# Sameer Agarwal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1846
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-17
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 6861 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sameer-agarwal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-54897
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

1846 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 4 ILRA 1846
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ A No. 6861 of 2024

Sameer Agarwal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
Whether a private bus owner, who has a transport agreement with a third party (the factory/guardians) rather
than directly with the school authorities, is legally entitled to a school transport carriage permit u/Rule 222-B
of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998?

Headnotes
A. Motor Vehicles Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Section 74; U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998:
Rule 222-A, 222-B and 222-L - The petitioner, Sameer Agarwal, owns a bus operating under an "All U.P.
Contract Carriage Permit." He entered into a private agreement with a factory, Avadh Sugar and Energy Ltd.,
to transport the children of the factory's employees to the ONGC Community School in District Sitapur. The
petitioner approached the Court aggrieved by the inaction of the Regional Transport Authority (RTA) in
refusing to grant him a specific contract carriage permit for carrying school children u/s 74 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988.
The Court rejected the argument that the rules were silently ambiguous. A literal reading of Rule
222-B(2) explicitly mandates that a private bus owner must have a 'written agreement with the
school authority' to apply for the permit.
Section 74 of Act, 1988 that allows for the grant of contract carriage permit, specifically states that the
Regional Transport Authority shall grant a contract carriage permit subject to any Rules that may be made
under the Act. Rules are unambiguous and a facial reading brings us to fore that these Rules allow such
permits only to private buses having an agreement with the school authorities as per Rule 222-B (2) of the
Rule, 1998. (Para 9, 10)
B. Rule 222-B (2) has to be read along with Rule 222- B (4), which prescribes certain condition
precedent for the school authorities before they could enter into an agreement with an owner of
a private bus. (Para 10)
The submission of the petitioner that it makes no difference as to whether the agreement is with the school or
with the guardian as eventually it is related to transportation of the children to school only, is fallacious. The
said prescriptions enjoins upon the school-authorities with certain responsibilities as mentioned and
enumerated in Rule 222-B (4) (a) to Rule 222-B (4) (c), which prima facie appears to this Court to be in the
nature of ensuring the safety and mandatory prior compliance of the school buses, its owner and driver before
they can be put to service of carrying school children. This Rule also ensures that the school buses' service is
not disrupted abruptly during the mid-sessions, which may cause inconvenience to the children. (Para 10)
4 All. Sameer Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1847
C. There appears to be a rationale nexus as to why agreement with guardians have not been
allowed under the Rules, inasmuch as, it is the school authorities, who is and are made
responsible for the safety of school children as per the Rules. The individual guardian or their
employers cannot be bestowed with such collective responsibility of these school children. In any case, the
safety of the school going children cannot be tweaked by expanding the zone of consideration for such school
buses, who do not have any agreement with the school-authorities as mandated u/Rule 222 (2) of the Rules,
1998. (Para 11)
There is no such mechanism of following strict safety norms as mentioned herein-above as a condition
precedent in the case of an agreement with the parents or their employers. (Para 11)
D. Condition precedent and condition subsequent - The petitioner shows his willingness to comply with
Rule 222-L (General conditions for school vehicle permit), but the said Rule is condition subsequent for Rule
222-B. Once it is found that the petitioner is not in compliance of the Rule 222-B, this Court finds no
substance in the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. (Para 12)
The conditions as mentioned in the Rules are mandatory and are ought to be strictly followed for the safety
and welfare of the school going children. (Para 13)
E. The vires of the Rules are not under challenge and the challenge is simply w.r.t. the absence of
a provision for providing permits to the school buses that have an agreement with the guardians
of children, who are attending schools. (Para 8)
The High Court found no fault in the statutory authorities' refusal to grant the contract carriage
permit. Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

List of Acts
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998.

List of Keywords
condition, precedent, subsequent, motor, vehicles, school, safety, contract, carriage, guardian, permit.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner(s): Alok Saxena
For Respondent(s): C.S.C

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
&
Hon'ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard Sri Alok Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ratnesh Singh Tomar,
learned counsel for the State- respondents. Rejoinder affidavit filed today by the learned counsel
for the petitioner is taken on record. Exchange of the pleading between the parties are complete.
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is taken for final disposal.

2. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the writ
petitioner is aggrieved by the inaction on the part of the respondent-authorities in not granting him
a contract carriage permit under Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to
1848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
as "the Act, 1988") for carrying school children of Factory's Employees of Avadh Sugar and
Energy Ltd. to the ONGC Community School, Village Paintala, District- Sitapur.

