# Sandeep Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 7 ILRA 718
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-07-08
- **Case number:** Service Single No. 14055 of 2021
- **Bench:** Abdul Moin
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sandeep-kumar-pandey-v-state-of-u-p-anr-47260
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Suspension - Central Civil
Services (Class, Control & Appeal) Rules,
1965 - Rule 10 - U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule
4(8).

Petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of
Ajay Kumar Choudhary (infra), to contend that
the suspension order should not extend beyond
three
months
if
within
this
period
the
memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not
served on the delinquent officer/employee.
(Para 9)

It was observed that petitioner would be
governed by the provisions of the U.P.
Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1999 (1999 Rules). Rule 4 of 1999 Rules
pertains to suspension of a State Government
employee. The said rule does not contain any
stipulation of the order of a suspension
becoming invalid after 90 days or three months,
rather Rule 4(8) of 1999 Rules itself stipulates
that any suspension ordered or deemed to have
been ordered shall continue to remain in force
unless and until it is modified or revoked by the
competent authority. (Para 18)
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
719
It was held that the judgment of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (infra) would not be applicable
w.r.t. a State Government employee i.e. the
petitioner because abovementioned judgment
pertained to All India Service Officer where
the suspension rules' themselves provided for
initial order of suspension being invalid
beyond three months and there is no such
stipulation in the discipline and appeal rules
governing the petitioner more particularly in
1999 Rules. (Para 19)

B. Precedential value of a decision -
Judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's Theorem nor as if it
was a statute. Rather ratio of any decision has,
to be understood in the background of the facts
of that case. Reliance on the decision
without
looking
into
the
factual
background of the case before it is clearly
impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its
own facts. (Para 20 to 24)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

## Text

718 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. In regard to challenge of
disciplinary proceeding in the present writ
petition, it is recorded that the proceeding
due to non existence of provisions at the
time of retirement cannot be continued,
thus the challenge to said proceeding is
futile exercise.

18. In view of the above, I am of the
considered opinion that once there was no
provision to continue the disciplinary
proceeding after retirement, the same
becomes nonest in the eyes of law after
retirement of the petitioner on 29.02.2016.

19. Accordingly, the disciplinary
proceeding initiated against the petitioner
prior to his retirement is declared nullity
and the same cannot be continued. In
regard to the payment of interest on the
gratuity amount already paid to the
petitioner, it is recorded that the payment of
gratuity was made to the petitioner after
some time from the date of retirement,
therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get
simple interest on the delayed payment
after the retirement. In regard to the
payment
of
other
dues
like
leave
encashment and security deposit, once this
Court has held that the disciplinary
proceeding is not permitted as per the rules
applicable
against the petitioner and
amendment was incorporated on 27.8.2018,
the petitioner is entitled for simple interest
on the amount due to be paid like leave
encashment and security deposit.

20. In view of the finding recorded
above, the petition succeeds and is allowed.

21. The respondents are directed to
release the post retiral dues to the petitioner
like interest on gratuity, leave encashment
and security deposit with simple interest of
8% within a period of two months from the
date of production of a certified copy of
this order.
----------
(2021)07ILR A718
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.07.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Service Single No. 14055 of 2021

Sandeep Kumar Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rakesh Chandra Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Suspension - Central Civil
Services (Class, Control & Appeal) Rules,
1965 - Rule 10 - U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule
4(8).

Petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of
Ajay Kumar Choudhary (infra), to contend that
the suspension order should not extend beyond
three
months
if
within
this
period
the
memorandum of charges/charge sheet is not
served on the delinquent officer/employee.
(Para 9)

It was observed that petitioner would be
governed by the provisions of the U.P.
Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1999 (1999 Rules). Rule 4 of 1999 Rules
pertains to suspension of a State Government
employee. The said rule does not contain any
stipulation of the order of a suspension
becoming invalid after 90 days or three months,
rather Rule 4(8) of 1999 Rules itself stipulates
that any suspension ordered or deemed to have
been ordered shall continue to remain in force
unless and until it is modified or revoked by the
competent authority. (Para 18)
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
719
It was held that the judgment of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (infra) would not be applicable
w.r.t. a State Government employee i.e. the
petitioner because abovementioned judgment
pertained to All India Service Officer where
the suspension rules' themselves provided for
initial order of suspension being invalid
beyond three months and there is no such
stipulation in the discipline and appeal rules
governing the petitioner more particularly in
1999 Rules. (Para 19)

