# Sanjay Kumar v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 9 ILRA 590
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-09-10
- **Case number:** Writ B No. 1983 of 2023
- **Bench:** Dinesh Pathak
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanjay-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52395
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Limitation Law - Condonation of delay
- U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1950
- Section 9A(2) & 48(1) - Whenever
technicality
is
pitted
against
the
substantial justice, it is substantial justice
which prevails. Law of limitation is based
upon public policy intending to discourage
unnecessary
litigation
between
the
parties,
therefore,
while
exercising
discretionary power to condone the delay,
the Court should act sparingly.

In
normal
course,
delay
cannot
be
condoned
unless
sufficient
reason
is
assigned.

Delay cannot be condoned in a cavalier
manner unless the sufficient cause is shown
by
the
parties.
Normally,
despite
the
prescribed period of limitation is expired, the
phrase "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence, inaction or for
want of bonafide is imputable to the
adversary
party.
Meaning
thereby,
if
sufficient cause for delay is shown by the
parties concerned, discretion is entrusted
upon
the
court/authority
concerned
to
condone the delay so that substantial justice
be done. (Para 6)

In present case, it is evident that Deputy
Director of Consolidation while quashing the
order passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation has not properly discussed the
genuineness of the Vakalatnama and service
of notice upon the Kanhaiya Lal as pointed
out by the petitioner in the writ petition.
Both the parties are at variance on the point
of knowledge qua order dated 30.7.1970
passed by the Consolidation Officer. The
petitioner has denied the knowledge of
proceeding u/s 9A(2) of UPCH Act before the
Consolidation Officer, however, conversely,
the
contesting-respondents
have
laid
emphasis upon the knowledge to Kanhaiya
Lal who was served with notice, and
appeared through "Vakeel", namely, Sri
Ramesh Chandra Kulshreshtha.

There is no discussion, appraising the copy
of notice which is said to have been served
upon Kanhaiya Lal and memo of appearance
filed by "Vakeel" Sri Ramesh Chandra
Kulshreshtha. In case, it is proved that
despite the knowledge Kanhaiya Lal had
chosen not to assail the order dated
30.07.1970, then right of the appellant
(descendants from Kanhaiya Lal) to assail
the order passed by the Consolidation Officer
will be affected. However, on the flip side, in
case, knowledge to Kanhaiya Lal is not
proved,
then
certainly,
to
serve
the
substantial justice, the petitioner should be
accorded an opportunity to contest the
appeal on merits. (Para 7)

B. The date of knowledge and source of
knowledge of any particular event to
explain
the
"sufficient
cause"
is
paramount consideration at the time of
considering the point of delay in filing any
9 All. Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
591
application
or
appeal
etc.
Therefore,
liberal approach in condoning the delay
cannot be made absolute and same is
subject to the bonafide and conscious
action of the person, who is beseeching
for the condonation of the delay. (Para 7)

The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
has
miserably failed to accord conscious discussion in
the light of available documentary evidence on the
record, (w.r.t. which both the parties are at
variance) to prove the presence of Kanhaiya Lal
and his knowledge qua order dated 30.7.1970.
Kanhaiya Lal has allegedly restrained himself from
assailing the said order during his life time. Thus,
instant writ petition succeeds and is partly allowed.
The order dated 27.03.2023 passed by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation is quashed. The revision
filed on behalf of Subhash Kumar and others is
restored to its original number and parties are
relegated
before
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation to get the revision decided de novo
in the light of the observation as made in the order
of the date. (Para 8)

Words and Phrases - "Sufficient cause" -
The expression "sufficient cause" should be given
a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial
justice is done, but only so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of

## Text

590 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
committed by the Tribunal in passing the
order
impugned
so
as
to
warrant
interference in the present proceedings.

46. Resultantly, the writ petition is
dismissed.

47. Interim order if any stands
vacated.
----------
(2024) 9 ILRA 590
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.09.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DINESH PATHAK, J.

Writ B No. 1983 of 2023

Sanjay Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Neeraj Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Alkesh Singh, C.S.C.

A. Limitation Law - Condonation of delay
- U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1950
- Section 9A(2) & 48(1) - Whenever
technicality
is
pitted
against
the
substantial justice, it is substantial justice
which prevails. Law of limitation is based
upon public policy intending to discourage
unnecessary
litigation
between
the
parties,
therefore,
while
exercising
discretionary power to condone the delay,
the Court should act sparingly.

In
normal
course,
delay
cannot
be
condoned
unless
sufficient
reason
is
assigned.

Delay cannot be condoned in a cavalier
manner unless the sufficient cause is shown
by
the
parties.
Normally,
despite
the
prescribed period of limitation is expired, the
phrase "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence, inaction or for
want of bonafide is imputable to the
adversary
party.
Meaning
thereby,
if
sufficient cause for delay is shown by the
parties concerned, discretion is entrusted
upon
the
court/authority
concerned
to
condone the delay so that substantial justice
be done. (Para 6)

In present case, it is evident that Deputy
Director of Consolidation while quashing the
order passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation has not properly discussed the
genuineness of the Vakalatnama and service
of notice upon the Kanhaiya Lal as pointed
out by the petitioner in the writ petition.
Both the parties are at variance on the point
of knowledge qua order dated 30.7.1970
passed by the Consolidation Officer. The
petitioner has denied the knowledge of
proceeding u/s 9A(2) of UPCH Act before the
Consolidation Officer, however, conversely,
the
contesting-respondents
have
laid
emphasis upon the knowledge to Kanhaiya
Lal who was served with notice, and
appeared through "Vakeel", namely, Sri
Ramesh Chandra Kulshreshtha.

There is no discussion, appraising the copy
of notice which is said to have been served
upon Kanhaiya Lal and memo of appearance
filed by "Vakeel" Sri Ramesh Chandra
Kulshreshtha. In case, it is proved that
despite the knowledge Kanhaiya Lal had
chosen not to assail the order dated
30.07.1970, then right of the appellant
(descendants from Kanhaiya Lal) to assail
the order passed by the Consolidation Officer
will be affected. However, on the flip side, in
case, knowledge to Kanhaiya Lal is not
proved,
then
certainly,
to
serve
the
substantial justice, the petitioner should be
accorded an opportunity to contest the
appeal on merits. (Para 7)

B. The date of knowledge and source of
knowledge of any particular event to
explain
the
"sufficient
cause"
is
paramount consideration at the time of
considering the point of delay in filing any
9 All. Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
591
application
or
appeal
etc.
Therefore,
liberal approach in condoning the delay
cannot be made absolute and same is
subject to the bonafide and conscious
action of the person, who is beseeching
for the condonation of the delay. (Para 7)

The
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
has
miserably failed to accord conscious discussion in
the light of available documentary evidence on the
record, (w.r.t. which both the parties are at
variance) to prove the presence of Kanhaiya Lal
and his knowledge qua order dated 30.7.1970.
Kanhaiya Lal has allegedly restrained himself from
assailing the said order during his life time. Thus,
instant writ petition succeeds and is partly allowed.
The order dated 27.03.2023 passed by the Deputy
Director of Consolidation is quashed. The revision
filed on behalf of Subhash Kumar and others is
restored to its original number and parties are
relegated
before
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation to get the revision decided de novo
in the light of the observation as made in the order
of the date. (Para 8)

Words and Phrases - "Sufficient cause" -
The expression "sufficient cause" should be given
a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial
justice is done, but only so long as negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed
to the party concerned, where or not "sufficient
cause" has been furnished, can be decided on
the facts of the particular case and no strait-
jacket formula is possible. (Para 6)

Writ petition partly allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Ram Nath Sao Vs Govardhan Sao, AIR 2002
SC 1201 (Para 6)

2. Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao Vs Reddy
Srivedi & ors., AIR 2022 SC 332 (Para 6)

Present
petition
assails
order
dated
27.3.2023, passed by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, reversing the order
dated 28.9.2002 passed by the Settlement
Officer of Consolidation, whereby delay
caused in filing the appeal has been
condoned on the cost of Rs. 100/- and
date is fixed for hearing the appeal on
merits.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dinesh Pathak, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record on board.

2. Aggrieved with the order dated
27.3.2023 passed by the Deputy Director of
Consolidation
in
Revision
No.
2015530149000043 under section 48(1) of
UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1950
(in brevity 'UPCH Act'), reversing the
order dated 28.9.2002 passed by the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation in
appeal No. 438 under section 11(1) of
UPCH Act whereby delay caused in filing
the appeal has been condoned on the cost
of Rs. 100/- and date is fixed for hearing
the appeal on merits, petitioner has filed the
present writ petition.

3. Having considered the rival
submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the parties and perusal of
record, it is manifested that instant writ
petition has arisen from delay condonation
in filing the appeal before the Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation.
In
basic
consolidation record, names of Kanhaiya
Lal and Shiv Prasad (predecessor-ininterest of the petitioners) were recorded.
One Angad Rai (father of respondent No.
4) has filed an objection under Section
9A(2) of UPCH Act claiming his right and
title over the property in question on the
basis of sale deed said to have been
executed
by
Kanhaiya
Lal.
The
Consolidation Officer, vide order dated
30.7.1970, has allowed the objection under
Section 9A(2) of UPCH Act and passed an
order to record the name of Aangad Rai &
others in place of recorded tenure holders.
At belated stage, after the death of
592 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kanhaiya Lal, an appeal dated 21.07.1982
has been preferred on behalf of his son,
namely, Sanjay Kumar (minor) under the
guardianship of his mother Smt. Prema
Devi wife of Kanhaiya Lal. The Settlement
Officer of Consolidation, vide order dated
15.11.1989, has condoned the delay in
filing the appeal and, simultaneously,
allowed the appeal on merits whereby the
parties
were
relegated
before
the
Consolidation Officer to get the matter
decided afresh. The Deputy Director of
Consolidation, on revision being filed on
behalf of the Angad Rai, has reversed the
order passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation and relegated the parties, at
the appellate stage to decide the point of
delay first caused in filing the appeal,
before deciding its merits. In pursuance of
the remand order dated 5.6.1999 passed by
the Deputy Director of Consolidation, the
matter has been scrutinized on the point of
delay, as such, the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation, vide order dated 28.9.2002,
has condoned the delay in filing the appeal
on the cost of Rs. 100/-. Having been
aggrieved with the order dated 28.9.2002
passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation, Subhash Kumar (respondent
No. 4) and others have preferred revision.
The Deputy Director of Consolation, vide
order dated 27.3.2003, has allowed the
revision and quashed the delay condonation
order passed by the Settlement Officer of
Consolidation, which gives rise a cause of
action for filing the instant writ petition.

4. Solitary point involved in the
instant
writ
petition
relates
to
the
condonation of delay caused in filing the
appeal dated 21.7.1982 assailing the order
dated
30.7.1970
passed
by
the
Consolidation Officer in proceeding under
Section 9A(2) of UPCH Act. As per the
ground taken by the petitioner in appeal
dated 21.7.2022 (annexure No. 5), he/she
came to know for the first time through
rumour in the village on 19.7.1982 qua
order passed by the consolidation court,
therefore,
inspected
the
record
on
20.7.1982. Petitioner came with a specific
case that before that neither the appellant
(petitioner No. 1 herein) nor his father had
ever come to know about the order passed
by the Consolidation Officer. It is apposite
to mention that father of the petitioner No.
1 had died on 25.4.1982 and, after his
death, the appeal was filed on 21.7.1982.
The petitioner has denied any service of
notice upon Kanhaiya Lal and also denied
the filing of Vakalatnama on his behalf.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has
attemted to bring out a case of fraud by
distinguishing between the signatures made
on the Vakalatnama (annexure No. 2) and
the notice (annexure No. 3). Learned
counsel for the contesting-respondents has
denied the plea as raised on behalf of the
petitioner and came with the contention
that one Mr. Ramesh Chandra Kulshrestha
had appeared and filed his Vakalatnama on
8.6.1970 on behalf of Kanhaiya Lal. Notice
was properly served upon Kanhaiya Lal
and the delay in filing the objection under
Section 9A(2) of UPCH Act was condoned
in his presence, vide order dated 18.6.1970,
on the cost of Rs. 10/-. He has placed
reliance on the order sheets dated 7.7.1970
and 16.7.1970 whereby time was granted to
the defendant for filing written statement
and, thereafter, the case was ordered to be
proceeded ex-parte in absence of the
defendant, respectively. Copy of the order
sheets from dated 27.5.1970 to dated
16.7.1970 are collectively filed as annexure
No. CA-1 to the counter affidavit. Qua the
survival of another co-tenant Shiv Prasad, it
has been contended that he has executed a
registered sale deed on 2.9.2002, however,
he himself has never made any endeavour
9 All. Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
593
to challenge the order dated 30.7.1970
passed by the Consolidation Officer.

5. In nutshell, there is an intricated
question qua knowledge of order dated
30.7.1970 passed by the Consolidation
Officer in proceeding under Section 9A(2)
of UPCH Act whereby names of Kanhaiya
Lal and Shiv Prashad (predecessors-ininterest of the petitioners) have been
ordered
to
be
deleted
from
the
consolidation record and in its place name
of
predecessors-in-interest
of
the
contesting-respondent No. 4 and others
have
been
ordered
to
be
recorded.
Admittedly,
Kanhaiya
Lal
died
on
25.4.1982, however, his minor son (Sanjay
Kumar) through his mother being a
guardian has filed an appeal on 21.7.1982.
The appellant has blatantly denied the
knowledge
about
the
order
dated
30.07.1970,
to
him,
and
his
father
Kanhaiya
Lal
either.
However,
the
contesting-respondents
are
vehemently
relied upon the memo of appearance filed
by
counsel
Sri
Ramesh
Chandra
Kulshreshtha, who was a designated
"Vakeel". The Settlement Officer of
Consolidation while condoning the delay in
filing the appeal was of the opinion that the
liberal view should be taken in condoning
the delay so that opportunity may be
accorded to the appellant to defend his
case. However, he has not returned any
finding qua sufficiency of cause for delay
in filing the appeal. The Deputy Director of
Consolidation, in turn, has laid emphasis
upon the service of notice on Kanhaiya Lal,
who had chosen not to contest the case and,
ultimately, the same is resulted into final
culmination of proceeding under section
9A(2) of UPCH Act by the order dated
23.7.1970 passed against him. The Deputy
Director of Consolidation has emphasised
the reluctance at the part of Kanhaiya Lal,
who had not assailed the order dated
30.7.1970. Thus, he has concluded that
both the parties were litigated before the
Consolidation Officer, therefore, filing an
appeal at the belated stage, after twelve
years, is not liable to be condoned.

6. It is no more res integra that
whenever technicality is pitted against the
substantial justice, it is substantial justice
which prevails. Law of limitation is based
upon public policy intending to discourage
unnecessary litigation between the parties,
therefore, while exercising discretionary
power to condone the delay, the Court
should act sparingly. Delay cannot be
condoned in a cavalier manner unless the
sufficient cause is shown by the parties.
Normally, despite the prescribed period of
limitation is expired, the phrase "sufficient
cause" receiving a liberal construction so as
to advance substantial justice when no
negligence, inaction or for want of bonafide
is imputable to the adversary party.
Meaning thereby, if sufficient cause for
delay is shown by the parties concerned,
discretion
entrusted
upon
the
court/authority concerned to condone the
delay so that substantial justice be done. In
the case of Ram Nath Sao v. Govardhan
Sao, AIR 2002 SC 1201, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has expounded that the
expression "sufficient cause" should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long
as negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned, where or not "sufficient cause"
has been furnished, can be decided on the
facts of the particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. Dealing with the
phrase
"sufficiency
cause",
Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Majji
Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy
Srivedi & Others reported in AIR 2022
594 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
SC 332, has expounded that, in normal
course, delay cannot be condoned unless
sufficient reason is assigned. For ready
reference, Paragraph Nos. 7.1 to 7.5 are
quoted hereinbelow:-

"7.1 In the case of Ramlal,
Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is
observed and held as under:-

In construing s. 5 it is relevant to
bear in mind two important considerations.
The
first
consideration
is
that
the
expiration of the period of limitation
prescribed for making an appeal gives rise
to a right in favour of the decree-holder to
treat the decree as binding between the
parties. In other words, when the period of
limitation prescribed has expired the
decree-holder has obtained a benefit under
the law of limitation to treat the decree as
beyond challenge, and this legal right
which has accrued to the decree-holder by
lapse of time should not be light- heartedly
disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause
for excusing delay is shown discretion is
given to the Court to condone delay and
admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the Court in
order that judicial power and discretion in
that behalf should be exercised to advance
substantial justice. As has been observed by
the Madras High Court in Krishna v.
Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, "s.
5 gives the Court a discretion which in
respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in
the way in which judicial power and
discretion ought to be exercised upon
principles which are well understood; the
words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction
nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
appellant."

7.2
In
the
case
of
P.K.
Ramachandran (supra), while refusing to
condone the delay of 565 days, it is
observed that in the absence of reasonable,
satisfactory
or
even
appropriate
explanation for seeking condonation of
delay, the same is not to be condoned
lightly. It is further observed that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular
party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes and
the courts have no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds.
It is further observed that while exercising
discretion for condoning the delay, the
court has to exercise discretion judiciously.

7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam
Patil (supra), it is observed as under :-

The
laws
of
limitation
are
founded on public policy. Statutes of
limitation are sometimes described as
"statutes of peace". An unlimited and
perpetual threat of limitation creates
insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of
limitation is essential for public order. The
principle is based on the maxim "interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the
interest of the State requires that there
should be end to litigation but at the same
time laws of limitation are a means to
ensure private justice suppressing fraud
and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing
time-limit for litigation is based on public
policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for
the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics but avail their legal
remedies
promptly.
Salmond
in
his
Jurisprudence states that the laws come to
the assistance of the vigilant and not of the
sleepy."

7.4 In the case of Basawaraj
(supra), it is observed and held by this
Court that the discretion to condone the
9 All. Sanjay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
595
delay has to be exercised judiciously based
on facts and circumstances of each case. It
is further observed that the expression
"sufficient cause" cannot be liberally
interpreted if negligence. inaction or lack
of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is
further
observed
that
even
though
limitation may harshly affect rights of a
party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when prescribed by statute. It is
further observed that in case a party has
acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or
there is inaction then there cannot be any
justified ground for condoning the delay
even by imposing conditions. It is observed
that each application for condonation of
delay has to be decided within the
framework laid down by this Court. It is
further observed that if courts start
condoning delay where no sufficient cause
is made out by imposing conditions then
that would amount to violation of statutory
principles and showing utter disregard to
legislature.

7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam
Patil (supra), it is observed by this Court
that the court cannot enquire into belated
and stale claims on the ground of equity.
Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those
who are vigilant and "do not slumber over
their rights."

7. Applying the ratio decided by
Hon'ble Supreme Court, as discussed above,
in the given circumstances of the present
case, it is evident that Deputy Director of
Consolidation while quashing the order
passed
by
the
Settlement
Officer
of
Consolidation has not properly discussed the
genuineness of the Vakalatnama and service
of notice upon the Kanhaiya Lal as pointed
out by the petitioner in the writ petition. Both
the parties are at variance on the point of
knowledge qua order dated 30.7.1970 passed
by the Consolidation Officer. I have already
discussed the facts relating to delay in
previous paragraphs, wherein petitioner has
denied the knowledge of proceeding under
section 9A(2) of UPCH Act before the
Consolidation Officer, however, conversely,
the
contesting-respondents
have
laid
emphasis upon the knowledge to Kanhaiya
Lal who was served with notice, and
appeared through "Vakeel", namely, Sri
Ramesh
Chandra
Kulshreshtha.
While
returning its finding qua service of notice
upon Kanhaiya Lal and his appearance
through "Vakeel", the Deputy Director of
Consolidation has failed to appraise the
evidence on record. There is no discussion,
appraising the copy of notice which is said to
have been served upon Kanhaiya Lal and
memo of appearance filed by "Vakeel" Sri
Ramesh Chandra Kulshreshtha on behalf of
Kanhaiya Lal. In case, it is proved that
despite the knowledge Kanhaiya Lal had
chosen not to assail the order dated 30.7.1970
passed by the Consolidation Officer then
right of the appellant (descendants from
Kanhaiya Lal) to assail the order passed by
the Consolidation Officer will be affected.
However, on the flip side, in case, knowledge
to Kanhaiya Lal is not proved, then certainly,
to serve the substantial justice, the petitioner
should be accorded an opportunity to contest
the appeal on merits. Needless to say that
date of knowledge and source of knowledge
of any particular event to explain the
"sufficient cause" is paramount consideration
at the time of considering the point of delay
in filing any application or appeal etc.
Therefore, liberal approach in condoning the
delay cannot be made absolute and same is
subject to the bonafide and conscious action
of the person, who is beseeching for the
condonation of the delay.

8. In this conspectus, as above, in my
considered opinion, the Deputy Director of
Consolidation has decided the revision in a
596 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
very perfunctory manner having been
influenced with the presence of Kanhaiya
Lal in proceeding under Section 9A(2) of
UPCH Act, culminated by order dated
30.7.1970 passed by the Consolidation
Officer. However, he has miserably failed
to discuss the relating evidence to prove the
presence of Kanhaiya Lal in the proceeding
in question and his knowledge qua order
dated
30.7.1970,
who
has
allegedly
restrained himself from assailing the said
order during his life time. The Deputy
Director of Consolidation should have
accorded
conscious
discussion
qua
knowledge of Kanhaiya Lal in the light of
available documentary evidence on the
record with respect to which both the
parties are at variance. Thus, instant writ
petition succeeds and is partly allowed.
The order dated 27.3.2023 passed by the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
is
quashed. The revision filed on behalf of
Subhash Kumar and others is restored to its
original number and parties are relegated
before
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation to get the revision decided
de novo in the light of the observation as
made in the order of the date.

9. It is expected that the Deputy
Director of Consolidation shall accord
conscious appraisal to the documents on
record and pass a speaking and reasoned
order in accordance with law after giving
opportunity of hearing to the parties
concerned without granting unnecessary
adjournment to either of the parties
expeditiously, preferably, within a period
of three months from the date of
appearance of the parties along with
certified copy of the order of the date, who
are hereby directed to appear before the
Deputy Director of Consolidation on
24.9.2024.
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(2024) 9 ILRA 596
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 3000082 of 1997

Krishna Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
U.K. Srivastava, Anuj Kudesia, Umesh
Kumar Srivastava, Vikas Kumar Agrawal

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Uttar Pradesh Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 - Nonirrigated land - Non-irrigated land does
not come under the ambit of the ceiling -
Determination of irrigated land, Section 4A - Held - Finding recorded by the
respondents to the effect that the entire
land of Village Charan Gahiya is irrigated
is erroneous, as the same has not been
recorded in accordance with the statutory
determination of irrigated land provided
under Section 4-A of the Act of 1960, read
with Rule 3 of the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Rule, 1961.
Gatas situated in Village Charan Gahiya
were unirrigated land as per Form CH-41
and 45 in the revenue record. (Para 23)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Ramadhar Singh VS Prescribed Authority &
ors. [1994 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 702]

2. Ram Chandra VS St. of U.P. & ors.2020 (4)
ADJ 535 (LB)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)