# Sanjeeva Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 12 ILRA 456
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-12-12
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 30782 of 2018
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanjeeva-kumar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49604
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

C.S.C., Ajay Kumar

Held- Where the Court while deciding the writ
petition on 27.05.2019 had explicitly directed
the disciplinary authority to conclude the
departmental enquiry within eight weeks and
pass final order preferably within one month
thereafter, failing which prior leave of the Court
was to be sought, the passing of the
punishment order on 24.12.2020 without such
leave
rendered
it
unsustainable.
Despite
reminders
and
legal
representations,
the
petitioner was provided with legible inquiry
report only on 02.09.2019, causing delay in
submission
of
explanation.
Though
the
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
457
punishment order was later withdrawn following
contempt
proceedings,
the
St.'s
belated
application for leave filed on 29.07.2022, nearly
three years after the stipulated deadline, lacked
any satisfactory justification. The Court, relying
on Full Bench decision in Abhishek Prabhakar
Awasthi (2014) 6 All LJ 662 (FB), reiterated that
extension of time must be sought from the
Court, and cannot be presumed. In absence of
timely application or leave, the disciplinary
proceedings conducted in defiance of Court's
directions are vitiated.

Key Words: Disciplinary Proceedings-Court
directions-Prior
leave-Delay
in
inquiryApplication for leave-Extension of timeWithdrawal of punishment order-ComplianceContempt-Consequential benefits.

Case Law Discussed:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,957 of 52,073. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39957 for what follows._

456 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
person appointed or where services were
regularized on or after 01.04.2005 so far as
addition of any past service rendered on
daily wages or similar basis is concerned as
there is no such scope in the New Pension
Scheme as distinct from the Old Pension
Scheme.

48. In the end, we summarize our
answers to the questions referred as under:-

(i) Those persons whose services
have
been
regularized
on
or
after
01.04.2005, and in respect of whom the
pensionary rules as applicable to State
Government Servants, apply, the New
Pension Scheme which has come into force
w.e.f. 01.04.2005 shall apply irrespective of
the initial appointment of such persons
prior to 01.04.2005 on daily wages or on
purely temporary nature (not a regular
appointment in accordance with the Rules)
and the old Pension Scheme would not
apply to them .

(ii) In view of Rule 2(3) of the
1961 Rules and the reasons already given
by us hereinbefore as there is no concept of
'qualifying service' under the New Pension
Scheme and the 1961 Rules as also the
Civil
Service
Regulations
are
not
applicable to those who have entered the
service
whether
by
way
of
direct
recruitment or by way of regularization of
their services on or after 01.04.2005,
therefore, the services rendered by such
employees prior to their regularization i.e.
prior to 01.04.2005 on daily wages, etc.
(not regular service) would have no
relevance in the context of the New Pension
Scheme
which
will
apply
to
such
employees.
(iii) The judgment rendered in Kaushal
Kishore Chaubey (supra) does not lay
down the law correctly. The correct
position of law is as discussed hereinabove.
The Court concurs with the judgment in the
case of Brahamanand Singh (supra) which
has understood and laid down the law
correctly.

49. The reference is answered
accordingly.

50. The records of the writ petition
shall be placed before the learned Single
Judge for a decision in the light of our
answers to the questions referred. The
petition
shall
be
listed
before
the
appropriate Single Bench in the 4th week
of January, 2024.
----------
(2023) 12 ILRA 456
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 12.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Writ-A No. 30782 of 2018

Sanjeeva Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sm Singh Royekwar, Sumeet Tahilramani

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ajay Kumar

Held- Where the Court while deciding the writ
petition on 27.05.2019 had explicitly directed
the disciplinary authority to conclude the
departmental enquiry within eight weeks and
pass final order preferably within one month
thereafter, failing which prior leave of the Court
was to be sought, the passing of the
punishment order on 24.12.2020 without such
leave
rendered
it
unsustainable.
Despite
reminders
and
legal
representations,
the
petitioner was provided with legible inquiry
report only on 02.09.2019, causing delay in
submission
of
explanation.
Though
the
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
457
punishment order was later withdrawn following
contempt
proceedings,
the
St.'s
belated
application for leave filed on 29.07.2022, nearly
three years after the stipulated deadline, lacked
any satisfactory justification. The Court, relying
on Full Bench decision in Abhishek Prabhakar
Awasthi (2014) 6 All LJ 662 (FB), reiterated that
extension of time must be sought from the
Court, and cannot be presumed. In absence of
timely application or leave, the disciplinary
proceedings conducted in defiance of Court's
directions are vitiated.