B. Precedential value of a decision -
Judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's Theorem nor as if it
was a statute. Rather ratio of any decision has,
to be understood in the background of the facts
of that case. Reliance on the decision
without
looking
into
the
factual
background of the case before it is clearly
impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its
own facts. (Para 20 to 24)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-3)

Precedent followed:

1. Deepak Bajaj Vs St. of Mah., AIR 2009 SC
628 (Para 20)

2. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & anr. Vs.
N.R. Vairamani & anr., (2004) 8 SCC 579 (Para
22)

3. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Smt. Raj
Kumari & ors., AIR 2008 SC 403 (Para 23)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs U.O.I. & anr.,
(2015) 7 SCC 291 (Para 9, 14, 25)

2. Ram Ratan Vs. St.of U.P. & ors., Writ Petition
No. 10276 (SS) of 2019 (Para 10, 25)

3. Radheyshyam Yadav Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
Writ Petition No. 14023 (SS) of 2020 (Para 10,
25)

Present petition assails suspension order
dated 12.01.2021.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Moin, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for
the
respondents
through
video
conferencing.

2. Present petition has been filed
inter-alia aggrieved against the suspension
order dated 12.01.2021, a copy of which is
Annexure-1 to the writ petition, by which
the petitioner has been placed under
suspension.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that primarily four grounds have
been taken while placing the petitioner
under suspension which grounds do not
stand scrutiny under the eyes of law and
consequently the suspension order merits to
be quashed.

4. So far as the first ground is
concerned, it is
contended that the
petitioner has been placed under suspension
on the ground that he continued to keep the
important documents pertaining to starred
questions in his possession. In this regard,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
invited the attention of this Court towards
the order dated 11.08.2020, a copy of
which is Annexure-11 to the writ petition,
whereby he contends that the duty
pertaining
to
documents
of
starred
questions had been given to Sri Afzal
Farooqui, Senior Assistant, while the work
of the petitioner in the said order itself only
pertained to the election and reservation
and thus prima facie the said charge cannot
be levelled against the petitioner.

5. So far as the second charge is
concerned, it has been contended in the
suspension order that the petitioner has not
720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decided the matters pertaining to Right to
Information Act within the specified time.

6. In this regard, learned counsel for
the petitioner has again invited the attention
of the Court towards the order dated
11.08.2020 to contend that the duty
pertaining to Right to Information Act had
been given to Sri Amit Srivastava,
Principal Assistant and thus again the
petitioner has no role in the matter.

7. So far as the third charge is
concerned which pertains to having kept
the applications of certain personnel whose
application for transfer during the annual
session 2019-2020 had been rejected,
learned counsel for the petitioner contends
that the petitioner has already been
punished for the same charge vide the
punishment order dated 14.01.2020, a copy
of which is Annexure-4 to the writ petition,
and as such, he cannot be placed under
suspension for the same charge.

8. So far as the fourth charge as has
been levelled in the suspension order is
concerned i.e. of having proceeded on
leave without his application for leave
being sanctioned, learned counsel for the
petitioner concedes that once no order
pertaining to rejection of his leave
application had been communicated, yet at
the same time, also not rejected, as such the
petitioner had bonafidely proceeded on
leave but he contends that even if the said
charge is proved, the same would not entail
imposition of a major punishment so as to
justify the impugned suspension order.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has placed reliance on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary vs. Union of India and
another reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 to
contend that the Apex Court has held that
currency of the suspension order should not
extend beyond three months if within this
period the memorandum of charges/charge
sheet is not served on the delinquent
officer/employee.

