# Salamat Ansari & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 1 ILRA 1075
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-08-25
- **Case number:** Chattisgarh Cr.M.P. No. 1068 of 2014
- **Bench:** Pankaj Naqvi, Vivek Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/salamat-ansari-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46099
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Criminal Law-Couple have attained age of
majority-contracted marriage and living
together-no
offence
made
out-F.I.R.
quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

1 All. Salamat Ansari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1075
Code, including the provisions of Sections
451
and
457
wholesomely
applied,
therefore, Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai can
at best be said to be an authority on the
general law regarding release of vehicle
seized in connection with any criminal
case.

23. From the perusal of impugned order
dated 25.08.2020 passed by learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, it transpires that learned
Magistrate has considered and followed the
legal position as expounded by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the Case of Shambhu Dayal
Agarwala, Oma Ram and followed in the
case of Vishnu Prasad Vaishnav Vs. State of
Chattisgarh Cr.M.P. No. 1068 of 2014
decided on 17.12.2014 and concluded that
during pendency of confiscation proceedings
before Collector under Section 6A of
Essential Commodities Act, Magistrate has
no jurisdiction to entertain the application for
release of vehicle, is correct and proper in the
eye of law.

24. In view of above, there is no any
manifest error of law or perversity in the
impugned order passed by learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, therefore, it does not
warrant any interference by this Court.

25. The present application u/s 482
Cr.P.C. being devoid of merits is hereby
dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2021)01ILR A1075
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ NAQVI, J.
THE HON'BLE VIVEK AGARWAL, J.

Crl. Misc. W.P. No. 11367 of 2020
Salamat Ansari & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rakesh Kumar Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A., Sri Ritesh Kumar Singh

Criminal Law-Couple have attained age of
majority-contracted marriage and living
together-no
offence
made
out-F.I.R.
quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Shafin Jahan Vs Asokan K.M (2018) 16 SCC
368

2. Shakti Vahini Vs U.O.I. (2018) 7 SCC 192

3. NandaKumar Vs St. of Ker., (2018) 16 SCC
602

4. KS Puttaswamy Vs U.O.I. (2017) 10 SCC 1

5. Smt Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali Mishra &
anr. Vs St. of U.P. & oth., Writ C No. 57068 of
2014 (distinguished)

6.Priyanshi @ Km. Shamren & ors. Vs St. of U.P.
&
anr.,
Writ
C
No.
14288
of
2020
(distinguished)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Naqvi, J.)

Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Mishra,
learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri
Ritesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for
the informant and Sri Deepak Mishra, the
learned A.G.A.

Learned AGA and the learned counsel
for the informant do not propose to file any
counter affidavit. With the consent of all,
the petition is being heard and finally
decided under the rules of the Court.
1076 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

This writ petition has been filed,
seeking a writ of mandamus, directing the
respondent concerned, not to arrest the
petitioners, with a further prayer for
quashing
the
impugned
F.I.R.
dated
25.08.2019 registered as Case Crime No.
0199 of 2019, under Sections 363, 366,
352, 506 I.P.C. and Section 7/8 POCSO
Act, Police Station- Vishnupura, District
Kushi Nagar.

1. Salamat Ansari and Priyanka
Kharwar @ Alia along with two others
have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court for seeking quashment of an
FIR dated 28.08.2019 as Case Crime No.
0199 of 2019 under Sections 363, 366, 352,
506 IPC and Section 7/8 POCSO Act,
Police Station Vishnupura, Kushinagar on
the premise that the couple is of the age of
majority, competent to contract a marriage,
performed Nikah on 19.08.2019 as per
muslim rites and rituals, after Priyanka
Kharwar renounced her Hindu identity and
embraced Islam. It is further submitted that
the couple has been living together as
husband and wife since last one year
peacefully and happily. It is finally
submitted that the FIR lodged by father of
petitioner no. 4/Priyanka Kharwar @ Alia
is prompted by malice and mischief only
with a view to bring an end to martial ties,
no offences are made out, FIR be quashed.

