# Sanjay Bhatia and another v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2002) 3 ILRA 817
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2001-09-08
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40307 of 2001
- **Bench:** S.K. Sen, C.J. R.K. Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanjay-bhatia-and-another-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-40010
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
226-Public
Interest litigation- Disputed Plot- out for
setting up Industry- sub tenant started
installing Petrol pump- against public
interest-
highly
inflammable
Petrol
Product- an obnoxious trade- admittedly
seven petrol pumps are already gaving
on the same vicinity- restriction imposed
in lease- only with regards to transfer
mortgage, sub letting, assignment or
relinquishment of the demised property-
proposed project being very global, and
International standard being in better
interest of Government. Mr. Tandon the
concerned minister committed no error
in forwarding the same- No malafide
action can be attributed.

Held- Para 12

The restriction is only in regard to
transfer,
mortgage,
sub
-letting,
assignment or relinquishment of the
demised property and also the embargo
is created only with regard to user of the
plot in clause (g) of the present lease
deed- on carrying on any obnoxious
trade or business or its user for any
religious purpose. Sri Ravi Kant is also
justified in his submission that the
opinion of Director of Industries that the
change in the land user cannot be
permitted since the site in question is
meant for industry, is only an individual
opinion
of
the
officer
and
cannot
override or abrogate or supersede the
terms of the lease. It appears to us that
the project, in question, shall be of a
very global and international standard
that shall be in the interest of the State
and it would be fit and proper for the
State
Government
to
accept
such
proposal and as such, Mr. Tandon, the
concerned
Minister,
on
the
representation of a delegation of Indian
Industries Association led by Sri Anil
Pandey, its General Secretary, forwarded
the matter. In such circumstances, no
malafide action can be attributed on the
basis of facts on record.
Case law discussed:
2002(2) SCC 465, 2000(7) SCC-552, AIR 1987
SC-294, AIR 1979 SC-49, AIR 1976 SC-1766,
2002 (2) SCC-333, 2001 (4) SCC-469, 2001 (9)
SCC-297

## Text

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3 All] Sanjay Bhatia and another V. State of U.P. and others 817
15. The last submission of the
counsel for the appellant is with regard to
violation of principle of natural justice.
The counsel for the appellant contended
that even though oral hearing was not
required but the petitioner (appellant) was
entitled for notice before cancellation.
From the facts brought on the record of
the writ petition, it appears that after filing
of the complaint by respondent no. 5
reports were called by Additional Director
of
Education
from
the
education
authorities. The District Inspector of
Schools has also called for report from the
management of the college to which
management
has
also
replied.
The
appellant was also fully aware of the
complaint and the enquiry which was
going on the aforesaid complaint. This
fact is proved from the letter of the
appellant himself dated 8th September,
2001 copy of which has been annexed as
Annexure CA-II to the counter affidavit
of respondent no. 5. The appellant wrote
to the District Inspector of Schools on 8th
September, 2001. The aforesaid letter also
takes notice of the fact that respondent no.
5 has sent complaint dated 17th August,
2001 to the Additional Director of
Education. In the letter, the appellant also
refuted the grounds mentioned in the
complaint of Mahendra Singh and has
stated that his transfer has been made
after following the procedure prescribed.
The appellant was, thus, aware of the
enquiry and has also made his protest by
the aforesaid letter. However, in view of
the fact that the power of cancellation of
transfer was exercised by the Additional
Director of Education on the basis of
stipulation reserved in the transfer order
dated 30th June, 2001 that if any fact is
found incorrect the transfer may be
cancelled and further the Additional
Director of Education has not taken into
consideration any other material apart
from information given by petitioner in
the transfer application, we are not
persuaded to accept that there was any
violation of principle of natural justice in
passing the cancellation order. The action
was being taken on the basis of
information submitted by the appellant in
the transfer application which was found
to be untrue. Before the learned single
Judge or before us, the appellant has
failed to prove that information given in
the transfer application in Columns no. 18
and 19 were correct information. The
observance of principal of natural justice
vary from fact situation of each case.
Thus, we are of the view that order dated
24th November, 2001 is not vitiated on
account of the aforesaid submission.

16. In view of what has been said
above, we do not find any substance in
any of the submissions of counsel for the
appellant. No error has been committed
by the learned single Judge in dismissing
the writ petition of the appellant.