10. Placing reliance on the aforesaid
judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that even this Court has held in a
number of judgments more particularly in
the case of Ram Ratan vs. State of U.P.
and others in Writ Petition No.10276 (SS)
of 2019 as well as the judgment in the case
of Radheyshyam Yadav vs. State of U.P.
and others in Writ Petition No.14023 (SS)
of 2020, copies of which are Annexure-14
to the writ petition, that suspension order
cannot continue beyond three months.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that once the suspension order is of
12.01.2021 and a period of almost six months
have lapsed and no charge sheet has been
served upon the petitioner consequently
considering the law laid down by the Apex
Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra), the suspension order
itself becomes vitiated in the eyes of law.

12. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record. The Court was
of the view that the learned Standing Counsel
for respondent State be granted a short time
to seek instructions in the matter but the
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri R.C.
Tewari, insisted that time be not granted
rather the matter should be decided on the
basis of judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra).
As such, the Court proceeds to decide the
matter.

13. The petitioner has been placed
under
suspension
vide
order
dated
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
721
12.01.2021 on four grounds as have already
been indicated above. There could be an
argument of three of the charges being
frivolous but learned counsel for the
petitioner has himself candidly admitted of
the leave not having been sanctioned to the
petitioner and he having proceeded on
leave. This fact is specifically admitted in
paragraphs 22 and 23 of the writ petition.
In this view of the matter, the said charge
alone is sufficient to place the petitioner
under suspension for in case an employee
gets unfettered discretion to go on leave
without any leave having been sanctioned
then both, the discipline of the office and
accountability of the person, would suffer.
However, this observation of the Court may
not be treated as if this Court has given a
finding on the charge levelled against the
petitioner.

14. So far as the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) is concerned, though
the Apex Court has categorically laid down
that a suspension order should not continue
beyond three months in case the charge
sheet has not been served yet from a
perusal of the said judgment, it comes out
that the Apex Court was seized of the
matter pertaining to an All India Service
Officer namely a Defence Estate Officer
belonging to All India Service of Indian
Defence Estate Service. At first glance, it
comes
out
that
All
India
Services
(Discipline
&
Appeal)
Rules,
1969
(hereinafter referred to as '1969 Rules')
shall be applicable with respect to All India
Service Officers but when seen in the
context of All India Services Act, 1951
(hereinafter referred to as '1951 Act' ), it
comes out that as per the definition clause,
'All-India Service' means the service
known as the Indian Administrative Service
or the Indian Police Service. Sfter
addition of Section 2-A in 1951 Act, the
Indian Service of Engineers, Indian Forest
Service and Indian Medical and Health
Service have been included in 1951 Act.
Thus, even though the Indian Defence
Estate Service is an All-India Service yet
once it is not included in 1951 Act
consequently 1969 Rules shall not be
applicable upon them rather it is the Central
Civil Services (Class, Control & Appeal)
Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as
'1965 Rules') which shall be applicable
upon them.

15. Rule 10 of 1965 Rules deals with
the suspension which, for the sake of
convenience, is reproduced below:-

"10.
Suspension.
(1)
The
appointing authority or any authority to
which it is subordinate or the disciplinary
authority
or
any
other
authority
empowered in that behalf by the President,
by general or special order, may place a
Government servant under suspension-

(a)
where
a
disciplinary
proceeding against him is contemplated or
is pending; or

(aa) where, in the opinion of the
authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself
in activities prejudicial to the interest of the
security of the State; or

(b) where a case against him in
respect of any criminal offence is under
investigation, inquiry or trial:

Provided that, except in case of
an order of suspension made by the
Comptroller and Auditor - General in
regard to a member of the Indian Audit and
722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Accounts Service and in regard to an
Assistant Accountant General or equivalent
(other than a regular member of the Indian
Audit and Accounts Service), where the
order of suspension is made by an authority
lower than the appointing authority, such
authority shall forthwith report to the
appointing authority the circumstances in
which the order was made.

