# Sallahuddin v. State of U.P. & Anr. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 438
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-09-26
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 2958 of 2022
- **Bench:** Ajai Kumar Srivastava-I
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sallahuddin-v-state-of-u-p-anr-opp-parties-49071
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian
Penal Code, 1860-Sections 420, 120B,
153A, 153B, 295A, & 511 - Sections 3/5/8
U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of
Religion Act, 2021-Denial -default bailaccused was arrested from Gujrat, his
judicial custody remand was granted time
to time-the chargesheet filed on 48th day
from the date of first remand-further,
supplementary chargesheet filed in the
court on 79th day and the learned court
below took cognizance of the matterThus, no occasion for applicant arose to
seek default bail under the proviso (a) of
Section
167(2)
Cr.P.C.-Special
Court
rightly rejected the application seeking
default bail-More so, Special Court Order
is an appealable order in view of the
provisions contained in Section 21(4) of
N.I.A.
Act,
2008-Hence,
the
instant
application is not maintainable.(Para 1 to
26)

B. The object behind the enactment of
Section 167 Cr.P.C. is to see that the
detention of the accused should not be
permitted for any unreasonably longer
period. The parliament has introduced the
proviso
to
Section
167(2)
Cr.P.C.
prescribing the outer limit within which
the investigation must be completed. If
the investigation is not completed within
the specified period the accused would
acquire a right to be released on bail and
if he is prepared to and does furnish the
bail, the Magistrate shall release him on
bail and such release shall be deemed to
be grant of bail under Chapter XXXII of
the Code.(Para 22)

The application is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

438 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
others; 2010 (12) SCC 576, Hc Pradeep
Kumar Rai & Ors vs Dinesh Kumar
Pandey & Ors; (2015) 11 SCC 493 and
Madras Inst.Of Dev. Studies & Anr vs K.
Sivasubramaniyan & Ors; (2016) 1 SCC
454.

23. There is another aspect of the
matter, as argued by learned counsel for some
of the private respondents also, that even if it
is found that there is any discrepancy, the
selection can not be quashed, unless it is
shown by the petitioners that they have
prejudiced in any manner by it. In the present
case, the petitioners have failed to show that
they have been prejudiced in any manner or
suffered any harm, injury or they were at
disadvantage by subsequent approval on the
maximum marks by the Government, which
were fixed by the Commission.

24. As per the Law Lexicon,
"Prejudice" means injurious effect, injury to
or impairment of a right, claim, statement etc.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of
Manharibhai
Muljibhai
Kakadia
and
Another Vs. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel
and Others, (2012) 10 SCC 517, has held
that "Prejudice" is generally defined as
meaning "to the harm, to the injury, to the
disadvantage of someone" and it also means
injury or loss. The relevant paragraphs 47.1
to 47.4 are extracted here-in-below :-

"47.1. Black's Law Dictionary (8th
Edn.) explains "prejudice" to mean damage
or detriment to one's legal rights or claims.
Concise Oxford English Dictionary [10th
Edn., Revised] defines "prejudice" as under:

"Prejudice.-- n. (1) preconceived
opinion that is not based on reason or actual
experience. ≫ unjust behaviour formed on
such a basis. (2) chiefly Law harm or injury
that results or may result from some action or
judgment. ≫ v. (1) give rise to prejudice in
(someone); make biased. (2) cause harm to (a
state of affairs)."

47.2.
Webster
Comprehensive
Dictionary (International Edn.) explains
"prejudice" to mean (i) a judgment or
opinion, favourable or unfavourable, formed
beforehand or without due examination ...
detriment arising from a hasty and unfair
judgment; injury; harm.

47.3. P. Ramanatha Aiyar; the Law
Lexicon (The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary)
explains "prejudice" to mean injurious effect,
injury to or impairment of a right, claim,
statement, etc.

47.4. "Prejudice" is generally
defined as meaning "to the harm, to the
injury, to the disadvantage of someone". It
also means injury or loss."

25. In view of above, this Court is of
the view that there is no illegality or error and
violation of Rule 8(1) of the Rules of 2015 in
selection in question, therefore this Court is
of the view that the writ petition has been
filed on misconceived ground, which lacks
merit and is liable to be dismissed.

26. The writ petition is, accordingly,
dismissed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 438
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 26.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAI KUMAR SRIVASTAVA-I, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 2958 of 2022

Sallahuddin ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Vivek Abhir
9 All. Sallahuddin Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
439
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian
Penal Code, 1860-Sections 420, 120B,
153A, 153B, 295A, & 511 - Sections 3/5/8
U.P. Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of
Religion Act, 2021-Denial -default bailaccused was arrested from Gujrat, his
judicial custody remand was granted time
to time-the chargesheet filed on 48th day
from the date of first remand-further,
supplementary chargesheet filed in the
court on 79th day and the learned court
below took cognizance of the matterThus, no occasion for applicant arose to
seek default bail under the proviso (a) of
Section
167(2)
Cr.P.C.-Special
Court
rightly rejected the application seeking
default bail-More so, Special Court Order
is an appealable order in view of the
provisions contained in Section 21(4) of
N.I.A.
Act,
2008-Hence,
the
instant
application is not maintainable.(Para 1 to
26)

B. The object behind the enactment of
Section 167 Cr.P.C. is to see that the
detention of the accused should not be
permitted for any unreasonably longer
period. The parliament has introduced the
proviso
to
Section
167(2)
Cr.P.C.
prescribing the outer limit within which
the investigation must be completed. If
the investigation is not completed within
the specified period the accused would
acquire a right to be released on bail and
if he is prepared to and does furnish the
bail, the Magistrate shall release him on
bail and such release shall be deemed to
be grant of bail under Chapter XXXII of
the Code.(Para 22)

The application is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Fakhrey Alam Vs St. of U.P. (2021) SCC
Online 532

2. Achpal @ Ramswroop & anr.. Vs St. of Raj.
(2019) 14 SCC 599
3. Ved Kumar Seth & anr.. Vs The St. of Assam
(1974) SCC Online Gau 44

4. Zakir Hussain Vs UT of Ladakh & ors. (2021)
SCC Online J&K 64

5. S.M. Purtado & etc. Vs Dy. S.P. C.B.I. Cochin
& etc (1996) Cri. L.J. 3042

6. Tarlok & ors. Vs St. of Haryana (2019) 3 RCR
Crl. 348

7. Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain Vs St. of
Mah & ors. (2013) 3 SCC 77

8. Abdul Azeez Vs NIA (2014) 144 AIC 380
9. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs .St. of Mah.(1994)
AIR SC 2623

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajai Kumar
Srivastava-I, J.)

1. Counter affidavit filed by the State
is taken on record.

2. Heard Sri Arsh R. Shaikh, learned
counsel for the applicant, Sri Shiv Nath
Tilhari, learned A.G.A. for the State and
perused the entire record.

3. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed praying
inter alia following reliefs:-

"1. Allow this application and quash
and set aside the impugned order dated
27.04.2022
passed
by
the
learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge,
ADJ-3, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh in CMRA
number 2823 of 2022;

2. Release the applicant on default
bail in connection with Case Crime number
9 of 2021 registered with ATS Gomtinagar
police station, Lucknow pending in the
court of Learned Additional District and
Sessions Judge, ADJ-3 in connection with
sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 417, 298,
440 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
121A, 123 and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and sections 3, 5 and 8 of The
Prohibition
of
Unlawful
Religious
Conversion Act, 2021.

3. Release the applicant on ad-interim
bail during pending admission, hearing
and
final
disposal
of
the
present
application in the interest of justice."

4. The facts as culled out from the
pleadings
are
that
the
applicant,
Sallahuddin was arrested on 30.06.2021
from District Ahmedabad, Gujarat in
connection with Crime No.9/2021 under
Sections 420, 120B, 153A, 153B, 295A,
511
I.P.C.
and
3/5
Uttar
Pradesh
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of
Religion Act 2021. His transit remand was
allowed from 18:00 hours on 30.06.2021
upto 17:00 hours on 03.07.2021 by the
learned Magistrate at Ahmedabad. The
accused/ applicant was produced before the
Special
CJM
Custom,
Lucknow
on
02.07.2021 and his judicial custody remand
was granted for 14 days by an order passed
by the learned Special CJM Custom,
Lucknow. For a period from 06.07.2021 to
13.07.2021, his first police custody remand
was allowed. For a period from 13.07.2021
to 15.07.2021, his second police custody
remand was allowed. Thereafter, his
judicial custody remand was granted from
time to time i.e. from 15.07.2021 to
26.07.2021, from 26.07.2021 to 09.08.2021
and from 09.08.2021 to 18.08.2021. Charge
sheet dated 13.08.2021, under Sections
471, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B, 295-A, 298-A
I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 U.P. Prohibition of
Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021
against the applicant came to be filed in the
court below on 18.08.2021 keeping the
investigation pending. This charge sheet
against the accused/ applicant was filed on
48th day from the date of first remand,
which was well within the prescribed
period under proviso (a) to Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. During the course of further
investigation, the offence under Sections
121-A and 123 I.P.C. were added on
31.08.2021 and the remand was obtained
on 01.09.2021 for the offence under
Sections 121-A and 123 I.P.C. As the
offence under Sections 121-A and 123
I.P.C. are scheduled offences as mentioned
in the Shedule to the National Investigating
Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to
as ''N.I.A. Act'), the information to this
effect was sent to the State Government on
02.09.2021
in
compliance
with
the
provision contained under Section 6 of
N.I.A. Act. The State Government sent the
information to the Central Government on
21.09.2021. The supplementary charge
sheet dated 17.09.2021 for the offence
under Sections 121-A and 123 I.P.C. came
to be filed in the court on 18.09.2021 i.e. on
79th day from the date of first remand by
competent court at Lucknow and 81st day,
inclusive of the time of transit remand too.
The sanction for prosecution for the
offences under Section 121-A/ 123 I.P.C.
appears
to
have
been
granted
on
22.11.2021. The learned court below took
cognizance of the matter on 18.12.2021.

5. It is submitted by learned counsel
for the applicant that the applicant was
taken into custody and transit remand for
three days was granted by the court of
Ahmedabad. However, he was produced
before the court at Lucknow on 02.07.2021
and the Chief Judicial Magistrate granted
seven days' remand from 06.07.2021 to
13.07.2021. The applicant is in judicial
custody since 15.07.2021.

6. His further submission is that on
14.09.2021, the applicant applied for
default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
which was disposed of by order dated
9 All. Sallahuddin Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
441
22.09.2021. The accused/ applicant again
filed an application for default bail by
challenging
the
earlier
order
dated
22.09.2021 and the learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge ADJ-3 was
pleased to reject the second application for
default bail by the order dated 27.04.2022,
both the orders as aforesaid, denying the
applicant the benefit of default bail are
illegal.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant
has also submitted that the first charge
sheet
was
filed
on 18.08.2021
and
thereafter the Investigating Officer filed an
application dated 31.08.2021 for adding
Sections 121-A and 123 I.P.C. Thereafter,
the supplementary charge sheet came to be
filed on 18.09.2021, without obtaining
sanction as required by Section 196 Cr.P.C.

8. He then contended that the
applicant was entitled to default bail as
investigation was not concluded within
sixty days. The investigating agency, only
to deprive the applicant of his right of
getting default bail, moved an application
for adding Section 121A and 123 I.P.C.
with a view to extend the time limit of
investigation upto 90 days. There is no
provision
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1989 for addition/substraction/
alteration
in
the
charge
sheet
once
submitted and as such the application dated
31.08.2021 for adding Sections 121A and
123 I.P.C. was not liable to be allowed by
the learned Magistrate.

9. In order to substantiate his
aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel
for the applicant has placed reliance on the
law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the Case of Fakhrey Alam vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh reported in 2021 SCC Online
532, Achpal @ Ramswroop & Another vs.
State of Rajasthan reported in (2019) 14
SCC 599 as well as law laid down by
Gauhati High Court in the case of Ved
Kumar Seth and another vs. The State of
Assam reported in 1974 SCC Online Gau
44. He has also placed reliance on the
judgment passed by Jammu and Kashmir
High Court in the case of Zakir Hussain vs.
UT of Ladakh and others reported in 2021
SCC Online J&K 64, judgment passed by
Kerala High Court in the case of S.M.
Purtado and etc. vs. Dy. S.P. C.B.I. Cochin
and etc. reported in 1996 Cri. L.J. 3042.
and judgdment passed by Punjab and
Haryana High Court in the case of Tarlok
and others vs. State of Haryana, 2019 (3)
R.C.R. (Criminal) 348.

10. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has
opposed the prayer by submitting that the
first charge sheet for the offence under
Sections 471, 120B, 153A, 153B, 295A,
298A I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 of U.P.
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of
Religion Act, 2021 was filed in the court
below
on
18.08.2021
keeping
the
investigation pending and as such the first
charge sheet was filed on the 48th day from
the date of first remand and keeping the
investigation pending in respect of alleged
anti-national activities committed by the
accused
person.
Thereafter,
the
supplementary
charge
sheet
dated
17.09.2021 was filed in respect of the
offence under Sections 121A and 123 I.P.C.
on 79th day from the date of first remand.

11. His further submission is that both
the charge sheets were filed well within the
time prescribed under Section 167 Cr.P.C.
and, therefore, the applicant has no right to
claim default bail. The prayer for default
bail itself is not maintainable as the charge
sheet was filed well within time. The right
of being enlarged on bail under Section 167
442 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Cr.P.C., arises only when the charge sheet
is not filed within time.

12. Learned A.G.A. for the State has also
submitted that the contention of the
applicant to the effect that the addition/
alteration of the other sections during
investigation is not permissible under
Cr.P.C., is neither acceptable nor tenable in
the eyes of law as Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.
permits the further investigation in respect
of an offence even after the report under
sub Section 2 of Section 173 Cr.P.C. has
been
forwarded
to
the
Magistrate.
Therefore, the filing of the first charge
sheet and thereafter undertaking further
investigation was legally sustainable and
filing of supplementary charge sheet, well
within ninety days from the date of first
remand was within the domain of the
investigating
agencies.
There
is
no
illegality in filing the first charge sheet
dated 13.08.2021 in the court below on
18.08.2021 and the supplementary charge
sheet in court below on 17.09.2021 because
the first charge sheet was filed on 48th day
and supplementary charge sheet was filed
on 79th day.

13. His further submission is that the
first application for default bail filed by the
applicant on 14.09.2021 was not pressed by
the applicant before the court below. The
order dated 22.09.2021, on the face of the
application dated 14.09.2021, which is
available at page No.58 to the instant
application, goes to show that the default
bail application was rejected because the
same was not pressed. The applicant after
getting his first application for default bail
rejected after not pressing the same, filed
another application for default bail on
13.04.2022 was not maintainable on two
counts, first that the charge sheet was
already filed well within ninety days and,
therefore, the default bail application was
not maintainable and second is that the
application
for
default
bail
dated
13.04.2022 was filed much after filing of
charge sheet and order of prosecution
sanction dated 18.12.2021 and the order of
cognizance dated 18.12.2021.

14. Learned A.G.A. for the State has
contended that it would not be open to
accused to claim that he is entitled to bail
under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
even if charge sheet is filed within time or
the charge sheet is filed before any time
prior to filing of application for default bail
and making any submission that accused is
prepared to furnish bail. In the present case,
both the conditions are not available.
Charge sheet was filed within ninety days.
Further, the application for default bail
being moved on 13.04.2022 does not entitle
the applicant in any manner to get the
default bail.

15. He has concluded his submissions
by stating that the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of
Fakhrey
Alam
(supra),
Achpal
@
Ramswroop (supra) as well as law laid
down by Gauhati High Court in the case of
Ved Kumar Seth (supra), Jammu and
Kashmir High Court in the case of Zakir
Hussain (supra), judgment passed by
Kerala High Court in the case of S.M.
Purtado and etc. (supra) and judgment
passed by Punjab and Haryana High Court
in the case of Tarlok and others (supra),
which have been relied by learned counsel
for the applicant have no application in this
case for the reason that the same are not
applicable in the facts of the present case.

16. His further submission is that the
other contentions of the applicant are that
in
want
of
sanction,
order
taking
9 All. Sallahuddin Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
443
cognizance was bad in law, is not
sustainable as the learned court below took
cognizance on 18.12.2021, only after the
sanction for prosecution was granted on
22.11.2021 as is evident from Annexures
No.14 and 15 to counter affidavit. Whether,
the cognizance is taken or not is not
material as far as grant of default bail under
proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. is
concerned. Merely because sanction has
not been obtained to prosecute the accused
and to proceed to the stage of Section 309
Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that the accused is
entitled to get default bail. Grant of
sanction is nowhere contemplated under
proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. To
buttress his aforesaid contention, reliance
has been placed on the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain vs. State
of Maharashtra and others, 2013 (3) SCC
77.

17. Having heard the learned counsel for
the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State
and upon perusal of record, it transpires
that the applicant, Sallahuddin was arrested
on 30.06.2021 from District Ahmedabad,
Gujarat
in
connection
with
Crime
No.9/2021 under Sections 420, 120B,
153A, 153B, 295A, 511 I.P.C. and 3/5 Uttar
Pradesh
Prohibition
of
Unlawful
Conversion of Religion Act 2021. His
transit remand was allowed from 18:00
hours on 30.06.2021 upto 17:00 hours on
03.07.2021 by the learned Magistrate at
Ahmedabad. The accused/ applicant was
produced before the Special CJM Custom,
Lucknow on 02.07.2021 and his judicial
custody remand was granted for 14 days by
an order passed by the learned Special CJM
Custom, Lucknow. For a period from
06.07.2021 to 13.07.2021, his first police
custody remand was allowed. For a period
from 13.07.2021 to 15.07.2021, his second
police custody remand was allowed.
Thereafter, his judicial custody remand was
granted from time to time i.e. from
15.07.2021 to 26.07.2021, from 26.07.2021
to 09.08.2021 and from 09.08.2021 to
18.08.2021. Charge sheet dated 13.08.2021,
under Sections 471, 120-B, 153-A, 153-B,
295-A, 298-A I.P.C. and Sections 3/5/8 U.P.
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of
Religion Act, 2021 against the applicant
came to be filed in the court below on
18.08.2021
keeping
the
investigation
pending. This charge sheet against the
accused/ applicant was filed on 48th day
from the date of first remand, which was
well within the prescribed period under
proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
During the course of further investigation,
the offence under Sections 121-A and 123
I.P.C. were added on 31.08.2021 and the
remand was obtained on 01.09.2021 for the
offence under Sections 121-A and 123
I.P.C. As the offence under Sections 121-A
and 123 I.P.C. are scheduled offences as
mentioned in the Shedule to the National
Investigating Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter
referred
to
as
''N.I.A.
Act'),
the
information to this effect was sent to the
State Government on 02.09.2021 in
compliance with the provision contained
under Section 6 of N.I.A. Act. The State
Government sent the information to the
Central Government on 21.09.2021. The
supplementary
charge
sheet
dated
17.09.2021 for the offence under Sections
121-A and 123 I.P.C. came to be filed in
the court on 18.09.2021 i.e. on 79th day
from the date of first remand by competent
court at Lucknow and 81st day, inclusive
of the time of transit remand too. The
sanction for prosecution for the offences
under Section 121-A/ 123 I.P.C. appears to
have been granted on 22.11.2021. The
learned court below took cognizance of
the matter on 18.12.2021.
444 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

18. Therefore, no occasion for
accused/ applicant arose to seek default bail
under the provision contained in proviso (a)
to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. Thus, the
impugned order dated 27.04.2022, whereby
the
Special
Court
has
rejected
the
application moved by the applicant seeking
default bail does not suffer from any
illegality.

19. A Division Bench of Kerala High
Court in the case of Abdul Azeez vs.
National Investigation Agency, (2014) 144
AIC 380, has held that in case, after further
investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.,
any
supplementary
charge
sheet
is
submitted, in such a case it cannot be said
that filing of such supplementary charge
sheet within statutorily stipulated period is
designed to defeat the right of an accused
to get default bail.

20. Be that as it may, the application
seeking default bail came to be filed by
the applicant on 13.04.2022 after filing of
charge sheet/ supplementary charge sheet
and even after cognizance of the matter
was taken by the court below. Therefore,
the application seeking default bail under
proviso (a) to Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. was
not maintainable. The question that
whether sanction was necessary or not or
whether sanction was obtained or not,
does not appear to be material in view of
admitted fact that the application seeking
default bail by the applicant came to be
filed after cognizance was taken by the
learned trial court. The first charge sheet
was
filed
on
13.08.2021
and
the
supplementary charge sheet was filed on
17.09.2021. Therefore, this Court does
not find any substance in the submissions
of learned counsel for the applicant to the
effect that the applicant was wrongly
denied default bail to which he was
entitled to get in this matter.

21. From a bare perusal of
provisions contained in proviso (a) to
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. makes it clear that
any bail, purportedly granted in exercise
of power vested by the aforesaid proviso,
would have effect of the bail granted
under Chapter XXXIII Cr.P.C., which
pertains to grant or refusal of bail.

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State Of
Maharashtra, AIR 1994 SC 2623 has held
that the object behind the enactment of
Section 167 Cr.P.C. is to see that the
detention of the accused should not be
permitted for any unreasonably longer
period. The Parliament has introduced the
proviso
to
Section
167(2)
Cr.P.C.
prescribing the outer limit within which the
investigation must be completed. If the
investigation is not completed within the
specified period the accused would acquire
a right to be released on bail and if he is
prepared to and does furnish the bail, the
Magistrate shall release him on bail and
such release shall be deemed to be grant
of bail under Chapter XXXIII of the
Code.

23. In view of the above, this matter may
be viewed from another perspective also. The
impugned order rejecting the application
seeking default bail was passed on 27.04.2022
by the learned Additional District & Sessions
Judge-3/ Special Judge NIA/ATS, Lucknow.
This Special Court was constituted under
Section 22 of N.I.A. Act and as such the
impugned order dated 27.04.2022 passed by
the special court is appealable under Section
21(4) of N.I.A. Act which, for ready reference,
is quoted herein below:-
9 All. Smt. Shalini Kashyap & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
445

"21 Appeals. -

(1)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie
from any judgment, sentence or order, not
being an interlocutory order, of a Special
Court to the High Court both on facts and
on law.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1)
shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of
the High Court and shall, as far as
possible, be disposed of within a period of
three months from the date of admission of
the appeal.

(3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or
revision shall lie to any court from any
judgment, sentence or order including an
interlocutory order of a Special Court.

(4)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (3) of section 378
of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the
High Court against an order of the
Special Court granting or refusing bail.

(5) Every appeal under this section
shall be preferred within a period of thirty
days from the date of the judgment,
sentence or order appealed from: Provided
that the High Court may entertain an
appeal after the expiry of the said period of
thirty days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal within the period of
thirty days: Provided further that no appeal
shall be entertained after the expiry of
period of ninety days."

24. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid, it
can safely be said that rejection of
application seeking default bail by Special
Court vide order dated 27.04.2022 is an
appealable order in view of the provisions
contained in Section 21(4) N.I.A. Act.

25. In this view of matter also, this
Court does not find the instant application
to be maintainable.

26. In view of the aforesaid
discussion, this Court does not see any
illegality, impropriety and incorrectness in
the impugned order. There is no abuse of
court's process either. Therefore, the instant
application lacks merit, which deserves to
be dismissed.

27.

Accordingly,
the
instant
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 445
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM
SHAMSHERY, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 23830 of 2021

Smt. Shalini Kashyap & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Sri Abhai Kumar
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Sanjay Vikarm Singh, Sri Rakesh Kumar
Singh

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 498-A, 504,
506, 120-B, 342, 377 & 376 - 3⁄4 D.P. Actchallenge to-cognizance order- Magistrate
cannot add or subtract section at the time
of taking cognizance as the same would
be permissible by the trial court only at
the
time
of
framing
of
charge-Ld.
Magistrate committed error by adding
sections at the time of taking cognizance
as well as by the Revisional CourtCognizance for offence u/s 406 by Ld.
Magistrate against all the accused is