# Saharanpur v. State of U.P. and

- **Citation:** (2006) 3 ILRA 986
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-07-18
- **Case number:** Writ Petition No. 37357 of 2006
- **Bench:** S.N. Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/saharanpur-v-state-of-u-p-and-40719
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Consolidation of Holding Rules-Rule 25A-read with Code of Civil Procedure-Ord.
23
Rule-3-Compromise-settlement
of
Rights-although provisions of C.P.C. not
applicable but to cut short the litigation
the rights confer upon the statue-such
tenure holder can settle their claim on
the
basis
of
compromise-otherwise
except procedure given under Rule 25-A.

Held: Para 17 and 18

A right which does not accrue to a
person under the provisions of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
or any other provision of law could not
be recognized by any agreement or
compromise
in
the
consolidation
proceedings. Thus, it is held that if a
person had no right under the statute
any such right could not be recognized or
admitted by a compromise or a new right
could
not
be
created
through
compromise or conciliation.

It is clear from the law laid down by the
Apex Court in AIR 1961 S.C. 1790, Rana
Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank
Ltd., Allahabad that Bhumidhari rights in
all the estates vested in the State is a
new statutory right under the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act.
Relevant portion of the judgment is
being reproduced below:-

"(7)...We
are
of
opinion
that
the
proprietary rights in sir and khudkashat
land and in grove land have vested in the
State and what is conferred on the
intermediary by S. 18 is a new right
altogether which he never had and
which could not therefore have been
mortgaged in 1914."
Case law discussed:
1976 RD (2) 69 SC
AIR 1961 SC-1790

## Text

986 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
Union of India and others on the
proposition that once the Senior Most
teacher declined to officiate as the
Principal, he cannot claim his right again
to officiate as the Principal.

5. On the other hand, the learned
counsel for the respondents submitted that
there is no bar for the senior most teacher
to
be
considered
again
for
the
appointment on the post of Principal after
a vacancy again occurs. A teacher, who
declines initially, could be considered
again as and when the vacancy arises
subsequently, and the Management takes
a decision to fill up the vacancy. In
support of his submission the learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon
the decision in the case of (1997) 1 ESC
414,
Awadhesh
Pandey
Vs.
Dy.
Director of Education-IVth Region,
Azamgarh and others, 1999 (4) AWC
3452,
Committee
of
Management,
Kisan
Vidya
Mandir
College,
Saharanpur Vs. State of U.P. and
others, (2004) 1 UPLBEC 600.

6. In my view, the judgment cited by
the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the submission made by him has been
dealt in length the decision in the
Committee of Management Vs. State of
U.P., (2004) 1 UPLBEC 600. Nothing
new has been added by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. Consequently,
this Court is not dwelling upon the
judgments cited by the learned counsel for
the petitioner. It is sufficient for the Court
to state that the court is in entire
agreement with the said judgment.

7. From a perusal of Regulation 2
Chapter II framed under the Intermediate
Education Act, 1921, a senior most
teacher
is
entitled
to
function
as
Officiating Principal. Once the power
under Regulation 2 Chapter II is exercised
and an adhoc Principal is be exercised,
whenever a vacancy occurs again in
future. Consequently, once a teacher
declines to accept the post, the said person
can apply again whenever the vacancy
occurs. Consequently, the respondent
having expressed his inability at an earlier
point of time to officiate as the Principal
can be considered again on the post of
Principal whenever the vacancy occurred
again,
when
a
vacancy
arose
subsequently.

8. In view of the aforesaid, the
judgment cited by the learned counsel for
the petitioner are distinguishable and is
not applicable to the present facts and
circumstances of the case.

9. In view of the aforesaid, the writ
petition fails and is dismissed. In the
circumstances of the case, there shall be
no order as to cost. -Petition dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.7.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.N. SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ Petition No. 37357 of 2006

Shiv Prasad

...Petitioner
Versus
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
Ghazipur and others
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kamleshwar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Kamlesh Kumar Yadav
S.C.
3 All] Shiv Prasad V. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others
987
Consolidation of Holding Rules-Rule 25A-read with Code of Civil Procedure-Ord.
23
Rule-3-Compromise-settlement
of
Rights-although provisions of C.P.C. not
applicable but to cut short the litigation
the rights confer upon the statue-such
tenure holder can settle their claim on
the
basis
of
compromise-otherwise
except procedure given under Rule 25-A.

