# Sangeeta v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 3 ILRA 463
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-01-30
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 1509 of 2022
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sangeeta-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51659
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - Ch. II, Reg. 3(1) - Seniority -
U.P. Hindi Sansthan Employees Service
Rules No. 1983 - Rule 3 and 5 - Both
464 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contesting parties were appointed on the
same date and taken joining on the same
date
also
-
Inter-se
seniority
-
Determination - Applicability of Hindi
Sansthan Rule - Time of joining -
Relevancy - Held, Rule 3 and 5 of Rules,
1983 as applicable to U.P. Hindi Sansthan
relates to recruitment and appointment
and has nothing to do with seniority -
Once statutory rule provide date of
substantive appointment to be guiding
factor, it mean that date and not the
joining time. The rule qua substantive
appointment would, therefore, include
both forenoon and afternoon joining - The
petitioner, being senior in age, is held
senior to 5th respondent in view of
provision as contained under Reg. 3(1) (a)
and (b). (Para 13, 15 and 16)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-

## Text

3 All. Sangeeta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
463
enquiry report and action to be taken based
thereon.

15. In spite of the aforesaid rules
we find tht in the instant case, a major
punishment has been imposed without
following due procedure under Rule 7.

15. Similar view has already been
taken by the coordiante Bench of this Court
in case of Brijesh Kumar Tripathi Versus
State of U.P. And others, passed in Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No (Writ-A) No. 71261
of 2005 on 21.11.2005 as well as by the
Division Bench of this Court in case of
State of U.P. Through Secretary Revenue
and 4 Others vs. State Public Service
Tribunal and 4 Others, passed in Writ-A
No. 3786 of 2022 on 25.3.2022.

16. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

17. It is well settled law that during
enquiry proceeding the principle of natural
justice must be followed i.e. the documents
relied upon be provided to the charged
employee, opportunity to adduce the
evidence
be
provided,
statement
of
witnesses for establishing the charges be
recorded and opportunity to cross examine
the witnesses be provided, whereas in the
present case no such procedure has been
followed. The petitioner has not been given
opportunity to adduce the evidence and
cross examine the witnesses and no
witnesses has been examined by the
enquiry officer in support of the charges
levelled against the petitioner.

18. In this view of the matter, this
Court is satisfied that the procedure
prescribed under Rule-7 of the U.P.
Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules, 1999, has not been followed
by the Inquiry Officer. Further, the enquiry
is not made in accordance with the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Ministry of Finance and another
(Supra)

19. Thus, in view of the aforesaid
fact, the impugned order dated 30.12.2023
passed by respondent no.3- Additional
Director-II,
Animal
Husbandry
Department, Meerut Mandal, Meerut, is set
aside.

20. The writ petition is allowed. No
order as to costs

21.

The
concerned
respondent
authority is at liberty to pass afresh order
after giving notice and opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner after following the
provisions as provided under the Rules,
1999.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 463
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.01.2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 1509 of 2022

Sangeeta ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Gulrez Khan, Sri Javed Husain Khan, Sri
Pramod Kumar Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Rakesh Pathak, Sri Saurabh
Srivastava

A. Service Law - Intermediate Education
Act, 1921 - Ch. II, Reg. 3(1) - Seniority -
U.P. Hindi Sansthan Employees Service
Rules No. 1983 - Rule 3 and 5 - Both
464 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contesting parties were appointed on the
same date and taken joining on the same
date
also
-
Inter-se
seniority
-
Determination - Applicability of Hindi
Sansthan Rule - Time of joining -
Relevancy - Held, Rule 3 and 5 of Rules,
1983 as applicable to U.P. Hindi Sansthan
relates to recruitment and appointment
and has nothing to do with seniority -
Once statutory rule provide date of
substantive appointment to be guiding
factor, it mean that date and not the
joining time. The rule qua substantive
appointment would, therefore, include
both forenoon and afternoon joining - The
petitioner, being senior in age, is held
senior to 5th respondent in view of
provision as contained under Reg. 3(1) (a)
and (b). (Para 13, 15 and 16)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of cases cited :-

1. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan Vs Binai
Cements Limited & anr.; (2014) 8 SCC 319

2. Suresh Dubey Vs District Inspector of Schools
& ors.; (2004) 2 UPLBEC 1876

3. Banolat Mohapatra Vs St. of Orissa & ors.;
(1999) 4 SCC 618

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Petitioner who is working as
Assistant Teacher in attached primary
section of an intermediate college, namely,
Mangatram
Kanya
Higher
Secondary
School,
Patla,
district
Ghaziabad,
is
aggrieved by decision of the District
Inspector of Schools dated 30.12.2016
holding respondent no. 5, namely, Ms.
Anupama Tyagi as a senior to the
petitioner. Both Assistant Teachers were
appointed with approval order issued by the
District Inspector of Schools, Ghaziabad on
30.12.2016. Since petitioner and 5th
respondent were simultaneously appointed
in the institution and their substantive
appointment is with effect from the same
date, an issue arose as to the inter se
seniority.

2. Petitioner is while claiming his
seniority on the basis of her date of birth
recorded as 5th June, 1981, the 5th
respondent claims seniority on the basis of
her joining in the forenoon of 30.12.2016.
It is admitted to both the parties that
petitioner joined in the afternoon of
30.12.2016 whereas 5th respondent joined
in the forenoon of 30.12.2016. Upon the
matter being remitted under the order of
this Court dated 21.6.2021 passed in Writ A
No. 4244 of 2021, the Regional Joint
Director of Education proceeded to decide
seniority taking as an admitted position that
both the petitioners were appointed on the
same date and the petitioner was senior in
age to the respondent no. 5. The Regional
Joint Director of Education found that rules
applicable to U.P. Hindi Sansthan, namely,
U.P. Hindi Sansthan Employees Service
Rules No. 1983 to be applicable as
according to the order of the Regional Joint
Director
of
Education,
the
relevant
regulations contained under Rule 3(1)(b) of
Chapter II of Intermediate Education Act,
1921 do not contemplate a situation where
two teachers join the same date but had
different point of time that is forenoon and
afternoon.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has argued that law is well settled that
special law will override the general law if
any. He has placed reliance upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v.
Binai Cements Limited and Another
(2014) 8 SCC 319 and accordingly submits
that Intermediate Education Act, 1921
being especially enacted for governing
service conditions like seniority etc. and
3 All. Sangeeta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
465
other incidental matters relating to teacher
and employees of a recognized and aided
institution
under
the
Act,
and
the
regulations provide for determination of
seniority, the Regional Joint Director of
Education was not justified in borrowing
Hindi Sansthan Employees Service Rules,
1983 in determining intere se seniority. He
submits that 1921 Act is a special Act
whereas general rule of seniority is
applicable to various other institutions. He
submits that even 1983 rules of Hindi
Sansthan have been especially framed for
employees of Hindi Sansthan and unless
and until adopted under the Act, 1921, they
cannot be applied directly or even on
principles.

4. Per contra, it is argued by learned
counsel appearing for the 5th respondents
that since Intermediate Education Act, 1921
does not contemplate a situation of dispute
of seniority between two teachers in the
event one has joined in forenoon and the
other joined in afternoon, it could have
been taken out of general provisions and
for this purpose he has taken the Court to
the relevant part i.e paragraph 5 (the
finding part) of the order dated 21.12.2021
passed by Regional Joint Director of
Education.

5. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the records,
three admitted position emerge out :

i)
both
petitioner
and
5th
respondent were appointed on the same
date with approval of the District Inspector
of Schools on 30.12.2016 which is their
date of substantive appointment;

ii) petitioner and 5th respondents
joined on the same date in the institution,
however, 5th respondent in the forenoon
and petitioner joined in the afternoon;

iii) both the petitioner and 5th
respondent
agree
that
their
service
conditions
are
governed
under
the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and
regulations framed thereunder.

6. In view of admitted above factual
position, now I proceed to examine relevant
regulations of the Intermediate Education
Act, 1921. Regulation 3(1) (as amended on
date) of Chapter II of Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 deals with seniority)
and same is reproduced as under:

"3(1)
The
Committee
of
Management of every institution shall
cause a seniority list of teachers to be
prepared in accordance with the following
provisions-

(a) The seniority list shall be
prepared separately for each grade of
teachers whether permanent or temporary,
on any substantive post;

(b) Seniority of teachers in a
grade shall be determined on the basis of
their substantive appointment in that grade.
If two or more teachers were so appointed
on the same date, seniority shall be
determined on the basis of age;

(bb)
Whether
two
or
more
teachers working in a grade are promoted
to the next higher grade on the same date,
their seniority inter se shall be determined
on the basis of the length of their service to
be reckoned from the date of their
substantive appointment in the grade from
which they are promoted:

Provided that if such length of
service is equal, seniority shall be
determined on the basis of age.

(c) A teacher in a higher grade
shall be deemed to be senior to a teacher in
the lower grade irrespective of the length of
service."
466 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. A bare reading of the aforesaid
provisions makes it absolutely clear that
seniority is determined grade-wise, on the
basis of substantive appointment in the
grade concerned and then in the event two
teachers or more teachers are appointed on
the same date, seniority shall be determined
on the basis of age. Sub-Regulation (a) and
(b) of Regulations 3(1) are attracted to the
controversy in hand and I do not see any
classification of teachers by the seniority
rule on the basis of joining time, instead,
what is relevant is date of substantive
appointment.

8. One of the arguments was
advanced by learned counsel appearing for
5th respondent that she received salary for
the day she joined because she had joined
in the forenoon whereas petitioner did not
get salary for the day as she joined in the
afternoon of the same date, but I do not see
any classification there to be in the relevant
rules of the seniority. Payment of salary is
not the criterion if otherwise teacher has
been working on temporary basis and
getting salary. Such temporary period could
have been taken into consideration for the
purposes of determination of seniority may
be the date of substantive appointment as
subsequent one .Thus argument advanced
by
respondents,
therefore,
is
highly
misplaced in view of sub regulation (b) of
the Regulation 3(1) of Chapter II of
Intermediate Education Act, 1921.

9. Inter se seniority amongst
promotee teachers is also provided on the
basis of length of service to be reckoned
again from the date of their substantive
appointment or vacancies in the grade from
which they have been promoted and these
teachers being promoted on the same date
shall have benefit of their seniority from
the date of substantive appointment in the
lower grade. Regulation also provides that
teacher in higher grade shall be entitled to
seniority over the teacher of lower grade.
Subregulation (d) further provides that
teacher who has been placed under
suspension if is reinstated on his original
post in the grade, his seniority shall not be
affected, meaning thereby where a teacher
has been getting salary even upon his
suspension being revoked and he stands
reinstated, his seniority will also stand
protected.

One must take example of cases
of selection by State Public Service
Commission, where seniority is batch-wise
and not dependent upon joining. Still
further payment of salary cannot be nor is
under the regulations a criterion to
determine seniority.

10. The argument advanced by
learned counsel for 5th respondent that she
did get salary and petitioner did not get
salary of the day of joining and so she is
seniority is not tenable.

11. In Suresh Dubey v. District
Inspector of Schools and Others (2004) 2
UPLBEC 1876, this Court has already
relied upon the judgment of the Court in
the Bahadur Singh Gaur v. D. I.O.S.,
Kanpur and Others 1995 All LJ 1292, in
holding
it
is
date
of
substantive
appointment which is relevant date and
approval would be the date of substantive
appointment.
The
joining
since
is
dependent upon mood and discretion of the
Committee of Management and discretion
that by itself cannot be a ground to place a
person above the seniority to the person
who has been given joining late by the
Committee of Management vide paragraph
5 of the judgment, the Court has held thus:

"In Bahadur Singh Gaur v.
D.I.O.S., Kanpur and Others 1995 All LJ
3 All. Sangeeta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
467
1292, where earlier two judgments were
referred and relied upon and similar view
was reiterated indicating that the approval
was given by the D.I.O.S. determining
seniority, issuance of appointment letter or
joining date by the claimant teacher and
the approval date of the appointment to the
substantive post is to be taken seniority if
the approval date is the same then the
seniority is to be determined on the basis of
age irrespective of the fact that particular
teacher was allowed and started working
as lecturer before joining such persons
whose
date
of
birth
approved
on
substantive post is elder in age. The
relevant paragraphs 4,8,9,10,11 and 15 are
reproduced below:

"4. There is no dispute that the
seniority shall be determined on basis of
the grant of approval of the selection by the
District Inspector of Schools. The limited
question remains to be decided as to
whether
a
teacher
who
is
issued
appointment letter subsequently and joined
later on and another teacher who is
permitted to function on the date of
approval
even
without
issuing
any
appointment letter, will be treated senior to
the person who Joins the institution later
on. It is relevant to refer to Clause (b) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 16F of U.P.
Intermediate Education Act (prior to the
amendment in the year 1975) which reads
as under :

"16F. (1) Subject to the provisions
hereinafter specified, no person shall be
appointed as a Principal, Headmaster or
the teacher in a recognised institution
unless he:

(a)
possesses
the
prescribed
qualifications or has been exempted under
Sub-section (1) of Section 16E.

(b) h a s been recommended by
selection committee constituted under Subsection (2) or (3), as the case may be of the
said section and approved, in the case of
Principal or Headmaster by the Regional
Deputy Director, Education, and in the case
of a teacher by the Inspector................."

8. The date of birth of the
petitioner is 1.1.1937 and date of birth of
respondent No. 3 is 26.9.1945. Admitted,
the petitioner is senior to respondent No. 3.
The relevant date is the date of approval of
appointment by the District Inspector of
Schools. The date of Joining is not the
determining
factor
for
deciding
the
seniority unless it is shown that the
candidate did not join the institution within
the time prescribed for joining as given in
the appointment letter. The committee of
management under Regulation 16 is bound
to issue appointment letter within two
weeks of the receipt of approval to selected
candidates for appointment.

9. In case the date of joining is
relevant date it will be on the discretion of
the committee of management to issue an
appointment letter to some candidate
earlier and to some other candidate later
on
with the
result, to
whom the
appointment letter has been issued earlier
will start functioning and the other may
join later on and will become junior to the
other candidate though the date of
selection and the date of approval is the
same. So far as the time prescribed under
Regulation 16 is concerned, the candidate
who is living in nearest place may come
and join the institution earlier but the
candidate who is living at distant place
may not come and join the institution
immediately.

10. Learned counsel for the
respondent urged that he has started
functioning on 14th August, 1973, i.e., the
date on which approval was granted and,
therefore, he was entitled to function from
the said date even though the letter of
appointment
was
issued
to
him
468 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
subsequently, i.e., on 22nd August, 1973,
as the same was ministerial act. It may be
that the appointment letter was issued
subsequently and the candidate before
issuance of the appointment letter himself
presents
before
the
committee
of
management on coming to know that the
approval has been granted and the
committee of management permits him to
function from the date, the approval has
been granted but it will not deprive the
right of another candidate merely because
the other candidate was not Issued
appointment letter or joined subsequently
within the prescribed time. The mere fact
that
respondent
No.
3
joined
the
institution on 22nd August, 1973, will not
confer any right of seniority against the
petitioner.

11. In Prabhu Narain Singh v.
Deputy Director of Education, Varanasi
1977 ALR 391, it has been held that a
person does not acquire the status of a
teacher
unless
the
approval
of
his
appointment is granted by the District
Inspector of Schools and the mere fact that
he was working in the institution will not
confer the status of a teacher.

15. In view of the discussions
made above, the Writ Petition No. 318 of
1993 is hereby allowed. The order passed
by the District Inspector of Schools dated
30th October, 1992, is quashed.
(emphasis added)

12. Now coming to the argument
raised
by
learned
counsel
for
5th
respondent,
since
rules
were
silent,
therefore, Regional Joint Director of
Education was justified in applying the
principle
of
U.P.
Hindi
Sansthan
Employees Service Rules, 1983, I find that,
what has been given in the rules has been
completely misinterpreted by Regional
Joint Director of Education. It says that
vide Rule 5 of 1983 Rules of the said rules
provides in the event there is no other rule
prescribed for otherwise than service of
employees would start from the date they
submit their joining. In the first instance to
appreciate the relevant paragraph 5 is
reproduced hereinbelow:

"5. इण्टरमीवडएट वर्शक्षा अविवनयम-1921 (यथा
सांर्शोविि) के भाग-2 अध्याय-2 के वववनवयम- 3(1) ख के
अनुसार वकसी श्रेणी में अध्यापको की ज्येष्ठिा उनकी मौवलक
वनयुवक्त के आिार पर अविाररि की जायेगी। यवि एक ही विनाांक
को िो या िो से अविक अध्यापक इस प्रकार वनयुवक्त वकये गये थे,
िो ज्येष्ठिा आयु के आिार पर अविाररि की जायेगी। वकन्िु
सन्िभागि प्रकरण उक्त प्रवक्रया से वभन्न प्रकार का है। श्रीमिी सांगीिा
रानी एवां श्रीमिी अनुपमा त्यागी द्वारा एक ही विवथ को कायाभार
ग्रहण वकया गया है वकन्िु श्रीमिी अनुपमा त्यागी द्वारा पूवााहन्न में
कायाभार ग्रहण वकया गया है एवां श्रीमिी सांगीिा रानी द्वारा अपरान्ह
में कायाभार ग्रहण वकया गया है, वजसके कारण श्रीमिी अनुपमा
त्यागी का वेिन विनाांक 06.01.2017 से आहररि हुआ एवां
श्रीमिी सांगीिा रानी का वेिन विनाांक 07.01.2017 से आहररि
हुआ। उ० प्र० वहन्िी सांस्थान कमाचारी सेवा वनयमावली 1983 के
अध्याय 3 भिी एवां वनयुवक्त की िारा 5 में यह प्रवक्रया वववहि की
गई है वक यवि वनयमों में कोई अन्य प्रावविान न हो िो सांस्थान के
कमाचाररयों की सेवाये उस विन से आरम्भ होगी वजस विन वह
कायाभार ग्रहण करेगा। यवि वह अपरान्ह में सेवा प्रारम्भ करिा है िो
उसकी सेवाये अगले विन के पूवाान्ह से आरम्भ होगी। इस प्रकार
श्रीमिी अनुपमा त्यागी की अनुिावनि सेवा विनाांक 06.01.2017
से मान्य की जायेगी, जबवक श्रीमिी सांगीिा रानी की सेवा विनाांक
07.01.2017 से मान्य होगी िथा सेवाववि की गणना वेिन
भुगिान की विवथ से वकया जाना उवचि होगा। इस प्रकार श्रीमिी
अनुपमा त्यागी श्रीमिी सांगीिा रानी से वररष्ठ होगी।"

13. From a bare reading of the
aforesaid paragraph, I find Rule 3 and 5 of
1983 rules as applicable to U.P. Hindi
Sansthan
relates
to
recruitment
and
appointment and has nothing to do with
seniority. All that it prescribes is that person
who shall be taken to have joined the date,
he resumes his duties . This is not the issue
in the present case. Here it is not from
joining which is relevant but it is the
3 All. Sangeeta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
469
substantive
date
of
substantive
appointment, which is relevant. The second
argument, therefore, advanced by learned
counsel appearing for the 5th respondent is
rejected.

14. The controversy qua forenoon and
afternoon joining was dealt with by the
Supreme court in the case of Banolat
Mohapatra v. State of Orissa and Others
(1999) 4 SCC 618. In the said case issue
had arisen for seniority claim for the post
of lecturer in a college, the appellant
therein claimed before the Supreme Court
that both he and respondent no. 4 joined the
institution on the same day while appellant
joined in the forenoon and respondent no. 4
joined in the afternoon and further letter of
appointment to the appellant was sent
earlier than respondent no. 4. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument and held that
these issues of seniority will not depend
upon the joining time in the forenoon and
afternoon or that who got appointment
order earlier. The Court while examining
the records found that appellant was
placing reliance upon as annexure A dated
15.12.1979 which showed appellant was
appointed against first post of Lecturer,
Economic whereas respondent no. 4 was
appointed against second post but in the
counter affidavit, the copy of resolution
that was filed which showed that appellant
was appointed against second post and
respondent no. 4 was against first post of
lecturer. The
Supreme
Court
further
examined that
original
records
were
produced before the High Court and High
Court found that Minister of Education
accepted the resolution of Governing Body
holding that appellant was shown senior to
respondent no. 4 was post of lectures, the
Court therefore found no reason to found
ratio of judgment of High Court in holding
fourth respondent senior to appellant. Vide
paragraphs 5 and 6 the Court held thus:

"5.It has been urged that though
both the appellant and Respondent 4
joined on the same day but the appellant
joined in the forenoon and Respondent 4
in the afternoon and further the letter of
appointment to the appellant was sent
earlier. We are of the opinion that these
are not at all relevant for the purpose of
examining the question of seniority.

6.The appellant placed reliance
on a copy of the resolution of the
Governing Body dated 15-12-1979 vide
Annexure A to the petition. In the said
resolution the name of the appellant had
been shown against the first post in
Economics in the College and the name of
Respondent 4 against the second post. In
the counter filed on behalf of the College
namely Respondents 3 and 4, a copy of the
resolution has been annexed as Annexure 2
and from the said resolution we find that
the appellant was shown against the second
post and Respondent 4 against the first post
of Lecturer. As resolutions of the Governing
Body are kept by the College and the above
resolution has been duly produced by the
College, it has to be accepted and not the
copy of the resolution annexed by the
appellant. We find from the judgment of the
High Court in OJC No. 867 of 1990 that
the Court called for the relevant file and on
perusing the record it was found that the
Minister
of
Education
accepted
the
resolution of the Governing Body holding
that Respondent 4 was senior to the
appellant. The Court also noted that the
enquiry report of the Director, which was
available on record, also indicated the
same position. The Court also perused the
resolution of the Governing Body and came
to the finding that the Governing Body also
decided the seniority as claimed by
470 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Respondent 4. In view of the above finding
of the High Court we are not at all inclined
to accept the submission made on behalf of
the appellant that as per the resolution of
the Governing Body the appellant was
shown senior to Respondent 4."

(emphasis added)

15. Coming to the judgment relied
upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, I
find it to settled law that special law would
override the general and so when special
provisions are there, no principle of general
law even can be renowned. Once statutory
rule
provide
date
of
substantive
appointment to be guiding factor, it mean
that date and not the joining time. The rule
qua
substantive
appointment
would,
therefore, include both forenoon and
afternoon joining. Vide paragraph 33,34,35
and 36 Supreme Court in the case of
Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan. (supra)
has observed thus:

33. We are mindful of the
principle that the Court should examine
every word of a statute in its context and
must use context in its widest sense. We are
also in acquaintance with observations of
this Court inReserve Bank of India v.
Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd., 1987 SCR (2) 1 where Chinnappa
Reddy, J. noting the importance of the
context in which every word is used in the
matter of interpretation of statutes held
thus:

"Interpretation must depend on
the text and the context. They are the basis
of interpretation. One may well say if the
text is the texture, context is what gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the
contextual. A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted. With
this knowledge, the statute must be read,
first as a whole and then section by section,
clause by clause, phrase by phrase and
word by word. If a statute is looked at, in
the context of its enactment, with the
glasses of the statute- maker, provided by
such context, its scheme, the sections,
clauses, phrases and words may take
colour and appear different than when the
statute is looked at without the glasses
provided by the context. With these glasses
we must look at the Act as a whole and
discover what each section, each clause,
each phrase and each word is meant and
designed to say as to fit into the scheme of
the entire Act. No part of a statute and no
word of a statute can be construed in
isolation. Statutes have to be construed so
that every word has a place and everything
is in its place."

34. It is well established that
when a general law and a special law
dealing with some aspect dealt with by the
general law are in question, the rule
adopted and applied is one of harmonious
construction whereby the general law, to
the extent dealt with by the special law, is
impliedly repealed. This principle finds its
origins in the latin maxim of generalia
specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law
yields to special law should they operate in
the same field on same subject. (Vepa P.
Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Ed.,
Eastern Book Company; N. S. Bindra's
Interpretation of Statutes, 8th Ed., The Law
Book Company; Craies on Statute Law,
S.G.G.Edkar, 7th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell;
Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory
Interpretation, 13th Ed., LexisNexis; Craies
on Legislation, Daniel Greenberg, 9th Ed.,
Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, Maxwell on
Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed., Lexis
Nexis)

35. Generally, the principle has
found vast application in cases of there
3 All. Dr. Bhawana Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
471
being two statutes: general or specific with
the latter treating the common subject
matter more specifically or minutely than
the former. Corpus Juris Secundum, 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 482 states that when
construing a general and a specific statute
pertaining to the same topic, it is necessary
to consider the statutes as consistent with
one another and such statutes therefore
should be harmonized, if possible, with the
objective of giving effect to a consistent
legislative policy. On the other hand, where
a general statute and a specific statute
relating to the same subject matter cannot
be reconciled, the special or specific statute
ordinarily will control. The provision more
specifically directed to the matter at issue
prevails as an exception to or qualification
of the provision which is more general in
nature, provided that the specific or special
statute clearly includes the matter in
controversy. (Edmond v. U.S., 520 U.S.
651, Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v.
Marrero).

36.
The
maximgeneralia
specialibus non derogant is dealt with in
Volume 44 (1) of the 4th ed. of Halsbury's
Laws of England at paragraph 1300 as
follows:

"The principle descends clearly
fromdecisionsof
theHouse
of
LordsinSeward v. Owner of "TheVera
Cruz", (1884) 10 App Cas 59and the Privy
Council inBarker v Edger,[1898] AC 748
and has been affirmed and put into effect
on many occasions....If Parliament has
considered all the circumstances of, and
made special provision for, a particular
case, the presumption is that a subsequent
enactment of apurelygeneral character
would not have been intended to interfere
with that provision; and therefore, if such
an
enactment,
although
inconsistent
insubstance, is capable of reasonable
andsensible application without extending
to the case in question, it is prima facie to
be construed as not so extending. The
special provision stands as an exceptional
proviso upon the general. If, however, it
appears from a consideration of the
general enactment in the light of admissible
circumstances
that
Parliament's
true
intention was to establish thereby a rule of
universal application, then the special
provision must give way to the general."

16. In view of above, the order passed
by the Regional Joint Director of Education
dated 21.12.2021 is hereby quashed.
Petitioner and 5th respondent having given
substantive appointment on 30.12.2016 and
they having joined on the same day as they
were issued appointment order, it will be
taken that they have been substantively
appointed together on 30th December, 2016
and the petitioner being senior in age is
held senior to 5th respondent in view of
provision as contained under Regulation
3(1) (a) and (b) of the Chapter III of
Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The
Committee
of
Management
shall
accordingly
pass consequential
orders
regarding inter se seniority
between
petitioner and 5th respondent for all
purposes.

17. Thus writ petition is accordingly
allowed with no order as to cost.
----------
(2024) 3 ILRA 471
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.03.2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 2075 of 2024

Dr. Bhawana ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents