# Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors v. Deputy Director of Consolidation District Sultanpur & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1868
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-25
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 563 of 2024
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/saiyed-mohammad-rehaan-ors-v-deputy-director-of-consolidation-district-51899
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Civil Laws - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - UP Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 - Section - 9(A)(2) - Writ
Petition - challenging the impugned remand
order passed by the revisional court - petitioners
claimed by filing of an objection u/s 9-A-(ii) of the
Act, 1953 their rights over the plots in question
on the basis that same was owned and possessed
by their ancestors and have developed on them
on the basis of General Rules of Succession - it
was St.d that said plots have been wrongly
recorded in the name of opponents - objection
was allowed - appeal - consolidation officer
decide the appeal on 28.09.2000 by undue haste
- grounds taken that on 28.09.2000 there is no
any date is fixed for hearing and order sheet
would indicate that order sheet has been altered
- Revision - DDC allowed the revision and
remanded the matter back to the Settlement officer
(Consolidation) for determination afresh - court
observed that, arbitrariness in passing the order
dated 28.09.2000 is writ large on the face of order
and the order sheet, - the dates were changed and
the order sheet deliberately manipulated so as to
pass the order before his superannuation - such an
exercise by a judicial officer or revenue officer
discharging judicial function is strongly condemned
- held, a judicial order should inspire confidence and
a judicial order which does not inspire confidence
shall be set aside and the manner of passing the
order should be above reproach and should be just,
fair and reasonable and should not be leave any
room for suspicion or arbitrariness - hence, writ
petition being devoid merits - Dismissed. (Para -
17, 18, 19)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)
5 All. Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation District
 Sultanpur & Ors.
1869
List of Cases cited:

## Text

1868 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the entries for the purposes of Section 20,
Act, 1950 cannot be doubted or questioned
or even incorrect entry (unless shown to
have
been
made
fraudulently
and
surreptitiously) will be sufficient to confer
the right of Adivasi/Sirdars/Bhumidhar
upon the person and if the entry is continued
from last 11 years, in that case, since before
start of consolidation then it cannot be
questioned in consolidation proceedings.
Similarly in the present case, the entry was
made in the year 1937-38 i.e. 1344-45 fasli
when Act,
1921
was
in
operation.
Thereafter, it remained intact when Act,
1950 has came into force w.e.f 01.07.1952
and
thereafter,
in
the
consolidation
proceedings, which were started in the year
1970's i.e. after 30 years from the date of
1345 fasli and 20 years from the date of Act,
1950, then for the first time in the
consolidation proceedings the objection was
raised by the respondents which is not
permissible under the law laid down by this
Court and over and above that the
respondents had never come with a case that
settlement made in 1345 fasli in favour of
the ancestors of the petitioners was made
fraudulently or surreptitiously.

21. In the aforesaid facts and
circumstances of this case, the present writ
petition is allowed.

22. The revisional order dated
31.12.1981 passed by respondent no. 1Deputy Director Consolidation is hereby
quashed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1868
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
Writ B No. 563 of 2024

Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation District
Sultanpur & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Dwijendra Mishra, Ajeet Kumar

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Mohan Singh

Civil Laws - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 226, - UP Consolidation and
Holdings Act, 1953 - Section - 9(A)(2) - Writ
Petition - challenging the impugned remand
order passed by the revisional court - petitioners
claimed by filing of an objection u/s 9-A-(ii) of the
Act, 1953 their rights over the plots in question
on the basis that same was owned and possessed
by their ancestors and have developed on them
on the basis of General Rules of Succession - it
was St.d that said plots have been wrongly
recorded in the name of opponents - objection
was allowed - appeal - consolidation officer
decide the appeal on 28.09.2000 by undue haste
- grounds taken that on 28.09.2000 there is no
any date is fixed for hearing and order sheet
would indicate that order sheet has been altered
- Revision - DDC allowed the revision and
remanded the matter back to the Settlement officer
(Consolidation) for determination afresh - court
observed that, arbitrariness in passing the order
dated 28.09.2000 is writ large on the face of order
and the order sheet, - the dates were changed and
the order sheet deliberately manipulated so as to
pass the order before his superannuation - such an
exercise by a judicial officer or revenue officer
discharging judicial function is strongly condemned
- held, a judicial order should inspire confidence and
a judicial order which does not inspire confidence
shall be set aside and the manner of passing the
order should be above reproach and should be just,
fair and reasonable and should not be leave any
room for suspicion or arbitrariness - hence, writ
petition being devoid merits - Dismissed. (Para -
17, 18, 19)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)
5 All. Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation District
 Sultanpur & Ors.
1869
List of Cases cited:

1. Sudha Chaudhary Vs St. of U.P. (Civil Appeal
no. 2077/2020 decided on 06.03.2020),

2. Shrirang yadavrao Waghmare Vs St. of Mah.
(2019 9 SCC 144),

3. Taras Singh Vs jyoti Basu (2005 1 SCC 201),

4. Daya Shankar Vs High Court of Allahabad
(1987 vol. 3 SCC 1),

5. R C Chandel Vs High Court of M. P. (2012 vol.
8 SCC 58),

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Dwijendra Mishra,
learned counsel for the petitioners as well as
learned Standing Counsel for respondent
nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Sri Mohan Singh, learned
counsel appearing for respondent no. 4.

2. In the light of proposed order notice
to private respondent nos. 5 to 20 is
dispensed with.

3. By means of present writ petition the
petitoiners have challenged order dated
21.02.2024, passed in Revision No. 34 of
2024 - Kafil Ahmad Vs. Syed Mohd.
Rahman, passed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation, Sultanpur.

4. It has been submitted by learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners
that
the
petitioners had filed objections under
Section 9-A(II) of the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953, claiming their right
over Plot Nos. 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123,
1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130,
1131, 1111, 1112, 1137, 870, 1138, 1247,
1114, 779/3, 842, 843 and 2661, situated at
Village - Kisni, Pargana - Jagdishpur, Tehsil
- Musafirkhana, Sultanpur (now Amethi).
The petitioners claimed their right over on
the basis that same was owned and
possessed by their ancestors and have
devolved on them on the basis of General
Rule of Succession. It was stated that the
said plots have been wrongly recorded in the
name of MOhd. Ahmad and Syed Ahmad
S/o Nawab Ali. The Consolidation Officer
has decided the application of the petitioners
and passed order in their favour by means of
order dated 28.09.2000.

5. Aggrieved by the order dated
28.09.2000, an appeal was filed before the
Settlement
Officer
(Consolidation)
by
respondent nos. 5 to 13, which appeal was
dismissed by order dated 25.05.2005. In the
appeal it was submitted that the case was
decided on 28.09.2000 by the Consolidation
Officer, with undue haste and it was
contended that the case as not listed on the
said date on which it was decided. It was
submitted that the case was listed on
18.09.2000, on which date arguments of the
parties were heard and next date was fixed,
but portion of the order sheet was destroyed
where next date was endorsed and
28.09.2000 was subsequently inserted, on
which date no proceedings took place and
the matter was further listed on 13.10.2000,
which date was deleted and the matter was
fixed for 25.09.2000.

6. It was submitted that perusal of the
order sheet would indicate that the order
sheet has been altered and manipulated only
because the Presiding Officer was about to
retire and therefore, prayed that the
impugned order be set aside and the matter
be remanded. The Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) did not agree with the
submissions
of
the
appellant
and
accordingly dismissed the appeal.

7. Revision was filed against the order
of Settlement Officer (Consolidation) before
1870 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who
has allowed the revision and remanded the
matter back to the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) for determination afresh.
While allowing the revision, the Deputy
Director of Consolidation was of the view
that as per order sheet the case as listed on
28.08.2000 and the parties were present and
the case was adjourned for 18.09.2000. On
18.09.2000 general date was fixed i.e.
28.09.2000 and subsequently the case was
listed on 16.10.2000, 13.11.2000 and
04.01.2001. He has further noticed that
typed order sheet exists till passing of order
dated 28.09.2000 and there is no mention as
to whether parties were heard or not.

8.

The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation has further noticed the fact
that in the year 2000 facility of stenographer
was not provided to the Consolidation
Officer and accordingly entire order sheet is
suspect and the orders passed by the
Consolidation Officer become suspect. He
has further noticed that in the present case
date was fixed for 04.01.2001 but as the
Presiding Officer was about to retire, date
was changed and the impugned order dated
28.09.2000 was passed by the Consolidation
Officer.

9. It is in the aforesaid circumstances
that the Deputy Director of Consolidation
has allowed the revision and set aside the
order passed by the Settlement Officer
(Consolidation) dated 21.09.2009 as well as
order of Consolidation Officer dated
28.09.2000.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has vehemently urged that there is no
infirmity in the order passed by the
Consolidation Officer and this aspect of the
matter has been rightly considered by the
Settlement Officer (Consolidation). He
further submits that even in case revisional
authority was of the opinion that the order of
Consolidation Officer was illegal and
arbitrary, he should not have proceeded to
decide the matter on merits rather then
remanding
the
matter
back
to
the
Consolidation Officer.

