# Saind Pal Singh & Anr v. State 688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 687
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-03
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2388 of 1982
- **Bench:** Sanjay Kumar Pachori
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/saind-pal-singh-anr-v-state-688-indian-law-reports-allahabad-series-53960
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

the U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Ordinance, 1982
can be sustained, in view of (i) delay in lodging
FIR, (ii) absence of independent witnesses, (iii)
non-compliance with S. 100(4) CrPC, and (iv)
failure to prove recovery and use of knives

Headnotes
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 154 -
Delay in lodging F.I.R. - Effect of - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 393 - Attempt
to commit robbery - Proof of - S. 393 IPC
r.w. S. 12 of U.P. Dacoity Affected Area
Ordinance, 1982 - Recovery and arrest
memo prepared prior to lodging FIR - No
independent/public witness - Mandatory
provision of Section 100(4), CrPC not
complied with - Delay of about 11⁄2 hours
in lodging FIR though police had already
arrested accused - Prosecution failed to
prove material genesis of case - Trial
court's acquittal under Section 25(b)(4) of
Arms Act showing failure to establish use
of knives.
Criminal Jurisprudence - Standard of
proof - "Guilt must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubt" - Reasonable doubt
must arise from evidence or lack of it -
Court to adopt view favourable to accused
where two views possible - Delay in FIR
must
be
satisfactorily
explained
-
Deliberate unexplained delay fatal.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 100(4)
- Search and Seizure - Independent
Witnesses - Admissibility and Weight.
Evidence
-
Police
officer
witness
-
Absence of independent witness not fatal
if efforts shown - But such absence casts
duty of careful scrutiny - Police evidence
not to be discarded solely due to absence
of public witness.
Held: The manner in which, according to the
prosecution, the incident unfolded, does not
inspire confidence in as much as theory of
attempting robbery by knives is not proved - All
this shrouds the prosecution in suspicion -
Prosecution has not proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt - contrary view taken by the
trial court is against the weight of evidence -
Prosecution has failed to prove the charges for
the offence punishable under S. 393 I.P.C. -
evidence on record does not bring home the
guilt - appellants are entitled to the benefit of
doubt - entitled to be acquitted - Present
criminal appeal is allowed - conviction and
sentence set aside - appellants acquitted -
personal bonds and sureties discharged. (Paras
16,17,18, 19,20,21,22,23,24) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3
SCC 393; Meharaj Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors, (1994) 5 SCC 188; Satpal Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714; Ajmer
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746;
Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI), (1997) 8
SCC 732; Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1996) 11 SCC 685; Yogesh Singh v.
Mahabeer Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195;
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC
302; Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56;
Valson v. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24;
Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v. State of Karnataka,
(2009) 11 SCC 690; Kali Ram v. State of H.P.,
(1973) 2 SCC 808; State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa v. State
of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Upendra
Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC
124; Golbar Hussain v. State of Assam, (2015)
11 SCC 242; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh,
(1974) 3 SCC 277; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860; U.P. Dacoity Affected
Area Ordinance, 198; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Arms Act, 1959.

List of Keywords
Attempt To Robbery; Recovery Memo; Arresting
Memo; Independent/Public Witness; Delay in
Lodging of the F.I.R.; Mandatory Provision of
Section 100(4) Cr.P.C.; Beyond Reasonable
Doubt; Benefit of Doubt; Theory of Attempting
Robbery
by
Knives;
Does
Not
Inspire
Confidence;
Shrouds
the
Prosecution
in
Suspicion.

Case Arising From
9 All. Saind Pal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
689
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURIDICTION:
Criminal Appeal No. 2388 of 1982, arising from
judgment dated 28.08.1982 passed by Special
Judge
(D.A.A.)/Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Lalitpur in Special

## Text

9 All. Saind Pal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
687
the object of sentencing in the criminal
matter as under:-

"8. The object should be to
protect society and to deter the criminal in
achieving the avowed object of law by
imposing appropriate sentence. It is
expected that the courts would operate the
sentencing system so as to impose such
sentence which reflects the conscience of
the society and the sentencing process has
to be stern where it should be.

9. Imposition of sentence without
considering its effect on the social order in
many cases may be in reality a futile exercise.
The social impact of the crime e.g. where it
relates to offences against women, dacoity,
kidnapping,
misappropriation
of
public
money, treason and other offences involving
moral turpitude or moral delinquency which
have great impact on social order and public
interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se
require exemplary treatment. Any liberal
attitude by imposing meagre sentences or
taking too sympathetic view merely on
account of lapse of time in respect of such
offences
will
be
resultwise
counterproductive in the long run and
against societal interest which needs to be
cared for and strengthened by a string of
deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.

