# Sanjay Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 4 ILRA 248
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-04-29
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 3258 of 2024
- **Bench:** Abdul Moin
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanjay-kumar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-51764
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - U.P. Collection Amins
Service Rules, 1974 - Rule 19-A -
Constitutional
Law
-
Article
226
-
Alternative Remedy - Natural Justice - Writ
Petition - Maintainability - Petitioner challenged
removal order dated 12.01.2024 passed by Sub
Divisional Magistrate (SDM) - Contended order
was without jurisdiction (SDM not appointing
authority) and violative of natural justice - Held,
SDM is appointing authority under Rule 19-A,
not District Magistrate, despite approval of
select list by latter - Alleged procedural
irregularities (e.g., not calling witnesses, not
considering reply properly) do not constitute
gross
violation
of
natural
justice
-
No
exceptional circumstances (e.g., violation of
fundamental rights, natural justice, lack of
jurisdiction, or challenge to vires of Act) to
bypass statutory appeal remedy - Writ petition
dismissed
for
availability
of
efficacious
alternative remedy - Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs
Excise and Taxation Officer and Whirlpool
Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks relied
upon. (Para 14, 18-20, 23)

Writ petition dismissed.

List of Cases cited:
4 All. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
249

## Text

248 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
event, when the transfer is made inter zonal
and in all over the Judgment and Order of
the Division Bench, there is no such
direction to ignore the rest of the provisions
of the Transfer Policy regarding the lady
officers, more so, the provision of inter
zonal transfer, is also viewed.

25. Resultantly, the second question is
also decided negatively, as the impugned
transfer order dated 04- 11-2023 is in no
way violative of the order or direction
issued vide judgment and order dated 1307-2023 passed in Special Appeal No. 347
of 2023 as well as the Judgment and Order
dated 21-06-2023 passed in Writ A No.
4679 of 2023.

26. This court is also not unmindful to
the several verdicts of the Hon'ble Apex
Court, wherein it is held that the statute or
rules made thereunder, should be read as a
whole and one provision should be
construed with reference to the other
provision to make the provision consistent
with the object sought to be achieved.

27. It is settled law, started from the
Judgment in the case of Nazir Ahmad
Vs.King Emperor, rendered by the Privy
Council, reported in 1936 SCC Online PC
41, as well as the consistent view of the
Hon'ble Apex Court that where the law
prescribes a thing to be done in a particular
manner
while
following
a
particular
procedure,it shall be done in the same
manner following the provisions of law,
without deviating from the prescribed
procedure. Conclusively, it is to be done in
a manner prescribed not otherwise.

28.
In
view
of
the
abovesaid
submissions and discussions, the writ
petition is devoid of merits, hence, the Writ
Petition is dismissed accordingly.

29. No order as to costs
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 248
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.04.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Writ A No. 3258 of 2024

Sanjay Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Prem Shankar, Mahendra Kumar Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C

A. Service Law - U.P. Collection Amins
Service Rules, 1974 - Rule 19-A -
Constitutional
Law
-
Article
226
-
Alternative Remedy - Natural Justice - Writ
Petition - Maintainability - Petitioner challenged
removal order dated 12.01.2024 passed by Sub
Divisional Magistrate (SDM) - Contended order
was without jurisdiction (SDM not appointing
authority) and violative of natural justice - Held,
SDM is appointing authority under Rule 19-A,
not District Magistrate, despite approval of
select list by latter - Alleged procedural
irregularities (e.g., not calling witnesses, not
considering reply properly) do not constitute
gross
violation
of
natural
justice
-
No
exceptional circumstances (e.g., violation of
fundamental rights, natural justice, lack of
jurisdiction, or challenge to vires of Act) to
bypass statutory appeal remedy - Writ petition
dismissed
for
availability
of
efficacious
alternative remedy - Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs
Excise and Taxation Officer and Whirlpool
Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade Marks relied
upon. (Para 14, 18-20, 23)

Writ petition dismissed.

List of Cases cited:
4 All. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
249
1. Harbanslal Sahnia Vs Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd.; AIR 2003 SC 2120

2. Rajendra Prasad Upadhyaya Vs St. of U.P.;
Special Appeal No. 73 of 2012, dated
29.03.2012

3. Smt. Manju Devi Vs St. of U.P.; Writ-C No.
29150 of 2018, dated 28.08.2018

4. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. Vs Excise and
Taxation Officer; Civil Appeal No. 5393 of
2010, dated 01.02.2023

5. St. of U.P. Vs Mohd. Nooh; 1958 SCR 595

6. Whirlpool Corporation Vs Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai; (1998) 8 SCC 1

7. Assistant Commissioner of St. Tax Vs M/s.
Commercial Steel Ltd.; 2021 SCC OnLine SC
884

8. St. of U.P. Vs Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.;
(1977) 2 SCC 724

9. U.O.I. Vs St. of Haryana; (2000) 10 SCC
482

10. Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs U.O.I.; Civil
Appeal No. 2106 of 2012, dated 15.02.2012

(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Moin, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Saharsh Srivastava,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondents.