Key Words: Disciplinary Proceedings-Court
directions-Prior
leave-Delay
in
inquiryApplication for leave-Extension of timeWithdrawal of punishment order-ComplianceContempt-Consequential benefits.

Case Law Discussed:

1. Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi Vs New India
Assurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 6 All LJ 662 (FB)

2. Gopal Chandra Sinha Vs St. of U.P., (2005) 3
UPLBEC 2929

3. Atma Singh Vs U.P. St. Bridge Corp. Ltd.,
Service Single No. 11867 of 2020

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anil Pratap Singh,
learned
Additional
Advocate
General
assisted by Sri Indrajeet Shukla, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the
Applicant / opposite parties in the writ
petition and Sri S.M. Singh Royekwar,
learned counsel for the writ petitioner /
respondents in the present application.

2. Admittedly, the writ petition
bearing Service Single No. 30782 of 2018
(Sanjeev Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P.
and others) has already been decided
finally on 27.5.2019 but the State opposite
parties have filed the application under the
title of "Application for Leave to Pass Final
Order In Disciplinary Proceedings Against
The Petitioner In Terms Of Directions
Contained in Judgment And Order Dated
27.5.2019" on 29.7.2022.

3. For disposal of the aforesaid
application it would be necessary to
reproduce the final order dated 27.5.2019
herein below:

"Heard
learned
counsel
for
the
parties.

The precise submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that by means
of order dated 20.5.2018 the petitioner was
placed under suspension and this Court
vide order dated 17.11.2018 was pleased to
stay the suspension order. Thereafter, vide
order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was
reinstated in service. However, no posting
order was passed. On 10.5.2019 the
posting order was issued by the opposite
party. The submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner is that he was issued
charge-sheet
on
13.11.2018
and
he
submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on
5.2.2019.

As per learned counsel for the
petitioner after the order dated 28.2.2019
the
petitioner
was
paid
subsistence
allowance for the suspension period and
has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 till
10.5.2019. Further after stay order being
passed by this Court the petitioner was
paid part of subsistence allowance and
thereafter after the reinstatement order he
has been paid the entire subsistence
allowance.

The submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that when the suspension
order was withdrawn by the opposite
parties in compliance of the order dated
17.5.2018 of this Court then the petitioner
is legally entitled for the arrears of salary
for suspension period. He has also
458 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
submitted that the petitioner should have
been paid salary w.e.f. 17.11.2018 till
28.2.2019 but he has been paid salary w.e.f.
28.2.2019 and has been paid subsistence
allowance till 28.2.2019 which was not
proper since this Court has granted interim
order on 17.5.2018. He has further
submitted that since he has already
submitted his defense to the charge-sheet,
therefore, the direction for conclusion of
departmental inquiry may be issued within
time frame.

The aforesaid submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner finds force.

Since the suspension order of the
petitioner has been withdrawn, therefore,
the opposite parties are directed to pay
arrears of salary for the suspension period
excluding the payment which has been
made to the petitioner in the name of
subsistence allowance for the suspension
period even till 28.2.2019 with promptness.
The opposite parties are also directed to
conduct and conclude the departmental
inquiry strictly in accordance with law
following the principles of natural justice
with expedition preferably within a period
of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the
final order may be passed, if so required
within further period of one month. In any
case the final order in the matter may be
passed on or before 31.8.2019 inasmuch as
the petitioner has filed reply to the chargesheet on 5.2.2019.

If no final order is passed within
aforesaid stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019
and the disciplinary authority may pass
final order but after seeking prior leave
from this Court.

Since no counter affidavit has been
filed in the present matter but in the wake
of aforesaid developments, the writ petition
is being decided finally at the admission
stage in view of the aforesaid terms. "

4. Notably, while disposing of the
aforesaid writ petition finally the direction
was issued to the opposite parties to
conduct and conclude the departmental
inquiry strictly in accordance with law
following the principles of natural justice
with expedition preferably within a period
of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the
final order may be passed, if so required
within further period of one month.