Held: Para 17 and 18

A right which does not accrue to a
person under the provisions of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
or any other provision of law could not
be recognized by any agreement or
compromise
in
the
consolidation
proceedings. Thus, it is held that if a
person had no right under the statute
any such right could not be recognized or
admitted by a compromise or a new right
could
not
be
created
through
compromise or conciliation.

It is clear from the law laid down by the
Apex Court in AIR 1961 S.C. 1790, Rana
Sheo Ambar Singh v. The Allahabad Bank
Ltd., Allahabad that Bhumidhari rights in
all the estates vested in the State is a
new statutory right under the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act.
Relevant portion of the judgment is
being reproduced below:-

"(7)...We
are
of
opinion
that
the
proprietary rights in sir and khudkashat
land and in grove land have vested in the
State and what is conferred on the
intermediary by S. 18 is a new right
altogether which he never had and
which could not therefore have been
mortgaged in 1914."
Case law discussed:
1976 RD (2) 69 SC
AIR 1961 SC-1790

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.N. Srivastava, J.)

1. By means of this writ petition, the
petitioner has assailed the order dated
19th May, 2006, passed by the Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation,
Ghazipur
setting aside order dated 26.6.1999 of
Consolidation Officer passed on the basis
of compromise dated 8.6.1999 as well as
order dated 18.6.2003, passed by the
Assistant
Settlement
Officer,
Consolidation in Appeal whereby the
matter was remanded to Consolidation
Officer attended with direction to decide
the matter on merits in accordance with
law
after
affording
opportunity
of
adducing evidence as also of hearing to
the parties.

2. The facts beyond the pale of
controversy are that the land in dispute
was acquired by one Babu Lal, a common
ancestor of all three branches of Hira Lal,
Kamta and Moti. It would thus appear that
all the three Branches inherited the
property. It would further appear that
some compromise-dated 8.6.1999 came to
be entered into between the parties and on
the basis of said compromise, the
Consolidation Officer passed an order
dated 26.6.1999 according approval to the
compromise centering round the land
situated in Villages Ramval, Khuthan,
Suhwal and Brumua. It further appears
that by the said compromise instead of
portioning out shares to the parties in
accordance with law, the parties were
given land on the basis of some family
settlement allegedly entered into between
the parties. An appeal preferred by Hari
Shanker heir of Hira Lal on the ground
that no such compromise was entered into
and that someone impersonating himself
as Hari Shanker was set up by the
petitioner to obtain compromise attended
with the relief that and the order passed
by the Consolidation Officer on the basis
of compromise by which rights of Opp.
Parties were affected in all the Villages be
set aside. The Appellate authority by an
988 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
order dated 18.6.2003 rejected appeal on
the ground that the order was rightly
passed on the basis compromise entered
into between the parties. A revision was
also filed by Hari Shanker on the ground
that the revisionist was entitled to get one
third share in all the properties of Hira Lal
including properties situated in Bengal
and Madhya Pradesh and further the
alleged compromise relied upon by
petitioner was the outcome of fraud. In
the
ultimate
analysis,
revision
was
allowed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, which order is impugned
in the present petition. While allowing the
Revision and remanding the matter to
Consolidation Officer for deciding the
same afresh, the Deputy Director of
Consolidation
recorded
categorical
findings to the effect that there was no
date mentioned in the order-sheet of
8.6.1999 on which alleged compromise
was claimed to have been entered into
between the parties and verified; that the
first date in the order sheet was 11.5.1999
and thereafter 19.6.1999 was the date
fixed; that on 26.6.1999 order was passed
by the Consolidation Officer on the basis
of alleged compromise that the matter has
been protracting since long; that the
alleged compromise appears to be a
forged compromise, which was entered
into between the parties on the date on
which case was not fixed and further that
there was also nothing on record to show
that how it was verified. Finally, it was
held that the alleged compromise was not
a
lawful
compromise
entered
into
between the parties and in consequence
the said compromise was set aside the
said and the matter was remanded to
determine the shares of the parties on
merits in accordance with law after giving
opportunity to adduce evidence and of
hearing to the parties.
Heard learned counsel for petitioner
and learned counsel for caveator-Opp.
Parties as well as learned Standing
Counsel.

