 2016 without
condoning the delay in filing the said
revision and remanded the matter back for
fresh
adjudication by the Magistrate
concerned.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the revisional court has passed
the order on 30th of June 2016, in most
mechanical manner and, while passing the
aforesaid order, no finding was recorded
with
regard
to
incorrectness
or
unlawfulness of the order passed by the
Magistrate. He
also added that the
application submitted by the respondent
no.2 under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. which
was registered as a complaint case, is an
abuse of process of law. He added that no
offence is made out against the applicant.

8. Adding his arguments, he submits
that in fact the applicant had already
instituted a suit being Civil Original Suit
No. 297 of 2014 for cancellation of the
agreement to sale dated 27.9.2013 before
the
Civil
Judge
(Junior
Division),
Balrampur. The opposite party no.2 had
also filed a suit being Civil Original Suit
No. 244 of 2014, for cancellation of sale
deed executed on 9th of April 2014 in
favour of the other accused, namely, Ms.
Saheena, before the Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Balrampur. Both the suits are
still pending consideration.

9. Referring the aforesaid argumetns,
he submits that in fact the dispute between
the parties is purely of civil nature and
prima facie, no offence is made out against
the applicant. He further added that Hon'ble
Apex Court and the Hon'ble High Courts
have held that if the dispute is of civil
nature then criminal proceeding is nothing
but an abuse of process of law. He submits
that since the land in question belongs to
the applicant and he had duly executed the
sale deed, as such, no question arises with
regard to committing cheat or fraud by the
applicant and, as such, the finding recorded
by the revisional court is perverse and
assails illegality.

10. In support of his contentions,
learned counsel for the applicant has placed
reliance on the Judgment of this Court
rendered in the case of State of U.P. Vs.
Gauri Shanker and others, (1992) 29
ACC 523, and referred paras 10 & 11 of
the Judgment, which are being quoted
hereunder:-

"10. As pointed out by the Privy
Council in Krishna Swami v. Ramaswami,
AIR 1917 PC 179, normally the question of
limitation affecting the competence of
474 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal or revision should be determined at
the stage of admission. Similarly in
Sundarbai v. Collector of Belgaon, AIR
1918 PC 135 it was observed by the Privy
Council that where the memorandum of
appeal or revision was presented beyond
the prescribed limitation, the proper order
which a Judge should pass was let the
notices go to the respondents. In the present
case if the delay has been condoned on the
date of admission or presentation, by the
Division Bench and the opposite parties
raise the objection about the delay,
subsequently it is proper that the party may
be heard. In case there was no justification
for condonation of delay the application be
rejected and in that event, even though that
veiw appears to be not quite consistent with
the settled principles, the order admitting
the appeal or revision could be recalled
also. But in the present case we are
satisfied
that
the
delay
has
been
satisfactorily explained by the State of U.P.
and even if on the date of admission delay
was condoned without issuing notices,
there
was
no
material
illegality
or
irregularity.

11. Matter can be reviewed from
another angle. The result of refusing to
condone the delay would result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and thereby the cause of
justice would be frustrated. As compared to
this asssuming the delay is condoned, the
maximum that can happen is that a cause
would be decided on merits after hearing the
parties. In the present revision also by
condoning the delay, no injustice was caused
to the opposite parties and now when present
application was moved, cause for delay has
been scrutinised and we are satisfied that it
has been correctly condoned. By condoning
delay, substantial justice is done. In such
matters of considerable Imagnitude, Courts
need not be technical. In view of the premises
aforesaid we are of the considered opinion
that the expression sufficient cause under S. 5
of Limitation Act has to be scrutinised in a
justice oriented manner and narrow pedantic
approach need not be made. Explanation of
each day's delay is not a correct formula in
every case. In the present case, delay was
explained satisfactorily on behalf of State and
it was correctly condoned on the date of
admission. Even though better course to be
adopted could have been to issue notice to the
opposite parties (present applicant) to show
cause as to why not the delay be condoned
but as the revision was essentially under the
Revisionary jurisdiction of the Court which
was somewhat similar to inherent jurisdiction
which could be exercised even suo motu,
even if delay was condoned on the date of
admission itself without issuing notices to the
opposite parties, we now after hearing
opposite parties on the point of condonation
of delay are of the view that the delay has
correctly been condoned by the Division
Bench conseuquently we refreain from
recalling the order passed by the Division
Bench condoning delay, admitting the
revision and issuing process to the opposite
parties (present applicant) and accordingly
the application moved on behalf of opposite
parties to recall the order passed by Division
Bench condoning delay, admitting revision
and issuing process to the oppoxsite parites is
rejected."