2. Instant petition has been filed
challenging the order of removal dated
12.01.2024, a copy of which is Annexure-2
to the writ petition.

3. A preliminary objection has been
taken by Sri Saharsh Srivastava, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel that the
petitioner has an alternative and statutory
remedy of filing an appeal against the order
impugned.

4. However, learned counsel for the
petitioner states that as the order impugned
is patently without jurisdiction having been
passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate,
who is not the appointing authority rather
the appointing authority is the District
Magistrate. Further, the order impugned
has been passed in gross violation of
principles
of
natural
justice
and
consequently placing reliance on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs.
Indian Oil Corporation Limited and
others - AIR 2003 SC 2120 and a
Division Bench judgment of this Court
passed in Special Appeal No.73 of 2012 in
re: Rajendra Prasad Upadhyaya vs.
State of U.P. and others decided on
29.03.2012, the contention is that as the
order
impugned
is
patently
without
jurisdiction and in gross violation of natural
justice as such the statutory and alternative
remedy of appeal would not be an absolute
bar in this Court entertaining the petition.
Reliance has also been placed on the
judgment of this Court in the case of Smt.
Manju Devi vs. State of U.P. and others
passed in Writ-C No.29150 of 2018
decided on 28.08.2018.

5. Whether the remedy of statutory
appeal would be an absolute bar for
entertaining a petition has been considered
threadbare recently by the Supreme Court
in the case of M/s Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.
vs. The Excise and Taxation Officer
Cum Assessing Authority and others
passed in Civil Appeal No.5393 of 2010
wherein the Apex Court vide judgment and
order dated 01.02.2023 after considering its
earlier judgments has held as under:-

"4.
Before
answering
the
questions, we feel the urge to say a few
words on the exercise of writ powers
250 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution
having come across certain orders passed
by the high courts holding writ petitions as
"not maintainable" merely because the
alternative remedy provided by the relevant
statutes has not been pursued by the parties
desirous
of
invocation
of
the
writ
jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative
writs under Article 226 is plenary in
nature. Any limitation on the exercise of
such power must be traceable in the
Constitution itself. Profitable reference in
this regard may be made to Article 329 and
ordainments of other similarly worded
articles in the Constitution. Article 226
does not, in terms, impose any limitation or
restraint on the exercise of power to issue
writs. While it is true that exercise of writ
powers despite availability of a remedy
under the very statute which has been
invoked and has given rise to the action
impugned in the writ petition ought not to
be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere
fact that the petitioner before the high
court, in a given case, has not pursued the
alternative remedy available to him/it
cannot mechanically be construed as a
ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that
the high courts (bearing in mind the facts
of each particular case) have a discretion
whether to entertain a writ petition or not.
One of the self-imposed restrictions on the
exercise of power under Article 226 that
has evolved through judicial precedents is
that the high courts should normally not
entertain a writ petition, where an effective
and efficacious alternative remedy is
available. At the same time, it must be
remembered that mere availability of an
alternative remedy of appeal or revision,
which the party invoking the jurisdiction of
the high court under Article 226 has not
pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of
the high court and render a writ petition
"not maintainable". In a long line of
decisions, this Court has made it clear that
availability of an alternative remedy does
not operate as an absolute bar to the
"maintainability" of a writ petition and
that the rule, which requires a party to
pursue the alternative remedy provided by
a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience
and discretion rather than a rule of law.
Though elementary, it needs to be restated
that
"entertainability"
and
"maintainability" of a writ petition are
distinct concepts. The fine but real
distinction between the two ought not to be
lost
sight
of.
The
objection
as
to
"maintainability" goes to the root of the
matter and if such objection were found to
be of substance, the courts would be
rendered incapable of even receiving the lis
for adjudication. On the other hand, the
question of "entertainability" is entirely
within the realm of discretion of the high
courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A
writ petition despite being maintainable
may not be entertained by a high court for
very many reasons or relief could even be
refused to the petitioner, despite setting up
a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed
relief would not further public interest.
Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a
high court on the ground that the petitioner
has not availed the alternative remedy
without, however, examining whether an
exceptional case has been made out for
such entertainment would not be proper.

5.A little after the dawn of the
Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this
Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR
595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd.
Nooh) had the occasion to observe as
follows:

"10. In the next place it must be
borne in mind that there is no rule, with
regard to certiorari as there is with
mandamus, that it will lie only where there
is no other equally effective remedy. It is
4 All. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
251
well established that, provided the requisite
grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a
right of appeal has been conferred by
statute, (Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd
Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited
there). The fact that the aggrieved party
has another and adequate remedy may be
taken into consideration by the superior
court in arriving at a conclusion as to
whether it should, in exercise of its
discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to
quash the proceedings and decisions of
inferior courts subordinate to it and
ordinarily the superior court will decline to
interfere until the aggrieved party has
exhausted his other statutory remedies, if
any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion
of statutory remedies before the writ will be
granted is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion rather than a rule of law and
instances are numerous where a writ of
certiorari has been issued in spite of the
fact that the aggrieved party had other
adequate legal remedies. ***"

6. At the end of the last century,
this Court in paragraph 15 of the its
decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1
(Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of
Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved
out the exceptions on the existence whereof
a Writ Court would be justified in
entertaining a writ petition despite the party
approaching it not having availed the
alternative remedy provided by the statute.
The same read as under:

(i) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights;

(ii) where there is violation of
principles of natural justice;

(iii) where the order or the
proceedings
are
wholly
without
jurisdiction; or

(iv) where the vires of an Act is
challenged.

7. Not too long ago, this Court in
its decision reported in 2021 SCC OnLine
SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State
Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited)
has reiterated the same principles in
paragraph 11.

8. That apart, we may also
usefully refer to the decisions of this Court
reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of
Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe
Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of
India vs. State of Haryana). What appears
on a plain reading of the former decision is
that whether a certain item falls within an
entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure
question of law and if investigation into
facts is unnecessary, the high court could
entertain a writ petition in its discretion
even though the alternative remedy was not
availed
of;
and,
unless
exercise
of
discretion is shown to be unreasonable or
perverse, this Court would not interfere. In
the latter decision, this Court found the
issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely
legal requiring determination by the high
court without putting the appellant through
the mill of statutory appeals in the
hierarchy. What follows from the said
decisions is that where the controversy is a
purely legal one and it does not involve
disputed questions of fact but only
questions of law, then it should be decided
by the high court instead of dismissing the
writ petition on the ground of an alternative
remedy being available.

9. Now, reverting to the facts of
this appeal, we find that the appellant had
claimed before the High Court that the suo
motu revisional power could not have been
exercised by the Revisional Authority in
view
of
the
existing
facts
and
circumstances
leading
to
the
only
conclusion that the assessment orders were
legally correct and that the final orders
impugned in the writ petition were passed
252 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
upon assuming a jurisdiction which the
Revisional Authority did not possess. In
fine, the orders impugned were passed
wholly
without
jurisdiction.
Since
a
jurisdictional issue was raised by the
appellant in the writ petition questioning
the very competence of the Revisional
Authority to exercise suo motu power,
being a pure question of law, we are of the
considered view that the plea raised in the
writ petition did deserve a consideration on
merits and the appellant's writ petition
ought not to have been thrown out at the
threshold.

10. Reliance placed by the High
Court on the decision in Titagarh Paper
Mills (supra), in our view, was completely
misplaced.
The
respondent
Electricity
Board had levied coal surcharge on the
appellant
company
in
terms
of
an
agreement. Such agreement contained an
arbitration agreement in clause 23. Instead
of pursuing its remedy in arbitration, the
appellant company unsuccessfully invoked
the writ jurisdiction. This Court was
approached whereupon it was held that in
view of the issues raised, there was no
reason why the appellant company should
not pursue its remedy in arbitration, having
solemnly accepted clause 23 of the
agreement,
and
instead
invoke
the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the high court
under Article 226 of the Constitution to
determine questions which really form the
subject matter of the arbitration agreement.
This decision could not have been of any
relevance having regard to the issue
presented for resolution before the High
Court by the appellant, particularly when
the disputes inter se were not referable to
arbitration.

6. From perusal of the aforesaid
judgment in the case of Godrej Sara Lee
Limited (supra), it emerges that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has carved out the
distinction between the 'maintainability' of
a writ petition and 'entertainability' of a
writ on the ground of alternative remedy.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that the 'maintainability' of a writ
petition goes to the root of the matter and
the mere fact that the party invoking
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution has not pursued the
alternative remedy of appeal or revision,
would not oust the jurisdiction of the High
Court and render the writ petition being
'not maintainable'.

8. So far as the 'entertainability' of
the writ petition is concerned, Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that the question of
"entertainability" is entirely within the
realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ
remedy being discretionary and a writ
petition despite being maintainable may not
be entertained by a High Court for various
reasons or relief could be refused to the
petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal
point, if grant of the claimed relief would
not further public interest.

9. The Apex Court has again
reiterated the principles of law laid down
by it earlier in the case of Whirlpool
Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai and Others-(1998) 8
SCC 1 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court
has held that a Writ Court would be
justified in entertaining a writ petition
despite the party approaching it not having
availed the alternative remedy provided by
the statute in the following exceptions
namely (a) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights, (b) where there is violation of
principles of natural justice, (c) where the
order or the proceedings are wholly without
4 All. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
253
jurisdiction, or (f) where the vires of an Act
is challenged. The same principle of law
has been laid down in the earlier judgment
of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Harbanslal Sahnia (supra) and the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in
the case of Rajendra Prasad Upadhyaya
(supra).

10. In the instant case, as already
indicated
above,
the
petitioner
has
approached the writ Court directly without
filing of an appeal, as per rules, on the
ground that (a) the order impugned is
patently without jurisdiction, and (b) that
the order is patently violative of the rules of
natural justice.

11. Considering the aforesaid two
grounds as have been raised on behalf of
the petitioner, the Court thus proceeds to
examine as to whether the order impugned
is without jurisdiction and in gross
violation of the rules of natural justice so as
to entertain the writ petition despite
alternative remedy of appeal.

12. So far as the order being without
jurisdiction is concerned, learned counsel
for the petitioner contends that the
appointing authority of the petitioner is the
District
Magistrate
while
the
order
impugned has been passed by Sub
Divisional Magistrate and as the order has
been passed by a lower authority than the
appointing authority the said act would
render the order being without jurisdiction.

13. In this regard, learned counsel for
the petitioner has invited the attention of
this Court towards the appointment order of
the petitioner as Collection Amin dated
20.08.1997, a copy of which is Annexure-3
to the petition. Placing reliance on the said
appointment order which in fact has been
issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate but
the said order also indicates that the select
list has been approved by the District
Magistrate,
the
argument
of
learned
counsel for the petitioner is that as the
select list has been approved by the District
Magistrate
consequently
even
if
the
appointment order has been issued by the
Sub Divisional Magistrate it is the District
Magistrate who is the appointing authority
of the petitioner.

14. The aforesaid argument of learned
counsel for the petitioner apart from being
patently
fallacious
is
also
patently
misconceived considering the fact that
admittedly the services of the petitioner are
governed by the U.P. Collection Amins
Service Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred as
the 'Rules, 1974'). Rule 19-A of the Rules,
1974 categorically indicates that the
appointing authority of a Collection Amin
is the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Thus,
considering the provisions of Rule 19-A of
the Rules, 1974 vis-a-vis the appointment
order of the petitioner dated 20.08.1997
which in fact has been issued by the Sub
Divisional Magistrate and the removal
order of the petitioner has also been issued
by
the
Sub
Divisional
Magistrate
consequently it cannot be said that merely
because the select list had been approved
by the District Magistrate, consequently it
is the District Magistrate who would
become the appointing authority of the
petitioner. Thus, the aforesaid argument is
rejected. It is held that the appointing
authority of the petitioner is in fact the Sub
Divisional Magistrate as per Rules, 1974.

15. So far as the ground that the order
has been passed in gross violation of rules
of natural justice, reliance has been placed
on the judgment of Apex Court in the case
of Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of
254 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
India passed in Civil Appeal No.2106 of
2012 decided on 15.02.2012 to contend that
as one of the charges against the petitioner
was his unauthorized absence consequently
the disciplinary authority was required to
prove that the absence is willful and in
absence of such finding the absence would
not amount to misconduct and as such the
disciplinary authority has patently erred in
law in removing the petitioner from service
on the ground that the petitioner was
unathorisedly absent.

16. Apart from the fact that in case
the disciplinary authority may have arrived
at a wrong finding by not considering the
relevant records it cannot be said that the
said finding would be patently violative of
rules of natural justice.

17. Even otherwise, a perusal of the
inquiry report dated 23.06.2023, which is
part of Annexure-18 to the writ petition,
would indicate that the competent authority
has considered the medical certificate of
the petitioner to specifically arrive at a
finding that the said medical certificate
does not inspire confidence as there is a
difference in date in the medical certificate
pertaining to the start of medical leave.

18. Thus, merely because the inquiry
officer/disciplinary authority may have
arrived at a finding which was at the
variance with what has been indicated in
the medical certificate and thereafter has
gone to hold that the petitioner was
willfully absent, the same cannot be said to
be violative of rules of natural justice.

19. So far as the further argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
order is also in gross violation of rules of
natural justice as the witnesses who were
indicated in the charge sheet were never
called to appear before the inquiry officer,
the Court may only observe that mere
calling or not calling the witnesses cannot
be construed that the order impugned is in
violation of rules of natural justice rather
the same may amount to procedural
irregularity which can always be looked
into by the appellate authority.

20. Another ground which has been
taken by the petitioner in support of his
argument of the order being violation of
rules of natural justice is that the reply as
filed by the petitioner dated 11.12.2023 has
not been considered. The said argument is
also found patently fallacious inasmuch as
a perusal of the order impugned dated
12.01.2024 would indicate that the reply of
the petitioner has in fact been considered.
Obviously, it cannot be the case of the
petitioner that his reply should have been
considered in a particular manner and the
petitioner should have been exonerated of
all the charges inasmuch as it is always the
discretion of the disciplinary authority to
take a view which could be erroneous but
the same would not result into the said
order being rendered in gross violation of
the rules of natural justice.

21. So far as the judgment in the case
of Smt. Manju Devi (supra) is concerned,
the writ Court had proceeded on the ground
that the order impugned had been passed
without an effective opportunity of hearing
to the petitioner.

22. In the instant case, it is not that
the petitioner has not been heard rather his
case is that the reply that had been filed by
him has not been considered in its proper
perspective. Thus, the judgment of this
Court in the case of Smt. Manju Devi
(supra) would be of no help to the
petitioner.
4 All. Basu Dev Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
255

23. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion, this Court finds that the
principles of law as laid down by the Apex
Court in the case of Godrej Sara Lee
Limited (supra) of entertaining a writ
petition are not made out. Accordingly, the
writ petition is dismissed leaving it open to
the petitioner to pursue the remedy of
appeal as per rules.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 255
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.03.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 4071 of 2020

Basu Dev Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Girja Shanker Mishra, Sri Govind Kumar
Singh (Sr. Advocate), Sri Sankalp Narain,
Sri H.N. Singh (Sr. Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C

A. Service Law - U.P. Secondary Education
(Services Selection Board) Act, 1982 -
Section 33C - Intermediate Education Act,
1921 - Natural Justice - Fraud in Appointment -
Petitioner's appointment as lecturer regularized
on 25.04.2006 - Regional Joint Director of
Education
stopped
salary
and
declared
appointment
fraudulent
vide
order
dated
19.03.2020
based
on
despatch
register
discrepancy - Held, order passed without notice
to
petitioner,
principal,
or
management,
violating natural justice - No specific finding of
fraud or misrepresentation by petitioner or
management
-
Regularization
order
not
cancelled, cannot be deemed automatically void
- Inquiry into appointment legality during
seniority
dispute
impermissible
-
Orders
quashed for lack of authority and procedural
fairness - Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs St. of U.P.
and Asha Saxena Vs S.K. Chaudhari relied
upon. (Para 8-9, 11-12)

Writ petition allowed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs St. of U.P.; AIR
2024 SC 260

2. Chief Engineer, M.S.E.B Vs Suresh Raghunath
Bhokare; (2005) 10 SCC 465 (AIR 2005 SC
1622)

3. Asha Saxena Vs S.K. Chaudhari; 1991(2)
UPLBEC 1202

4. Ram Sarup Vs St. of Har.; AIR 1978 SC 1536

5. Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Sousa; 1975 L.I.C.
816

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri H.N. Singh, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Shri G.S.
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner
and
Shri
Neeraj
Tripathi,
learned
Additional Advocate General for the
State-respondents.

2. The petitioner before this Court
has been working as a lecturer in the
institution
and
his
services
were
regularized way back on 25.04.2006. He is
aggrieved now by the order passed by the
Regional Joint Director of Education dated
19.03.2020, holding the appointment of
the petitioner to be bad for being result of
fraud and forgery and thus directed for
stoppage of payment of salary of the
petitioner, and also the consequential
order passed by the District Inspector of
Schools on 20.03.2020 withholding the
payment of salary of the petitioner and
further directing the authorized controller