3. Learned counsel for petitioner
urged that as the parties had arrived at a
compromise filed before Consolidation
Officer, it was not open for any of the
party to retreat from the compromise even
if it be assumed that the compromise was
not entered into between the parties. He
further urged that the finding recorded by
the Deputy Director of Consolidation that
the compromise was not signed by the
parties, and further that it was forged and
unlawful is wholly perverse and renders
itself liable to be set aside and the order
passed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation is liable to be quashed. It
was also urged that the share of the parties
could only be determined on the basis of a
family settlement entered into between
the parties and the orders were rightly
passed by the Consolidation Officer as
well as Assistant Settlement Officer,
Consolidation in accordance with law
according
approval
to
the
family
settlement by way of compromise entered
into
between
the
parties
before
Consolidation Officer. It was finally
urged that the order of Deputy Director of
Consolidation remanding the matter is
vitiated in law.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the
Caveator-Opp. Parties as well as learned
Standing Counsel urged that compromise
which is not lawful could not be relied
upon by the Consolidation Officer. They
urged that lawful compromise implies that
it shall not be one militating to the
provisions of law. It was further urged
that right of a party or his share is defined
in the statute and the compromise which
3 All] Shiv Prasad V. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others
989
is contrary to statute falls short of
acceptability. It was further urged that in
the present case Hari Shanker did not
enter into compromise and the alleged
compromise was entered into by setting
up some one who impersonated himself as
Hari Shanker and affixed false signature
posing it to be that of Hari Shanker on the
date on which case was not fixed. The
learned counsel also alleged that the entire
web of deceit was woven behind the back
of Opp. Parties. Lastly, it was urged that
the Deputy Director of Consolidation
rightly set aside the compromise and
rightly remanded the matter to decide the
matter afresh in accordance with law.

5. In rejoinder to the above
submissions, the learned counsel for the
petitioner asserted that the compromise
was entered into between the parties on
the basis of a settlement in the family and
the shares of the parties were given due
consideration including the rights/share of
a party who had already executed sale
deeds in favour of different persons were
also taken note of while determining
respective shares of the parties in the land
in dispute and further that the finding that
Opp. Parties did not enter into any
compromise is perverse. It was also
asserted that Hari Shanker himself was a
party to the compromise and the orders of
Consolidation Officer as well as Assistant
Settlement Officer, Consolidation were
set aside illegally by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation.

6. I have bestowed my anxious
considerations to the respective arguments
of learned counsel for the parties and have
also perused the materials on record as
well as relevant provisions of law on the
point.

7. On the basis of pleadings and
arguments of the parties, the first question
that arises for consideration is whether
under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act a compromise could be entered into
between the parties as contemplated under
the C.P.C. at any stage in proceedings
arising out of Section 9-A(2)/Section
11/Section 12/Section21/Section 48 of the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
secondly, whether title of the parties in
the land which is creation of a statue
could be determined on the basis of a
compromise for exclusive title or for
determination of share in a joint holding
and, thirdly, whether a person could be
declared as Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Asami
on the basis of a compromise in the
proceeding under the U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act or any other proceeding
under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition &
Land Reforms Act without any title in
law.

8. Before delving into this question,
I feel called to advert to certain provisions
of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
Section 3(4-C) of the U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act defines land, same is
being reproduced as under:-

"3(4-C) ''Holding' means a parcel or
parcels of land held under one tenure by a
tenure-holder singly or jointly with other
tenure-holders."

Section 3(11) defines tenure-holder which
runs as under:-

"3(11)
''Tenure-holder'
means
a
(bhumidhar with transferable rights or
bhumidhar with non-transferable rights),
and includes-
(a) an asami,
990 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
(b) a Government lessee or Government
grantee, or
(c) a
co-operative
farming
society
satisfying such conditions as may be
prescribed."

9. Definition in Section 3((12) also
makes
it
clear
that
"Words
and
expressions not defined in this Act but
(used or) defined in the U.P. Land
Revenue Act, 1901, but (used or) in the
U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 shall have the
meaning assigned to them in the Act in
which they are so (used or) defined."

10. Under the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, the procedure prescribed is
that after spot verification, as required
under
the
Act
and
the
Rules,
Consolidation Officer shall prepare a
statement of principles under Section 8-A
as well as statement under Section 8 of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act
on verification of map and land record,
thereafter, Record shall be published and
the statement showing the mistakes
(undisputed cases of succession) and
disputes discovered during the test and
verification of the record of right during
the course of the field to field partal shall
be
published
in
the
Village.
Any
Objection to that shall be filed on
publication of record under Section 9 of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act
before Assistant Consolidation Officer
disputing the correctness and nature of the
entries in the record or in the extract
furnished there-from or in the statement
of principles, or the need for partition. At
the stage of Assistant Consolidation
Officer, the only provision under which a
compromise, by way of conciliation,
could be entered into is Rule 25-A of the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules
which is being reproduced below:-

"25-A. Sections 9-A, 9-B and 9-C.-
(1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer
shall, as far as possible, deal with all the
objections filed by a tenure-holder with
regard to matters referred to in clause (i)
of sub-section (1) of Section 9-A and subsection (1) of Section 9-B in village itself.
In decided dispute on the basis of
conciliation in terms of sub-section (1) of
Section 9-A, he shall record the terms of
conciliation in the presence of at least two
members of the Consolidation Committee
of the village. These terms shall then be
read over to the parties concerned and
their signatures or thumb impressions
obtained.
The
members
of
the
Consolidation Committee present shall
also sign the terms of conciliation. The
Assistant Consolidation Officer shall then
pass orders deciding the dispute in terms
of conciliation specifying the precise
entries to be made in the records. Details
of the operative part of the orders passed
by the Assistant Consolidation Officer
shall be noted in the Misilband register.
No ex parte order or orders in default
shall
be
passed
by
the
Assistant
Consolidation Officer.

(2) In all cases in which the Assistant
Consolidation Officer sends a report,
under the provisions of sub-section (2) of
Section 9-A, or sub-section (1) of Section
9-B to the Consolidation Officer for
disposal, he may fix a date and place for
the disposal of the cases by the
Consolidation Officer and communicate
the same to the parties present before him
and issue notices in C.H. Form 6-A to the
parties not so present. The report of the
Assistant consolidation Officer in such
cases clearly brings out the points in
3 All] Shiv Prasad V. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others
991
dispute between the parties and the efforts
made by him to reconcile them."

11. The quintessence of the above
rule
i.e.
Rule
25-A
of
the
U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Rules at the
risk of repetition is that at the stage of
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer
conciliation may take place in terms of
sub-section (i) of Section (1) of Section 9A and sub-section (1) of Section 9-B and
Assistant Consolidation Officer shall
record terms of conciliation in the
presence
of
two
members
of
Consolidation Committee. The terms shall
then be read over to the parties concerned
and their signature and thumb impression
shall be obtained. The members of
Consolidation Committee shall also sign
the terms of conciliation and then
Assistant Consolidation Officer shall pass
orders deciding dispute in terms of
conciliation. The details of the operative
part of the order passed by the Assistant
Consolidation
Officer,
it
is
further
envisaged in the Rule, shall be noted in
the Misilband Register. No ex parte order
or order in default shall be passed by the
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer.
All
disputed cases received from the Assistant
Consolidation Officer shall be entered in
the Misilband Register in the office of the
Consolidation
Officer
and
the
Consolidation Officer shall hear the
parties, frame issues on the points in issue
and take evidence and then decide the
dispute. In the case of partition in case
any objection is filed, the Consolidation
Officer shall proceed with the partition,
only after recording reasons in writing if
he considers it in the interest of better
consolidation.

12. There is no provision under the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act or
Rules
framed
thereunder
by
which
provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 of
C.P.C. have been made applicable to
consolidation proceedings. The intention
of the Legislature while enacting U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act was
development of agriculture land as is
eloquent from the preamble of the Act.