11. Learned counsel for the applicant
further placed reliance upon the Judgment
of the Apex Court rendered in the case of
P.K. Choudhary Vs. Commander, 48
BRTF (GREF), (2008) 13 SCC 229 and
referred paras 10 and 11 thereof, which are
being quoted hereunder:-

"10. The learned Judicial Magistrate
did not apply his mind on the said
averments. It did not issue any notice upon
11 All. Roshan Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
475
the appellant to show cause as to why the
delay shall not be condoned. Before
condoning the delay the appellant was not
heard.
In
State
of
Maharashtra
v.
Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre (1995) 1
SCC 42, this Court held: (SCC p.44, para
5)

" 5. In our view, the High Court was
perfectly justified in holding that the delay,
if any, for launching the prosecution, could
not have been condoned without notice to
the respondents and behind their back and
without
recording
any
reasons
for
condonation of the delay. However, having
come to that conclusion, it would have
been appropriate for the High Court,
without going into the merits of the case to
have remitted the case to the trial court,
with a direction to decide the application
for condonation of delay afresh after
hearing both sides. The High Court
however, did not adopt that course and
proceeded further to hold that the trial court
could not have taken congnizanc of the
offence in view of the application filed by
the prosecution seeking permission of the
Court to file a ''supplementary charge-sheet'
on the basis of an ''incomplete charge-sheet'
and quashed the order of the CJM dated
21.11.1986 on this ground also. This view
of the High Court, in the facts and
circumstances of the case is patently
erroneous."

11. In view of the aforesaid decision,
there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that
the appellant was entitled to get an
opportunity of being heard before the delay
could be condoned."

12. Further contention is that the
revisional court has erred while passing the
order dated 30.6.2016, as the direction has
been given to the parties of the revision to
appear before the court of Magistrate,
meaning thereby the present applicant has
also to appear though the Magistrate has
still not applied his mind on the fact that
whether any case is made out under Section
419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the I.P.C.

13. Thus, submissions are that since
the order passed by the learned Magistrate
issuing summons against the applicant was
assailed before the learned revisional court
with the delay of about nine months, as
such, the revision court was to issue notice
to the applicant and the opportunity of
hearing should have been afforded to him.
He submits that the revisional court neither
took care of the delay and latches in filing
the revision nor afforded opportunity of
hearing to the applicant and, as such, the
order of the revisional court assails
illegality and infirmity and is liable to be
set aside.

14. On the other hand, learned
counsel for the State has very vehemently
opposed the contention aforesaid and
submits that in fact the applicant cannot be
said to be prospective accused as the order
dated 25th July 2014 passed by the learned
Magistrate has been set aside by the
Additional Sessions Judge in Revision
No.36 of 2015, vide order dated 30th June
2016. He further submitted that since no
process is in existence against the present
applicant, as such, he is not a prospective
accused and, in such view of the matter, the
applicant has no locus to assail, the order
passed by the revisional court.

15. Sri Prabhat Kumar, learned
counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has
controverted the contention of the counsel
for the applicant and submitted that it is
wrong to say that the opposite party no.2
while filing the revision did not file the
application for condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963. In
476 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
support of his contention, he has drawn
attention of this Court towards the counter
affidavit dated 15th July 2021 and has
referred page 7, i.e., the application for
condonation of delay appended with the
counter affidavit. He further added that the
applicant had taken the plea before the
learned Magistrate as well as the revisional
court regarding the nature of the dispute but
both the courts have rejected the same on
the ground that the civil and criminal
proceedings may run simulataneously if
there
are
allegations
disclosing
the
commencement of congnizable offence.

16. Adding his argument, he has
submitted
that
under
the
revisional
jurisdiction suo motu cognizance can be
taken by the revisional court and, as such,
the issue with regard to the limitation will
not attract in this matter. In the instant
matter, there is a prima facie case made out
against the applicant under Sections 419,
420, 467, 468, 471 of the I.P.C.

17. He further submits that in the
aforesaid circumstance, as per the settled
proposition of law, the issue of limitation
would
not
attract
in
this
matter.
Furthermore, the respondent had submitted
the application for condonation of delay
along
with
the
revision
before
the
revisional court and, as such, there is no
illegality or infirmity in the order passed by
the revisional court.

18. In rejoinder to the arguements,
learned counsel appearing for the applicant
submits that in fact the summon was
issued, vide order dated 25th of July 2014
and as soon as the summon was issued, the
applicant's case comes under the purview
of prospective accused. He further added
that the revisional court has recorded
finding which is against the applicant. He
submits that revisional court did not
consider the fact that the civil suits are
pending between the parties and further the
land in question, which was transferrred
through a registered sale deed, is of the
present applicant. As such, there can be no
charge with regard to cheat or forgery. The
order of the revisional court indicates that
as if the applicant is also to be prosecuted
under Section 420, 467, 468, 471 and 406
of I.P.C. He submits that, in such view of
the matter, the applicant is required to be
heard before the revisional court and the
order passed by the revisional court is
required to be tested on the pretext of its
illegality and perversity.

19. I have considered the rival
submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and have also gone through the
records available before this Court. The
issue, which emerges for consideration
before this Court, is that while exercising
power under Chapter XXX of Cr.P.C., can
the revisional Court proceed without
condoning the delay of such revision and
further without reducing the reasons in
writing?

20. As per provision 131 of the
Schedule of Limitation Act, 1963, the
period of ninety days is the limitation for
filing of any revision under the Criminal
Procedure Code wherein the decree or
order or sentence is sought to be revised.
The point 131 of the Schedule of
Limitation
Act
1963
is
quoted
hereinunder:-

Description
of
application
s
Period of
Limitatio
n
Time
from
which
period
begins
to run
11 All. Roshan Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
477
131
.
To
any
court
for
the exercise
of
its
powers
of
revision
under
the
Code
of
Civil
Procedure,
1908 (5 of
1908),
or
the Code of
Criminal
Procedure,
1898 (5 of
1898).
Ninety
days
The
date of
the
decree
or order
or
sentenc
e sought
to
be
revised.

21. From bare perusal of aforequoted
provision, it is evident that for filing
revision, there is 90 days' limitation period
from the date of decree or order or
sentence, which is sought to be revised.
This Court is of the considered view that
there
is
no
deeming
provision
for
condonation of delay and delay could be
condoned only when it is pleaded and
prayed by the person concerned or the court
taking cognizance of the relevant provision
of Limitation Act 1963, decides the issue.

22. So far as the contention of the
learned counsel for the opposite party no.2
with respect to the fact that since the
revisional court can exercise the revisional
power suo motu and, therefore, in such
conditions, the application for condonation
of delay or condoning the delay is not
mandatory provision. When this Court
examined this contention, it is evident that
suo motu cognizance does not mean that
the court is at liberty to ignore the statutory
provision and settled proposition of law. It
is well settled law that if a statute provides
a specific mode or action of law, the same
has to be followed in the manner
prescribed.

23. This Court is also not unmindful
that the criminal law is strict law and, there
are far-reaching and serious consequences
of the same. This Court finds that there is
specific provision with respect to limitation
for filing of revision against decree or order
or sentence and, thus, the same cannot be
overlooked while entertaining any revision
or passing any order thereon. So far as
revision is concerned, prior to deciding the
issue of delay and laches, the issuance of
notice
may
not
be
a
compulsory
requirement.

24. In the instant matter with respect
to the application for condonation of delay
in filing the revision, it is an admitted fact
that there was delay of nine months but
there is no single whisper in all over the
finding or order passed by the revisional
court, which is impugned with this
application.

25. When this Court further examined
the revisional order dated 30.6.2016, it is
overt that learned revisional court while
remitting back the matter, has erroneously
directed the applicant to appear before the
court of Magistrate though the order passed
by the Magistrate dated 25.7.2014 was set
aside. After setting aside the order dated
25.7.2014, the present applicant is neither
accused nor prospective accused and, as such,
he could not have directed to appear before
the Magistrate unless any process is issued
and, thus, this Court is of considered opinion
that the order dated 30.6.2016 passed by the
revisional court is erroneous, unlawful and
against the settled proposition of law.

26. In view of the aforesaid
submissions and discussions, the order dted
478 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
30th June 2016 passed by the Additional
District and Sessions Judge is hereby set
aside. The matter is remitted back to the
revisional court for hearing the matter
afresh, in the light of the observations made
hereinabove.

27. Instant application is allowed
accordingly.
----------
(2022) 11 ILRA 478
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE SYED WAIZ MIAN. J.

Government Appeal No. 71 of 2021

State of U.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Nanhe Lal & Anr. ...Accused-Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
G.A.

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Dhananjay Singh

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302, 376, 394 & 411 - Evidence
Act, 1872 - Section 3 - circumstantial
evidence - in a criminal case based on the
strength of circumstantial evidence, chain
of circumstances must be complete and on
completion
of
such
chain
only
one
conclusion can be drawn that it is only the
accused who had committed the crime -
F.I.R. version that informant daughter
went to watch T.V. at accused house; she
was wearing golden earrings and one
locket on her neck; they out of greed,
murdered the deceased by strangulation
by her Dupatta and snatched jewellery
from her and kept them in the Almirah
placed in the room; they had thrown her
dead body in the wheat field - Held - case
rests on circumstantial evidence - no
witness came forward to depose that they
had seen the deceased going to the house
of the accused to watch Television - P.W.-
1, Veerpal, on whose instance First
Information Report came to be lodged
turned hostile and has not supported the
allegations contained in his written First
Information Report - P.W.-2 w/o P.W.-1
also
turned
hostile
-
independent
witnesses also turned hostile and those
witnesses in their cross examination have
not stated any thing which may support
the prosecution story - alleged recovery of
articles from the Almirah of the accused is
also not proved - impugned judgment and
order is not erroneous or perverse and the
same is sustainable in the eyes of law
(Para 45, 26)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Suraj Singh Vs St. of U.P., 2008 (11) SCR 286

2. C. Magesh & ors. Vs St. of Karn., Criminal
Appeal
Nos.
1028-1029
OF
2008,
dt
30.04.2010

3. Silash Singh Kurid Vs The State 2018 Cr.L.J.
394

4. Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda Vs St.of Mah.
(1984) 4 SCC 116

(Delivered by Hon'ble Syed Waiz Mian, J.)

1. By means of this Government
Appeal, on behalf of the State, challenge
has been made to the validity and legality
of judgment and order of acquittal dated
11.11.2020, having been passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast
Track Court, Bareilly, in connection with
Session trial No. 275 of 2017, State vs.
Nanhe Lal and another, arising out of Case
Crime No. 89 of 2017, under Sections-302,
376, 394 and 411 I.P.C., Police StationBhamora, District-Bareilly.