2. Learned AGA and learned counsel
for the informant vehemently opposed the
submissions on the premise that conversion
per se for contracting a marriage is
prohibited, said marriage has no sanctity in
law, thus this Court should not exercise its
extra-ordinary jurisdiction in favour of such
a couple. They relied on a judgment of a
Learned Single Judge in Writ C No. 57068
of 2014 (Smt Noor Jahan Begum @ Anjali
Mishra and Another vs. State of U.P. and
others) decided on 16.12.2014 and its
recent reiteration in Writ C No. 14288 of
2020 (Priyanshi @ Km. Shamren and
others Vs. State of U.P. and Another)
decided on 23.09.2020.

3. There is no dispute that the couple
has attained the age of majority as Priyanka
Kharwar @ Alia's date of birth as per High
School
Certificate
(annexure
3)
is
07.07.1999 which is an enlisted document
in
Juvenile
Justice
Act,
2015
for
determining the age of an individual
coupled with the fact that the entry of the
date of birth is not under challenge. The
mere fact that this petition is filed and
supported by an affidavit of Priyanka
Kharwar @ Alia alleged victim, goes to
show that she is voluntarily living with
Salamat Ansari as a married couple.

4. Once age of Priyanka Kharwar @
Alia is not in dispute as she is reported to
be around 21 years, petitioner nos. 1 to 3
cannot be made accused for committing an
offence under Section 363 IPC or 366 IPC
as victim on her own left her home in order
to live with Salamat Ansari. Similarly once
Priyanka Kharwar @ Alia is found not to
be a juvenile, the offence under Seciton 7/8
POCSO Act is also not made out.
Allegations relating to offence under
Section 352, 506 IPC qua petitioner no. 2
and 3 prima facie, in view of above
background, appear to be exaggerated and
malafidely motivated with a view to
implicate the family of petitioner no. 1 as
petitioner no. 2 and 3 are mother and
brother of petitioner no. 1 respectively.

5. We do not see Priyanka Kharwar
and Salamat as Hindu and Muslim, rather
as two grown up individuals who out of
their own free will and choice are living
together peacefully and happily over a year.
1 All. Salamat Ansari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1077
The Courts and the Constitutional Courts in
particular are enjoined to uphold the life
and liberty of an individual guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Right to live with a person of his/her
choice irrespective of religion professed by
them, is intrinsic to right to life and
personal liberty. Interference in a personal
relationship, would constitute a serious
encroachment into the right to freedom of
choice of the two individuals. We fail to
understand that if the law permits two
persons even of the same sex to live
together
peacefully
then
neither
any
individual nor a family nor even State can
have objection to relationship of two major
individuals who out of their own free will
are living together. Decision of an
individual who is of the age of majority, to
live with an individual of his/her choice is
strictly a right of an individual and when
this right is infringed it would constitute
breach of his/her fundamental right to life
and personal liberty as it includes right to
freedom of choice, to choose a partner and
right to live with dignity as enshrined in
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

6. The Apex Court in Shafin Jahan
v. Asokan K.M (2018) 16 SCC 368,
decided on April 9, 2018, held as under:

"74. The principles which underlie
the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court
in a habeas corpus petition have been
reiterated in several decisions of the
Court. In Gian Devi v Superintendent,
Nari Niketan, Delhi31, a three-judge
Bench observed that where an individual
is over eighteen years of age, no fetters
could be placed on her choice on where
to reside or about the person with whom
she could stay:

"7. Whatever may be the date
of birth of the petitioner, the fact
remains that she is at present more than
18 years of age. As the petitioner is sui
juris no fetters can be placed upon her
choice of the person with whom she is to
stay, nor can any restriction be imposed
regarding the place where she should
stay. The court or the relatives of the
petitioner can also not substitute their
opinion or preference for that of the
petitioner in such a matter." (emphasis
supplied)

75. The ambit of a habeas corpus
petition is to trace an individual who is
stated to be missing. Once the individual
appears before the court and asserts that
as a major, she or he is not under illegal
confinement, which the court finds to be
a free expression of will, that would
conclude the exercise of the jurisdiction.
In Girish v Radhamony a two judge
Bench of this Court observed thus:

"3 In a habeas corpus petition, all
that is required is to find out and
produce in court the person who is stated
to be missing. Once the person appeared
and she stated that she had gone of her
own free will, the High Court had no
further jurisdiction to pass the impugned
order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution."