10. The court will be failing in
its duty if appropriate punishment is not
awarded for a crime which has been
committed not only against the individual
victim but also against the society to which
the criminal and victim belong. The
punishment to be awarded for a crime must
not be irrelevant but it should conform to
and be consistent with the atrocity and
brutality with which the crime has been
perpetrated, the enormity of the crime
warranting public abhorrence and it should
?respond to the society's cry for justice
against the criminal".

51. In view of the aforesaid
categorical observation of the Apex Court
and looking at the nature of the instant case
and sentence awarded by the trial court
which appears to be reasonable, this Court
do not find any good reason to interfere
with the sentence awarded to the surviving
appellants no. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9 herein.
Therefore, the conviction as well as the
sentence of the appellants herein is upheld.

52. The instant criminal appeal is
accordingly dismissed. The trial court
record be sent back to the trial court. The
Appellants No. 1, 4, 5, 6 and 9, are on bail.

53. The concerned trial court is
directed to take them into custody to serve
out the sentence awarded by the trial court
and affirmed by this Court and send a
report to this Court within one month.

54. Registrar (Compliance) is directed
to send a copy of this order to the trial court
concerned forthwith for compliance.

55.
This
court
appreciates
the
assistance provided by Sri Vijay Shantam,
learned Amicus Curiae, who has assisted
the Court and for the service rendered by
him, an honorarium of Rs. 10,000/- shall be
paid to him as per rules.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 687
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR PACHORI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2388 of 1982

Saind Pal Singh & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
State ...Respondent
688 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Appellants:

Counsel for the Respondent:

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether the conviction of the
appellants under S. 393 IPC read with S. 12 of
the U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Ordinance, 1982
can be sustained, in view of (i) delay in lodging
FIR, (ii) absence of independent witnesses, (iii)
non-compliance with S. 100(4) CrPC, and (iv)
failure to prove recovery and use of knives

Headnotes
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 154 -
Delay in lodging F.I.R. - Effect of - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 393 - Attempt
to commit robbery - Proof of - S. 393 IPC
r.w. S. 12 of U.P. Dacoity Affected Area
Ordinance, 1982 - Recovery and arrest
memo prepared prior to lodging FIR - No
independent/public witness - Mandatory
provision of Section 100(4), CrPC not
complied with - Delay of about 11⁄2 hours
in lodging FIR though police had already
arrested accused - Prosecution failed to
prove material genesis of case - Trial
court's acquittal under Section 25(b)(4) of
Arms Act showing failure to establish use
of knives.
Criminal Jurisprudence - Standard of
proof - "Guilt must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubt" - Reasonable doubt
must arise from evidence or lack of it -
Court to adopt view favourable to accused
where two views possible - Delay in FIR
must
be
satisfactorily
explained
-
Deliberate unexplained delay fatal.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 100(4)
- Search and Seizure - Independent
Witnesses - Admissibility and Weight.
Evidence
-
Police
officer
witness
-
Absence of independent witness not fatal
if efforts shown - But such absence casts
duty of careful scrutiny - Police evidence
not to be discarded solely due to absence
of public witness.
Held: The manner in which, according to the
prosecution, the incident unfolded, does not
inspire confidence in as much as theory of
attempting robbery by knives is not proved - All
this shrouds the prosecution in suspicion -
Prosecution has not proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt - contrary view taken by the
trial court is against the weight of evidence -
Prosecution has failed to prove the charges for
the offence punishable under S. 393 I.P.C. -
evidence on record does not bring home the
guilt - appellants are entitled to the benefit of
doubt - entitled to be acquitted - Present
criminal appeal is allowed - conviction and
sentence set aside - appellants acquitted -
personal bonds and sureties discharged. (Paras
16,17,18, 19,20,21,22,23,24) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3
SCC 393; Meharaj Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.
& Ors, (1994) 5 SCC 188; Satpal Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714; Ajmer
Singh v. State of Haryana, (2010) 3 SCC 746;
Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI), (1997) 8
SCC 732; Sahib Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1996) 11 SCC 685; Yogesh Singh v.
Mahabeer Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195;
State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal, (1988) 4 SCC
302; Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56;
Valson v. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24;
Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v. State of Karnataka,
(2009) 11 SCC 690; Kali Ram v. State of H.P.,
(1973) 2 SCC 808; State of Rajasthan v. Raja
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180; Chandrappa v. State
of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Upendra
Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC
124; Golbar Hussain v. State of Assam, (2015)
11 SCC 242; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh,
(1974) 3 SCC 277; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860; U.P. Dacoity Affected
Area Ordinance, 198; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Arms Act, 1959.

