# Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 5 ILRA 1405
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-05-13
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 612 of 2023
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Jitendra Kumar Sinha
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sandeep-bhatnagar-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53476
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Section
21
-
Issue
of
pecuniary
jurisdiction was neither raised before High
Court nor before Supreme Court - Right of
review is not akin to right of appeal -
Scope of review under O.47 R. 1 CPC is
limited and does not permit rehearing of
case on ground of erroneous decision - At
time of filing First Appeal, pecuniary
jurisdiction of District Judge was Rs.
5,00,000, hence, Court had jurisdiction to
entertain appeal - When arguments heard,
pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge
stood unchanged - Although pecuniary
jurisdiction
later
enhanced
to
Rs.
25,00,000
on
date
of
judgment,
jurisdiction determined by date of filing,
not date of decision - Thus, Court had
inherent and pecuniary jurisdiction to
1406 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decide appeal - Appellant cannot raise
issue of pecuniary jurisdiction at belated
stage - For condonation of delay, ground
of illness not sufficient to justify delay in
filing review application - Accordingly,
both delay condonation application and
review application rejected. (Para 25, 29
to 31)

Appeal rejected. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

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5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1405
settled principle of law reiterated
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramdas
Shrinivas Nayak (Supra).

20. The allegation leveled in para
27 of the transfer application that when a
coordinate Bench of this Court did not find
any ground to dismiss the application under
Section 482 No. 9166 of 2024 as the
petition is strong on merit, he declined to
pass the final order or interim order for
making
the
petition
infructuous
deliberately, is apparently false, scandalous
and contemptuous.

21. The averment made in the
comments submitted by the Presiding
Officer of the trial Court to the Session
Judge, that the petitioner and his Counsel
want to mount pressure on the Court so that
they can prolong the trial for they use loud
noises in the Court room, is also correct, as
the learned Counsel for the petitioner has
persisted with this conduct and he has used
loud voice in this Court also and he insisted
that this Court should deal with all the
judgments that had been referred by him
before the trial Court in support of his
applications under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and
Section 59(2)(c) of PMLA and Section 161
read with Sections 16 & 145 of the
Evidence Act, whereas those judgments are
not relevant for examining the legality of
the order rejecting the transfer application.

22. In view of the aforesaid
circumstances, I am of the considered view
that the transfer application has been filed
on false and imaginary allegations so as to
avoid facing trial before the presiding
officer who has passed two orders against
the petitioner. The learned Session Judge
has not committed any illegality in passing
the impugned order dated 11.04.2025
rejecting the transfer application filed by
the petitioner and I find myself in complete
agreement with the view taken by the
learned Sessions Judge while rejecting
passed on 11.04.2025.

23. The writ petition lacks merit
and the same is dismissed.
----------
(2025) 5 ILRA 1405
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, J.

First Appeal No. 612 of 2023

Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri S.V. Goswami, Sri Manish Kr. Nigam, Sri
Pradeep Kumar Rai, Sri Shesh Kumar, Sri
V.P. Rai, Sri Vishnu Swaroop Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:

Civil Law - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 -
Section
21
-
Issue
of
pecuniary
jurisdiction was neither raised before High
Court nor before Supreme Court - Right of
review is not akin to right of appeal -
Scope of review under O.47 R. 1 CPC is
limited and does not permit rehearing of
case on ground of erroneous decision - At
time of filing First Appeal, pecuniary
jurisdiction of District Judge was Rs.
5,00,000, hence, Court had jurisdiction to
entertain appeal - When arguments heard,
pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judge
stood unchanged - Although pecuniary
jurisdiction
later
enhanced
to
Rs.
25,00,000
on
date
of
judgment,
jurisdiction determined by date of filing,
not date of decision - Thus, Court had
inherent and pecuniary jurisdiction to
1406 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decide appeal - Appellant cannot raise
issue of pecuniary jurisdiction at belated
stage - For condonation of delay, ground
of illness not sufficient to justify delay in
filing review application - Accordingly,
both delay condonation application and
review application rejected. (Para 25, 29
to 31)

