# Sagar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 64
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-10
- **Bench:** Rajiv Lochan Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sagar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54404
- **Pages:** 9

## Text

64 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) The applicant will not tamper with the evidence during the trial.

(ii) The applicant will not pressurize/ intimidate the prosecution witness.

(iii) The applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to
any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to
the Court or to any police officer or tamper with the evidence.

(iv) The applicant shall file an undertaking to the effect that he shall not seek any adjournment
on the dates fixed for evidence when the witnesses are present in court. In case of default of this
condition, it shall be open for the trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders in
accordance with law.

(v) The applicant shall remain present before the trial court on each date fixed, either
personally or through his counsel. In case of his absence, without sufficient cause, the trial court
may proceed against him in accordance with law.

(vi) In case the applicant misuses the liberty of bail during trial and in order to secure his
presence proclamation under Section 84 B.N.S.S. is issued and the applicant fails to appear before
the court on the date fixed in such proclamation, then, the trial court shall initiate proceedings
against him, in accordance with law, under Section 209 of B.N.S.

19. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are confined to the present bail
application and shall have no bearing on the merits of the trial.

20. For trial expedition, the trial court is directed to conclude the trial expeditiously, without
giving any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties.
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(2026) 3 ILRA 64
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJIV LOCHAN SHUKLA, J.

Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/S 482 BNSS No.- 9312 of 2025

Sagar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether an anticipatory bail application u/s 482 BNSS would be maintainable in a case
involving offences u/s 70(2) BNS, and whether the statutory bar contained in s. 482(4) BNSS is attracted
where either s. 65 BNS or s. 70(2) BNS is applicable.
3 All. Sagar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
65
Headnotes
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - ss. 65, 70(2), 137(2), 351(2) - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 - ss. 482(4), 180, 183 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - ss.
5(G), 6 - Anticipatory Bail - Plea regarding falsity/improvement in subsequent statement -
Maintainability - Use of word 'and' in s. 482(4) BNSS - Interpretation of - An FIR was initially
registered against the applicant and other co-accused persons u/ss. 64(2) and 61(2) BNS along
with ss. 3 and 4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act alleging sexual assault upon
the minor victim, pursuant to which the applicant was arrested and subsequently enlarged on
bail - During the course of investigation, on the basis of second statement of victim's mother,
allegations were further leveled that the applicant had accompanied the victim and other
accused persons to the place of occurrence and had dragged the victim to the field where the coaccused allegedly committed rape upon her, leading to addition of s. 70(2) BNS - The applicant
thereafter approached the High Court seeking anticipatory bail, contending that the subsequent
allegations constituted an improvement introduced only to defeat the earlier bail granted to him
and that the bar contained u/s 482(4) BNSS would not apply in the absence of an offence u/s 65
BNS.

Held: Once the statute has granted the right to seek anticipatory bail such right can be restricted and also
taken away for a particular offence or particular class of offences and in the instant case, s. 65 and s. 70(2) of
BNS - The intent of legislature of course was to deny the benefit of anticipatory bail to persons accused of
offences u/ss. 65 or 70(2) of BNS - Accepting the contention of learned counsel for the applicant would render
the bar granted u/s 482(4) of BNSS otiose - Court is in agreement with the determination on the point by High
Court of Gauhati and for reasons discussed, the word "and" as mentioned in s. 482(4) of BNSS appearing
between "Section 65 and sub-section (2) of Section 70" has to be read as "or" - As offence u/s 70(2) of BNS is
made out, the application is not maintainable in view of the bar u/s 482(4) of BNS - Accordingly, application
dismissed. [Para 18 to 20] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
State of M.P. v. Ram Kishna Balothia; (1995) 3 SCC 221 - referred to

Nazir Hussain and Others v. State of Assam Rep by the PP, Assam reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Gau
2971 - relied on