List of Keywords
Attempt To Robbery; Recovery Memo; Arresting
Memo; Independent/Public Witness; Delay in
Lodging of the F.I.R.; Mandatory Provision of
Section 100(4) Cr.P.C.; Beyond Reasonable
Doubt; Benefit of Doubt; Theory of Attempting
Robbery
by
Knives;
Does
Not
Inspire
Confidence;
Shrouds
the
Prosecution
in
Suspicion.

Case Arising From
9 All. Saind Pal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
689
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURIDICTION:
Criminal Appeal No. 2388 of 1982, arising from
judgment dated 28.08.1982 passed by Special
Judge
(D.A.A.)/Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Lalitpur in Special Case No. 31 of 1982.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Shri Nanhe Lal Tripathi,
Shri Anshul Tiwari,
Sri Sudhanshu Chaturvedi
Advs. for the Respondent:
Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, A.G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar
Pachori, J.)

1. Present Criminal Appeal has been
preferred under Section 374 of Code of
Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
as "Cr.P.C.) against the judgment and
order dated 28.8.1982 passed by Special
Judge
(D.A.A.)/Additional
Sessions
Judge, Lalitpur in Special Case No. 31 of
1982, whereby trial court convicted the
appellants under Section 393, I.P.C. read
with Section 12 of U.P. Dacoity Affected
Area Ordinance, 1982 and sentenced
them 3 years rigorous imprisonment each,
however,
trial
court
acquitted
the
appellants under Section 25(b)(4) of
Arms Act.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the
first information report dated 29.12.1981
has been registered against the appellants
and unknown persons stating that when the
first informant was on the way of village
Bairwara at 9.00 p.m. near the Mission
hospital,
three
assailants
came
and
threatened him with dire consequences
after showing the knives and attempted to
robbery with him. On his crying 4-5 police
personnels came and arrested two persons
out of three assailants. The appellants have
been arrested by the police at the place of
incident.

3. The F.I.R. (Ex- Ka-3) was lodged at
22.30 p.m. on 29.12.1981 (which was
registered within about 1-1/2 hour of the
incident) against the appellants and the
police party prior to lodging of F.I.R.
prepared two recovery memos as Ex- Ka-1
and Ex- Ka-2 of illegal knives from the
possession of appellants. After completing
the investigation, charge sheets have been
submitted against the appellants under
Section 393, I.P.C. and Section 25/4 of
Arms Act, separately as Ex- Ka-7, Ex- Ka8 and Ex- Ka-9.

4. Being the Special Case, which is
triable by the Special Judge of D.A.A.,
charge has been framed on 29.5.1982 under
Sections 393, I.P.C. read with Section 12 of
D.A.A. and Section 25(b)(4) of Arms Act
against the appellants and they denied the
charges.

5. The Prosecution has examined as
many as four witnesses namely, PW-1, S.I.
Surjan Singh, (who prepared recovery
memo, Ex- Ka-1 and Ex- Ka-2), PW-2,
H.C. 3, Naresh Singh (Scribe, who proved
chik F.I.R. and G.D. Rapat as Ex- Ka-3 and
Ex- Ka-4) PW-3, S.I. P.N. Tripathi
(Investigating Officer) and PW-4 Munna
Lal (first informant).

6. After examination of prosecution
witnesses,
trial
court
recorded
the
statements of the present appellants under
Section 313, Cr.P.C. wherein they stated
that they have been implicated due to
enmity with the local police and they stated
that they have been taken into custody from
Station Lalitpur. However, the appellants
have not produced any evidence in defence.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants
argued before the trial court that they have
been implicated by the local police due to
690 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
enmity and the prosecution has totally
failed to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt against the appellants.