76. In Lata Singh v State of U.P,
Bench of two judges took judicial notice
of the harassment, threat and violence
meted out to young women and men who
marry outside their caste or faith. The
court observed that our society is
emerging
through
a
crucial
transformational period and the court
cannot remain silent upon such matters
of grave concern. In the view of the
court:

"17 This is a free and democratic
country, and once a person becomes a
major he or she can marry whosoever
he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or
1078 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
girl do not approve of such inter-caste or
inter-religious marriage the maximum
they can do is that they can cut-off social
relations with the son or the daughter,
but they cannot give threats or commit
or instigate acts of violence and cannot
harass the person who undergoes such
inter-caste or inter-religious marriage.
We,
therefore,
direct
that
the
administration/police
authorities
throughout the country will see to it that
if any boy or girl who is a major
undergoes inter-caste or inter-religious
marriage with a woman or man who is a
major, the couple is not harassed by
anyone nor subjected to threats or acts
of violence, and anyone who gives such
threats or harasses or commits acts of
violence
either
himself
or
at
his
instigation, is taken to task by instituting
criminal proceedings by the police
against such persons and further stern
action is taken against such persons as
provided by law." (emphasis supplied)

77. Reiterating these principles in
Bhagwan Dass v State (NCT OF
DELHI), this Court adverted to the
social evil of honour killings as being but
a reflection of a feudal mindset which is
a slur on the nation.

78. In a more recent decision of a
three judge Bench in Soni Gerry v Gerry
Douglas, this Court dealt with a case
where the daughter of the appellant and
respondent, who was a major had
expressed a desire to reside in Kuwait,
where she was pursuing her education,
with her father. This Court observed
thus:

"9 She has, without any hesitation,
clearly stated that she intends to go back
to Kuwait to pursue her career. In such a
situation, we are of the considered
opinion that as a major, she is entitled to
exercise her choice and freedom and the
Court cannot get into the aspect whether
she has been forced by the father or not.
There may be ample reasons on her
behalf to go back to her father in
Kuwait, but we are not concerned with
her reasons. What she has stated before
the Court, that alone matters and that is
the heart of the reasoning for this Court,
which keeps all controversies at bay.

10. It needs no special emphasis to
state that attaining the age of majority in
an
individual's
life
has
its
own
significance. She/He is entitled to make
her/his choice. The courts cannot, as long
as the choice remains, assume the role of
parens patriae. The daughter is entitled
to enjoy her freedom as the law permits
and the court should not assume the role
of a super guardian being moved by any
kind of sentiment of the mother or the
egotism of the father. We say so without
any reservation."

79. These principles emerge from a
succession
of
judicial
decisions.
Fundamental to them is the judgment of
a Constitution bench of this Court in
Kanu Sanyal v District Magistrate,
Darjeeling.

7. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment
manifests that the Apex Court has consistently
respected the liberty of an individual who has
attained the age of majority.

8. The Apex Court in Shakti Vahini Vs.
Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 192 came down
heavily on the perpetrators of "honour killings",
which the Court found not only horrific and
barbaric but also interfering with the right to
choose a life partner and the dignity of an
individual. The Apex Court held as under:-