5. The further direction was issued to
the effect that in any case the final order in
the matter may be passed on or before
31.8.2019. The further direction was issued
that if no final order is passed within
stipulated
period
i.e.
31.8.2019,
the
disciplinary authority may pass final order
but after seeking prior leave from this
Court.

6. By means of aforesaid application,
however, the leave to pass final order in the
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
petitioner in terms of the order of this court
has been prayed, but it has nowhere been
indicated as to why no such application
has been filed on or before 31.8.2019
when the period had expired to pass any
final order. Even no such application has
been filed till 29.7.2022. It has been
averred in the application that after
making some correspondences with Uttar
Pradesh Public Service Commissioner
(herein after referred to as UPPSC) with
affect from 22.2.2020 (Annexure A-8) till
10.08.2020
(Annexure
A-11),
the
disciplinary authority passed a final
punishment order against the petitioner on
24.12.2020 by imposing the punishment of
stoppage of three increments permanently
invoking
the
Rule
51(7)
of
U.P.
Sachivalaya Anudesh -1982 (Annexure A12 and A-13).
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
459

7. So from the perusal of the aforesaid
averment of the application it is an
admitted position that without seeking prior
leave from this Court on or before
31.8.2019
the
disciplinary
authority
preferred to proceed against the petitioner
imposing major punishment on 24.12.2020.
In the aforesaid application the plausible
and cogent reasons have not been shown as
to why before taking leave from the Court
in terms of the order dated 27.5.2019 the
final order has been passed after expiry of
substantial period.

8. The paper-book reveals that against
the aforesaid application the learned
counsel for the petitioner has filed a
detailed objection on 24.1.2023 indicating
therein that in view of the facts and
circumstances of the issued in question the
State opposite parties may not be granted
leave to take action against the petitioner
for the reason that the punishment order
dated 24.12.2020 had been assailed before
the U.P. Public Service Tribunal by filing
claim petition and the petitioner had also
filed contempt petition before this Court
bearing Contempt Misc. Case No. 2320 (C)
of 2019. Further, when the contempt court
issued a notice to the opposite party asking
as to why the punishment order has been
passed in derogation of the final order
dated 27.5.2019 (supra), the punishment
order
dated
24.12.2020
had
been
withdrawn by the disciplinary authority /
Government on 6.4.2022. Even after
withdrawal of the punishment order on
6.4.2022 no such application has been filed
promptly as the same has been filed after
about four months i.e. on 25.7.2022. Even
after filing the aforesaid application on
25.7.2022 no application for listing has
been filed by the State authorities seeking
early disposal of the aforesaid application.
However, on 10.5.2023 the application was
listed and the direction was issued to list on
24.5.2023. On 24.5.2023 the case was fixed
for next date i.e. 25.5.2023. On 25.5.2023
the Additional C.S.C. has argued the
aforesaid application and learned counsel
for the writ petitioner has opposed the
arguments. As a matter of fact after filing
the aforesaid application on 25.7.2022 the
application was heard first time on
25.5.2023 and the following order has been
passed which reads as under :

"(C.M. Application/I.A. No.5 of 2022)

1. Heard Sri S.P. Singh, learned Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel for the Staterespondents/ applicant of the present
application, which is an application for
leave to pass final order in disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner in terms
of directions contained in judgment and
order dated 27.05.2019 and Sri S.M. Singh
Royekwar, learned counsel for the writ
petitioner.

2. For disposal of the aforesaid
application, the order dated 27.05.2019 is
necessary to be reproduced, which is as
under:-

"Heard
learned
counsel
for
the
parties.

The precise submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that by means
of order dated 20.5.2018 the petitioner was
placed under suspension and this Court
vide order dated 17.11.2018 was pleased to
stay the suspension order. Thereafter, vide
order dated 28.2.2019 the petitioner was
reinstated in service. However, no posting
order was passed. On 10.5.2019 the
posting order was issued by the opposite
party. The submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner is that he was issued
charge-sheet
on
13.11.2018
and
he
submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on
5.2.2019.
460 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

As per learned counsel for the
petitioner after the order dated 28.2.2019
the
petitioner
was
paid
subsistence
allowance for the suspension period and
has been paid salary w.e.f. 28.2.2019 till
10.5.2019. Further after stay order being
passed by this Court the petitioner was
paid part of subsistence allowance and
thereafter after the reinstatement order he
has been paid the entire subsistence
allowance.

The submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that when the suspension
order was withdrawn by the opposite
parties in compliance of the order dated
17.5.2018 of this Court then the petitioner
is legally entitled for the arrears of salary
for suspension period. He has also
submitted that the petitioner should have
been paid salary w.e.f. 17.11.2018 till
28.2.2019 but he has been paid salary w.e.f.
28.2.2019 and has been paid subsistence
allowance till 28.2.2019 which was not
proper since this Court has granted interim
order on 17.5.2018. He has further
submitted that since he has already
submitted his defense to the charge-sheet,
therefore, the direction for conclusion of
departmental inquiry may be issued within
time frame.

The aforesaid submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner finds force.

Since the suspension order of the
petitioner has been withdrawn, therefore,
the opposite parties are directed to pay
arrears of salary for the suspension period
excluding the payment which has been
made to the petitioner in the name of
subsistence allowance for the suspension
period even till 28.2.2019 with promptness.
The opposite parties are also directed to
conduct and conclude the departmental
inquiry strictly in accordance with law
following the principles of natural justice
with expedition preferably within a period
of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the
final order may be passed, if so required
within further period of one month. In any
case the final order in the matter may be
passed on or before 31.8.2019 inasmuch as
the petitioner has filed reply to the chargesheet on 5.2.2019.

If no final order is passed within
aforesaid stipulated period i.e. 31.8.2019
and the disciplinary authority may pass
final order but after seeking prior leave
from this Court.

Since no counter affidavit has been
filed in the present matter but in the wake
of aforesaid developments, the writ petition
is being decided finally at the admission
stage in view of the aforesaid terms."

3. As per the aforesaid order, the
State-respondents will have to conclude the
departmental inquiry within a period of
eight
weeks
from
the
order
dated
27.05.2019 and thereafter, the final order
was to be passed, if it was so required,
within a period of one month. This Court
fixed the date for 31.08.2019 indicating
therein that the final order would be passed
on or before 31.08.2019. As per the
aforesaid order, if the final order is not
passed on or before 31.08.2019, for
passing
final
order,
the
disciplinary
authority shall seek prior leave of the
Court.
4. The departmental inquiry was concluded
and show cause notice dated 13.06.2019
was issued to the petitioner to submit his
explanation within a period of fifteen days.
As per learned counsel for the petitioner,
show cause notice along with inquiry
report was received to the petitioner on
02.07.2019. Since page nos.9, 10 & 17 of
the inquiry report were missing and page
nos.2, 4, 5, 20 & 22 were not legible,
therefore,
the
petitioner
preferred
a
representation dated 03.07.2019 through
registered post to the disciplinary authority
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
461
making request that the legible copy of the
inquiry report, more particularly page no.9,
10 & 17 as well as 2, 4, 5, 20 & 22 be
provided to him, so that he may submit his
explanation to the show cause notice. As
per Sri Royekwar, no decision was taken on
such
letter,
therefore,
the
petitioner
preferred another representation dated
20.07.2019 to the disciplinary authority
through registered post with the same
request. When no suitable action was taken,
the
petitioner
again
preferred
representations
dated
01.08.2019
&
28.08.2019 through registered post but to
no avail. However, vide letter dated
02.09.2019, the petitioner was provided
legible copy of the inquiry report. Just after
receiving the legible copy of the inquiry
report,
the
petitioner
submitted
his
explanation on 03.10.2019. Sri Royekwar
has submitted that had the legible copy of
the inquiry report been provided to the
petitioner on his representation dated
03.07.2019, the explanation would have
been filed well in time and the final order
would have been passed within the time
frame so prescribed by this Court vide
order dated 27.05.2019. Further, the final
order was passed on 24.12.2020 awarding
punishment to the petitioner. Sri Royekwar
has submitted that aforesaid final order
was passed in violation of the order being
passed by this Court dated 27.05.2019
inasmuch as the aforesaid order was
passed without seeking prior leave of the
Court. As per Sri Royekwar, the aforesaid
order has been assailed by the petitioner by
filing claim petition before the State Public
Services Tribunal but in the meantime,
contempt petition of the petitioner was
pending consideration before this Court
wherein explanation was sought from the
State-respondent as to why the impugned
punishment order dated 24.12.2020 has
been passed without seeking prior leave of
the Court, the disciplinary authority has
withdrawn the punishment order dated
24.12.2020 vide order dated 06.04.2022.
On account of the aforesaid reason, the
claim petition filed by the petitioner before
the State Public Services Tribunal rendered
infructuous.

5. Sri Royekwar has submitted that in
the instant case, the State-respondent has
committed apparent error time and again;
firstly, the proper inquiry report has not
been provided to the petitioner; secondly,
on his representation dated 03.07.2019,
legible copies of the inquiry report have not
been provided, legible copies have been
provided vide letter dated 02.09.2019 after
expiry of stipulated time i.e. 31.08.2019.
Thereafter, final order has been passed on
24.12.2020 without seeking leave of the
Court; thereafter, during pendency of the
contempt petition, the punishment order
has been withdrawn on 06.04.2022 and
thereafter application for clarification has
been filed on 29.07.2022. The aforesaid
callous
approach
of
the
authority
concerned clearly discloses the malafide
intention to harass the petitioner, therefore,
as
per
Sri
Royekwar,
the
present
application for leave of the Court may be
rejected and the authorities may be directed
to provide all consequential benefits to the
petitioner for which he is entitled.

6. Sri S.P. Singh, learned Addl. Chief
Standing Counsel has submitted that since
he will have to seek instructions on the
aforesaid
aspect,
which
has
been
considered by this Court in this order,
therefore, he may be given some reasonable
time.

7.
However,
Sri
Royekwar
has
opposed
the
aforesaid
request
by
submitting that the present petitioner has
been suffering since 20.05.2018 when he
was placed under suspension and about
five years' period has passed, no final
462 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decision has been taken in his case,
resultant thereof his promotional benefits
have not been given and he has not been
promoted on the next higher post on which
his batch-mate and juniors have been
promoted.

8. On the request of Sri S.P. Singh,
learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel, the
case is listed on 10.07.2023 to enable him
to seek complete instructions in the matter
but
in
the
meantime,
admissible
promotional benefits may be given to the
petitioner and if his batch-mate and juniors
to him have been promoted to the next
higher post, such promotion may be
considered on adhoc basis subject to the
final decision in the present application. If,
in
the
meantime,
any
sealed
cover
procedure has been adopted, such sealed
cover shall be opened."

9. In the aforesaid order, I have
noticed the fact that before taking prior
leave from the Court the punishment order
has been passed against the petitioner. It
has also been noticed that the delay has
been committed on the part of the inquiry
officer / disciplinary authority inasmuch as
the petitioner has not been provided the
proper copy of the inquiry report as some
pages were missing and despite couple of
request being made by the petitioner he was
provided those copies at the belated stage.
However, immediately after receiving the
legible papers of the inquiry report on
2.9.2019 the petitioner submitted his
explanation on 3.10.2019. Learned counsel
for the writ petitioner has intimated the
Court that as soon as the petitioner received
the copy of inquiry report on 2.7.2019 he
immediately preferred a representation on
the next date i.e. 3.7.2019 seeking the
legible copies of those papers. Further, had
the legible copies of the papers been
provided to the petitioner immediately after
the representation dated 3.7.2019, the
explanation would have been filed well in
time and final order would have been
passed within time, so stipulated by this
Court vide order dated 27.5.2019. Sri
Royekwar has further submitted that even
after
submitting
his
explanation
on
3.10.2019, the punishment order has been
passed on 24.12.2020 i.e. after about 14
months. The aforesaid punishment order
was withdrawn on 6.4.2022 after filing of
the contempt petition before this Court and
claim petition before the U.P. Public
Service Tribunal.

10. Sri Royekwar has also drawn
attention of this Court towards C.M.
Application No. 114110 of 2019 i.e.
"Application
for
Clarification
/
Modification/
Issuing
Appropriate
Directions" wherein the petitioner has
prayed that the direction may be issued to
the authorities to make payment of arrears
of salary for the suspension period and the
petitioner be also paid his regular salary
and the opposite parties be also directed to
supply the missing pages and complete
legible pages of the inquiry report to the
petitioner.