(2) A Government servant shall
be deemed to have been placed under
suspension by an order of appointing
authority -

(a) with effect from the date of his
detention, if he is detained in custody,
whether on a criminal charge or otherwise,
for a period exceeding forty-eight hours;

(b) with effect from the date of his
conviction, if, in the event of a conviction
for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours
and is not forthwith dismissed or removed
or compulsorily retired consequent to such
conviction.

EXPLANATION - The period of
forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of
this sub-rule shall be computed from the
commencement of the imprisonment after
the conviction and for this purpose,
intermittent periods of imprisonment, if
any, shall be taken into account.

(3) Where a penalty of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement from
service imposed upon a Government
servant under suspension is set aside in
appeal or on review under these rules and
the case is remitted for further inquiry or
action or with any other directions, the
order of his suspension shall be deemed to
have continued in force on and from the
date of the original order of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement and shall
remain in force until further orders.

(4) Where a penalty of dismissal,
removal or compulsory retirement from
service imposed upon a Government
servant is set aside or declared or rendered
void in consequence of or by a decision of
a Court of Law and the disciplinary
authority, on a consideration of the
circumstances of the case, decides to hold a
further
inquiry
against
him
on
the
allegations on which the penalty of
dismissal,
removal
or
compulsory
retirement was originally imposed, the
Government servant shall be deemed to
have been placed under suspension by the
Appointing Authority from the date of the
original order of dismissal, removal or
compulsory retirement and shall continue
to remain under suspension until further
orders :

Provided that no such further
inquiry shall be ordered unless it is
intended to meet a situation where the
Court has passed an order purely on
technical grounds without going into the
merits of the case.

[(5)(a) Subject to the provisions
contained in sub-rule (7), an order of
suspension made or deemed to have been
made under this rule shall continue to
remain in force until it is modified or
revoked by the authority competent to do
so.]

(b) Where a Government servant
is suspended or is deemed to have been
suspended (whether in connection with any
disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and
any
other
disciplinary
proceeding
is
commenced
against
him
during
the
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
723
continuance
of
that
suspension,
the
authority competent to place him under
suspension may, for reasons to be recorded
by him in writing, direct that the
Government servant shall continue to be
under suspension until the termination of
all or any of such proceedings.

(c) An order of suspension made
or deemed to have been made under this
rule may at any time be modified or
revoked by the authority which made or is
deemed to have made the order or by any
authority to which that authority is
subordinate.

[(6) An order of suspension made
or deemed to have been made under this
rule shall be reviewed by the authority
competent to modify or revoke the
suspension, before expiry of ninety days
from the effective date of suspension, on
the
recommendation
of
the
Review
Committee constituted for the purpose and
pass orders either extending or revoking the
suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be
made before expiry of the extended period
of suspension. Extension of suspension
shall not be for a period exceeding one
hundred and eighty days at a time.]

[(7) An order of suspension made
or deemed to have been made under subrules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be
valid after a period of ninety days unless it
is extended after review, for a further
period before the expiry of ninety days :

Provided that no such review of
suspension shall be necessary in the case of
deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if
the Government servant continues to be
under suspension at the time of completion
of ninety days of suspension and the ninety
days period in such case will count from
the date the Government servant detained
in custody is released from detention or the
date on which the fact of his release from
detention is intimated to his appointing
authority, whichever is later.]"

16. From perusal of the aforesaid
rules, it comes out that Rule 10(5)(a) of
1965 Rules provides that an order of
suspension shall continue to remain in
force until it is modified or revoked by the
competent authority. Rule 10(6) of 1965
Rules provides that an order of suspension
made or deemed to have been made under
this rule shall be reviewed by the
competent authority before expiry of 90
days from the effective date of suspension,
on the recommendation of the Review
Committee and that subsequent reviews
shall be made before expiry of the extended
period of suspension. Further extension of
suspension shall not be for a period
exceeding 180 days at a time.

17. Rule 10(7) of 1965 Rules also
provides that an order of suspension made
or deemed to have been made under subrules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be
valid after a period of ninety days unless
it is extended after review for a further
period before the expiry of 90 days.
However, from perusal of Rule 10(7) of
1965 Rules, it is apparent that an order of
suspension passed against a Government
Servant shall not be valid after a period of
90 days unless it is extended after a review
for a further period. Thus, the rule itself
contains specific stipulation of an order of
suspension
becoming
invalid,
if
not
extended, beyond three months.