"44. The concept of liberty has to be
weighed and tested on the touchstone of
constitutional sensitivity, protection and
1 All. Salamat Ansari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1079
the values it stands for. It is the
obligation of the Constitutional Courts
as the sentinel on qui vive to zealously
guard the right to liberty of an
individual as the dignified existence of an
individual has an inseparable association
with liberty. Without sustenance of
liberty, subject to constitutionally valid
provisions of law, the life of a person is
comparable to the living dead having to
endure cruelty and torture without
protest
and
tolerate
imposition
of
thoughts and ideas without a voice to
dissent or record a disagreement. The
fundamental
feature
of
dignified
existence is to assert for dignity that has
the spark of divinity and the realization
of choice within the parameters of law
without any kind of subjugation. The
purpose of laying stress on the concepts
of individual dignity and choice within
the framework of liberty is of paramount
importance.
We
may
clearly
and
emphatically state that life and liberty
sans dignity and choice is a phenomenon
that allows hollowness to enter into the
constitutional recognition of identity of a
person. (emphasis supplied)

45. The choice of an individual is an
inextricable part of dignity, for dignity
cannot be thought of where there is
erosion of choice. True it is, the same is
bound by the principle of constitutional
limitation but in the absence of such
limitation, none, we mean, no one shall
be
permitted
to
interfere
in
the
fructification of the said choice. If the
right to express one's own choice is
obstructed,
it
would
be
extremely
difficult to think of dignity in its
sanctified
completeness.
When
two
adults marry out of their volition, they
choose their path; they consummate
their relationship; they feel that it is
their goal and they have the right to do
so. And it can unequivocally be stated
that they have the right and any
infringement of the said right is a
constitutional violation...

46. It has been argued on behalf of
the "Khap Panchayats" that it is a
misnomer to call them by such a name.
The
nomenclature
is
absolutely
irrelevant. What is really significant is
that the assembly of certain core groups
meet, summon and forcefully ensure the
presence of the couple and the family
members and then adjudicate and
impose
punishment.
Their
further
submission is that these panchayats are
committed to the spreading of awareness
of permissibility of inter-community and
inter-caste marriages and they also tell
the people at large how "Sapinda" and
"Sagotra" marriages have no sanction of
law.
The
propositions
have
been
structured with immense craft and
advanced with enormous zeal and
enthusiasm but the fallacy behind the
said
proponements
is
easily
decipherable. The argument is founded
on the premise that there are certain
statutory
provisions
and
certain
judgments of this Court which prescribe
the prohibitory degrees for marriages
and provide certain guidelines for
maintaining the sex ratio and not giving
any allowance for female foeticide that is
a resultant effect of sex determination
which is prohibited under the PreConception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic
Techniques
(Prohibition
on
Sex
Selection) Act, 1994 (for short 'PCPNDT
Act')
(See
:
Voluntary
Health
Association of Punjab v. Union of India
and others12 and Voluntary Health
Association of Punjab v. Union of India
and others13)

47. The first argument deserves to
be rejected without much discussion.
1080 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Suffice it to say, the same relates to the
recognition of matrimonial status. If it is
prohibited in law, law shall take note of
it when the courts are approached.
Similarly, PCPNDT Act is a complete
code. That apart, the concern of this
Court in spreading awareness to sustain
sex
ratio
is
not
to
go
for
sex
determination and resultantly female
foeticide. It has nothing to do with the
institution
of
marriage."
(emphasis
supplied)

9. We are conscious that above
observations were made in connection with
"honour killings" but we are of the firm
view that the said principle would apply in
the present context too where a relationship
of two matured individuals is sought to be
jeopardized at the whim and caprice of a
parent.

10. We find from para 46 and 47 of
Shakti Vahini (supra) that even if a
marriage is prohibited in law, same shall be
taken note of only when the courts are
approached
for
recognition
of
such
marriage, which finds further corroboration
in the case of NandaKumar vs. State of
Kerala, (2018) 16 SCC 602 which after
relying upon Shafin Jahan (supra) held that
on attaining majority an individual is
entitled to make his/her choice which is
pivotal and cannot be infringed by anyone.
The
relevant
paragraphs
are
quoted
hereunder:-

"7. A neat submission which is
made by the learned counsel for the
appellants is that the High Court has
adopted an approach which is not
permissible in law by going into the
validity of marriage. It is submitted that
when Thushara is admittedly a major
i.e., more than 18 years of age, she has
right to live wherever she wants to or
move as per her choice. As she is not a
minor daughter of respondent No. 4,
"custody" of Thushara could not be
entrusted to him.