List of Acts
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012

List of Keywords
Anticipatory Bail Application; Maintainability; Literal Interpretation; Legislative Intent; Applicability of s. 482(4)
BNSS; Offence u/s 70(2) BNS; POCSO Act; Distinct offences; Reliability of statement; Statement u/ss. 180 and
183 BNSS; Accusation; Bar to Anticipatory Bail; Reading "And" as "Or"; Otiose Interpretation; Interim
Anticipatory Bail; Sexual assault; Role of Applicant; Improvement in second statement; Merits of allegations;
Apply for Regular Bail; Application dismissed.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application u/s 482 BNSS No. - 9312 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.06.2025 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special
Judge (POCSO Act), Muzaffarnagar in Case Crime No. 29 of 2025.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Applicant(s):
Amit Rai, Gaurav Singh
66 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Advs. for the Opposite Party(s):
Brahma Kumar Tiwari, G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajiv Lochan Shukla, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amit Rai, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Brahma Kumar Tiwari, learned
counsel for the informant/opposite party no. 2 as well as Sri Surendra Singh, learned A.G.A. for the
State and perused the record.

2. This Court on 23.02.2026 passed the following order:-

"1. Shri Brahma Kumar Tiwari, Learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 has raised a
preliminary objection stating that as the offences, that have been levelled against the applicant
involve Section 70(2) of the BNS 2023, in view of the sub section 4 of Section 482 of the BNSS, this
application is not maintainable.

2. Shri Amit Rai, Learned counsel for the applicant, replying to the preliminary objection
raised by Shri Tiwari, contends that a bare reading of Section 482 (4) BNSS would indicate that an
anticipatory bail application is barred only when Section 65 and 70(2) BNS are both applicable in
a particular case.

3. Replying to this submission, Shri Tiwari relying upon a decision of the Gauhati High
Court in the case of Nazir Hussain and three other vs. State of Assam, Case No.:AB/446/2025,
where a Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, while concurring with the submissions made by
the Amicus Curiae appointed in the case, has concluded that the word 'and' used in Section 482(4)
BNSS shall be read as 'or' to give full effect to the intent of the legislature.

4. The matter requires consideration on this legal issue.

5. Put up as fresh on 10.03.2026. In the meantime, Learned AGA shall file a counter
affidavit, as also Shri Tiwari.

6. Till the next date of listing, in the event of arrest of the applicant-Sagar, involved in the
Case Crime No.29 of 2025 under Sections 137(2), 351(2), 70(2) BNS and Section 5(G), 6 POCSO
Act, P.S. Charthawal, District Muzaffar Nagar, he shall be released on interim anticipatory bail on
his furnishing a personal bond and two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the
Station House Officer of the police station/Court concerned with the following conditions:-

(i) The applicant shall not tamper with evidence and that he would appear before the trial
Court on the date fixed unless exempted by the Court concerned;

(ii) The applicant shall not directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise
to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her/them from disclosing
such facts to the Court or to any police officer;

(iii) The applicant would co-operate during trial and would not misuse the liberty of bail.

(iv) The applicant shall not leave India without prior permission of the Court concerned.

(v) that the applicant shall not pressurize/intimidate the prosecution witness;

7. In default of any of the conditions, the prosecution shall be at liberty to file
appropriate application for cancellation of interim anticipatory bail granted to the applicant."
3 All. Sagar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
67

3. Today, when the case has been called on, the learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for the
informant have prayed for further time to file a counter affidavit. However, with the consent of the
parties, this matter is being disposed of without awaiting for counter affidavits.

4. Sri Rai submits that a bare reading of the statute specifically Section 482(4) BNSS clearly
indicates that an anticipatory bail application is barred only when both Section 65 and Section
70(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as 'the BNS') are applicable in a
case. He submits that in the present case as Section 65 of the BNS is not attracted and only Section
70(2) of the BNS is attracted, the anticipatory bail application would be maintainable.

5. Sri Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, who has raised the objection with
respect to the maintainability of the present case has relied upon a decision of the High Court of
Gauhati in Nazir Hussain and Others vs. State of Assam Rep by the PP, Assam reported in 2025
SCC OnLine Gau 2971, where agreeing with the submissions made by the amicus curiae appointed
in the case, the Court found that the word "and" used in the provision would be considered to be
"or".

6. Learned A.G.A. has also questioned the maintainability of the application for anticipatory
bail and has adopted the arguments of Sri Tiwari.