18. So far as the rules pertaining to
suspension of the State
Government
724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
employees is concerned i.e. in the case of
the petitioner, he would be governed by the
provisions of the U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999
(hereinafter referred to as 1999 Rules).
Rule 4 of 1999 Rules pertains to suspension
of a State Government employee. The said
rule does not contain any stipulation of the
order of a suspension becoming invalid
after 90 days or three months, rather Rule
4(8) of 1999 Rules itself stipulates that any
suspension ordered or deemed to have been
ordered shall continue to remain in force
unless and until it is modified or revoked
by the competent authority.

19. Thus, once the Apex Court was
seized of a matter of suspension pertaining
to All India Service Officer where the
suspension rules themselves provided for
initial order of suspension being invalid
beyond three months and there being no
such stipulation in the discipline and appeal
rules
governing
the
petitioner
more
particularly in 1999 Rules consequently it
cannot be said that the judgment of Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra) would be
applicable
with
respect
to
a
State
Government employee i.e. the petitioner.

20. In this regard, the Court may
notice the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of Deepak Bajaj vs. State of
Maharashtra - AIR 2009 SC 628 wherein
it has been held by the Apex Court that the
judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's Theoram nor as
if it was a statute rather ratio of any
decision has to be understood in the
background of the facts of that case.

21. For the sake of convenience,
relevant observations of the aforesaid
judgment are reproduced below:-

7. It is well settled that a
judgment of a Court is not to be read
mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as
if it was a statute.

8. On the subject of precedents
Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn vs.
Leathem, 1901 AC 495 :

"Now before discussing the case
of Allen Vs. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what
was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I
wish to make, and one is to repeat what I
have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved or assumed to be
proved,
since
the
generality
of
the
expressions which may be found there are
not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but are governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides. I entirely deny that it can
be quoted for a proposition that may seem
to follow logically from it. Such a mode of
reasoning
assumes
that
the
law
is
necessarily a logical Code, whereas every
lawyer must acknowledge that the law is
not always logical at all."

We entirely agree with the above
observations.

9. In Ambica Quarry Works vs.
State of Gujarat & others (1987) 1 SCC
213 (vide paragraph 18) this Court
observed :

"The ratio of any decision must
be understood in the background of the
facts of that case. It has been said a long
time ago that a case is only an authority for
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
725
what it actually decides and not what
logically follows from it".

10. In Bhavnagar University vs.
Palittana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. (2003) 2
SCC 111 (vide paragraph 59), this Court
observed :

"It is well settled that a little
difference in facts or additional facts may
make
a
lot
of
difference
in
the
precedential value of a decision".

11. As held in Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. & another vs. N.R.
Vairamani & another (AIR 2004 SC 4778),
a decision cannot be relied on without
disclosing the factual situation. In the same
judgment this Court also observed :

"Courts
should
not
place
reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with
the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. Observations of Courts
are neither to be read as Euclid's
theorems nor as provisions of the statute
and that too taken out of the context.
These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been
stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark
into lengthy discussions but the discussion
is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words
of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes".(emphasis supplied)

12. In London Graving Dock Co.
Ltd. vs. Horton (1951 AC 737 at page 761),
Lord Mac Dermot observed :

"The matter cannot, of course,
be settled merely by treating the ipsissima
verba of Willes, J. as though they were part
of an Act of Parliament and applying the
rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.
This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the language actually used by
that most distinguished judge".

13. In Home Office vs. Dorset
Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid
Said, "Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be
treated as if it was a statute definition; it
will
require
qualification
in
new
circumstances, Megarry, J. in (1971) 1
WLR 1062 observed :

"One
must
not,
of
course,
construe even a reserved judgment of
Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament".

14. And in Herrington vs. British
Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord
Morris said :

"There is always peril in treating
the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances are made in the setting
of the facts of a particular case.