17. This special appeal has no merit
and is dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD SEP. 26, 2002.

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.K. SEN, C.J.
THE HON'BLE R.K. AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40307 of 2001

Sanjay Bhatia and another ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Amreshwar Pratap Sahi
Sri Govind Kumar Singh
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818 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
Sri R.N. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ravi Kant
Sri L.M. Singh
Sri P. Padia
S.C.

Constitution
of
India,
226-Public
Interest litigation- Disputed Plot- out for
setting up Industry- sub tenant started
installing Petrol pump- against public
interest-
highly
inflammable
Petrol
Product- an obnoxious trade- admittedly
seven petrol pumps are already gaving
on the same vicinity- restriction imposed
in lease- only with regards to transfer
mortgage, sub letting, assignment or
relinquishment of the demised property-
proposed project being very global, and
International standard being in better
interest of Government. Mr. Tandon the
concerned minister committed no error
in forwarding the same- No malafide
action can be attributed.

Held- Para 12

The restriction is only in regard to
transfer,
mortgage,
sub
-letting,
assignment or relinquishment of the
demised property and also the embargo
is created only with regard to user of the
plot in clause (g) of the present lease
deed- on carrying on any obnoxious
trade or business or its user for any
religious purpose. Sri Ravi Kant is also
justified in his submission that the
opinion of Director of Industries that the
change in the land user cannot be
permitted since the site in question is
meant for industry, is only an individual
opinion
of
the
officer
and
cannot
override or abrogate or supersede the
terms of the lease. It appears to us that
the project, in question, shall be of a
very global and international standard
that shall be in the interest of the State
and it would be fit and proper for the
State
Government
to
accept
such
proposal and as such, Mr. Tandon, the
concerned
Minister,
on
the
representation of a delegation of Indian
Industries Association led by Sri Anil
Pandey, its General Secretary, forwarded
the matter. In such circumstances, no
malafide action can be attributed on the
basis of facts on record.
Case law discussed:
2002(2) SCC 465, 2000(7) SCC-552, AIR 1987
SC-294, AIR 1979 SC-49, AIR 1976 SC-1766,
2002 (2) SCC-333, 2001 (4) SCC-469, 2001 (9)
SCC-297

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.K. Sen, C.J.)

1. In the instant writ petition, stated
to be a 'Public Interest Litigation', the
petitioners
seek
to
restrain
the
respondents
from
raising
construction/installing a Petrol Pump on
plot no. 5-A Government Industrial
Estate, Kalpi Road, Kanpur (hereinafter
referred to as 'the plot in dispute') (in
pursuance of direction of Mr. Lalji
Tandon, the then Urban Planning and
Development Minister, State of U.P. and
consequential Government order dated
28.4.2002). The petitioners have claimed
to have filed this petition as 'Public
Interest Litigation'.

2. The case of the petitioners, in
brief, is that the plot, in dispute, was
initially leased out to one Girish Chandra
Poddar. After the death of Sri Poddar, his
heirs could not develop the land for the
purpose for which it had been leased out.
Therefore, the proposal of the respondent
no. 7 for sub letting the plot in dispute to
Sri B.D. Agarwal was considered by the
District Industries Centre. It is mandatory
under the terms and conditions of the
lease deed that the plot, in dispute, can be
utilized only for the purpose of setting up
of an industry and the same cannot be
used for commercial purposes. It is
alleged that the respondent no. 7 made a
proposal for setting up an industry to
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3 All] Sanjay Bhatia and another V. State of U.P. and others 819
manufacture certain petroleum products.
District
Industries
Administration
permitted negotiation of sub letting of the
plot in dispute and accordingly, a lease
deed
was
executed
on
20.7.1999,
contained in Annexure 3 to the writ
petition. It stipulates that no charge- either
by way of transfer or any conveyance
thereafter shall be done without the
previous consent, in writing, of the
Industrial Estate Administration. The
petitioners allege that the respondent no. 7
is bound by the aforesaid terms of the
lease deed. That apart, it is alleged that a
hire purchase agreement was entered into
by the respondent no. 7 with the Director
of Industries, U.P., contained in Annexure
4 to the writ petition, which contains a
clause that the land shall not be utilized
for
carrying
on
any
business
of
dangerous, noisy or offensive nature and
that the property shall neither be sold,
mortgaged
assigned
nor
otherwise
conveyed nor transferred except with the
previous permission, in writing of the
Industrial Estate Administration. The
petitioners allege that the parties are
bound by the agreement, the respondent
no. 7, it is alleged, in collusion with
respondent no. 8. agreed for getting the
Petrol Pump installed despite the fact that
there was no such proposal before the
District
Industries
Department.
Respondent no. 7 has been able to procure
the impugned letter dated 27.8.2000,
contained in Annexure 5 to the writ
petition, from the concerned Minister
directing
the
Director,
Industries
Department to give permission and
consent for the conversion of the plot, in
dispute,
for
commercial
use.
The
petitioners claim that the proposed Petrol
Pump is against public interest, inasmuch
as, trading in highly inflammable petrol
product is an obnoxious trade and is
seriously
hazardous
to
the
people,
residing in the locality.