7. Before proceeding to decide the legal issue certain relevant facts may be noted in the
present case. Initially, the First Information Report in this case was registered against the applicant
and the other accused for offences under Section 64(2), 61(2) of the BNS and Section 3 and 4 of
the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as 'the POCSO
Act'). The applicant is said to have been arrested and then bailed out on 04.04.2025. It is thereafter
that during investigation when the second statement of the mother of victim was recorded that
Section 70(2) of the BNS was added in the said case. The thrust of the contention of learned
counsel for the applicant is that no offence under Section 70(2) BNS is made out and as such, even
if the argument of learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 with respect to the maintainability of
the application is to be taken into account, the application for anticipatory bail would be
maintainable.

8. Before adverting to the arguments on Section 482(4) BNSS, the contention of the learned
counsel for the applicant that no offence under Section 70(2) is made out, is required to be dealt
with. From a perusal of the record, it is borne out that no role of participating in the sexual assault
of the victim has been given to the applicant in the First Information Report and in the statement of
the victim under Section 180 and 183 BNSS. The first statement of the mother of the victim also
does not make any allegation against the applicant of sexual assault on the victim. It is almost after
a month of the incident that the applicant is said to have been nominated for an offence under
Section 70(2) BNS where the role assigned to the applicant is of dragging the victim after
accompanying her and other accused on motorcycles to the field where co-accused Himanshu
committed rape upon the victim. On the strength of this, learned counsel for the applicant states
that as these allegations are absent from the statement of the victim made under Section 180 and
183 BNSS, the subsequent improvement in the second statement is only to defeat the bail granted
68 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the applicant for the other sections. He contends that this improvement is required to be
discarded and the anticipatory bail application would then be maintainable.

9. I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the applicant on the point of no
offence being made out. The reliability of a particular statement is not to be taken note of while
deciding whether the offence is made out or not. What is to be seen is that from the materials
collected during investigation and the allegations that appear against an accused, what offence is
made out. It is no doubt true that in the earlier statements of the victim and her mother, no
allegation pertaining to Section 70(2) of the BNS is made out, however in the second statement of
the mother of the victim specific allegation of dragging the victim to the fields where she was
subjected to rape by the co-accused has been made. Thus she states was later told by the victim to
her.

10. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the subsequent improvement in
the second statement of the mother of the victim is only for the purposes of enhancing the gravity
of the offence after the applicant had obtained bail in the other offences alleged against him, cannot
be looked into when considering the maintainability of this application for anticipatory bail. The
merits of the allegations are not to be taken note of as the provision for anticipatory bail itself is not
to be applied in cases where there is an accusation against the applicant of having committed an
offence under Section 65 and Section 70(2) of the BNS. In the opinion of this Court, without
commenting on the merits of the allegations as such, offence under Section 70(2) of the BNS is
made out against the applicant.

11. With respect to the second contention raised by Sri Rai regarding Section 65 and Section
70(2) both being applicable to a case and only then an application for anticipatory bail would not be
maintainable, in the opinion of this Court, is also misconceived. Literal interpretation of words in a
statute sometimes lead to conclusions which may not be in consonance with the intention of the
legislature. The courts must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the provision and in
the present case it was to bar the applicability of Section 482 BNSS in certain cases. Section 482(4)
of BNSS reads as under:-

" Section 482. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.

(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on
accusation of having committed an offence under section 65 and sub-section (2) of section 70 of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023."

12. The literal interpretation as is being sought to be canvassed by learned counsel for the
applicant would indicate that both Section 65 and Section 70(2) of the BNS are to be necessarily
made out in a case for the bar to apply and it is only in those cases that application for anticipatory
bail would not be maintainable.

13. Section 65 of the BNS reads as under:-
3 All. Sagar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
69

"65. (1) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be
Punishment punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty
years, for rape in certain cases but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean
imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine:

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.

(2) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under twelve years of age shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend
to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person?s natural
life, and with fine or with death:

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim."

14. Section 70(2) reads as under:-

"(2) Where a woman under eighteen years of age is raped by one or more persons
constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons shall be
deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's
natural life, and with fine, or with death:

Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and
rehabilitation of the victim:

Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim."

15. Perusal of Section 65 and Section 70(2) of the BNS, in the opinion of the court, leave no
room for doubt that they are distinct offences. Section 65 deals with one person who commits rape
upon a woman under 16 years of age or 12 years of age and the punishment provided therefor.
Section 70(2) deals with one or more persons acting as a group and committing rape upon a woman
under 18 years of age and every person who acts in furtherance of the common intention of the
group would be deemed to have committed the offence of rape. Thus, a perusal of the provisions
clearly indicate that for a person who is said to have individually committed an act under Section
65, no charge under Section 70(2) could be brought against him. There is also similarly no
likelihood of a group of persons committing an offence under Section 70(2) of the BNS to be
charged under Section 65, as gang rape is a distinct offence to rape on a minor under 16 years or
under 12 years of age committed by an individual. The applicability of both the provisions with
respect to the age of the victim i.e. less than 18 years in Section 70(2) and less than 16 years and 12
years in Section 65 also makes it highly unlikely for a person to be charged with both the offences.

16. The Gauhati High Court while considering a similar controversy in the case of Nazir
Hussain and Others vs. State of Assam Rep by the PP, Assam reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Gau
2971, has very concisely and appropriately discussed the differences between Section 65 and
Section 70(2) of the BNS and opined as under:-
70 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"24. The Apex Court in the case of "Spentex Industries Limited v. Commissioner of
Central excise"(supra) has observed as follows:-

"29. We are conscious of the principle that the word "or" is normally disjunctive and
"and" is normally conjunctive (see Union of India v. Kamalabai Harjivandas Parekh [AIR 1968
SC 377 : (1968) 1 SCR 463]). However, there may be circumstances where these words are to be
read as vice versa to give effect to manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the
context".

25. If we look at the provisions contained in Section 65 of BNS, it appears that it
penalizes two kinds of rape i.e., under Section 65(1), it penalizes rape of a woman under the age of
16 years whereas under Section 65(2), the penalty is for rape of a woman under the age of 12 years
whereas Section 70(2) penalizes gang rape (rape of a woman by one or more person constituting a
group or acting in furtherance of common intention of a woman who is less than 18 years of age).
The basic difference between the two penal provisions is that in case of offence under Section 65,
the victim is either less than 16 years of age or less than 12 years of age and the offender is
normally a single person, whereas under Section 72(1) of the BNS, the victim is under the age of 18
years and the offenders are more than one person constituting a group or acting in furtherance of
common intention. There is unlikelihood of a case where a person would be charged both under
Section 65 of BNS as well as under Section 70(2) of BNS. If there is a single offender and the victim
is less than 16 years of age, he would be charged under Section 65 of BNS whereas if there are one
or more women who is raped by one or more in a group of persons acting in furtherance of their
common intention of raping the minor girl, they would be charged under Section 70(2) of BNS. To
say in other words, if more than one person are involved in the offence of raping a victim under the
age of 18 years, they would not be charged under Section 65 but under Section 70(2) of BNS,
therefore, there is unlikelihood of a case being registered under both the sections i.e., Section 65
and Section 70(2) of BNS if there are more than one person involved and victim is less than 18
years of age.

26. Under such circumstances, giving a literal meaning to the word "and" and insisting
that the bar of Section 482(4) would be applicable only if both the sections are involved in the case
and the accused has been arrested of having his own accusations of committing offence under both
the Sections i.e., under Section 65 and Section 70(2) of BNS would result in making the bar
provided in Section 482(4) of BNSS almost redundant in any case which would frustrate the
legislative intent.

27. Hence, agreeing with the submissions made by the learned Amicus Curiae, this Court
is of considered opinion that the word "and" appearing between the words "under Section 65"
and "sub-Section (2) of Section 70" in Section 482(4) of BNSS shall have to be read as "or" to
give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature.

28. In view of the above discussion, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is rejected and it is hereby held that the embargo of Section 482(4) of BNSS would
apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence
under Section 65 or sub-Section (2) of Section 70 of BNS, 2023."

17. The statute which provides for grant of anticipatory bail can also restrict the operation of
such exercise by the courts for a particular class of offences. The Supreme Court in the case of
State of M.P. vs. Ram Kishna Balothia; (1995) 3 SCC 221 while examining the contention with
3 All. Sagar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
71
respect to bar to applicability of Section 438 Cr.P.C. under Section 18 of the SC & ST Act violating
Article 21 of the Constitution held as under:-

"7. We have next to examine whether Section 18 of the said Act violates, in any
manner, Article 21 of the Constitution which protects the life and personal liberty of every
person in this country. Article 21 enshrines the right to live with human dignity, a precious
right to which every human-being is entitled; those who have been, for centuries, denied
this right, more so. We find it difficult to accept the contention that Section 438 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is an integral part of Article 21. In the first place, there was
no provision similar to Section 438 in the old Code of Criminal Procedure. The Law
Commission in its 41st Report recommended introduction of a provision for grant of
anticipatory bail. It observed:

"We agree that this would be a useful advantage. Though we must add that it is in
very exceptional cases that such power should be exercised."

In the light of this recommendation, Section 438 was incorporated, for the first
time, in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1973. Looking to the cautious recommendation
of the Law Commission, the power to grant anticipatory bail is conferred only on a Court
of Session or the High Court. Also, anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of
right. It is essentially a statutory right conferred long after the coming into force of the
Constitution. It cannot be considered as an essential ingredient of Article 21 of the
Constitution. And its non-application to a certain special category of offences cannot be
considered as violative of Article 21."

18. Thus, once the statute has granted the right to seek anticipatory bail such right can
be restricted and also taken away for a particular offence or particular class of offences and
in the present case, Section 65 and Section 70(2) of the BNS. The intent of the legislature
of course was to deny the benefit of anticipatory bail to persons accused of offences under
Section 65 or Section 70(2) of the BNS. Accepting the contention of learned counsel for
the applicant would render the bar granted under Section 482(4) of the BNSS otiose.

19. This Court is in agreement with the determination on the point by the High Court
of Gauhati and for the reasons as discussed above, the word "and" as mentioned in Section
482(4) of BNSS appearing between "Section 65 and sub-section (2) of Section 70" has to
be read as "or".

20. As held above, as offence under Section 70(2) of the BNS is made out, this
application is not maintainable in view of the bar under Section 482(4) of the BNS. This
application is therefore, dismissed.

21. It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are only restricted to the
disposal of this anticipatory bail and shall not be construed to be an opinion on the merits
of the case. The applicant may appear and apply for regular bail, which shall be considered
and disposed of on its own merits without being influenced by the observations made in
this order.
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72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 3 ILRA 72
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 32166 of 2025

Deepak Kumar Chauhan ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains to whether the applicant, implicated in offences under various sections of IPC, was entitled to
be enlarged on bail pending trial, particularly in view of absence of any specific / separate role attributed to
him, nature of injuries sustained by injured, pendency of investigation, and the constitutional mandate of
personal liberty under Article 21 of Constitution of India.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 147, 506 and 307 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right
to life and personal liberty - Bail - Grant of - The prosecution case arose out of an FIR alleging
that the accused-applicant, along with five co-accused persons, assaulted the injured by using
hard and blunt objects as well as a sharp-edged weapon, thereby attracting offences uss. 147,
506 and 307 IPC - The applicant sought enlargement on bail contending that no specific or
distinct role had been attributed to him either in FIR or in statement of injured, that only three
lacerated injuries were found in medical examination with no abnormality detected in the X-ray
report, and that he had been falsely implicated - Opposing the prayer, the State contended that
the applicant did not deserve indulgence at the pre-trial stage, however, considering the nature
of allegations, absence of a specific role, pendency of investigation and the mandate of Article 21
of Constitution, the High Court proceeded to enlarge the applicant on bail subject to certain
conditions.

Held: Though accused applicant along with five other accused persons are named but no specific and
separate role has been assigned to the applicant either in the F.I.R. or in statement of injured, common and
general role has been assigned to six accused persons regarding causing injuries by hard and blunt object and
sharp edged weapon but only three injuries are noted in medical report, in the X-ray report NAD is noted, as
per instructions dated 16.09.2025, investigation is going on - Keeping in view of uncertainty regarding
conclusion of trial; larger mandate of Article 21 of Constitution of India, considering paragraph no.53 of Apex
Court in case of Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement (infra), dictum of Apex Court in Union of India v.
K.A. Najeeb (infra) & Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (Infra) and without
expressing any opinion on merits of case, the applicant is entitled to be released on bail - Accordingly, bail
application allowed. [Paras 6, 7] (E-13)

Case Law Cited
Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement 2024 (SC) LawSuit 677; Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021)
3 SCC 713; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2022) 10 SCC 51 -relied on

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