Appeal rejected. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Delhi Development Authority Vs Jagan Singh &
ors., Civil Appeal No.4335 of 2023, (Paras 11 to 14)

2. Zuari Cement Ltd. Vs Regional Director
E.S.I.C., Hyderabad & ors., (2015) 7 SCC 690,
(Paras 9 to 11)

3. A.R.Antulay Vs R.S.Nayak & anr., (1988) 2
SCC 602, (Para 87)

4. S.Narahari & ors. Vs S.R.Kumar & ors., (2023)
7 SCC 740, (Paras 35 to 37)

5. Tejumal Vs Mohd. Sarfraz reported in 2016(3)
A.R.C. 570, (Paras 5 to 7)

6. Subhash Mahadevasa Habib Vs Nemasa
Ambasa Dharmadas (D) By LRS & ors., (2007)
13 SCC 650

7. R.S.D.V. Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs Vallabh Glass
Works Ltd., 1993 AIR 2094

8. Sneh Lata Goel Vs Pushplata & ors., (2019) 3
SCC 594, (Paras 15 to 24)

9. Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs DLF Universal
Ltd. MANU/ SC/0710/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 791,
(Para 3)

10. Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs Usman Abbas
Sayyad MANU/SC/5541/2006: (2007) 2 SCC
355, (Para 24)

11. Mantoo Sarkar Vs Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. MANU/SC/8464/2008: (2009) 2 SCC 244,
(Para 20)

12. Punjab National Bank Vs Atin Arora & anr.,
Supreme Court [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27]
13. S.Nagraj & ors. Vs St. of Karn. & anr., 1993,
Supp (4) SCC 595

14. Shivdeo Singh Vs St. of Pun., AIR 1963 SC 1909

15. Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through LRs & ors. Vs
Vinod Kumar Rawat & ors. 2020(12) Scale 415,
(Para 9)

16. Parison Devi Vs Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC
715, (Para 9)

17. Delhi Administration Vs Guldip Singh Uban &
ors. AIR 2000 SC 3737, (Para 23)

18. U.O.I. Vs B. Valluvan (2006) 8 SCC 686

19. St. of Har. & ors. Vs M.P. Mohilal (2006 INSC
832)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha, J.)

Order
on
Civil
Misc.
Review
Application No.135040 of 2017

1. Heard Shri Shesh Kumar,
learned counsel for the appellant and Shri
Dinesh Varun, learned Standing Counsel
for all the respondents.

2.
We
have
considered
the
submissions made by counsel for the
parties and have perused the material
available on record. In the interest of
justice, we have heard learned counsel for
the appellants on the point of delay
condonation application as well as merit of
the review application.

3. This present Civil Misc. Delay
Condonation application has been filed for
condoning the delay in filing the review
application to review / recall the judgment
passed by this Court, dated 25.01.2016,
passed in First Appeal No.612 of 2003, in
which, one of us (Hon'ble Justice Vivek
Kumar Birla, J) was a member of the
Bench. The ground taken in this Civil Misc.
5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1407
Application, inter-alia is that prior to
delivery of judgement of this Court in First
Appeal No.612 of 2003, the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the District Judge was
raised from Rs.5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs) to
Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty Five Lakhs) vide
Gazette Notification No. 1599/79-V-1-151(ka)19/2015 dated 07.12.2015, Section 19
of The Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil
Court Act, 1987 was amended and the
concerned District Judges were conferred
jurisdiction to hear appeals of valuation up
to Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs. Hence, the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the first appeal
was that of the learned District Judge and
this Court ought not to have decided the
first appeal, instead, the same ought to have
been remanded/ transferred to the learned
District Judge, Moradabad.

4.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant submits that since the pecuniary
jurisdiction of learned District Judge to
hear the first appeal stood raised from
Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.25,00,000/- during
pendency of the appeal this Court had no
jurisdiction to decide the instant first appeal
No.612 of 2003. He further submits that
lack of jurisdiction is error apparent on the
face of record and the review application
has got strong merit.

5. Confronted with the situation
regarding filing of Special Leave Petition
against the judgement of this Court before
the Hon'ble Apex Court which was
dismissed in limine and by non speaking
order and how the review petition could be
maintainable before this Court, the learned
counsel submits that the doctrine of merger
does not apply in this case as the lack of
jurisdiction is involved.