11. Learned Standing Counsel on the
other hand has opposed the writ petition. He
has submitted that there are ample evidence
on record to indicate that there has been
manipulation of records and specially the
order sheet at the stage of Consolidation
Officer who looking into his retirement
seems to have altered the dates and passed
the order dated 28.09.2000. He has
supported the order passed by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation and prayed for
dismissal of the writ petition.

12. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

13. It is at the very outset noticed that
the Consolidation Officer has by means of
impugned order has not only allowed the
objections filed by the petitioner but has also
adjudicated upon the issue with regard to
public way and canal, in favour of the
petitioner. While passing any such order it
was mandatory to issue notice to the Gaon
Sabha. It is further noticed that the order
dated 28.09.2000 has been passed in haste
without considering the evidence on record
and points of determination nos. 8, 6, 7 and
9 and the impugned order has been passed in
a very cryptic manner in favour of petitioner.

14. The other grounds which have been
considered by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation is the manner in which the
Consolidation Officer has proceeded to
decide the objections submitted by the
petitioner and the private respondents. He
5 All. Saiyed Mohammad Rehaan & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation District
 Sultanpur & Ors.
1871
has perused the order sheet and recorded that
the case was listed on 28.08.2000 on which
date parties were present and case was
adjourned for 18.09.2000. On 18.09.2000,
general date of 28.09.2000 was fixed
subsequent to which the case was listed on
16.11.2000, 13.11.2000 and 04.01.2001.
Typed copy of the order dated 28.09.2000 is
also found on record. The Deputy Director
of Consolidation has stated that portion of
order sheet is torn and the date fixed has
been deliberately obliterated by removing
portion of the order sheet.

15. In the aforesaid circumstances,
when the matter has been adjourned to
04.01.2001, there was no occasion to decide
the case on previous date i.e. 28.09.2000 and
accordingly, such an order does not inspire
confidence and accordingly the Deputy
Director of Consolidation has rightly set
aside the order passed by the Consolidation
Officer and remanded the matter for
consideration afresh.

16. Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil
Appeal No. 2077 of 2020 - Sadhna
Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. and Another
(decided on 06.03.2020), while dealing the
issue of necessity of upholding the rule of
law has held has under :-

"17. Undoubtedly, the High Court
is correct in its observation of the applicable
law. Indeed, the end result of the judicial
process does not matter, and what matters is
only the decision-making process employed
by the delinquent officer. Clearly, it is a
principle since the nineteenth century that
Judges cannot be held responsible for the
end result or the effect of their decisions.
[See Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850.]
This is necessary to both uphold the rule of
law, and insulate judicial reasoning from
extraneous factors.

18. Even furthermore, there are no
two ways with the proposition that the
Judges, like Caesar's wife, must be above
suspicion. Judicial officers do discharge a
very sensitive and important constitutional
role. They not only keep in check excesses of
the executive, safeguard citizens' rights and
maintain law and order. Instead, they
support the very framework of civilised
society. It is courts, which uphold the law
and ensure its enforcement. They instil trust
of the constitutional order in people, and
ensure the majesty of law and adherence to
its principles. The courts, hence prevent
people from resorting to their animalistic
instincts, and instead provide them with a
gentler and more civilised alternative of
resolving disputes. In getting people to obey
their dicta, courts do not make use of guns
or other (dis)incentives, but instead rely on
the strength of their reasoning and a certain
trust and respect in the minds of the general
populace. Hence, it is necessary that any
corruption or deviation from judicial
propriety
by
the
guardians
of
law
themselves, be dealt with sternly and swiftly.

19. It has amply been reiterated by
this Court that the judicial officers must
aspire and adhere to a higher standard of
honesty, integrity and probity. Very recently
in Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of
Maharashtra
[Shrirang
Yadavrao
Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9
SCC 144 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a
Division Bench of this Court very succinctly
collated these principles and reiterated that:

"5. The first and foremost quality
required in a Judge is integrity. The need of
integrity in the judiciary is much higher than
in other institutions. The judiciary is an
institution whose foundations are based on
honesty and integrity. It is, therefore,
necessary that judicial officers should
possess the sterling quality of integrity. This
Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak
1872 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201] held
as follows:

'Integrity is the hallmark of
judicial discipline, apart from others. It is
high time the judiciary took utmost care to
see that the temple of justice does not crack
from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe
in the justice-delivery system resulting in the
failure of public confidence in the system. It
must be remembered that woodpeckers
inside pose a larger threat than the storm
outside.'