13. As stated supra, the only
provision under the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act and the Rules framed
thereunder for conciliation is Rule 25-A.
Rule 25-A of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Rules, as discussed above,
provides that a person could get his rights
settled through conciliation in case his
rights are recognized by a statute. A
person cannot get any right settled or
declared in conciliation proceedings under
Rule 25-A of the U.P. Consolidations of
Holdings Rules if his rights are not
recognized by statute. The intention of
Legislature while framing Rule 25-A of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules
clearly is that the parties may not be
drawn into avoidable and unnecessary
litigation relating to their legitimate rights
created under U.P. Zamindari Abolition &
Land Reforms Act and for correction of
the entries in the revenue records.
Intention of Legislature while enacting
Rule 25-A of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Rules is clear and a person
cannot get any right under Rule 25-A of
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules
which was never created and recognized
by the statute under the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act on
abolition of Zamindari or under any other
subsequent amendment of U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act. A tenure
holder could get his legitimate right of
cotenancy in case land was acquired by
common ancestors or jointly by way of
992 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
reconciliation. Similarly, if an entry in the
joint name of a number of tenure holders
is incorrectly recorded, parties may get
the entry corrected by conciliation under
Rule 25-A of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Rules settling the matter/rights
by mutual partition or by recognizing
family settlement already taken place and
already acted upon by the parties to get
the entry corrected accordingly. But a
tenure holder cannot get any exclusive
right in a proceeding under Section 25-A
of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Rules unless such Rules are recognized by
statute.

14. In 1976 (2) R.D. p. 69, Kale
and others v. Deputy Director of
Consolidation and others, it has been
held by the Apex Court that family
arrangements acted upon by parties could
be recognized by the consolidation
authorities as family arrangement operates
as estoppels against parties having taken
benefit thereunder.

15. There is no provision under the
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for
compromise at any of the stage of
consolidation proceedings either under
Sections 9-A, 9-B, 11, 20, 21 or Section
48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings
Act. Though under the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act, the
provisions of C.P.C. are made applicable
by virtue of Section 341 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
and in appropriate cases in the suits
arising out of U.P. Zamindari Abolition &
Land Reforms Act, a compromise could
be entered into.

16. Under the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, provisions of C.P.C. are not
made applicable like Section 341 of the
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
&
Land
Reforms Act and as such there is no
provision of compromise under the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act, but in
order to secure interest of justice and cut
short litigation, rights recognized by
statute
may
be
settled
by
mutual
agreement
before
any
Consolidation
authority
other
than
Assistant
Consolidation
Officer.
Procedure
prescribed under the C.P.C. are not
applicable to consolidation proceedings,
but if an agreement was entered into
which was not contrary to the rights
conferred
by
the
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition & Land Reforms Act such
agreement in which all the parties
including State joined may be legitimately
relied
upon
by
the
Consolidation
authorities. Thus, a tenureholder who did
not have any right under the statute could
not get any right by way of compromise
or settlement.

Order XXIII Rule 3 of the C.P.C. is
being reproduced below:-

"3. Compromise of suit. Where it is
proved to the satisfaction of the Court that
a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part
by any lawful agreement or compromise
(in writing and signed by the parties), or
where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff
in respect of the whole or any part of the
subject matter of the suit, the Court shall
order such agreement, compromise or
satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass
a decree in accordance therewith (so far as
it relates to the parties to the suit, whether
or
not
the
subject-matter
of
the
agreement, compromise or satisfaction is
the same as the subject-matter of the suit).
(Provided that where it is alleged by
one party and denied by the other that an
adjustment or satisfaction has been
3 All] Shiv Prasad V. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others
993
arrived at, the Court shall decide the
question; but no adjournment shall be
granted for the purpose of deciding the
question, unless the Court, for reason to
be recorded, thinks fit to grant such
adjournment.)
(Explanation.-An
agreement
or
compromise which is void or voidable
under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of
1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful
within the meaning of this rule.)"

17. Since right of a tenure-holder in
land is a creation of statute under the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
and
these
rights
are
declared
or
adjudicated
by
the
Consolidation
authorities for the area where the
notification under Section 4 of the U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act is made,
only such statutory rights already in
existence in favour of a person could be
recognized through a lawful agreement or
compromise in consolidation proceedings.
A right which does not accrue to a person
under
the
provisions
of
the
U.P.
Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act
or any other provision of law could not be
recognized
by
any
agreement
or
compromise
in
the
consolidation
proceedings. Thus, it is held that if a
person had no right under the statute any
such right could not be recognized or
admitted by a compromise or a new right
could not be created through compromise
or conciliation.

18. It is clear from the law laid down
by the Apex Court in AIR 1961 S.C.
1790, Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. The
Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allahabad that
Bhumidhari rights in all the estates vested
in the State is a new statutory right under
the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act. Relevant portion of the
judgment is being reproduced below:-

"(7)............We are of opinion that the
proprietary rights in sir and khudkashat
land and in grove land have vested in the
State and what is conferred on the
intermediary by S. 18 is a new right
altogether which he never had and which
could not therefore have been mortgaged
in 1914."

19. In view of the discussions made
above, as in the present case there is no
such family arrangement acted upon
between the parties of which parties have
taken
benefit
as
claimed
by
the
petitioners,
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
rightly
set
aside
the
compromise and orders passed by the
Consolidation Officer and the Assistant
Settlement
Officer,
Consolidation.
Finding recorded by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation does not suffer from any
error of law apparent on the face of record
in holding that the compromise relied
upon by petitioner was not lawful.
Impugned order was rightly passed in
accordance with law. The questions
framed above are decided accordingly.

20. In the light of the discussions
made above, writ petition has no force
and is dismissed.

No order as to cost.
Petition dismissed.
---------
994 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.05.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.42503 of 2004

Israr Ahmad

...Petitioner
Versus
Devanand and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ravi Kiran Jain
Sri Ashish Kumar Singh
Sri Mohd. Sarwar Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Shashi Nandan
Sri R.B. Srivastava
Sri Amar Nath Mishra

U.P.
Urban
Building
(Regulation
of
letting
and
Rent
Control
Act-1972Section 21 (a)(b)-Release application on
the ground of bonafide need-to settled
two unemployed sons as well as for
demolition
and
reconstructionconcurrent findings recorded by the
courts below regarding bonafide needcomparative hardship and dilapidated
condition of the building-can not be
interfered by the writ court by exercising
power as an appellate court.

Held: Para 4

The appellate authority considered the
entire material on the record including
the evidence and affirmed the findings
arrived at by the prescribed authority
with regard to bona fide requirement of
the landlord, comparative hardship and
dilapidated condition of the building
which
requires
demolition
and
reconstruction. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has not been able to point out
any infirmity in the order passed by the
prescribed authority and affirmed by the
appellate authority which may warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of
powers
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India except that he
submitted that the findings recorded by
the prescribed authority and affirmed by
the appellate authority are such that no
reasonable person can arrive at.
Case law discussed:
2004 (3) SCC-682 relied on.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar, J.)

1. This writ petition, by the tenant
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, challenge the order dated 19th
August 2004 passed by the appellate
authority under the provisions of U.P. Act
No.13 of 1972 (in short the Act) whereby
the appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant
against the order of the prescribed
authority under the Act dated 17.2.2004 is
dismissed and the application filed by the
respondent-landlords under Section 21 (1)
(a) and (b) of the Act has been allowed by
the
prescribed
authority
and
the
prescribed authority directed release of
the accommodation in dispute in favour of
the landlord.

2. Brief facts are that respondentlandlords' father, Arjun Prasad, filed an
application before the prescribed authority
under Section 21 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act
on the ground that the building in
question is more than 150 years old and
the building is in dilapidated condition
which may fall down any time. Apart
from the above Arjun Prasad also stated
that he has two sons, Devanand and
Vidyanand, who are 38 and 29 years of
age respectively, who could not study
beyond
Intermediate
and
are
still
unemployed. The landlord, therefore,
wanted to settle them in two separate
businesses. It is, therefore, prayed that
premises may be released in favour of the