6. In so far as condonation of delay
is concerned, in support of his argument,
learned counsel for the appellant has placed
reliance upon the judgements of Hon'ble
Apex
Court
in
the
case
of
Delhi
Development Authority Vs. Jagan Singh
and others, passed in Civil Appeal
No.4335 of 2023, paragraph nos.11,12, 13
& 14 whereof reads as under:-

 11. There cannot be any dispute
about the proposition of law canvassed by
the learned counsel appearing for the first
respondent. However, there cannot be any
hard and fast rule to decide whether
sufficient cause exists. It all depends on the
facts and circumstances of each individual
case.

 12. Over the years, this Court has
repeatedly held that a liberal and justiceoriented approach needs to be adopted in
the matters of condonation of delay so that
the substantive rights of the parties are not
defeated only on the ground of delay. The
power under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 must be exercised in a very
meaningful manner which will serve the
ends of justice.

 13. It is true that the fact that the
decision on which the impugned judgement
is based has been overruled is by itself no
ground to condone a long delay. In the
facts of this case, it is true that the Special
Leave Petition has been filed two years and
three days after the date of the decision of
the Constitution Bench in the case of
Indore Development Authority.

 14. In this case, admittedly, the
acquired land has been used by DMRC for
the metro depot and the metro depot exists
on the acquired land as noted in the
impugned judgement. Thus, when the writ
petition was filed invoking sub-section (2)
of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the acquired
1408 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
land was already put to use for an
important public purpose of the metro
depot. The use of the land for public
purposes for the last several years is
certainly a relevant factor for adopting a
liberal approach while considering the
prayer for condoning the delay. We may
also note here that the petition invoking
sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act
was filed by the appellant nearly seventeen
months after the 2013 Act came into force.
In a case where the land was not put to use
for a public purpose, the approach of this
Court while deciding the application for
condonation of a long delay in such a case
would have been different."

7. In so far as issue of lack of
jurisdiction is concerned, learned counsel
has placed reliance upon the judgement in
the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. Vs.
Regional Director E.S.I.C., Hyderabad
& others, (2015) 7 SCC 690, paragraph
nos.9,10 and 11 whereof reads as under:-

 " 9. As per the scheme of the Act,
the power to grant exemption is a plenary
power given to an appropriate government.
It follows that the ESI Court constituted
under Section 74 of the Act has no
jurisdiction to take up the question of grant
of exemption. The Court constituted under
Section 74 of the Act cannot decide such
matters including the validity of an
exemption
notification.
The
order
granting
or
denying
exemption
is
certainly open to judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
But the question of exemption under
Section 87 cannot be raised under
Section 75 of the Act and the ESI Court
constituted under Section 74 of the Act,
cannot decide the legality or otherwise of
an order relating to exemption passed by
the appropriate government.
 10. Learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant vehemently contended that
grant of exemption to a factory or
establishment from the operation of the Act
falls within the jurisdiction of ESI Court
under Section 75(1)(g) of the Act which
specifically empowers the ESI Court to
decide any matter which is in dispute
between a principal employer and the
Corporation in respect of any contribution
or benefit or other dues payable or
recoverable under the Act. It was submitted
that only pursuant to the orders of the High
Court, the appellant approached the ESI
Court and the ESI Court has exercised its
power to grant exemption on the basis of
the orders of the Division Bench of the
High Court. It was submitted that ESI
Corporation
submitted
itself
to
the
jurisdiction of ESI Court and while so, it
cannot turn round and raise objection as to
its jurisdiction to consider the issue of
exemption and in support of his contention,
learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
placed reliance upon the decision of this
Court in Sohan Singh & Ors. vs. G.M.
Ordnance Factory & Ors., (1984) Supp.
SCC 661.