3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner has a bus with an All U.P. Contract
Carriage Permit and he has entered an agreement with the Factory, namely, Avadh Sugar and
Energy Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Factory") by virtue of which the petitioner has
got permission to carry the children of the Factory's Employees to the ONGC Community
School.

4. In support of his submission, Sri Alok Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on Section 2 (7) and Section 74 of the Act, 1988 . He further relied on Rule 222-A,
222-B and 222-L of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Rules, 1998") to submit that the Regional Transport Authority is required to grant a contract
carriage permit to him for carrying school children as provided in Section 74 of the Act,
1988 read with Rules 222-B of the Rules, 1998.

5. Sri Saxena has further articulated that sub rule -1 of Rule 222-B of the Rules, 1998
allows for educational institutions to run buses and permits to be issued by the competent
authority to such buses. He submits that sub-rule-2 allows for a owner of a private bus, who
has written agreement with school authorities to apply for such permit. He further relied on
sub rule-3 of Rule 222-B of the Rules, 1998 to indicate that owner of the school vans, who
are having an agreement with guardian or a group of guardians for transporting school
children are also permitted to get the carriage permit for plying school children.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submitted that with regard to an owner of
a private bus the Rules are silent on the aspect as to whether such owner may get a permit or
not, if he has an agreement with the guardians for transporting school children. According to
the learned counsel, this gap would not act as a bar for issuing permit to the private buses,
who are having agreement with the guardians and/or their employers, which is the present
case.

7. Per contra, Sri Ratnesh Singh Tomar, learned counsel appearing for the State
submits that Chapter IX-A of the Rules, 1998 was added in the Rules specifically in the year,
2018 and came into effect from 17th of December of 2018 with respect to special provisions
for school vehicles. The insertion of the entire Chapter IX-A also contains Rules 222-B and
222-L to ensure the safety and security of the children, who are going to school. He further
submits that the petitioner has not challenged the vires of the said Rules and accordingly, the
Rules as it is today are required to be followed for all intents and purposes. On the aspect of
permission granted to school vans, who are having permission with the guardians, he submits
that the rationale therein is different from that granting a permit to an owner of a private bus.

8. Upon hearing learned counsel for both the parties, it is to be firstly noted by us
that the vires of the Rules are not under challenge and the challenge is simply with regard to
the absence of a provision for providing permits to the school buses that have an agreement
with the guardians of children, who are attending schools. Learned counsel for the petitioner
4 All. Sameer Agarwal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1849
has argued that there is no real logic and/or difference with regard to permitting the owner of
a private bus, who has an agreement with the school authorities, juxtaposed to permitting the
owner of a private school bus, who has an agreement with the guardians of the children
instead of the school-authorities. According to him, the purpose and objective being one and
the same, that is carrying school children by bus, the petitioner bus should also be granted
permit for carrying school children.

9. In our view, Section 74 of Act, 1988 that allows for the grant of contract carriage
permit, specifically states that the Regional Transport Authority shall grant a contract
carriage permit subject to any Rules that may be made under the Act. As far as grant of
permit for carrying school children are concerned, Rule 222-B of the Rules, 1998 as
amended and inserted with effect from 22.05.2019 to U.P. Motor Vehicle Rules 1998,
provides for the following:-

 "222 B. Grant of permit for carrying school children- (1) An Educational
institution bus shall have to obtain permit of private service vehicle under section 76 of the
Act. The owner shall apply in Form SR-23A before Competent Authority and the authority
may grant permit in accordance with application or with such modification as it deems fit or
refuse to grant such permit. The permit shall be issued in Form SR-29A .

 (2) An owner of a private bus, who has a written agreement with school authority
shall apply before the Competent Authority under section 73 of the Act in Form SR21A and
the authority may grant permit in accordance with application or with such modifications as
it deems fit or refuse to grant such permit. The permit shall be issued in Form SR-27A.

 (3) The owner of school van having an agreement with guardians or group of
guardians for transporting the school children shall apply under section 73 before the
Competent Authority in Form SR-21B along with copy of agreement duly forwarded by the
school. The authority may grant permit in accordance with application or with such
modifications as it deems fit or refuse to grant such permit. The permit shall be issued in
Form SR-27B.

 (4) Every school, before going to an agreement with a private operator, shall ensure:
that;

 (a) the vehicle complies all the norms prescribed in these rules and directions of the State
Government from time to time.

 (b) the character certificate of vehicle owner and driver is obtained.

 (c) the agreement shall not be terminated before one year except in unavoidable
circumstances."

10. In the present case, the aforesaid Rules are unambiguous and a facial reading brings us
to fore that these Rules allow such permits only to private buses having an agreement with the
1850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
school authorities as per Rule 222-B (2) of the Rule, 1998. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
argued that it makes no difference as to whether the agreement is with the school or with the
guardian as eventually it is related to transportation of the children to school only. However, on a
closer scrutiny of the Rules, we find that the said submission of the petitioner to be fallacious and
an outcome of an erroneous reading of the Rules for a simple reason that Rule 222-B (2) has to be
read along with Rule 222-B (4), which prescribes certain condition precedent for the school
authorities before they could enter into an agreement with an owner of a private bus. The said
prescriptions enjoins upon the school-authorities with certain responsibilities as mentioned and
enumerated in Rule 222-B (4) (a) to Rule 222-B (4) (c), which prima facie appears to this Court to
be in the nature of ensuring the safety and mandatory prior compliance of the school buses, its
owner and driver before they can be put to service of carrying school children. This Rule also
ensures that the school buses service is not disrupted abruptly during the mid-sessions, which
may cause inconvenience to the children.

11. Unfortunately, we are not able to find any such mechanism of following strict safety
norms as mentioned herein-above as a condition precedent in the case of an agreement with the
parents or their employers. Neither the learned counsel was able to point out any such similar
provision under the Rules nor has relied on any document which could come to the rescue of the
petitioner. According to this Court, there appears to be a rationale nexus as to why agreement with
guardians have not been allowed under the Rules, inasmuch as, it is the school-authorities, who is
and are made responsible for the safety of school children as per the Rules. The individual guardian
or their employers cannot be bestowed with such collective responsibility of these school children.
In any case, the safety of the school going children cannot be tweaked by expanding the zone of
consideration for such school buses, who do not have any agreement with the school-authorities as
mandated under Rule 222 (2) of the Rules, 1998.

12. As far as the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner is ready and willing to comply with Rule 222-L (General conditions for school
vehicle permit), we find that the said Rule is condition subsequent for Rule 222-B. Once it is
found that the petitioner is not in compliance of the Rule 222-B, this Court finds no
substance in the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and as such the
same has been noted to be rejected.

13. Having said so, this Court is of the view that the safety of school children ought to be
of paramount significance, which should be the driving force for not only the guardians or the
school management but also for the statutory authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act and the
Rules made therein for plying the school buses. According to this Court, the conditions as
mentioned in the Rules are mandatory and and ought to be strictly followed for the safety and
welfare of the school going children.

14. In light of the same, we cannot find any fault on the part of the authorities in not
granting a carriage permit for school children to the petitioner.

15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
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4 All. Jai Prakash Awasthi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1851
(2026) 4 ILRA 1851
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 15.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ A No. 8315 of 2022

Jai Prakash Awasthi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
Whether in the absence of an explicit rule or regulation permitting the continuation, a disciplinary proceedings
can continue after retirement?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - In absence of any provision under the Regulation and Rules, no disciplinary
proceeding can continue after the retirement. (Para 11)

The petitioner was working as a Godown Man / Centre In Charge / In Charge District Manager. On
02.06.2011, he was placed under suspension due to certain allegations, and an inquiry officer was appointed.
Because the inquiry was not completed in time, the petitioner's suspension was revoked on 18.06.2012,
though he remained attached to the office. The petitioner subsequently reached the age of superannuation
and retired on 30.06.2014. The respondents refused to release his retiral dues, citing the pendency of the
disciplinary proceeding. Nearly seven years after his retirement, on 22.03.2021, the General Manager
concluded the disciplinary proceeding and passed a punishment order directing a recovery of Rs. 8,80,230/-
from the petitioner.

In the case of Bhagirathi Jena (infra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has precisely considered this aspect of the
matter and recorded finding that in absence of any Rule, Regulation or Act, no disciplinary proceeding can go
on after the retirement, therefore, due to continuation of disciplinary proceeding in absence of
provision of Rules or Regulation, the order is per se illegal and is liable to be set aside by this
Court. (Para 13)

In the present case, the disciplinary proceeding continued after the retirement of the petitioner i.e. 30.6.2014
and impugned order of recovery was passed on 22.03.2021, therefore, the order is per se illegal and is not
sustainable in law. (Para 12)

The order dated 22.03.2021, being contrary to the Rules, is quashed. The respondents are directed to ensure
payment of retiral dues as well as arrears of salary, if any, to the petitioner with 8 % interest.

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Bhagirathi Jena Vs. Orissa State Financial Corporation, 1999 (3) SCC 666 (Para 7)
2. Dev Prakash Tewari Vs. Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board Lucknow and others, 2014 (7)
SCC 260 (Para 7)
3. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others Vs. Kamal Swaroop Tandon, 2008 (1) SCC 352 (Para 8)