8.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellants is right in his submission.
Even the counsel for the State did not
dispute the aforesaid position in law and,
in fact, supported this submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants.....

12. The Court also emphasised due
importance to the right of an adult
person, which the Constitution accords
to an adult person as under, (Shafin
Jahan's case para 52)

"Choosing
a
faith
is
the
substratum of individuality and sans it,
the right of choice becomes a shadow. It
has
to
be
remembered
that
the
realization of a right is more important
than the conferment of the right. Such
actualization indeed ostracises any kind
of societal notoriety and keeps at bay the
patriarchal supremacy. It is so because
the individualistic faith and expression of
choice
are
fundamental
for
the
fructification of the right. Thus, we
would like to call it indispensable
preliminary condition."

11. Right to choose a partner
irrespective of caste, creed or religion, is
inhered under right to life and personal
liberty, an integral part of the Fundamental
Right under Article 21 of the Constitution
of
India.
The
Apex
Court
in
KS
Puttaswamy vs Union of India (2017) 10
SCC 1 while deciding the issue of right to
privacy, held as under:-

298. Privacy of the individual is an
essential aspect of dignity. Dignity has
both an intrinsic and instrumental value.
As an intrinsic value, human dignity is
1 All. Salamat Ansari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1081
an entitlement or a constitutionally
protected
interest
in
itself.
In
its
instrumental facet, dignity and freedom
are inseparably inter-twined, each being
a facilitative tool to achieve the other.
The ability of the individual to protect a
zone of privacy enables the realization of
the full value of life and liberty. Liberty
has a broader meaning of which privacy
is a subset. All liberties may not be
exercised in privacy. Yet others can be
fulfilled only within a private space.
Privacy enables the individual to retain
the autonomy of the body and mind. The
autonomy of the individual is the ability
to make decisions on vital matters of
concern to life. Privacy has not been
couched as an independent fundamental
right. But that does not detract from the
constitutional protection afforded to it,
once the true nature of privacy and its
relationship with those fundamental
rights which are expressly protected is
understood. Privacy lies across the
spectrum of protected freedoms. The
guarantee of equality is a guarantee
against arbitrary state action. It prevents
the state from discriminating between
individuals. The destruction by the state
of a sanctified personal space whether of
the body or of the mind is violative of the
guarantee against arbitrary state action.
Privacy of the body entitles an individual
to the integrity of the physical aspects of
personhood. The intersection between
one's mental integrity and privacy
entitles the individual to freedom of
thought, the freedom to believe in what
is right, and the freedom of selfdetermination. When these guarantees
intersect with gender, they create a
private space which protects all those
elements which are crucial to gender
identity.
The
family,
marriage,
procreation and sexual orientation are
all integral to the dignity of the
individual. Above all, the privacy of the
individual recognises an inviolable right
to determine how freedom shall be
exercised. An individual may perceive
that the best form of expression is to
remain silent. Silence postulates a realm
of privacy. An artist finds reflection of
the soul in a creative endeavour. A
writer expresses the outcome of a
process
of
thought.
A
musician
contemplates
upon
notes
which
musically lead to silence. The silence,
which lies within, reflects on the ability
to choose how to convey thoughts and
ideas or interact with others. These are
crucial aspects of personhood. The
freedoms Under Article 19 can be
fulfilled where the individual is entitled
to decide upon his or her preferences.
Read in conjunction with Article 21,
liberty enables the individual to have a
choice of preferences on various facets of
life including what and how one will eat,
the way one will dress, the faith one will
espouse and a myriad other matters on
which autonomy and self-determination
require a choice to be made within the
privacy of the mind. The constitutional
right to the freedom of religion Under
Article 25 has implicit within it the
ability to choose a faith and the freedom
to express or not express those choices to
the world. These are some illustrations of
the manner in which privacy facilitates
freedom and is intrinsic to the exercise of
liberty.
The
Constitution
does
not
contain a separate Article telling us that
privacy has been declared to be a
fundamental right. Nor have we tagged
the provisions of Part III with an alpha
suffixed right of privacy: this is not an
act of judicial redrafting. Dignity cannot
exist without privacy. Both reside within
the inalienable values of life, liberty and
1082 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
freedom which the Constitution has
recognised. Privacy is the ultimate
expression
of
the
sanctity
of
the
individual. It is a constitutional value
which straddles across the spectrum of
fundamental rights and protects for the
individual a zone of choice and selfdetermination. (emphasis supplied)

299. Privacy represents the core of
the human personality and recognises
the ability of each individual to make
choices and to take decisions governing
matters intimate and personal. Yet, it is
necessary
to
acknowledge
that
individuals live in communities and work
in
communities.
Their
personalities
affect and, in turn are shaped by their
social environment. The individual is not
a hermit. The lives of individuals are as
much a social phenomenon. In their
interactions with others, individuals are
constantly
engaged
in
behavioural
patterns and in relationships impacting
on the rest of society. Equally, the life of
the individual is being consistently
shaped by cultural and social values
imbibed from living in the community.
(emphasis supplied)

323. Privacy includes at its core the
preservation of personal intimacies, the
sanctity
of
family
life,
marriage,
procreation,
the
home
and
sexual
orientation. Privacy also connotes a right
to be left alone. Privacy safeguards
individual autonomy and recognises the
ability of the individual to control vital
aspects of his or her life. Personal
choices governing a way of life are
intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects
heterogeneity
and
recognises
the
plurality and diversity of our culture.
While the legitimate expectation of
privacy may vary from the intimate zone
to the private zone and from the private
to the public arenas, it is important to
underscore that privacy is not lost or
surrendered
merely
because
the
individual is in a public place. Privacy
attaches to the person since it is an
essential facet of the dignity of the
human being; (emphasis supplied)

12. We now propose to deal with the
judgment passed by learned Single Judge
of this Court in Noor Jahan (supra). Noor
Jahan along with her alleged husband
approached
this
Court
for
claiming
protection as it was alleged that she had
embraced Islam after renouncing her Hindu
identity to contract a Nikah with her
Muslim husband. There were four more
petitions filed by married couples, wherein
the identity of a lady in each case was
analogous to that of Noor Jahan. The writ
Court recorded the following statements of
the ladies who appeared in person before
the Court.

Statement of Petitioner No.1 (girl) in
Writ C No. 58129 of 2014

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t;a=h izlkn fuoklh taxyhiqj Fkkuk Hkkokuhxat ftyk
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c;ku fd;k fd vkt fnukWd 3&11&14 dks
fuEufyf[kr c;ku ns jgh gwWA esjs firk th dk uke
t;a=h izlkn gS eSa taxyhiqj ftyk fl)kFkZuxj dh
jgus okyh gwWA eSa b.Vj ehfM,V rd i<+h gwWA eSa
bykgkckn fnukWd 20 vDVwcj lu~ 2014 dks 5 cts
lk;adky vkbZ FkhA eSa bykgkckn vdsyh vkbZ FkhA esjk
fudkg ukS cts fnu esa bykgkckn esa vCnqy jghe us
ccyw mQZ bjQku ds lkFk djk fn;k A ;g fudkg
vdcj iqj ftyk bykgkckn esa djk;k x;k FkkA esjk
/keZ ifjorZu vCnqy jghe fu0 vdcjiqj ftyk
bykgkckn esa djk;k x;k FkkA ;g /keZ ifjroZu mUgksaus
'kknh djus ds fy, djk;k FkkA ;g /keZ ifjorZu
mUgksaus ccyw mQZ bjQku tks fd ;kph la[;k nks gS ds
dgus ij djk;k FkkA /keZ ifjorZu izek.k i= tks fd
bl ;kfpdk dk layXud rhu gS eq>s vCnqy jghe us
vdcjiqj bykgkckn esa fn;k FkkA bl dkxt ds fo"k;
esa eSa dqN ugha tkurh gwWA bLyke ds ckjs esa eSa dqN
1 All. Salamat Ansari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1083
ugha tkurh gwWA dfFkr fudkgukek tks ;kfpdk dk
layXud pkj gS esa fudkg dk LFkku unZ gkbZdksVZ
bykgkckn vFkkZr~ gkbZdksVZ ds djhc fy[kk gqvk gSA
;gkW esjk fudkg ugha gqvkA C;ku i<+ o lqudj
rLnhd fd;k^^

Statement of Petitioner No.1
(Girl) in Writ C No. 62587 of 2014

^^;kph la0 1 lksue mQZ fiz;adk us le{k
U;k;ky; l'kiFk c;ku fd;k fd vkt fnukWd
21&11&14 dks fuEufyf[kr c;ku ns jgh gwWA
esjk uke lksue mQZ fiz;adk gSA esjs firk th
dk uke Hkxoku flag gSA og ,d d`"kd gSA og
uxyk yks/kbZ xkao es [ksrh djrs gSA esjk
fudkg dc gqvk] eq>s ;kn ugh gSA

Statement of Petitioner No.1
(Girl) in Writ C No. 60494 of 2014

;kph la0&1 us le{k U;k;ky; l'kiFk
c;ku fd;k fd vkt fnukWd 13&11&14 dks
fuEufyf[kr c;ku ns jgh gwWA esjk uke vk;lk
csxe mQZ vuhrk fo'odekZ esjs firk th dk
uke Jh f'ko lju yky gSA oks dq.Mk izrkix<
esa jgrs gSaA eSa ch0,0 rd i<+h gwWA esjk /keZ
ifjorZu eks0 lyhe us djok;k Fkk A ;s /keZ
ifjorZu Jh lyeku ds lkFk 'kknh djokus ds
fy, djok;k FkkA esjk fudkg lyeku us
dpgjh] esa djok;k A fudkg esa D;k gqvk eq>s
ekywe ugha A eq>s bLyke ds ckjs esa irk ugha
gSA

Statement
of
Petitioner
no.
1(girl) in Writ C No. 57068 of 2014
:-

^^uwjtgkW csxe mQZ vatyh feJk ,oa ,d
vU; cuke LVsV vkQ ;w0ih0 ,oa vU; ;kph
la0 1 vatyh feJk le{k U;k;ky; l'kiFk
c;ku fd;k &

Jh vf[kys'k feJk esjs ikik dk uke gSA
;g nsofj;k esa jgrs gSa eSa bUgha ds lkFk jgrh
FkhA eSa b.Vj rd i<+h gqbZ gwWA eSa bLyke /keZ
ds ckjs esa dqN ugha tkurh gwWA fn0 23 flrEcj
2014 dks esjk /keZ ifjorZu eks0 lyhe ;kph
la0 2 ds ?kj ij djk;k x;k FkkA tc ;g /keZ
ifjorZu djk;k x;k rc eSa vyx dejs esa cSBh
Fkh vkSj ckgj ekSyoh futke vgen cSBs Fks
mlh le; fudkg gks x;k Fkk ekSyoh lkgc us
djk;k FkkA Jh eks0 lyhe lkM+h dk C;kikj
djrs gSaA 'kknh djus ds fy, ;g /keZ ifjorZu
gqvk FkkA^^

Statement of Petitioner no. 1(girl) in
Writ C No. 58910 of 2014 :-

^^esjk uke lksuh mQZ lkfc;k] iRuh lxhj vgen
gSA esjs firk dk uke jes'k pUnz gSA eSa bl ;kfpdk esa
;kfpuh la0 1 gwWA eSa 217 lEHky xsV pankSlh ftyk
lEHky dh jgus okyh gwWA

eS l'kiFk c;ku djrh gwW fd& esjs firk th esaFkk
QSDVzh esa ukSdjh djrs gSaA eSa Lukrd dh Nk=k gwWA eSa
bLyke /keZ ds ckjs esa ugha tkurh gwWA eq>s 'kknh ds fy,
bLyke /keZ dqcqy djok;k x;kA eq>s lxhj vgen ;kph
la0 2 ds mifLFkfr esa bLyke /keZ dqcqy djok;k x;kA
;g dqcwyukek 15 tqykbZ 2014 dks gqvkA lxhj vgen
th us esjs lkFk fudkg 1 vxLr 2014 dks fdlh dkth
ls djk;kA mUgksaus ;g fudkg ekSgEen gqlSu ds ?kj ij
djok;kA eq>s ugha ekywe fd fudkgukek tks ;kfpdk
layXud la0 2 gS ds vuqlkj fudkg 10 vxLr 2014 dks
djok;k x;k A lxhj vgen 'kh'ks dk dke etnwjh ij
djrs gSaA^^

13. We find from the judgement in
Noor Jahan's case that no doubt the ladies in
question could not authenticate their alleged
conversion as they were unable to show the
knowledge regarding the basic tenets of
Islam, the writ court against the above
background held that the alleged marriage
was illegal as it was performed after a
conversion which could not be justified in
law.

14. We lest not forget that couples in
Noor Jahan and other cognate petitions
preferred a joint petition on the basis of
alleged conversion of one of the partners.
Once the alleged conversion was under clout,
the Constitutional Court was obliged to
ascertain the wish and desire of the girls as
they were above the age of 18 years. To
disregard the choice of a person who is of the
age of majority would not only be antithetic
1084 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the freedom of choice of a grown up
individual but would also be a threat to the
concept of unity in diversity. An individual
on attaining majority is statutorily conferred a
right to choose a partner, which if denied
would not only affect his/her human right but
also his/her right to life and personal liberty,
guaranteed
under
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India. We say so for the
reason that irrespective of the conversion
being under clout, the mere fact that the
couple was living together, the alleged
relationship can very well be classified as a
relationship in the nature of marriage distinct
from the relationship arising out of marriage,
in view of the provisions of Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

15. The judgment in Priyanshi (supra)
followed Noor Jahan (supra). None of these
judgments dealt with the issue of life and
liberty of two matured individuals in
choosing a partner or their right to freedom of
choice as to with whom they would like to
live. We hold the judgments in Noor Jahan
and Priyanshi as not laying good law.

16. We before parting wish to reiterate
that we are quashing the FIR primarily on the
ground that no offences are made out, as
discussed above, as also the fact that two
grown up individuals are before us, living
together for over a year of their own free will
and choice. The ultimate contention on behalf
of the informant was that he be afforded
visiting rights to meet his daughter. Once
petitioner no. 4 has attained majority, then it
is her choice, as to whom she would like to
meet. We, however expect the daughter to
extend all due courtseys and respect to her
family.

17. We clarify that while deciding this
petition, we have not commented upon the
validity of alleged marriage/conversion.

18. In view of above discussion, the writ
petition succeeds and is allowed. The F.I.R. dated
25.08.2019 registered as Case Crime No. 0199 of
2019, under Sections 363, 366, 352, 506 IPC and
Section 7/8 POCSO Act, Police Station-
Vishunpura, District Kushi Nagar as well as all
consequential proceedings are hereby quashed.
----------
(2021)01ILR A1084
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.
THE HON'BLE GAUTAM CHOWDHARY, J.

Crl. Misc. W.P. No. 16767 of 2020

Mohd. Gufran @ Gufran ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Kshitiz Shailendra

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A., Sri Dileep Singh Yadav

Civil Law-Matrimonial dispute-both party
want to bury their differences-PartiesMuslim religion-both have accepted talaq
(Khula Talaq)- Complaint quashed.

W.P. disposed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Bitan Sengupta Vs St. of W.B., AIR 2018 SC
(Supp) 1217,

2. Kamlesh Kalra Vs Shilpika Kalra & ors., 2020 0
Supreme (SC) 605

3. B.S. Joshi & ors. Vs St. of Har. & anr., 2003 0
Supreme (SC) 332

4. Application U/s 482 No. 13797 of 2020