 11. While disposing the writ
petitions, of course, the High Court
directed the appellant to approach the ESI
Court constituted under Section 74 of the
Act for the relief which the appellant had
claimed in the writ petitions. Notably, both
the
appellant
as
well
as
the
ESI
Corporation did not challenge the order of
the High Court but subjected themselves to
the jurisdiction of the ESI Court. In our
view, neither the order of the High Court
nor the act of Corporation subjecting itself
to the jurisdiction of ESI Court would
confer jurisdiction upon ESI Court to
determine the question of exemption from
the operation of the Act. By consent, parties
5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1409
cannot agree to vest jurisdiction in the
Court to try the dispute when the Court
does not have the jurisdiction.

8. Learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgement in the case of
A.R.Antulay Vs. R.S.Nayak and another,
(1988) 2 SCC 602, paragraph no.87
whereof reads as under:-

 " 87. In the aforesaid view of the
matter,
the
appeal
is
allowed;
all
proceedings in this matter subsequent to
the directions of this Court on 16th
February, 1984 (reported in AIR 1984
Supreme Court 684) as indicated before
are set aside and quashed. The trial shall
proceed in accordance with law, that is to
say under the Act of 1952 as mentioned
hereinbefore."

9. In so far as doctrine of merger is
concerned, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgement in the case of
S.Narahari & others Vs. S.R.Kumar &
others, (2023) 7 SCC 740, paragraph
no.35, 36 & 37 whereof reads as under:-

 "35.While the conclusion of the
said judgment is not relevant to the present
case at hand, however, the reasoning
behind coming to the said conclusion, in
our opinion, has bearing on the present
case.This Court, in the abovementioned
case, while holding that a review is
maintainable even after the dismissal of
Special Leave Petition, observed that the
dismissal of Special Leave Petition by way
of a non- speaking order does not attract
the doctrine of merger.

 36.In simpler terms, this would
essentially mean that even in cases where
the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as
withdrawn, where no reason was assigned
by the Court while dismissing the matter
and where leave was not granted in the
said Special Leave Petition, the said
dismissal would not be considered as
laying down law within the ambit of Article
141 of the Constitution of India.

 37.If a dismissal of Special Leave
Petition by way of a non- speaking order is
not considered law under Article141 of the
4(2000) 6 SCC 359 14 Constitution of
India, the same also cannot be considered
as res judicata, and therefore, in every such
dismissal, even in cases where the
dismissal is by way of a withdrawal, the
remedy of filing a freshSpecial Leave
Petition would still persist. Further, if on
the said reasoning, a remedy to file a
review in the High Court is allowed, then
the same reasoning cannot arbitrarily
exclude the filing of a subsequent Special
Leave Petition."

10.
On
lack
of
pecuniary
jurisdiction, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the judgement in the case of
Tejumal Vs. Mohd. Sarfraz reported in
2016(3) A.R.C. 570, paragraph nos.5, 6 &
7 whereof reads as under:-

 "5. In SCC Revision No.278 of
2016, Shri Shobit Nigam Vs. Smt. Batulan
and another decided by me, vide judgement
and order dated 29.08.2016. I have held
that with effect from 07.12.2015, in view of
the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act,
2015, the jurisdiction to try all suits
between the lessor and lessee for rent and
eviction under Section 15 of the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act as applicable to
the State of U.P. up to the valuation of Rs.1
Lakh, irrespective of the date of institution
of the suit vests in the small cause court
presided over by the Civil Judge (Senior
Division) and that the District Judge/
1410 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Additional District Judge would have
jurisdiction to decide such cases of higher
valuation, above Rs.1 Lakh only.

 6. In view of the above decision,
as the valuation of the present suit happen
to be Rs.41,400/- it was cognizable and
triable by the Small Cause Court of the
Civil Judge (Senior Division) and not by
the District Judge/ Additional District
Judge.
Accordingly,
the
impugned
judgement and order passed by the
Additional District Judge on the face of it
appears to be without jurisdiction.