8. The trial court observed that the
first informant has no enmity with the
appellant Munna Lal, so as to why he has
been implicated in the present case, in this
regard no question has been asked in his
cross examination. The police reached at
the place of incident on crying of the first
informant and the police caught the
appellants after chasing 40-45 paces. The
prosecution successfully proved the case
beyond reasonable doubt against the
appellants on the basis of evidence of PW-4
Munna Lal and proved the charges under
Section 393, I.P.C. read with Section 12 of
U.P. Dacoity Affected Area Ordinance,
1982 and convicted and sentenced the
appellants under Section 393, I.P.C. read
with Section 12 of U.P. Dacoity Affected
Area Ordinance, 1982. However, the trial
court further observed that the prosecution
has failed to prove the charge under Section
25(b)(4) of Arms Act without proving the
notification.
Hence,
the
appellants
preferred the present appeal.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants
submits before this Court that the first
information report of the present case was
lodged after preparing the recovery and
arrest memo on the spot by which the
police arrested the appellants. It is further
submitted that the prosecution has not
proved the recovery and arresting memo, as
per law provided under Section 100(4),
Cr.P.C. by an independent and respectable
inhabitants of the locality. It is further
submitted that the prosecution has failed to
explain the delay in lodging of the F.I.R.
after about 1-1/2 hour of the incident
whereas
the
police
party
reached
immediately. It is further submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charge
against
the
appellants
under
Section
25(b)(4) of the Arms Act, due to this reason
there is no evidence to prove the fact that
the appellants attempted to robbery with
the first informant on the basis of knives
after causing hurt. Therefore, the present
appeal is liable to be allowed.

10.
Learned
A.G.A.
vehemently
refuted the arguments of the appellants and
supported the judgment and order passed
by the trial court and submits that the
prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt against the appellants.
Hence, the criminal appeal deserves no
merit and is liable to be dismissed.

11. Heard Shri Nanhe Lal Tripathi,
Shri
Anshul
Tiwari,
Sri
Sudhanshu
Chaturvedi, learned counsels for the
appellants and Sri Manoj Kumar Singh,
learned A.G.A. for the State.

12. In the present case, recovery and
arresting memo have been prepared prior to
lodging of F.I.R, which had been proved by
PW-1, S.I. Surjan Singh as Ex-Ka-1 and
Ex-Ka-2.
The
prosecution
has
not
examined any independent/public witness
of the locality with regard to recovery made
as Ex-Ka-1 and Ex-Ka-2.

13. PW-1, S.I. Surjan Singh stated in
his cross-examination that on screaming of
PW-4 Munna Lal, the police party reached
the spot where the appellants committed
offence of attempt to robbery. On reaching
of police party, they fled away from the
spot but the appellants have been arrested
at 9.00 p.m. after chasing 40-50 paces.

14. PW-4 Munna Lal stated in his
chief examination that at 9.00 p.m., three
assailants came and on the basis of showing
9 All. Saind Pal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
691
knives, they attempted to commit robbery
with him and on his crying, police party
reached the spot and after chasing two
assailants (present appellants) had been
caught hold by the police. As per statement
of the witness, he also proved the recovery
and arresting memo of the appellants.

15. Except the two witnesses, there is
no other witness of fact. It is cardinal
principle that for administration of criminal
justice, the prosecution has to prove the
case
against
the
appellants
beyond
reasonable doubt.

16. After having gone through the
entire material on record, except the
statements of PW-1, S.I. Surjan Singh and
PW-4 Munna Lal, there is no other
evidence to prove the prosecution case and
following facts clearly emerged thereof:-

(a)
PW-4
Munna
Lal,
first
informant lodged the F.I.R. after about 11/2 hours of the arresting of the appellants
by the police personnel. At 9.00 p.m., PW1, S.I. Surjan Singh along with police party
arrested the appellants after chasing them
and arresting and recovery memo have
been prepared without following the
mandatory provision of Section 100(4)
Cr.P.C. and no attempt or effort was made
for independent witness.

(b) There is a considerable delay in
lodging of the F.I.R. by PW-4 when the
appellants were arrested at 9.00 p.m. and
police reached the place of incident and
arrested them immediately. There is no
explanation of causing delay in lodging the
F.I.R.

(c) The trial court acquitted the
appellants under Section 25(b)(4) of Arms
Act and prosecution has also failed to prove
material genesis of the prosecution case, as
alleged by the prosecution that appellants
attempted to commit offence of robbery at the
instance of knives.

17. It is well-settled position of law that
delay in lodging the FIR does not make
prosecution case improbable when such delay
is properly explained, but a deliberate delay
in lodging the FIR may prove fatal. In cases
where there is delay in lodging the FIR, the
court has to look for a plausible explanation
for such delay. [Thulia Kali v. The State of
Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 (SCC p.
397, para 12), Meharaj Singh & Ors. v.
State of U.P. & Ors, (1994) 5 SCC 188
(SCC p. 195-96, para 12), Satpal Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714 (SCC
p. 397, para 12)]

18. Section 100(4) of CrPC reads as
under:-

"100)(4). Before making a search
under this Chapter, the officer or other person
about to make it shall call upon two or more
independent and respectable inhabitants of the
locality in which the place to be searched is
situate or of any other locality if no such
inhabitant of the said locality is available or is
willing to be a witness to the search, to attend
and witness the search and may issue an order
in writing to them or any of them so to do."

19. The Supreme Court in Ajmer Singh
v. State of Haryana (2010) 3 SCC 746
observed that one can not forget that it may
not be possible to find independent witness at
all places at all times. The obligation to take
public witness is not an absolute rule, if
despite effort public witness could not be
associated with the raid or arrest of the
culprit, the arrest or the recovery made would
not be necessarily vitiated.

20. The Apex Court in the case of
Kalpnath Rai v. State (through CBI)
692 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(1997) 8 SCC 732, while interpreting
Section 100(4) Cr.P.C. observed that there
can be no legal proposition that evidence of
police officer is unworthy of acceptance in
case of absence of a witness during police
raid. At the most, It would cast a duty on
the court to adopt greater care while
scrutinizing the evidence of the police
officer. If the evidence of a police officer is
found acceptable, then it would be the
erroneous proposition that the court must
reject the prosecution version, solely on the
ground that no witness was present.
Paragraph No. 88 of the above judgment is
quoted as under:-

"15. In the case of Sahib Singh v.
State of Punjab (1996) 11 SCC 685, while
interpreting Section 100(4) Cr.P.C., the
Supreme Court observed that the absence
of independent witness during the search
would affect the weight of the evidence of
police officer, though not its admissibility."

21. In Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer
Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195, the
Supreme Court observed:-

"15. It is a cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubts. However, the burden on
the prosecution is only to establish its case
beyond all reasonable doubt and not all
doubts. Here, it is worthwhile to reproduce
the observations made by Venkatachaliah,
J., in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal,
(1988) 4 SCC 302: (SCC pp. 313-14, paras
25-26)

"25. ... Doubts would be called
reasonable if they are free from a zest for
abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than truth. To constitute
reasonable doubt, it must be free from an
overemotional response. Doubts must be
actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused person arising from the
evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed
to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable
doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a
merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt
based upon reason and common sense. It
must grow out of the evidence in the case.

26. The concept of probability,
and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be
expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how
many of such units constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable
subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of
proof. Forensic probability must, in the last
analysis, rest on a robust common sense
and, ultimately on the trained intuitions of
the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is
not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimization of trivialities
would make a mockery of administration of
criminal justice."

[See also Krishnan v. State,
(2003) 7 SCC 56; Valson v. State of
Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24 and Bhaskar
Ramappa Madar and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690].

16.Another golden thread which
runs through the web of the administration
of justice in criminal cases is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced
in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. (Vide Kali Ram v. State
of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808; State of
Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180;
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007)
4 SCC 415; Upendra Pradhan v. State of
Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and Golbar
Hussain v. State of Assam and Anr., (2015)
11 SCC 242).
9 All. Saind Pal Singh & Anr. Vs. State
693

17.However, the rule regarding
the benefit of doubt does not warrant
acquittal of the accused by resorting to
surmises,
conjectures
or
fanciful
considerations, as has been held by this
Court in the case of State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277: (SCC pp.
285-86, para 23)

"23. A criminal trial is not like a
fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight
to one's imagination and fantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to
whether the accused arraigned at the trial
is guilty of the offence with which he is
charged. Crime is an event in real life and
is the product of interplay of different
human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime,
the court has to judge, the evidence by the
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic
worth and the animus of witnesses. Every
case in the final analysis would have to
depend upon its own facts. Although the
benefit of every reasonable doubt should be
given to the accused, the courts should not
at the same time reject evidence which is ex
facie trustworthy, on grounds which are
fanciful or in the nature of conjectures."

18. Similarly, in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2
SCC 793, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus:
(SCC p. 799, para 6)

"6... The cherished principles or
golden thread of proof beyond reasonable
doubt which runs through the web of our
law should not be stretched morbidly to
embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree
of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected
in the attitude that a thousand guilty men
may go but one innocent martyr shall not
suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable
doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise
any practical system of justice will then
break down and lose credibility with the
community."

