# Sadgi Investment Pvt. Ltd v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2004) 2 ILRA 449
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2004-04-20
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14988 of 2004
- **Bench:** M. Katju, R.S. Tripathi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sadgi-investment-pvt-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40400
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Article 226-Writ
Jurisdiction-Judicial
review
administrative
functions-scope-Courts
should be slow in such matters-No
interference unless decision is tainted
with illegality, irrationality or procedural
impropriety- Impugned order states that
plot No. 881 is next to main National
Highway and that adjacent plot no. 883
and 884 sought to be acquired are very
important
for
industrial
area-
held
cannot
be
called
arbitrary
considerations-Land Acquisition Act- Ss.
4,6 and 17.

The Supreme Court observed that the
Court will be slow to interfere in such
matters
relating
to
administrative
functions unless the decision is tainted by
any vulnerability enumerated above, like
illegality,
irrationality
and
procedural
impropriety. The famous case, commonly
known as the 'Wednesbury's case', is
treated as the landmark in laying down
various principles relating to judicial
review of administrative or statutory
discretion.

Para 25
From the above standpoint the impugned
decision of the administrative authorities
in the present case (Annexure 1 to the
writ petition) cannot be faulted as it
cannot be said to be so outrageous in
defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that no sensible person could
have arrived at it. It has been stated
therein that plot no. 881 is next to the
main
National
Highway,
and
that
adjacent plot nos. 883 and 884 are very
important for the industrial area. These
cannot
be
called
arbitrary
considerations.

Para 27
Case law discussed:
W.P. No. 27317 of 2001 decided on 5.3.2004
(1966) 10 SCC 721
W.P. 29031 of 2003 decided on 11.7.2003
2003 (1) AWC 116
W.P. No. 24670 of 2003 decided on 2.7.2003
1993 ALJ 154 (DB)
AIR 1978 SC 515
W.P.No. 15586 of 2001 decided on 4.10.2002
(1994) 6 SCC 651
(2001) 2 SCC 386
JT 1994 (7) SC 551
(2002) 1 UPLBEC 937 (Pr.10)
AIR 1996 SC 11 (Pr. 113)
2002 (4) AWC 3221
(1994) 1 SCC 658
(1997) QB 643 (724)
AIR 1973 SC 1461 (Pr. 1547)
(2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206
(1984) 3 All ER 935

## Text

http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
2 All] Sadgi Investment Pvt. Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
449
will communicate it to the aforesaid
authorities forthwith.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.4.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 14988 of 2004

Sadgi Investment Pvt. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri R.C.Sinha
Sri Arvind Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 226-Writ
Jurisdiction-Judicial
review
administrative
functions-scope-Courts
should be slow in such matters-No
interference unless decision is tainted
with illegality, irrationality or procedural
impropriety- Impugned order states that
plot No. 881 is next to main National
Highway and that adjacent plot no. 883
and 884 sought to be acquired are very
important
for
industrial
area-
held
cannot
be
called
arbitrary
considerations-Land Acquisition Act- Ss.
4,6 and 17.

The Supreme Court observed that the
Court will be slow to interfere in such
matters
relating
to
administrative
functions unless the decision is tainted by
any vulnerability enumerated above, like
illegality,
irrationality
and
procedural
impropriety. The famous case, commonly
known as the 'Wednesbury's case', is
treated as the landmark in laying down
various principles relating to judicial
review of administrative or statutory
discretion.

Para 25
From the above standpoint the impugned
decision of the administrative authorities
in the present case (Annexure 1 to the
writ petition) cannot be faulted as it
cannot be said to be so outrageous in
defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that no sensible person could
have arrived at it. It has been stated
therein that plot no. 881 is next to the
main
National
Highway,
and
that
adjacent plot nos. 883 and 884 are very
important for the industrial area. These
cannot
be
called
arbitrary
considerations.