 7. The Apex Court in case of
R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Ltd. Vs.
Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., AIR 1993
Supreme Court 2094, has held that in view
of Section 21(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, object as to the place of suing
should be taken by the party concerned in
the Court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity and that objection to
this effect shall not be allowed by the
appellate or revisional Court. "

11. The question of defect of
pecuniary
jurisdiction
and
territorial
jurisdiction on the decree has been
considered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib Vs.
Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (D) By
LRS and others, (2007) 13 SCC 650, in
which the Apex Court has held that the
Code of Civil Procedure has made a
distinction
between
lack
of
inherent
jurisdiction and objection to territorial
jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction.
Whereas, an inherent lack of jurisdiction
may make a decree passed by that Court
one without jurisdiction or void in law, a
decree passed by a Court lacking territorial
jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does
not automatically become void. At best it is
voidable in the sense that it could be
challenged in appeal therefrom provided
the conditions of Section 21 of the of the
Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. It
may be noted that Section 21 of C.P.C.
provides that no objection as to place of
suing can be allowed by even an appellate
or revisional Court unless such objection
was taken in the Court of first instance at
the earliest possible opportunity and there
has been a consequent failure of justice.

12.
Similar
view
has
been
expressed in an earlier decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.S.D.V.
Finance Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Vallabh Glass
Works Ltd., 1993 AIR 2094, the Hon'ble
Apex Court has held that Section 21 of the
Civil Procedure Code provides that no
objection as to the place of suing shall be
allowed by any appellate or revisional
Court unless such objection was taken in
the Court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity.

13. In Sneh Lata Goel Vs.
Pushplata and others, (2019) 3 SCC 594,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the
same view that an objection to territorial
jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does
not go to the root of the subject matter of
the suit and would not render a final decree
as void. Paragraph nos. 15 to 24 reads as
under:-

 "15. Learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the respondent has placed a
considerable degree of reliance on the
judgment of four Judges of this Court in
Kiran Singh (supra). In that case, there was
a dispute in regard to the valuation of the
suit. The issue would ultimately determine
the forum to which the appeal from the
judgment of the trial court would lie. If the
valuation of the suit as set out in the plaint
5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1411
was to be accepted, the appeal would lie to
the district court. On the other hand, if the
valuation as determined by the High Court
was to be accepted, the appeal would lie
before the High Court and not the District
Court. It was in this background that this
Court held that as a fundamental principle,
a decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a nullity and that its validity
could be set up wherever it is sought to be
enforced or relied upon, even at the stage
of execution in a collateral proceeding.
Moreover, it was held that a defect of
jurisdiction,
whether
pecuniary
or
territorial or whether it is in respect of the
subject matter of the action, strikes at the
very authority of the court to pass the
decree and cannot be cured even by the
consent of the parties.

 16. The Court then proceeded to
examine the effect of Section 11 of the Suit
Valuation Act 1887 on this fundamental
principle. This Court held thus:

 "7.
Section
11
enacts
that
notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection
that a court which had no jurisdiction over
a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason
of overvaluation or undervaluation, should
not be entertained by an appellate court,
except as provided in the section...a decree
passed by a court, which would have had
no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but
for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not
to be treated as, what it would be but for
the section, null and void, and that an
objection
to
jurisdiction
based
on
overvaluation or undervaluation, should be
dealt with under that section and not
otherwise. The reference to Section 578,
now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words
of the section is significant. That section,
while providing that no decree shall be
reversed or varied in appeal on account of
the defects mentioned therein when they do
not affect the merits of the case, excepts
from its operation defects of jurisdiction.
Section 99 therefore gives no protection to
decrees passed on merits, when the courts
which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a
result of overvaluation or undervaluation.
It is with a view to avoid this result that
Section 11 was enacted. It provides that
objections to the jurisdiction of a court
based on overvaluation or undervaluation
shall not be entertained by an appellate
court except in the manner and to the
extent mentioned in the section. It is a selfcontained provision complete in itself, and
no objection to jurisdiction based on
overvaluation or undervaluation can be
raised otherwise than in accordance with
it. With reference to objections relating to
territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the
Civil Procedure Code enacts that no
objection to the place of suing should be
allowed by an appellate or Revisional
Court, unless there was a consequent failure
of justice. It is the same principle that has
been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits
Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary
jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections
21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the
same, namely, that when a case had been
tried by a court on the merits and judgment
rendered, it should not be liable to be
reversed purely on technical grounds, unless
it had resulted in failure of justice, and the
policy of the legislature has been to treat
objections to jurisdiction both territorial and
pecuniary as technical and not open to
consideration by an appellate court, unless
there has been a prejudice on the merits."
 (Emphasis supplied)