Circumstantial flexibility, one
additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions
in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not
proper. The following words of Lord
Denning
in
the
matter
of
applying
precedents have become locus classicus :

Each case depends on its own
facts and a close similarity between one
726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter
the entire aspect. In deciding such cases,
one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching
the colour of another. To decide, therefore,
on which side of the line a case falls, the
broad resemblance to another case is not at
all decisive.

Precedent should be followed
only so far as it marks the path of justice,
but you must cut the dead wood and trim
off the side branches else you will find
yourself lost in thickets and branches. My
plea is to keep the path of justice clear of
obstructions which could impede it."

(emphasis supplied)

15. The same view was taken by
this Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana
(K.V.), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra &
Ors. AIR 2008 SC 946 and in Government
of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Gowramma &
Ors. AIR 2008 SC 863.

22. In the case of Bharat Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. and another vs. N.R.
Vairamani and another - (2004) 8 SCC
579, Apex Court has held as under:-

"Courts should not place reliance
on decisions without discussing as to how
the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance
is placed. Observations of Courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor
as provisions of the statute and that too
taken
out
of
their
context.
These
observations must be read in the context in
which they appear to have been stated.
Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark
into lengthy discussions but the discussion
is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words
of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving
Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at
p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

"The matter cannot, of course, be
settled merely by treating the ipsissima
vertra of Willes, J as though they were part
of an Act of Parliament and applying the
rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.
This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the language actually used
by that most distinguished judge."

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht
Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said,
"Lord Atkin's speech.....is not to be treated
as if it was a statute definition it will
require
qualification
in
new
circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1
WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of
course, construe even a reserved judgment
of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British
Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord
Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating
the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances made in the setting of
the facts of a particular case."

Circumstantial
flexibility,
one
additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in
two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not
proper.
7 All. Sandeep Kumar Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
727

The following words of Lord
Denning
in
the
matter
of
applying
precedents have become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own
facts and a close similarity between one
case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter
the entire aspect, in deciding such cases,
one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the
colour of one case against the colour of
another. To decide therefore, on which side
of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."

*** *** ***

"Precedent should be followed
only so far as it marks the path of justice,
but you must cut the dead wood and trim
off the side branches else you will find
yourself lost in thickets and branches. My
plea is to keep the path to justice clear of
obstructions which could impede it."

23. Likewise, in the case of Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Raj Kumari
and others - AIR 2008 SC 403, Apex
Court has held as under:-

"11. Reliance on the decision
without
looking
into
the
factual
background of the case before it is clearly
impermissible. A decision is a precedent
on its own facts. Each case presents its
own features. It is not everything said by a
Judge while giving a judgment that
constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a
Judges decision binding a party is the
principle upon which the case is decided
and for this reason it is important to
analyse a decision and isolate from it the
ratio decidendi. According to the wellsettled theory of precedents, every decision
contains three basic postulates (i) findings
of material facts, direct and inferential. An
inferential finding of facts is the inference
which the Judge draws from the direct, or
perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the
principles of law applicable to the legal
problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii)
judgment based on the combined effect of
the above. A decision is an authority for
what it actually decides. What is of the
essence in a decision is its ratio and not
every observation found therein nor what
logically
flows
from
the
various
observations made in the judgment. The
enunciation of the reason or principle on
which a question before a Court has been
decided is alone binding as a precedent.
(See: State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar
Misra and Ors. (AIR 1968 SC 647) and
Union of India and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi
and Ors. (1996 (6) SCC 44). A case is a
precedent and binding for what it explicitly
decides and no more. The words used by
Judges in their judgments are not to be
read as if they are words in Act of
Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathem (1901)
AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC
observed that every judgment must be read
as applicable to the particular facts proved
or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions which are
found there are not intended to be
exposition of the whole law but governed
and qualified by the particular facts of the
case in which such expressions are found
and a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides.

12. Courts should not place
reliance on decisions without discussing as
to how the factual situation fits in with the
fact situation of the decision on which
728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reliance is placed. Observations of Courts
are neither to be read as Euclids theorems
nor as provisions of the statute and that too
taken
out
of
their
context.
These
observations must be read in the context in
which they appear to have been stated.
Judgments of Courts are not to be
construed as statutes. To interpret words,
phrases and provisions of a statute, it may
become necessary for judges to embark
into lengthy discussions but the discussion
is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not
interpret judgments. They interpret words
of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving
Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton (1951 AC 737 at
p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

"The matter cannot, of course, be
settled merely by treating the ipsissima
vertra of Willes, J as though they were part
of an Act of Parliament and applying the
rules of interpretation appropriate thereto.
This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the language actually used
by that most distinguished judge."

13. In Home Office v. Dorset
Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid
said, Lord Atkins speech.....is not to be
treated as if it was a statute definition. It
will
require
qualification
in
new
circumstances. Megarry, J in (1971) 1
WLR 1062 observed: One must not, of
course, construe even a reserved judgment
of Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of
Parliament. And, in Herrington v. British
Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord
Morris said:

"There is always peril in treating
the words of a speech or judgment as
though they are words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be remembered that
judicial utterances made in the setting of
the facts of a particular case."

14. Circumstantial flexibility, one
additional or different fact may make a
world of difference between conclusions in
two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not
proper.

15. The following words of Lord
Denning
in
the
matter
of
applying
precedents have become locus classicus:

"Each case depends on its own
facts and a close similarity between one
case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter
the entire aspect, in deciding such cases,
one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the
colour of one case against the colour of
another. To decide therefore, on which side
of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all
decisive."

*** *** ***

"Precedent should be followed
only so far as it marks the path of justice,
but you must cut the dead wood and trim
off the side branches else you will find
yourself lost in thickets and branches. My
plea is to keep the path to justice clear of
obstructions which could impede it."

24. From perusal of the aforesaid
judgments in the cases of Deepak Bajaj
(supra), Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd.
(supra) and Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd.
(supra) and the cases as have been referred
to in the said judgments, it comes out that
the broad principles of law as have been
laid down by the Apex Court with regard to
7 All. Ajay Prakash Mishra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
729
following of a precedent are primarily as
under:-

(a) The ratio of any decision has
to be understood in the background of the
facts of that case;

(b) A little difference in facts or
additional facts may make a lot of
difference in the precedential value of a
decision;

(c) The Courts should not place
reliance on decisions without discussing as
to how the factual situation fits in with the
fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed;

(d) Observations of Courts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor
as provisions of the statute and that too
taken out of the context;

(e) An additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases;

(f) Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper;
and

(g) Each case depends on its own
facts and a close similarity between one
case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter
the entire aspect.

25. Considering the aforesaid principles
of law, it is apparent that the rules governing
the suspension in the present case are at
variance with the rules which were applicable
in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary
(supra) where there was a clear stipulation of
a suspension order coming to an end after 90
days in case the suspension order was not
extended. As regards the judgment of this
Court in the cases of Ram Ratan (supra)
and Radheyshyam Yadav (supra) passed by
this Court, suffice to state that the said
judgments were based on the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) and once the judgment
in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary
(supra) itself is not applicable in the facts of
the instant case consequently the judgments
of Ram Ratan (supra) and Radheyshyam
Yadav (supra) would also not be applicable.
Thus, the Court does not find any merit in the
writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is
dismissed.
----------
(2021)07ILR A729
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.06.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.

Writ -A No. 26813 of 2018 connected with
others cases

Ajay Prakash Mishra & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Seemant Singh, Sri Ashok Kumar Singh,
Sri Dhiraj Singh, Sri Ganesh Kumar, Sri
Rakesh Kumar, Sri Vibhu Rai, Sri Siddharth
Khare, Sri Pradeep Keshwarni, Ms. Atipriya
Gautam, Sri Vinod Kumar Mishra, Sri
Devesh Mishra, Sri Tarun Agarwal, Sri
Mujeeb Ahmad Siddqui, Sri Ashok Khare,
Sri H.N. Singh, Sri Vjay Gautam, Sri Anoop
Trivedi

Counsel for the Respondents: