# Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 7 ILRA 469
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-07-24
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 2778 of 2018
- **Bench:** Saurabh Lavania
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanehi-ram-sanehi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52287
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(A) Criminal Law - Maintainability of
Application
-
The
Code
of
criminal
procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power, Section 397 - revision, Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149,
302, 504 - mere availability of alternative
remedy cannot be a ground to disentitle
the relief under Section 482 CrPC - Section
482 CrPC powers can be exercised despite
alternative remedies - High Courts should
exercise self-restraint and consider each
case
on
its
merits,
rather
than
mechanically dismissing applications due
to alternative remedies.(Para - 8,9,10 )

Summoning order passed by Magistrate -
challenged before revisional court - revisional
Court interfered in summoning order
-
whereby Magistrate summoned the persons
impleaded as opposite parties in Complaint
Case - impugned order (dated 13.04.2018)
was passed by a revisional court under
Section 397 Cr.P.C. - applicant has right to a
revision remedy - preliminary objection raised
by opposite party to the maintainability of an
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C..(Para 1
to 5)

HELD: - Application under Section 482 CrPC
held maintainable; matter listed for final
disposal. (Para -11,12)

Application pending. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

7 All. Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
469

"(7)
Where
a
criminal
proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge."

13. Since Applicant-1 has already
initiated criminal proceedings against her
husband and in-laws, therefore, it is a case
wherein opposite parties have initiated
present
proceedings
for
wreaking
vengeance.

14. The outcome of above discussion
is that, the application is allowed. Entire
proceedings of Complaint Case No. 3921
of 2023 as well as summoning order dated
18.12.2023 passed by Additional Civil
Judge (Senior Division)/ Additional Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Court
No.
4,
Ghaziabad, are hereby quashed.

15. Registrar (Compliance) to take
steps.
----------
(2024) 7 ILRA 469
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.07.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 2778 of 2018

Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Raj Kr. Singh Suryavanshi

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Nadeem Murtaza
(A) Criminal Law - Maintainability of
Application
-
The
Code
of
criminal
procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power, Section 397 - revision, Indian
Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 147, 148, 149,
302, 504 - mere availability of alternative
remedy cannot be a ground to disentitle
the relief under Section 482 CrPC - Section
482 CrPC powers can be exercised despite
alternative remedies - High Courts should
exercise self-restraint and consider each
case
on
its
merits,
rather
than
mechanically dismissing applications due
to alternative remedies.(Para - 8,9,10 )

Summoning order passed by Magistrate -
challenged before revisional court - revisional
Court interfered in summoning order
-
whereby Magistrate summoned the persons
impleaded as opposite parties in Complaint
Case - impugned order (dated 13.04.2018)
was passed by a revisional court under
Section 397 Cr.P.C. - applicant has right to a
revision remedy - preliminary objection raised
by opposite party to the maintainability of an
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C..(Para 1
to 5)

HELD: - Application under Section 482 CrPC
held maintainable; matter listed for final
disposal. (Para -11,12)

Application pending. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Vipin Sahni & anr. Vs C.B.I., 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 511

2. Drigpal Singh & ors. Vs Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi
& ors., SLP(Crl.) No. 8396 of 2018 (Criminal
Appeal No. 366 of 2024)

3. Prabhu Chawla Vs St. of Raj. & anr., (2016)
SCC OnLine SC 905

4. Vijay & anr. Vs St. of Maha., (2017) 13 SCC
317

5. Mohit Vs St. of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC 789

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)
470 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Heard.

2. Shri Nadeem Murtaza, learned
counsel for the opposite party has raised
preliminary
objection
regarding
the
maintainability of the instant application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C..

3. By means of the instant application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant
has challenged the order dated 13.04.2018
which has been passed by Additional
District Judge/ Special Judge (Essential
Commodities Act), Room No. 2, Barabanki
(in short "revisional Court") in Criminal
revision No. 128 of 2017 (Drig Pal Singh
Vs. State of U.P.).

4. The revisional Court vide order
dated
13.04.2018
interfered
in
the
summoning order dated 31.05.2017 passed
by
C.J.M.,
Barabanki
(in
short
"Magistrate")
whereby
the
Magistrate
summoned the persons impleaded as
opposite parties in Complaint Case no.
191/2016 (Ram Sanehi Vs. Drig Pal Singh)
under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 504 IPC,
Police Station - Tikait Nagar, District -
Barabanki.

5. On the issue of maintainability, it is
stated by Shri Nadeem Murtaza, learned
counsel for the opposite parties that the
order dated 13.04.2018 under challenge
was passed by revisional Court in exercise
of powers under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and
the remedy of revision is available under
the said section to the presentapplicant
which is permissible under the law, and as
such in view of the statutory remedy
available to the applicant, the present
application is not maintainable.

6. In support of his submissions,
reliance has been placed on the judgement
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Vipin Sahni and Another Vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation, reported in 2024
SCC OnLine SC 511. Relevant para of the
judgment reads as under:

"23. As regards the objection
raised by the appellants as to the
maintainability of the CBI's petition filed
before the High Court under Section 482
Cr. P.C., we may note that, as per Article
131 in the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963, the limitation period for filing a
criminal revision under Section 397 Cr.
P.C., be it before the High Court or the
Sessions Court, is 90 days. However, there
is no limitation prescribed for invocation of
the inherent powers of the High Court
under Section 482 Cr. P.C. and it can be at
any time. It is a matter of record that when
the learned Special Magistrate, CBI Court,
dismissed the appellants' discharge petition
in the first instance, they had filed a
revision before the Sessions Court under
Section 397 Cr. P.C. and the matter was
remanded for hearing afresh. However, the
CBI did not choose to adopt this course
when the appellants' discharge petition was
allowed by the learned Special Magistrate
in the second round. Long after the expiry
of the limitation period of 90 days, the CBI
filed a petition before the High Court at
Allahabad under Section 482 Cr. P.C. This
was obviously to get over the hurdle of the
limitation for filing of a revision under
Section 397 Cr. P.C. In this regard, useful
reference may be made to the decision of
this Court in Mohit alias Sonu v. State of
U.P.3, wherein it was observed thus:

'28. So far as the inherent power
of the High Court as contained in Section
482 CrPC is concerned, the law in this
regard is set at rest by this Court in a
catena of decisions. However, we would
like to reiterate that when an order, not
7 All. Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
471
interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in
the High Court in revisional jurisdiction,
then there should be a bar in invoking the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In
other words, inherent power of the Court
can be exercised when there is no remedy
provided
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure for redressal of the grievance. It
is well settled that the inherent power of the
Court can ordinarily be exercised when
there is no express provision in the Code
under which order impugned can be
challenged.

29.
Courts
possess
inherent
power in other statute also like the Code of
Civil Procedure (CPC), Section 151
whereof deals with such power. Section 151
CPC reads:

"151. Saving of inherent powers
of court.-Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect the
inherent power of the court to make such
orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of
the court."

30. This Court in Padam Sen v.
State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 218 : (1961) 1
Cri LJ 322] regarding inherent power of
the Court under Section 151 CPC observed
: (AIR p. 219, para 8)

"8. ... The inherent powers of the
court are in addition to the powers
specifically conferred on the court by the
Code. They are complementary to those
powers and therefore it must be held that
the Court is free to exercise them for the
purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the
Code when the exercise of those powers is
not in any way in conflict with what has
been expressly provided in the Code or
against the intentions of the legislature. It
is also well recognised that the inherent
power is not to be exercised in a manner
which will be contrary to or different from
the procedure expressly provided in the
Code."

31. In a Constitution Bench
decision rendered in Manohar Lal Chopra
v. Seth Hiralal [AIR 1962 SC 527], this
Court held that : (AIR p. 537, para 43)

"43. ... The inherent jurisdiction
of the court to make orders ex debito
justitiae is undoubtedly affirmed by Section
151 of the Code, but [inherent] jurisdiction
cannot be exercised so as to nullify the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Where the Code of Civil Procedure deals
expressly with a particular matter, the
provision should normally be regarded as
exhaustive."

32.
The
intention
of
the
legislature enacting the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Code of Civil Procedure
vis-à-vis the law laid down by this Court it
can safely be concluded that when there is
a specific remedy provided by way of
appeal or revision the inherent power
under Section 482 CrPC or Section 151
CPC cannot and should not be resorted to.'

24. In the light of the above edict,
it was not open to the CBI to blithely ignore
the statutory remedy available to it under
Section 397 Cr. P.C. and thereafter resort
to filing of an application under Section
482 Cr. P.C."

7. In response, it is stated by learned
counsel for the applicant that the present
application was entertained by this Court
challenging the order passed by the
revisional Court in exercise of power under
Section 397 Cr.P.C. read with Section 399
Cr.P.C. and thereafter, the final order was
passed on 09.05.2018 whereby this Court
allowed the present application and set
aside the order dated 13.04.2018 and
directed the Magistrate to proceed in
accordance with law without any delay.
Thereafter
aggrieved,
the
parties
472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
approached the Hon'ble Apex Court by
filing SLP(Crl.) No. 8396 of 2018
(Drigpal Singh and Ors. Vs. Sanehi @
Ram Sanehi and Ors.), which was
converted into Criminal Appeal No. 366
of 2024 and the Hon'ble Apex Court after
considering the fact that all the accused
were
not
impleaded
in
the
instant
application interfered in the judgment dated
09.05.2018 passed by this Court and
remanded the matter back and in terms of
the said order, the instant application is
listed before this Court for final disposal,
after impleading all the accused.

8. It is thus stated that in the aforesaid
background of the case as also the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Anr. reported in (2016) SCC
OnLine SC 905, the application is liable to
be entertained, heard and decided on
merits. Reference has been made to
following paragraphs:

"5. Mr Goswami also placed
strong reliance upon the judgment of
Krishna Iyer, J. in a Division Bench in Raj
Kapoor v. State [Raj Kapoor v. State,
(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] .
Relying upon the judgment of a Bench of
three Judges in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 10] and quoting therefrom,
Krishna Iyer, J. in his inimitable style made
the law crystal clear in para 10 which runs
as follows : (Raj Kapoor case [Raj Kapoor
v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri)
72] , SCC pp. 47-48)

"10. The first question is as to
whether the inherent power of the High
Court under Section 482 stands repelled
when the revisional power under Section
397 overlaps. The opening words of Section
482 contradict this contention because
nothing of the Code, not even Section 397,
can affect the amplitude of the inherent
power preserved in so many terms by the
language of Section 482. Even so, a
general principle pervades this branch of
law when a specific provision is made :
easy resort to inherent power is not right
except under compelling circumstances.
Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but
that inherent power should not invade
areas set apart for specific power under the
same Code. In Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 10] this Court has exhaustively
and, if I may say so with great respect,
correctly discussed and delineated the law
beyond mistake. While it is true that
Section 482 is pervasive it should not
subvert legal interdicts written into the
same Code, such, for instance, in Section
397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in
some situations between the two provisions
and a happy solution 'would be to say that
the bar provided in sub-section (2) of
Section 397 operates only in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court,
meaning thereby that the High Court will
have no power of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order. Then in accordance
with one of the other principles enunciated
above, the inherent power will come into
play, there being no other provision in the
Code for the redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party. But then, if the order
assailed is purely of an interlocutory
character which could be corrected in
exercise of the revisional power of the High
Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court
will refuse to exercise its inherent power.
But in case the impugned order clearly
brings about a situation which is an abuse
of the process of the court or for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice
7 All. Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
473
interference
by
the
High
Court
is
absolutely
necessary,
then
nothing
contained in Section 397(2) can limit or
affect the exercise of the inherent power by
the High Court. But such cases would be
few and far between. The High Court must
exercise the inherent power very sparingly.
One such case would be the desirability of
the quashing of a criminal proceeding
initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being
without jurisdiction'. (SCC pp. 555-56,
para 10)

In short, there is no total ban on
the exercise of inherent power where abuse
of the process of the court or other
extraordinary situation excites the Court's
jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint,
nothing more. The policy of the law is clear
that interlocutory orders, pure and simple,
should not be taken up to the High Court
resulting in unnecessary litigation and
delay. At the other extreme, final orders are
clearly capable of being considered in
exercise of inherent power, if glaring
injustice stares the court in the face. In
between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J.
has pointed out as for example, where it is
more than a purely interlocutory order and
less than a final disposal. The present case
falls under that category where the accused
complain of harassment through the court's
process. Can we state that in this third
category the inherent power can be
exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J. :
(SCC p. 556, para 10)

'10. ... The answer is obvious
that the bar will not operate to prevent the
abuse of the process of the court and/or to
secure the ends of justice. The label of the
petition filed by an aggrieved party is
immaterial. The High Court can examine
the matter in an appropriate case under its
inherent
powers.
The
present
case
undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power
of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even
assuming, although not accepting, that
invoking the revisional power of the High
Court is impermissible.'

I am, therefore clear in my mind
that the inherent power is not rebuffed in
the case situation before us. Counsel on
both sides, sensitively responding to our
allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that
the fanatical insistence on the formal filing
of a copy of the order under cessation need
not take up this Court's time. Our
conclusion concurs with the concession of
counsel on both sides that merely because a
copy of the order has not been produced,
despite its presence in the records in the
court, it is not possible for me to hold that
the entire revisory power stands frustrated
and the inherent power stultified."

6. In our considered view any
attempt to explain the law further as
regards the issue relating to inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is unwarranted. We would simply
reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non
obstante clause to state:

"482. Saving of inherent powers
of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

A fortiori, there can be no total
ban on the exercise of such wholesome
jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna
Iyer, J.

"abuse of the process of the court
or other extraordinary situation excites the
Court's jurisdiction. The limitation is selfrestraint, nothing more". (Raj Kapoor case
[Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 72] , SCC p. 48, para 10)
474 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

We venture to add a further
reason in support. Since Section 397 CrPC
is attracted against all orders other than
interlocutory, a contrary view would limit
the availability of inherent powers under
Section
482
CrPC
only
to
petty
interlocutory orders! A situation wholly
unwarranted and undesirable.

7.
As
a
sequel,
we
are
constrained to hold that the Division
Bench, particularly in para 28, in Mohit
[Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC 789 :
(2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 727] in respect of
inherent power of the High Court in
Section 482 CrPC does not state the law
correctly.
We
record
our
respectful
disagreement.

8. In our considered opinion the
learned Single Judge of the High Court
should have followed the law laid down by
this Court in Dhariwal Tobacco Products
Ltd. [Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 806] and other earlier
cases which were cited but wrongly
ignored them in preference to a judgment
of that Court in Sanjay Bhandari [Sanjay
Bhandari v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 1
Cri LR 282 : 2009 SCC OnLine Raj 456]
passed by another learned Single Judge on
5-2-2009 in SB Criminal Miscellaneous
Petition No. 289 of 2006 which is
impugned in the connected criminal appeal
arising out of Special Leave Petition No.
4744 of 2009. As a result, both the appeals,
one preferred by Prabhu Chawla and the
other by Jagdish Upasane and others are
allowed. The impugned common order
dated 2-4-2009 [Ashish Bagga v. State,
2009 SCC OnLine Raj 1552] passed by the
High Court of Rajasthan is set aside and
the matters are remitted back to the High
Court for fresh hearing of the petitions
under Section 482 CrPC in the light of law
explained above and for disposal in
accordance with law. Since the matters
have remained pending for long, the High
Court is requested to hear "5. A close
scrutiny of the order of the High Court
reveals that the whole basis for the High
Court to pass the order impugned is that
there is an alternative remedy available to
the petitioner i.e. by way of revision under
Section
156(3)
CrPC.
Hence,
the
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC
cannot be exercised by indirect method
when statutory remedy of revision is
available. Hence, the High Court disposed
of the application reserving liberty to the
appellants to take appropriate steps as are
available in law and further directed to
complete the investigation within three
months from the date of the order.

6. The learned counsel appearing
for the appellants relied upon the judgment
of this Court in Dhariwal Tobacco
Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806] : (SCC p. 372, para 6)

"6. ... Only because a revision
petition is maintainable, the same by itself,
in our considered opinion, would not
constitute a bar for entertaining an
application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is
barred, as for example the remedy by way
of Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, this Court has held that
the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India would be available."
The learned counsel further relied upon the
recent judgment of this Court in Prabhu
Chawla v. State of Rajasthan [Prabhu
Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16
SCC 30] .

7. After hearing the counsel and
also after perusing the impugned order, we
are of the considered opinion that the order
of the High Court has no legs to stand in
7 All. Sanehi @ Ram Sanehi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
475
view of the law laid down by this Court in
Prabhu Chawla [Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30] . In the
above referred case, in view of the
divergent opinions of this Court in
Dhariwal
Tobacco
Products
Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806] and Mohit v. State of
U.P. [Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC
789 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 727] , the matter
was placed before the three-Judge Bench of
this Court. The three-Judge Bench took the
view that Section 482 CrPC begins with a
non obstante clause to state:

"482. Saving of inherent powers
of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

As Section 397 CrPC is attracted
against all orders other than interlocutory,
a contrary view would limit the availability
of inherent powers under Section 482
CrPC only to petty interlocutory orders! A
situation which is wholly unwarranted and
undesirable. The three-Judge Bench has
confirmed the law laid down by this Court
in
Dhariwal
Tobacco
Products
Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806]

8. In view of the above settled
law, mere availability of alternative remedy
cannot be a ground to disentitle the relief
under Section 482 CrPC and, apart from
this, we feel that the learned Judge without
appreciating any of the factual and legal
position, in a mechanical way, passed the
impugned
order,
which
warrants
interference by this Court. Accordingly, the
order of the High Court is set aside and the
matter is remanded to the High Court for
reconsideration in the light of the settled
legal position."and decide the matters
expeditiously,
preferably
within
six
months."

9. Considered the aforesaid and
perused the records.

10. Before proceeding further on the
issue of maintainability of the present
application, it would be fruitful to extract
relevant paras of the judgment passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay
and
Another
Vs.
State
of
Maharasthra, (2017) 13 SCC 317, which
read as under:

"5. A close scrutiny of the order
of the High Court reveals that the whole
basis for the High Court to pass the order
impugned is that there is an alternative
remedy available to the petitioner i.e. by
way of revision under Section 156(3)
CrPC. Hence, the jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC cannot be exercised by
indirect method when statutory remedy of
revision is available. Hence, the High
Court disposed of the application reserving
liberty to the appellants to take appropriate
steps as are available in law and further
directed to complete the investigation
within three months from the date of the
order.

6. The learned counsel appearing
for the appellants relied upon the judgment
of this Court in Dhariwal Tobacco
Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806] : (SCC p. 372, para 6)

"6. ... Only because a revision
petition is maintainable, the same by itself,
in our considered opinion, would not
constitute a bar for entertaining an
476 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application under Section 482 of the Code.
Even where a revision application is
barred, as for example the remedy by way
of Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, this Court has held that
the remedies under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India would be available."

The
learned
counsel
further
relied upon the recent judgment of this
Court in Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan [Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30] .

7. After hearing the counsel and
also after perusing the impugned order, we
are of the considered opinion that the order
of the High Court has no legs to stand in
view of the law laid down by this Court in
Prabhu Chawla [Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30] . In the
above referred case, in view of the
divergent opinions of this Court in
Dhariwal
Tobacco
Products
Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806] and Mohit v. State of
U.P. [Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC
789 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 727] , the matter
was placed before the three-Judge Bench of
this Court. The three-Judge Bench took the
view that Section 482 CrPC begins with a
non obstante clause to state:

"482. Saving of inherent powers
of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

As Section 397 CrPC is attracted
against all orders other than interlocutory,
a contrary view would limit the availability
of inherent powers under Section 482
CrPC only to petty interlocutory orders! A
situation which is wholly unwarranted and
undesirable. The three-Judge Bench has
confirmed the law laid down by this Court
in
Dhariwal
Tobacco
Products
Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806]

8. In view of the above settled
law, mere availability of alternative remedy
cannot be a ground to disentitle the relief
under Section 482 CrPC and, apart from
this, we feel that the learned Judge without
appreciating any of the factual and legal
position, in a mechanical way, passed the
impugned
order,
which
warrants
interference by this Court. Accordingly, the
order of the High Court is set aside and the
matter is remanded to the High Court for
reconsideration in the light of the settled
legal position."

11. Upon due consideration of the
aforesaid particularly the fact that the
present application was finally allowed
vide order dated 09.05.2018 by this Court
and this order was challenged before the
Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble Apex
Court interfered in the order of this Court
and remanded the matter back to decide the
case afresh vide final judgment/order dated
23.01.2024 as also the observation made by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Prabhu Chawla (supra), wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to
judgment passed in case of Mohit Vs.
State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC 789, relied
upon in the judgment passed in the case of
Vipin Sahni (supra), observed that "we
are constrained to hold that the Division
Bench, particularly in para 28, in Mohit
(supra) in respect of inherent power of the
High Court in Section 482 CrPC does not
state the law correctly. We record our
respectful
disagreement",
and
Vijay
(supra), this Court, at this stage of the
proceedings, is not inclined to relegate the
7 All. Bare Lal Pandey Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
477
applicant to avail the remedy under Section
397 Cr.P.C. and accordingly, the issue of
maintainability is decided.

12. Accordingly, list this case on
29.07.2024 for final disposal.
----------
(2024) 7 ILRA 477
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 03.07.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH LAVANIA, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 5716 of 2024

Bare Lal Pandey ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Surya Prakash Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power, Section 156(3) - Complaint case,
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 65B -
Admissibility of electronic records - if
investigation in the matter is not required
then
in
that
eventuality,
the
Magistrate/Court
of
competent
of
jurisdiction can treat the application
under
Section
156(3)
Cr.P.C.
as
a
'complaint case' - Magistrate/Court of
competent
of
jurisdiction
is
also
empowered to reject the application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C..(Para - 19,20,23)

(B) Evidence law - pleadings are not
evidence - a party who wants to prove
anything as made out in his/her pleading
has to give evidence to prove his/her
assertions - held - reliance on averment made
in regard to passing of order dated 26.02.2024
cannot be made.
Application preferred by applicant under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. - trial Court entertained the
application as a complaint case - hence present
application - allegations of conspiracy against the
private opposite parties - Applicant produced CCTV
footage and certificate as evidence - CCTV footage
and recordings are in applicant's possession -
CCTV cameras are installed on applicant's
premises - Incident occurred on applicant's
premises. (Para - 2, 24)

HELD: - Trial and revisional court did not
commit any illegality in passing the challenged
orders, and the applicant's application under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was treated as a
complaint case, requiring no interference and
rejecting the applicant's force. (Para -27)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. rejected. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. XYZ Vs St. of M.P. & ors., 2023 (1) JIC 538
(SC)

2. Lalita Kumari Vs St. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1

3. Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs St. of
Guj., (2015) 6 SCC 439

4. Vishwanath Vs St. of U.P. & ors, (2020) ILR 2
All 889

5. Sukhwasi Vs St. of U.P., 2007 (59) ACC 739
(All);

6. Lalita Kumari Vs St. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1.

7. Priyanka Srivastava Vs St. of U.P., (2015) 6
SCC 287.

8. Vishwanath Vs St. of U.P. & ors, (2020) ILR 2
All 889.

9. Kailash Vijayvargiya Vs Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri,
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 569

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State
as well as perused the records.