3. Respondent no. 7 is main
respondent in the present case. It is the
case of respondent no. 7 that the
petitioners
have
been
able
to
unnecessarily
stall
the
project
of
establishment
of
a
world
class
Automobile
Workshop-Petrol
Pump
within the industrial estate at Kanpur
Nagar by obtaining a stay order from this
Court. The petitioners are mere busy
bodies and it is sheer misnomer to label
the present petition as 'Public Interest
Litigation'. It is alleged that the petitioners
have been set up by the trade rival of
respondent no. 7, namely, M/s Kishori Lal
Jogendra Lal. Annexure CA-7 to the
counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 7
is the objection filed by the aforesaid rival
firm. Moreover, petitioner no. 1 resides at
a place which is more than 56 kilometers
away from the plot in dispute. Same holds
true for petitioner no. 2 as well. He
resides
in
House
no.
118/241
Kaushalpuri, Kanpur Nagar which too is
about 6 kms away from the plot in
dispute. The petitioner no. 2 has wrongly
described residential address as 123/1-A,
which actually is the address of the rival
firm, namely , M/s Kishori Lal Jogendra
Lal. This clearly shows the nexus of the
petitioners with the rival firm. At least
seven or eight petrol pumps already exist
in the concerned area. If these petrol
pumps do not cause any danger to the
ecology, there is no reason for denying
the respondent no. 7 to install petrol
pump.

4. Heard Sri R.N. Singh, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri A.P.
Sahi on behalf of the petitioners and Sri
Ravi Kant, learned senior Advocate
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820 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
assisting by L.M. Singh on behalf of the
respondent no. 7.

5. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior
Advocate strenuously urged that if the
respondent no. 7 is allowed to install
petrol pump in the concerned locality, the
entire ecological balance will be disturbed
and the residents of the locality will be the
worst suffers. He, therefore, claimed that
the instant is 'Public Interest Litigation'. In
support of his contention, he cited two
decisions of the apex court in Chairman
Railway Board V. Chandhima Das-
(2000) 2 SCC-405 and M.S. Jayaraj Vs.
Commissioner of Excise-(2000) 7SCC552. Sri Singh further contended that in
order to uphold the cleanliness in public
life and rule of law, the bar of locus standi
is not as rigorous as in other petitions of
adversial nature. In support of this
contention he relied upon paragraphs 50
and 51 of the Report in Nilangekar Patil
V. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi- AIR 1987
SC-294, Sri Singh vehemently urged that
the present is a case of malice in law and,
therefore, he urged that the impugned
action
on
the
part
of
the
State
Government deserves to be deprecated by
this court. In support of this contention,
he drew our attention to the law laid down
by apex court in Smt. S.R. Venkataraman
V. Union of India and another-AIR 1979
SC-49 and The Regional Manager and
another Vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey- AIR
1976 SC-1766.

6. In reply to the allegation of the
respondent no. 7, in the counter affidavit,
that 7 or 8 petrol pumps are already
existing in the locality, Sri Singh pointed
out that the other existing petrol pumps
are outside the vicinity of the Industrial
Estate and not within the Industrial Estate.
Thus, the plea of the respondent no. 7 to
the contrary is misconceived. Moreover,
according to Sri Singh, installation of
petrol pump is contrary to the policy and
guidelines
framed
by
the
State
Government as per Government orders
dated 18.2.2001 and September 2001,
contained in Annexure R.A. 1 and R.A. 4
respectively to the Rejoinder Affidavit. A
bare perusal of these Government orders
will reveal that they clearly prohibit the
change of user of the land from industrial
to commercial purpose. Precisely, because
of this reason, Sri Singh asserted that till
date, there does not exist any permission
of the Director of Industries, or for that
matter, any other officer of the Industries
Department. Sri Singh alleged that the
respondent no. 7, therefore, contacted Sri
Lalji Tandon, Minister who used his good
offices to pass an order in favour of the
respondent no. 7 in utter breach of the
provisions of law. Sri Singh vehemently
urged that the action of the State
Government in proceeding to accord
permission to the respondent no. 7 to
install a petrol pump is patently without
jurisdiction. It is a glaring example of
abuse of power having been exercised
arbitrarily and maliciously at the behest of
the concerned Minister. Sri Singh drew
our attention to the contents of paragraphs
5 and 6 of the counter affidavit of Sri O.P.
Srivastava
of
Industries
Department
wherein
it
has
been
averred
that
permission and consent, in writing, are
sine qua non for change of user of the
land. So far as the case in hand is
concerned. Sri Singh asserted that a bare
perusal of the counter affidavit on behalf
of the Director of Industries reveals that
no such permission was ever granted by
the Director of Industries or the Industries
Department. The impugned order has
been passed straightaway without at all
following the procedures prescribed by
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3 All] Sanjay Bhatia and another V. State of U.P. and others 821
law. Sri Singh, therefore, strenuously
urged that the impugned orders deserve to
be quashed and the petition deserves to be
allowed with costs.

7. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior
Advocate
appearing
on
behalf
of
respondent no. 7, on the other hand,
submitted that by means of the present
petition, in insidious attempt has been
made to frustrate the ambitions project of
establishment
of
an
automobile
workshop- petrol pump of repute within
the industrial estate at Kanpur Nagar. He
vehemently urged that the petitioners are
mere busy bodies and the instant is not, at
all,
a
"Public
Interest
Litigation'.
According
to
Sri
Ravi
Kant,
the
petitioners are mere proxies, having been
set up by M/s Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal- a
rival firm of the respondent no. 7. Sri
Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate
submitted that the gravamen of averments
made in the writ petition is breach of
provisions of the lease deed rather than
disturbance of ecological equilibrium.
The main plank of attack of the
petitioners is that the respondent no. 7
proposes to use the land in dispute for
commercial
purposes
rather
than
industrial purposes. However, on the own
showing of the petitioners, there are seven
or eight petrol pumps in the vicinity, Sri
Ravi Kant stressed on the word 'vicinity'
and pointed out that the word 'vicinity'
means 'surrounding' or 'nearness'. Thus, if
seven or eight petrol pumps in vicinity do
not cause any harm to the ecology of the
area, it passes one's comprehension as to
how the proposed petrol pump would
ruffle the ecological equilibrium. Thus,
the petitioners have made sweeping and
bald allegations.

8. Sri Ravi Kant, in the forefront,
contended
that
by
no
stretch
of
imagination can instant petition be said to
espouse any public cause. On the other
hand, in real sense, it is private interest
litigation. To support his view, Sri Ravi
Kant placed reliance on paragraphs 77,
78, 79,80,81,82,88,97 and 99 of the latest
decision of the apex court in Balco
Employees' Union (Regd.) V. Union of
India and others- (2002) 2 SCC and he
dubbed the present litigation as private
interest litigation. Sri Ravi Kant drew our
attention to the address of petitioner no.
2, mentioned in the writ petition, which is
that of M/s Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal , the
person who had filed the objection. He,
therefore, contended that this itself is
sufficient to establish the nexus between
the petitioners and M/s Kishori Lal
Jogendra Lal, which is too close and
patent. It was also contended by Sri Ravi
Kant that it has not been averred by the
petitioners, anywhere, that they suffer any
injury or that any of their interests is
being prejudiced. In this behalf, Sri Ravi
Kant placed reliance on the decisions in
T.N.
Civil
Supplies
Corporation
Workers' Union V. T.N. Civil Supplies
Corporation Ltd. and others- (2001) 4
SCC-469; Vinay Kumar V. State of U.P.
(2001) 4 SCC-734 Union of India V.
Alok Kumar Dass- (2001) 9 SCC-297.
According to Sri Ravi Kant, the decisions
cited by Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior
Advocate on behalf of the petitioner are
of no assistance to the petitioner and,
they, in fact, on the other hand support the
case of the respondent no.7.

9. Sri Ravi Kant, next contended
that
the
substantive/parent document
governing the relations between Kanpur
Nagar Maha Palika and the State
Government through the Director of
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822 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
Industries, contained in Annexure-CA-7
to the counter affidavit of respondent no.
7. Its prefatory part recites that it is the
Governor of Uttar Pradesh who is the
lessee. Thus , the land vests in the State
Government. Clauses (d) (g) and (k) of
the aforesaid document authorize the user
of the demised plot for workshop. The
term 'industrial estate' in clauses (d) and
(k) has been defined inclusively and not
exclusively. Thus, it expands the meaning
of the term 'industrial estate'. 'Industrial
estate' therefore, includes any ancillary or
any other industry which has connection
with the industries in the State.

10. Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the
petitioners seriously refuted the aforesaid
assertion and contended that it is not the
aforesaid lease deed, but the lease deed
executed between the respondent no. 7
and the Director of Industries which is
material.

11. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior
Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent no. 7 replied that even if the
aforesaid version of Sri Singh is accepted,
the same would not alter the complexion
or the rules of the game. According to Sri
Ravi Kant, reliance has been placed by
Mr. R.N. Singh on the counter affidavit of
Sri O.P. Srivastava on behalf of the
Director of Industries. Sri Ravi Kant
pointed out that in his counter affidavit,
Sri O.P. Srivatava placed reliance on
clause (h) and (i) of the lease deed
executed between the predecessor-ininterest of the respondent no. 7 and the
Director of Industries. There is absolutely
no material difference between the two.
Neither clause (k) nor clause (g) nor
clause (i) imposes any restriction on
change of user. The restriction is only in
regard to transfer, mortgage, subletting,
assignment or relinquishment of the
demised property. The only embargo
regarding user of the plot in clause (g) of
the present lease deed is on carrying on
any obnoxious trade or business or its
user for any religious purpose. As regards
the opinion of the Director of Industries
that the change in the land user cannot be
permitted since the site in question is
meant for industry. Sri Ravi Kant
submitted that it is only the individual
opinion of an officer and it cannot trench
upon, abrogate or supersede the terms of
the lease. Sri Ravi Kant lastly contended
that the project , in question, is an
ambitious
project
and
the
State
Government would be gaining and is
anxious to have it located in this State.
Mr. Tandon, the concerned Minister acted
accordingly and no exception can be
taken, much less any mala fide attributed
to such an action. Mr. Tandon has not
showered any patronage on an individual
rather
it
goes
to
a
public
body/corporation.
Sri
Ravi
Kant
vigorously urged that it is easy to allege
mala fide but too difficult to prove it. The
standards of proving mala fide are,
indeed, very rigorous. In support of this
contention, he relied upon the decisions of
the summit court in Express Newspapers
Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Union of India
and others- AIR 1986 SC-872, E.P.
Royappa V. State of Tamil Nadu and
another -AIR 1974 SC-555 and S. Pratap
Singh Vs. State of Punjab- AIR 1964 SC72, Sri Ravi Kant, therefore, vehemently
urged that the writ petition being devoid
of any merit and substance, deserves to be
dismissed and the petitioners are liable to
be saddled with heavy and exemplary
costs.
12. Having heard learned counsel
for the parties and gone through the entire
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3 All] Sanjay Bhatia and another V. State of U.P. and others 823
materials, placed before us, we are of the
view that it cannot be said that the
submissions of Sri Ravi Kant, learned
Senior Advocate is without substance.
The submission of Mr. Ravi Kant that
neither clause (k) nor clauses (g), (h) and
(i) imposes any restriction on change of
user appears to us to be correct. The
restriction is only in regard to transfer,
mortgage,
sub-letting,
assignment
or
relinquishment of the demised property
and also the embargo is created only with
regard to user of the plot in clause (g) of
the present lease deed- on carrying on any
obnoxious trade or business or its user for
any religious purpose. Sri Ravi Kant is
also justified in his submission that the
opinion of Director of Industries that the
change in the land user cannot be
permitted since the site in question is
meant for industry, is only an individual
opinion of the officer and cannot override
or abrogate or supersede the terms of the
lease. It appears to us that the project, in
question, shall be of a very global and
international standard and shall be in the
interest of the State and it would be fit
and proper for the State Government to
accept such proposal and as such, Mr.
Tandon, the concerned Minister, on the
representation of a delegation of Indian
Industries Association led by Sri Anil
Pandey, its General Secretary, forwarded
the matter. In such circumstances, no
mala fide action can be attributed on the
basis of facts on record. We may take
note of the decisions of the apex court in
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others
Vs. Union of India and others- AIR 1986
SC-872 E.P. Royappa V. State of Tamil
Nadu and another -AIR 1974 SC-555, S.
Pratap Singh V. State of Punjab- AIR
1964 SC-72 in which in fact, rigorous
standard has been laid down by the
Supreme Court. Since the site, in
question, is meant for industry, decision
of the apex court in Balco Employees'
Union (Regd.) (supra) is relevant. The
apex court has clearly emphasized the
necessity of distinguishing between the
'Public Interest Litigation and private
interest litigation as well as a publicity
interest litigation'. It also stressed that
mere interlopers, by standards or busy
bodies have no locus standi to maintain
the petition. The case, on hand, does not
fall
within
any
of
the
parameters
enumerated in Balco Employees' Union
(Regd.) (Supra). Thus, the reliance on the
decisions in Chairman Railway Board
(supra) and M.S. Jayaraj (supra) placed
by Sri R.N. Singh, learned Senior
Advocate on behalf of the petitioners, is
utterly misplaced. Chairman Railway
Board (supra) is clearly distinguishable as
in that case, the modesty of a Bangladesh
national was outraged by many, including
the employees of Railway in a room at
Yatri Niwas at Howrah station. The apex
court distinguished between public law
and private law and recorded a finding
that the inaction of the authorities to bring
to book such criminals fall within rainbow
of public law. The offence committed was
at a public place. It amounted to most
flagrant breach of the most cherished right
to life which includes the right to live
with human dignity contained in Article
21 of the Constitution of India. It was in
this context that the apex court permitted
the petition by a public spirited person, a
practicing Advocate of Calcutta High
Court. Thus, no parallel can be drawn
between
Chairman
Railway
Board
(supra) and the present case. So far as
M.S. Jayaraj (supra) is concerned, this
too was not a public interest litigation. It
was instituted by rival trader. The
Supreme Court held that even a rival
trader can impugn the locale of another
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824 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
liquor shop near his shop. The apex court
specified three categories of persons, visà-vis, locus standi (i) a person aggrieved
(ii) a stranger and (iii) a busybody or a
meddlesome interloper. It was held that
any one belonging to third category is
easily distinguishable and such person
interferes in the things which do not
concern him as he masquerades to be a
crusader of justice. Petition by such
person has to be rejected at the very
threshold. The instant case squarely falls
in the third category. Not a single
entrepreneur from the industrial estate has
come forward to complain about the
project, in question. Supreme Court, has
very clearly held in T.N. Civil Supplies
Corporation Workers' Union Vs. T.N.
Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. and
others- (2001) 4 SCC-469, Vinay Kumar
V. State of U.P. (2001) 4 SCC-734 Union
of India Vs. Alok Kumar Dass- (2001)
9SCC-297 that a person shall have no
locus standi to file writ petition if he is
not personally affected by the impugned
order or his Fundamental Rights have
neither been directly or substantially
invaded nor is there any imminent danger
of such rights being invaded or his
acquired interests have been violated
ignoring the applicable rules. The relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution is
based on the existence of a right in favour
of the person invoking the jurisdiction.
The exception to the general rule is only
in cases where the writ applied for is a
writ of Habeas Corpus or Quo Warranto
or instituted in the public interest. In
Nilangekar Patil (supra), the apex court
stressed the necessity to cleanse public
life. It equated the pollution in values and
standards as equally grave as pollution in
the environment. Thus, Nilangekar Patil
(supra) too is of no assistance to the
petitioners.

13. We also find ourselves unable to
accept the argument of Sri Singh, learned
Senior Advocate that the present is a case
of 'malace of law'. Sri Singh has sought to
distinguish between 'malice of fact' and
malice of law'. In this behalf, paragraph
28 of the writ petition is relevant wherein
it has been alleged by the petitioners that
the Minister was won over and, therefore,
the Minister with a mala fide intention
and for extraneous consideration favoured
the respondent no. 7 with the impugned
letter dated 27.8.2000. Use of words' won
over' 'mala fide intention and ' extraneous
consideration' can only mean 'malice in
fact' and not 'malice in law'. It is precisely
because of this reason that Mr. Lalji
Tandon
has
been
impleaded
as
a
respondent in the writ petition. Had it
been a case of 'malice in law', there was
absolutely no need to implead Mr.
Tandon in the instant case.

14. Considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, noted as
aforesaid, we are of the view that there is
no merit in the writ petition. The writ
petition,
accordingly,
fails
and
is
dismissed without any order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED:ALLAHABAD 6.9.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.K. SEN, C.J.
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Writ Tax No. 2447/2002

Manoharlal

...Petitioner
Versus
Bhoora

 ...Respondent