Para 27
Case law discussed:
W.P. No. 27317 of 2001 decided on 5.3.2004
(1966) 10 SCC 721
W.P. 29031 of 2003 decided on 11.7.2003
2003 (1) AWC 116
W.P. No. 24670 of 2003 decided on 2.7.2003
1993 ALJ 154 (DB)
AIR 1978 SC 515
W.P.No. 15586 of 2001 decided on 4.10.2002
(1994) 6 SCC 651
(2001) 2 SCC 386
JT 1994 (7) SC 551
(2002) 1 UPLBEC 937 (Pr.10)
AIR 1996 SC 11 (Pr. 113)
2002 (4) AWC 3221
(1994) 1 SCC 658
(1997) QB 643 (724)
AIR 1973 SC 1461 (Pr. 1547)
(2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206
(1984) 3 All ER 935

(Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed
with a prayer for mandamus directing the
respondents to de- notify the land in
question which was notified under the
Land Acquisition Act. The petition has
also prayed for a writ of certiorari to
quash the impugned notification dated
31.10.2000 under Section 4/17 of the
Land Acquisition Act and the notification
dated 5.10.2002 issued under Section 6
and also the impugned order dated
10.3.2003 passed by the respondent no. 1
copy of which is Annexure 1 to the writ
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
450
petition. The petitioner has also prayed
for
a
mandamus
restraining
the
respondents from taking possession of the
disputed land in pursuance of the
impugned notification.

2. We are of the opinion that this
petition is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of laches.

3. It may be noted that the
notification under Section 4/17 copy of
which is Annexure 4 to the writ petition
was issued on 31.10.2000 whereas the
present writ petition has been filed in
April 2004. Thus the challenge of the said
notification is clearly belated. Similarly,
the challenge to the notification dated
5.10.2002 is also belated. As regards the
impugned order dated 10.3.2003 copy of
which is Annexure 1 to the writ petition
the challenge to this order is also belated
as the writ petition has been filed in April
2004 that is more than one year after the
passing of the said order. Hence this writ
petition deserves to be dismissed on the
ground of laches alone.

4. However, even on merits we are
of the opinion that the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed. A perusal of the
notification
dated
31.10.2000
under
Section 4/17 of the Land Acquisition Act
(vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition)
shows that the land was being acquired
for planned industrial development in
district Mathura.

5. In Kaloo Ram vs. State of U.P.
and others, writ petition no. 27317 of
2001 decided on 5.3.2004 the entire case
law on the point has been discussed in
great detail by a division bench of this
Court. In that decision also the land was
being acquired for planned development
and it was held that this was for public
purpose vide Ajai Krishna Singhal and
others vs. Union of India, (1966) 10 SCC
721.

6. In Amar Singh and others vs.
State, writ petition no. 29031 of 2003
decided on 11.7.2003 the Court has held
that even abadi land can be acquired. The
same view was taken in Manvir Singh vs.
State of U.P., 2003 (1) AWC 116 and
Horam Singh vs. State of U.P. writ
petition no. 24670 of 2003 decided on
2.7.2003.

7. In Kashi Nath vs. State of U.P.
ALJ 154 a Division Bench of this Court
following the decision of the Supreme
Court in Bai Malimabu vs. State of
Gujrat, AIR 1978 SC 515 held that the
word 'land in Section 3 (a) includes the
superstructures on the land. Hence abadi
land can be acquired, even if there are
structures thereon, though, of course
compensation has to be paid for the same.

8. In Amar Singh's case (supra) it
has also been held after a detailed
discussion
that
whether
to
grant
exemption from acquisition or not is a
purely administrative matter and this
Court could not interfere. It was also held
therein that directions directing disposal
of
the
petitioner's
application
for
exemption should not be issued by the
Court as this only results in further delay
of the acquisition proceedings for years
and years.

9. In Ram Charittar and others vs.
State of U.P., writ petition no. 15586 of
2001 decided on 4.10.2002 a similar view
was taken.
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2 All] Sadgi Investment Pvt. Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
451
10. Moreover it appears that the
petitioner had earlier filed writ petition
no. 46299 of 2002 which had been
disposed off by a Division Bench of this
Court on 28.10.2002 vide Annexure 2 to
the writ petition. In that decision it was
held that the notification under section
6(1) of the Act was perfectly valid.

11. As regards the prayer for
exempting the land from acquisition it
was
held
that
the
petitioner's
representation
should
be
decided
expeditiously.

12.

In
the
judgment
dated
28.10.2002 (vide Annexure 2 to the writ
petition) it has been observed that t he
petitioner has constructed a boundary wall
and had also laid the foundation for
making construction of the building of the
factory. Thus at that time admittedly there
was no building on the land in question
and there was only a boundary wall.
However, even if there had been a
building on the land it could yet be
acquired vide Amar Singh v. State of U.P.
(infra).

13. The petitioner's application for
exemption has been rejected by the order
dated 10.3.2003 Annexure 1 to the writ
petition. We have already observed that
the challenge to this order is belated
because the petition has been filed more
than one year after the order was passed.
Apart from that it has been stated in the
said order that the acquisition of the land
was very important for the establishment
of the industrial area.

14. We have already held in Amar
Singh vs. State of U.P., writ petition no.
29031 of 2003 decided on 11.7.2003,
Manvir Singh vs. State of U.P., 2003 (1)
AWC 116 and Horam Singh vs. State of
U.P. writ petition no. 24670 of 2003
decided on 2.7.2003, etc. that whether to
grant exemption or not is a purely
administrative matter and the Court
cannot interfere with it. In Amar Singh vs.
State of U.P. (supra) it was also held that
even the direction that the petitioner's
application for exemption should be
decided should not be issued by this Court
as this only resulted in further delay of the
acquisition proceedings for years to years.
If such direction is given and the
exemption application is rejected without
giving reason then immediately another
writ petition is filed alleging that the order
rejecting
the
exemption
application
should be quashed on the ground that no
reason was given. However, if reasons are
given in the said order then also a writ
petition is filed alleging that the reasons
are arbitrary or extraneous and once again
an attempt is made to obtain a stay order
from this Court and such stay order are
passed and the mater lingers on for
several years. In this way the entire
scheme of acquisition is frustrated.

15. It may be mentioned that when a
scheme for acquisition is made there is a
plan for leveling the land, construction of
roads, sewage system, water supply
system, etc. This entire plan is frustrated
if stay orders are obtained in respect of
some plots in the scheme and it is well
known that such stay orders often
continue for years and years because of
the heavy pendency in most courts. Hence
this Court should exercise restraint and
not interfere with the executive function
of granting exemption or not granting
exemption.

16. This Court cannot ordinarily
interfere in administrative matter, since
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
452
the administrative authority are specialists
in matters relating to the administration.
The court does not have the expertise in
such matters, and ordinarily should leave
such matters to the discretion of the
administrative authorities. It is only in
rare and exceptional cases, where the
Wednesbury principle applies, that the
Court should interfere, vide Tata Cellular
vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, Om
Kumar vs. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC
386. In U.P. Financial Corporation V.
M/s Naini Oxygen & Acetylence Gas Ltd.
J.T. 1994 (7) S.C. 551 (vide para 21) the
Supreme Court observed:

"However, we cannot lose sight of
the fact that the Corporation is an
independent autonomous statutory body
having its own constitution and rules to
abide by, and functions and obligations to
discharge. As such, in the discharge of its
function it is free to act according to its
own light. The views it forms and the
decisions it takes are on the basis of the
information in its possession and the
advice it receives and according to its
own perspective and calculations. Unless
its action is mala fide, even a wrong
decision taken by it is not open to
challenge. It is not for the Courts or a
third party to substitute its decision,
however more prudent, commercial or
business like it may be, for the decision of
the Corporation. Hence, whatever the
wisdom (or the lack of it) of the conduct
of the Corporation, the same cannot be
assailed by making the Corporation
liable."

17.

In
Haryana
Financial
Corporation
and
another
v.
M/s
Jagdamba Oil Mills and another (2002) 1
UPLBEC 937 (vide paragraph 10) the
Supreme Court observed:

"If the High Court cannot sit as an
appellate authority over the decisions and
orders of quasi-judicial authorities, it
follows equally that it cannot do so in the
case of administrative action, it is well
known that more than one choice is
available to the administrative authorities.
They have a certain amount of discretion
available to them. They have "a right to
choose between more than one possible
course of action upon which there is room
for reasonable course of action upon
which there is room for reasonable people
to hold differing opinions as to which is to
be preferred". (per Lord Diplock in
Secretary of State for Education and
Science
V.
Metropolitan
Borough
Counsel of Tameside, 1977 AC 1014).
The Court cannot substitute its judgment
for
the
judgment
of
administrative
authorities in such cases. Only when the
action of the administrative authority is so
unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable
person would have taken that action, the
Court can intervene. To quote the classic
passage from the judgment of Lord
Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. V. Wednesbury
Corporation, 1947 (2) ALLER 630:

"It is true the discretion must be
exercised reasonably. Now what does that
mean?
Lawyer
familia
with
the
phraseology commonly used in relation to
exercise of statutory discretions often use
the word 'unreasonable' in a rather
comprehensive sense. It has frequently
been used and is frequently used as a
general description of the things that must
not be done. For instance, a person
entrusted with the discretion must, so to
speak, direct himself properly in law. He
must call his own attention to the matters
which he is bound to consider. He must
exclude from his consideration matters
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2 All] Sadgi Investment Pvt. Ltd. V. State of U.P. and others
453
which are irrelevant to what he has to
consider. If he does not obey those rules,
he may truly be said, and often is said, to
be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there
may be something so absurd that no
sensible person could ever dream that it
lay within the powers of the authority."

In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India
AIR 1996 SC 11 (vide paragraph 113) the
Supreme Court observed:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial
restraint in administrate action.
(2) The Court does not sit as a court of
appeal over administrative decisions but
merely reviews the manner in which the
decision was made.
(3) The court does not have the expertise
to correct an administrative decision. If a
review of the administrative decision is
permitted it will be substituting its own
decision, without the necessary expertise,
which itself may be fallible."

18. In the same decision the
Supreme Court observed that judicial
review is concerned with reviewing not
the merits of the decision but the decision
making
process
(the
Wednesbury
principle). See also Pramod Kumar Misra
vs. Indian Oil Corporation 2002 (4) AWC
3221, State of Kerala vs. Joseph Antony
1994 (1) SCC 658, etc.

As Lord Denning observed:

"This power to overturn executive
decisions
must
be
exercised
very
carefully, because you have got to
remember that the executive and the local
authorities
have
their
very
own
responsibilities and they have the right to
make decisions. The courts should be
very wary about interfering and only
interfere in extreme cases, that is, cases
where the Court is sure they have gone
wrong in law or they have been utterly
unreasonable. Otherwise you would get a
conflict between the courts and the
government and the authorities, which
would be most undesirable. The courts
must act very warily in this matter." (See
'Judging in World' by Garry Sturgess
Philip Chubb).

19. In our opinion judges must
maintain judicial self restraint while
exercising the powers of judicial review
of administrative or legislative decisions.

"In view of the complexities of
modern
society,"
wrote
Justice
Frankfuter, while Professor of Law at
Harvard University, "and the restricted
scope of any man's experience, tolerance
and humility in passing judgment on the
worth of the experience and beliefs of
others become crucial faculties in the
disposition of cases. The successful
exercise of such judicial power calls for
rare intellectual disinterestedness and
penetration, lest limitation in personal
experience and imagination operate as
limitations of the Constitution. These
insights Mr. Justice Holmes applied in
hundreds of cases and expressed in
memorable language;

"It is a misfortune if a judge reads his
conscious or unconscious sympathy with
one side or the other prematurely into the
law, and forgets that what seems to him to
be first principles are believed by half his
fellow men to be wrong."

(See Frankfuter's 'Mr. Justice Holmes
and the Supreme Court').
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2004
454

20. In our opinion the administrative
authorities must be given freedom to do
experimentations
and
in
exercising
powers, provided of course they do not
transgress
the
legal
limits
or
act
arbitrarily.

21. The function of a judge has been
described thus by Lawton LJ: "A Judge
acts as a referee who can below his
judicial whistle when the ball goes out of
play, but when the game restarts he must
neither take part in it nor tell the players
how to play" vide Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Department of Trade (1977) QB 643
(724).