 17. Dealing with the question of
whether a decree passed on appeal by a
1412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
court which had jurisdiction to entertain it
only by reason of undervaluation or
overvaluation can be set aside on the
ground that on a true valuation that court
was not competent to entertain the appeal,
the Court held that a mere change of forum
is not 'prejudice' within Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act. This Court held thus:

 "12. it is impossible on the
language of the section to come to a
different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal
being heard by a Subordinate Court or
District Court where the appeal would
have lain to the High Court if the correct
valuation had been given is itself a matter
of prejudice, then the decree passed by the
Subordinate Court or the District Court
must, without more, be liable to be set
aside,
and
the
words
"unless
the
overvaluation or undervaluation thereof
has prejudicially affected the disposal of
the suit or appeal on its merits" would
become wholly useless. These words
clearly show that the decrees passed in
such cases are liable to be interfered with
in an appellate court, not in all cases and
as a matter of course, but only if prejudice
such as is mentioned in the section results.
And the prejudice envisaged by that section
therefore must be something other than the
appeal being heard in a different forum. A
contrary conclusion will lead to the
surprising result that the section was
enacted with the object of curing defects of
jurisdiction
arising
by
reason
of
overvaluation or undervaluation, but that,
in fact, this object has not been achieved.
We are therefore clearly of opinion that the
prejudice contemplated by the section is
something different from the fact of the
appeal having been heard in a forum which
would not have been competent to hear it
on a correct valuation of the suit as
ultimately determined."
 (Emphasis supplied)

 18. The Court disallowed the
objection to jurisdiction on the ground that
no objection was raised at the first instance
and that the party filing the suit was
precluded from raising an objection to
jurisdiction of that court at the appellate
stage. This Court concluded thus:

 "16. If the law were that the
decree of a court which would have had no
jurisdiction over the suit or appeal but for
the overvaluation or undervaluation should
be treated as a nullity, then of course, they
would not be stopped from setting up want
of jurisdiction in the court by the fact of
their having themselves invoked it. That,
however, is not the position under Section
11 of the Suits Valuation Act."

 19. Thus, where the defect in
jurisdiction is of kind which falls within
Section 21 of the CPC or Section 11 of the
Suits Valuation Act 1887, an objection to
jurisdiction cannot be raised except in the
manner and subject to the conditions
mentioned thereunder. Far from helping
the case of the respondent, the judgment in
Kiran Singh (supra) holds that an objection
to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary
jurisdiction is different from an objection to
jurisdiction over the subject matter. An
objection to the want of territorial
jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or
to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil
court to entertain the suit.

 20. In Hiralal v Kalinath, a
person filed a suit on the original side of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for
recovering commission due to him. The
matter was referred to arbitration and it
resulted in an award in favour of the
Plaintiff. A decree was passed in terms of
5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1413
the award and was eventually incorporated
in a decree of the High Court. In execution
proceedings, the judgment-debtor resisted
it on the ground that no part of the cause of
action
had
arisen
in
Bombay,
and
therefore,
the
High
Court
had
no
jurisdiction to try the cause and that all
proceedings
following
thereon
where
wholly without jurisdiction and thus a
nullity. Rejecting this contention, a four
judge Bench of this Court held thus:

 "The objection to its [Bombay
High Court] territorial jurisdiction is one
which does not go to the competence of the
court and can, therefore, be waived. In the
instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the
leave of the Bombay High Court on the
original side, under clause 12 of the Letters
Patent, the correctness of the procedure or
of the order granting the leave could be
questioned by the defendant or the
objection could be waived by him. When he
agreed to refer the matter to arbitration
through court, he would be deemed to have
waived his objection to the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, raised by him in
his written statement. It is well settled that
the objection as to local jurisdiction of a
court does not stand on the same footing as
an objection to the competence of a court
to try a case. Competence of a court to try
a case goes to the very root of the
jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a
case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the
other hand, an objection as to the local
jurisdiction of a court can be waived and
this principle has been given a statutory
recognition by enactments like Section 21
of the Code of Civil Procedure."