22. The appellants have been arrested
prior to lodging of the F.I.R. on the basis of
recovery and arresting memo and the F.I.R.
was lodged after about 1-1/2 hour of
arresting of the appellants. The manner in
which, according to the prosecution, the
incident
unfolded,
does
not
inspire
confidence
inasmuch
as
theory
of
attempting robbery by knives is not proved
by the prosecution. All this shrouds the
prosecution in suspicion.

23. On the basis of the facts and
circumstances
discussed
above,
an
inference can easily be drawn that the
prosecution has not proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The contrary view taken
by the trial court is against the weight of
evidence. The substantial portion of the
judgment of the trial court depends upon
the fact that the first informant had no
enmity with the appellants to implicate in
the case.

24. For all the reasons recorded and
discussed above, I am of the considered
view that the prosecution has failed to
prove
the
charges
for
the
offence
punishable under Section 393, I.P.C. read
with Section 12 of U.P. Dacoity Affected
Area
Ordinance,
1982
against
the
appellants beyond reasonable doubt as the
evidence on record does not bring home the
guilt of the appellants beyond the pale of
doubt, the appellants are entitled to the
benefit
of
doubt.
Consequently,
the
appellants are entitled to be acquitted of the
charges for which they were tried.

25. As a result, present criminal appeal
is allowed. The impugned judgment and
order of conviction as well as sentence
694 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recorded by the trial court is set aside. The
appellants Saind Pal Singh and Prem Babu
are acquitted of the charges for which they
have been tried. The appellants Saind Pal
Singh and Prem Babu are on bail, therefore,
their personal bonds and sureties are,
hereby, discharged. The appellants will
fulfil the requirement of Section 437-A,
Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the trial court
at the earliest.

26. The trial court record be returned
forthwith with a certified copy of this
judgment for compliance. The office is
further directed to enter the judgment in
compliance register maintained for the
purpose of the Court.
----------
(2025) 9 ILRA 694
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 2477 of 1986

Har Swaroop ...Appellant
Versus
State ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
S.P.S. Raghav, Rohit Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to whether the conviction of the
appellant Suresh under Ss. 302/149 IPC and
148 IPC was sustainable in view of the ocular,
medical
and
circumstantial
evidence,
and
whether the prosecution had proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt.

Headnotes
Indian Penal Code, 1860 - SS. 147, 148,
149,
302,
307
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - S. 313 - Criminal Trial -
Appreciation
of
Evidence
-
Related/Interested
Witnesses
-
Eye
Witnesses (P.W. 3, P.W. 4, P.W. 6) -
Conduct of Near Relatives of Deceased -
Non-touching of Dead Body - Highly
Unnatural
-
Presence
at
place
of
occurrence - Doubtful - Medical Evidence -
Inconsistency with Ocular Evidence -
Direction of Fire Arm Injuries - Motive -
Alternate Suspect - Enmity Established -
Benefit of Doubt - Failure of Prosecution.
Held: Conduct of the eye witness P.W. 3, P.W.
4 and P.W. 6 is highly unnatural -Presence is
highly doubtful - Dimension and size of the
injuries does not correspond to the eye
witnesses account - Prosecution has failed to
prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable
doubt - Appeal allowed - Conviction set aside
- Appellant Suresh acquitted - Bail bonds
cancelled. (Paras 33, 34, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48,
49) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC
81; Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC
202; Darya Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965
SC 328; Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR
1988 SC 696; State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa,
(2006) 4 SCC 512; Pulicherla Nagaraju v.
State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444; Satbir
Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 13 SCC 790;
Jayabalan v. U.T. of Pondicherry, (2010) 1
SCC 199; Dharnidhar v. State of U.P., (2010)
7 SCC 759; Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P.,
AIR 2010 SC 917; Baban Shankar Daphal v.
State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
137; Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. v. State
of
Maharashtra,
(2023)
12
SCC
558;
Pahalwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2020 (6) ALJ
166; Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., 2020 (1)
ADJ 106 (DB); Jarnail Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719; State of Haryana
v. Bhagirath, (1999) 5 SCC 96; Neeraj Sharma
v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125;
Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 355; Amar Singh v.
State (NCT of Delhi), Criminal Appeal Nos.
335-336 of 2015.

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