22. In writing a biographical essay
on the celebrated Justice Holmes o the
U.S. Supreme Court in the dictionary of
American Biography, Justice Frankfurter
wrote:

"It was not for him (Holmes) to
prescribe for society or to deny it the right
of experimentation within very wide
limits. That was to be left for contest by
the political forces in the state. The duty
of the Court was to keep the ring free. He
reached the democratic result by the
philosophic route of skepticism-by his
disbelief in ultimate answers to social
questions. Thereby he exhibited the
judicial function at its purest."

(See 'Essays on Legal History in Honour
of Felix Frankfurter 'Edited by Morris D.
Forkosch).

23. In our opinion adjudication must
be done within the system of historically
validated
restraints
and
conscious
minimization of the judges preferences.
The Court must not embarrass the
administrative authorities and must realize
that
administrative
authorities
have
expertise in the field of administration
while the Court does not. In the word of
Chief Justice Neely:

"I have very few illusions about my
own limitations as a Judge. I am not an
accountant, electrical engineer, financer,
banker,
stockbroker
or
system
management analyst. It is the height of
folly to expect Judges intelligently to
review a 5000 page record addressing the
intricacies of a public utility operation. It
is not the function of a Judge to act as a
super board, or with the zeal of a
pedantic school master substituting its
judgment for that of the administrator."

24. In administrative matters the
Court should therefore ordinarily defer to
the judgment of the administrators unless
the
decision
is
clearly
illegal
or
shockingly arbitrary.

In this connection Justice Frankfurter
while Professor of Law at Harvard
University wrote in "The Public and its
Government'-

"With the great men of the Supreme
Court constitutional adjudication has
always been statecraft. As a mere Judge,
Marshall had his superiors among his
colleagues. His supremacy lay in his
recognition of the practical needs of
government. The great judges are those to
whom the Constitution is not primarily a
text for interpretation but the means of
ordering the life of a progressive people."

In the same book Justice Frankfurter
also wrote-

"In simple truth, the difficulties hat
government encounters from law do not
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2 All] Prem Chand Singh and others V. State of U.P. and others
455
inhere in the Constitution. They are due to
the
judges
who
interpret
it.
That
document
has
ample
resources
for
imaginative statesmanship."

In Keshvanand Bharti v. State of
Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 (vide para
1547) Khanna, J. observed:

"In exercising the power of judicial
review, the Court cannot be oblivious of
the practical needs of the government.
The door has to be left open for trial and
error."

25. In Indian Railway Construction
Co. Limited vs. Ajay Kumar (2003) 2
UPLBEC 1206 (vide para 14) the
Supreme Court observed that there are
three grounds on which administrative
action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground is illegality, the
second is irrationality and the third is
procedural impropriety. These principles
were highlighted by Lord Diplock in
Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) All
ER 935. The Supreme Court observed
that the Court will be slow to interfere in
such matters relating to administrative
functions unless the decision is tainted by
any vulnerability enumerated above, like
illegality, irrationality and procedural
impropriety. The famous case, commonly
known as the 'Wednesbury's case', is
treated as the landmark in laying down
various principles relating to judicial
review of administrative or statutory
discretion.

26.

Lord
Diplock
explained
irrationality as follows:

"By irrationality I mean what can be
now
be
succinctly
referred
to
as
Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies
to a decision which is so outrageous in its
definance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had
applied his mind to the question to be
decided could have arrived at it."

27. From the above standpoint the
impugned decision of the administrative
authorities in the present case (Annexure
1 to the writ petition) cannot be faulted as
it cannot be said to be so outrageous in
defiance of logic or accepted moral
standards that no sensible person could
have arrived at it. It has been stated
therein that plot no. 881 is next to the
main National Highway, and that adjacent
plot nos. 883 and 884 are very important
for the industrial area. These cannot be
called arbitrary considerations.

28. Petition dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.4.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J.
THE HON'BLE R.S. TRIPATHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8070 of 2002

Prem Chand Singh and others ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners.
Sri S.C. Mandhyan

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Constitution of India, Article 300-A read
with
U.P.
Rural
Development
(Requisition of land) Act, 1948-lands
taken
without
following
procedure