 (Emphasis supplied)

 21. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi
v DLF Universal Ltd.9, this Court held that
an objection to territorial and pecuniary
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest
possible opportunity. If it is not raised at
the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be
taken at a subsequent stage. This Court
held thus:

 "30. The jurisdiction of a court
may be classified into several categories.
The important categories are (i) territorial
or
local
jurisdiction;
(ii)
pecuniary
jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the
subject matter. So far as territorial and
pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned,
objection to such jurisdiction has to be
taken at the earliest possible opportunity
and in any case at or before settlement of
issues. The law is well settled on the point
that if such objection is not taken at the
earliest, it cannot be allowed to be aken at
a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to
subject-matter, however, is totally distinct
and stands on a different footing. Where a
court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of the suit by reason of any
limitation imposed by statute, charter or
commission, it cannot take up the cause or
matter. An order passed by a court having
no jurisdiction is a nullity."

 22. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad v
Usman Abbas Sayyad 10, a two judge
Bench of this Court held thus:

 "24. We may, however, hasten to
add that a distinction must be made
between a decree passed by a court which
has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction
in the light of Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a
court having no jurisdiction in regard to
the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in
the former case, the appellate court may
not interfere with the decree unless
prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second
1414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
category of the cases would be interfered
with."

 23. Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar v
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, a two judge
Bench of this Court held thus:

 "20. A distinction, however, must
be made between a jurisdiction with regard
to the subject-matter of the suit and that of
territorial
and
pecuniary
jurisdiction.
Whereas in the case falling within the
former category the judgment would be a
nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not
a case where the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter
of claim?in our opinion, the court should
not have, in the absence of any finding of
sufferance of any prejudice on the part of
the first respondent, entertained the appeal.

 24. The objection which was
raised in execution in the present case did
not relate to the subject matter of the suit.
It
was
an
objection
to
territorial
jurisdiction which does not travel to the
root of or to the inherent lack of
jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the
suit. An executing court cannot go behind
the decree and must execute the decree as
it stands. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v
Rajabhai Abdul Rehman12, the Petitioner
filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes,
Ahmedabad for ejecting the Defendanttenant. The suit was eventually decreed in
his favour by this Court. During execution
proceedings, the defendant-tenant raised
an objection that the Court of Small Causes
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and
its decree was a nullity. The court
executing the decree and the Court of Small
Causes rejected the contention. The High
Court reversed the order of the Court of
Small Causes and dismissed the petition for
execution. On appeal to this Court, a three
judge Bench of this Court, reversed the
judgment of the High Court and held thus:

 "6. A court executing a decree
cannot go behind the decree: between the
parties or their representatives it must take
the decree according to its tenor, and
cannot entertain any objection that the
decree was incorrect in law or on facts.
Until it is set aside by an appropriate
proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree
even if it be erroneous is still binding
between the parties. 8. If the decree is on
the face of the record without jurisdiction
and the question does not relate to the
territorial jurisdiction or under Section 11
of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the
jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree
may be raised; where it is necessary to
investigate facts in order to determine
whether the Court which had passed the
decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and
try the suit, the objection cannot be raised
in the execution proceeding."

14. In assessing the merits of the
rival submissions, it would, at the outset, be
necessary to advert to the provisions of
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.

 (1) Section 21(1) postulates that
no objection as to the place of suing shall
be allowed by any appellate or revisional
court 6 AIR 1954 SC 340 7 (2005) 7 SCC
791 unless the objection was taken in the
court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity and in all cases where
issues are settled on or before such
settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.

 (2) No objection as to the
competence of a Court with reference to the
pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be
5 All. Sandeep Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1415
allowed by any Appellate or Revisional
Court unless such objection was taken in
the Court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity, and in all cases
where issues are settled, at or before such
settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.

 (3) No objection as to the
competence of the executing Court with
reference to the local limits of its
jurisdiction shall be allowed by any
Appellate or Revisional Court unless such
objection was taken in the executing Court
at the earliest possible opportunity, and
unless there has been a consequent failure
of justice."

 Sub-section (1) of Section 21
provides that before raising an objection to
territorial jurisdiction before an appellate or
revisional court, two conditions precedent
must be fulfiled:

 i) The objection must be taken in
the court of first instance at the earliest
possible opportunity; and

 ii) There has been a consequent
failure of justice.

15. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi
Vs.
DLF
Universal
Ltd.
MANU/
SC/0710/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 791, this
Court held that an objection to territorial
and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken
at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is
not raised at the earliest, it cannot be
allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage.
This Court held as under:-

 "3). The jurisdiction of a court may
be classified into several categories. The
important categories are (i) Territorial or
local jurisdiction; (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction;
and (iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter.
So
far
as
territorial
and
pecuniary
jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest
possible opportunity and in any case at or
before settlement of issues. The law is well
settled on the point that if such objection is
not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed
to be taken at a subsequent stage.
Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is
totally distinct and stands on a different
footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit by reason
of any limitation imposed by statute, charter
or commission, it cannot take up the cause or
matter. An order passed by a court having no
jurisdiction is nullity.

16. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs.
Usman
Abbas
Sayyad
MANU/SC/5541/2006: (2007) 2 SCC 355, a
two judge Bench of this Court has held as
under:-

 "24. We may, however, hasten to
add that a distinction must be made between
a decree passed by a court which has no
territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the
light of Section 21 of the Code of the Code of
Civil Procedure Code, and a decre passed by
a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the
subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the
former case, the appellate court may not
interfere with the decree unless prejudice is
shown, ordinarily the second category of the
cases would be interfered with."

17. Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar
Vs.
Oriental
Insurance
Co.
Ltd.
MANU/SC/8464/2008: (2009) 2 SCC 244,
a two judge Bench of this Court held as
under :-

 "20. A distinction, however, must
be made between a jurisdiction with regard
1416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to the subject matter of the suit and that of
territorial
and
pecuniary
jurisdiction.
Whereas in the case falling within the
former category the judgtement would be a
nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not
a case where the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter
of claim... in our opinion, the Court should
not have, in the absence of any finding of
sufferance of any prejudice on the part of
the
first
respondent,
entertained
the
appeal."

18. In a recent judgement in
Punjab National Bank Vs. Atin Arora &
another, Supreme Court [2025 LiveLaw
(SC) 27], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that while exercising its discretion, the
Court overlooked the provisions of Section
21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
whose principles and rule, should be
applied in the present case. The principle
enjoins that objections regarding the place
of suing shall not be allowed unless such
objection is taken in the Court/ tribunal of
first instance at the earliest possible
opportunity.

19. In S.Nagraj and others Vs.
State of Karnataka and another, 1993,
Supp (4) SCC 595, the Court has held that
the review literally and even judicially
means re-examination or reconsideration.
Basic philosophy inherent in it is the
universal acceptance of human fallibility.
The purpose of review is rectification of an
order which stems from the fundamental
principle that the justice is above all and it
is exercised only to correct the error which
has occurred by some accident without any
blame. The power of a Civil Court to
review its judgement/ decision is traceable
in Section 114 CPC and the grounds on
which review can be sought are enumerated
in order 47, Rule 1 CPC, which imposes
definitive limits to the exercise of power of
review.

20. In Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of
Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, the power of
review is very much endowed upon High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, being a court of plenary
jurisdiction, in order to prevent miscarriage
of justice or to correct grave and palpable
errors committed by it. Such power of
review is to be exercised within the
definitive limits, for which the grounds
provided under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC
provides sufficient guidance.

21. In Shri Ram Sahu (dead)
through LRs and others Vs. Vinod
Kumar Rawat and others 2020(12) Scale
415, in following terms:-

 "...9. To appreciate the scope of
review, it would be proper for this Court to
discuss the object and ambit of Section 114
CPC as the same is a substantive provision
for review when a person considering
himself aggrieved either by a decree or by
an order of Court from which appeal is
allowed but no appeal is preferred or
where there is no provision for appeal
against an order and decree, may apply for
review of the decree or order as the case
may be in the Court, which may order or
pass the decree.