6. The behaviour of a Judge has to
be of an exacting standard, both inside and
outside the court. This Court in Daya
Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya
Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987)
3 SCC 1 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132] held thus:

'11. ? Judicial officers cannot have
two standards, one in the court and another
outside the court. They must have only one
standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity.
They cannot act even remotely unworthy of
the office they occupy.'

7. Judges are also public servants.
A Judge should always remember that he is
there to serve the public. A Judge is judged
not only by his quality of judgments but also
by the quality and purity of his character.
Impeccable integrity should be reflected
both in public and personal life of a Judge.
One who stands in judgments over others
should be incorruptible. That is the high
standard which is expected of Judges.

8. Judges must remember that they
are not merely employees but hold high public
office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P.
[R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8
SCC 58 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3
SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] ,
this Court held that the standard of conduct
expected of a Judge is much higher than that
of an ordinary person. The following
observations of this Court are relevant:

'29. Judicial service is not an
ordinary government service and the Judges
are not employees as such. Judges hold the
public office; their function is one of the
essential functions of the State. In discharge
of their functions and duties, the Judges
represent the State. The office that a Judge
holds is an office of public trust. A Judge
must be a person of impeccable integrity and
unimpeachable independence. He must be
honest to the core with high moral values.
When a litigant enters the courtroom, he
must feel secured that the Judge before
whom his matter has come, would deliver
justice impartially and uninfluenced by any
consideration. The standard of conduct
expected of a Judge is much higher than an
ordinary man. This is no excuse that since
the standards in the society have fallen, the
Judges who are drawn from the society
cannot be expected to have high standards
and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A
Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above
suspicion. The credibility of the judicial
system is dependent upon the Judges who
man it. For a democracy to thrive and the
rule of law to survive, justice system and the
judicial process have to be strong and every
Judge must discharge his judicial functions
with integrity, impartiality and intellectual
honesty.'

9. There can be no manner of
doubt that a Judge must decide the case only
on the basis of the facts on record and the
law applicable to the case. If a Judge
decides a case for any extraneous reasons
then he is not performing his duty in
accordance with law.

10. In our view the word
"gratification" does not only mean monetary
gratification. Gratification can be of various
types. It can be gratification of money,
gratification of power, gratification of lust
etc., etc."
5 All. Ram Dularey Singh & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
1873

20. We are also not oblivious to the
fact that mere suspicion cannot constitute
"misconduct".
Any
"probability"
of
misconduct needs to be supported with oral
or documentary material, even though, the
standard of proof would obviously not be on
a par with that in a criminal trial. While
applying these yardsticks, the High Court is
expected to consider the existence of
differing
standards
and
approaches
amongst
different
Judges.
There
are
innumerable instances of judicial officers
who are liberal in granting bail, awarding
compensation under MACT or for acquired
land, back wages to workmen or mandatory
compensation in other cases of tortious
liabilities. Such relief-oriented judicial
approaches cannot by themselves be
grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty
and integrity of an officer.

21.
Furthermore,
one
cannot
overlook the reality of ours being a country,
wherein countless complainants are readily
available without hesitation to tarnish the
image of the judiciary, often for mere pennies
or
even
cheap
momentary
popularity.
Sometimes, a few disgruntled members of the
Bar also join hands with them, and the officers
of the subordinate judiciary are usually the
easiest target. It is, therefore, the duty of the
High Courts to extend their protective
umbrella and ensure that the upright and
straightforward judicial officers are not
subjected to unmerited onslaught."

17. A judicial order should inspire
confidence and a judicial order which does
not inspire confidence shall be set aside and
the manner of passing the order should be
above reproach and should be just, fair and
reasonable and should not leave any room
for suspicion or arbitrariness.

18. Arbitrariness in passing the order
dated 28.09.2000 is writ large on the face of
the order and the order sheet. The dates were
changed and the order sheet deliberately
manipulated so as to pass the order before
his superannuation. Such an exercise by a
Judicial
Officer
or
Revenue
Officer
discharging judicial functions is strongly
condemned.

19. From the discussion made above as
well as in view of the arguments raised by
the petitioners, no ground for interference in
the matter by this Court is made out. Hence
the prayer made by the petitioners in the
present writ petition are declined.

20. The writ petition being devoid of
merits is dismissed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1873
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 09.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR, J.

Writ B No. 739 of 1982

Ram Dularey Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
S. Mirza, Ashok Kumar Verma, Jagdish,
Nirmal Singh

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C., Ashok Kumar Verma, Harguru
Charan, K.P Singh

Consolidation-Appellate
order
passed
by
Settlement Officer, Consolidation and Revisional
order impugned-undisputed fact between the
parties that the identity of the holdings has been
changed-was not in the identical form as it was
at the time of common ancestor and admitting