11. In the aforesaid application the
petitioner has requested that since the
opposite parties
are deliberately and
intentionally
delaying
the
inquiry
proceedings, therefore, they may likely to
approach this Court seeking extension of
time on or before 31.8.2019, so that
application,
if
filed,may
be
treated
disregard to the direction issued by this
Court. In the aforesaid application the
petitioner has requested that looking into
the facts and circumstances of the issue in
question he may be provided complete
justice and his harassment, so committed
by the opposite parties, may be directed to
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
463
be stopped. The aforesaid application has
been disposed of by this Court vide order
dated 26.9.2019 which reads as under :

"(C.M. Application
No.114110
of
2019)

Heard Sri S.M. Singh Royekwar,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner/
applicant.

By means of this application, learned
counsel for the petitioner has sought
clarification/ modification of the direction
being issued by this Court on 27.5.2019.

By means of order dated 27.5.2019,
this Court has granted time to the
disciplinary authority to pass any final
order by 31.8.2019 and if the disciplinary
authority does not pass any such order by
31.8.2019, he may pass such order but after
seeking prior leave from this Court.

Submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner is that neither the final order has
been passed on or before 31.8.2019 nor any
leave has been prayed by the disciplinary
authority to the best of the knowledge of the
petitioner as no such application has been
filed in this writ petition.

Therefore, in view of the above, it is
observed that if the disciplinary authority
could not pass any appropriate order on or
before 31.8.2019, he could have filed
application seeking leave, failing which the
benefit of the order dated 27.5.2019 would
definitely be extended to the petitioner. No
order extending time for passing final order
can be passed in this application.

Accordingly,
the
application
is
disposed of. "

12. While disposing of the aforesaid
application this Court has taken cognizance
of the fact that no final order has been
passed on or before 31.8.2019, however,
the liberty was given to the disciplinary
authority / inquiry officer to file appropriate
application seeking leave from the Court,
failing which the benefit of the final order
dated 27.5.2019 would be extended to the
petitioner.

13. Notably, despite the aforesaid
order dated 26.9.2019 having been passed
the disciplinary authority / inquiry officer
has not filed any application seeking
extension of time and admittedly such
application has been filed on 29.7.2022 i.e.
after about two years and ten months.

14. Sri Indrajeet Shukla, learned Addl.
C.S.C. has informed the Court that the
petitioner has been given all consequential
service benefits and pursuant to the inquiry
report only the final decision has to be
taken
by
the
disciplinary
authority.
Admittedly, the aforesaid consequential
service benefits have been given to the
petitioner after 25.5.2023 when this Court
heard the aforesaid application and passed
a detailed order; even the appearance of the
responsible competent authorities was
directed and responsible authorities were
present before the Court and the affidavit of
compliance was filed on 17.8.2023.

15. Sri Shukla, learned Addl. C.S.C.
has mainly placed reliance of the judgment
of Full Bench of this Court in re: Abhishek
Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New India
Assurance Company Limited & others,
(2014) 6 All LJ 662 (FB) referring para 2
and 19 thereof. By means of para 2 the Full
Bench has formulated the questions which
have been referred for determination and
by means of para 19 the answers thereof
have been indicated. Precisely, the question
before the Full Bench was that as to
whether if an inquiry proceeding is not
concluded within time frame fixed by the
Court and it concludes without seeking
extension from the Court then on such
464 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ground the entire proceedings as well as
punishment order passed would vitiate in
terms of earlier judgment of this Court in
re: P.N. Srivastava. Secondly, whether the
law laid down by the Division Bench in re:
P.N. Srivastava (supra) is a good law in
view of the judgment rendered by the Apex
Court in the case of Suresh Chandra as
well as Union of India vs. Satendra
Kumar Sahai.

16. Sri Shukla, learned Addl. C.S.C.
has fairly stated that though the application
for seeking extension of time has not been
filed within time but since the aforesaid
application has been filed and looking into
the seriousness of the issue in question the
final order should have been passed on the
basis of inquiry report considering the
explanation of the petitioner in the interest
of justice. He has also submitted that the
Full Bench had itself observed that in an
appropriate case it would be open to the
Court to extend the time suo-moto in order
to ensure that serious charge of misconduct
does not go unpunished leading to serious
detriment to the public interest. Sri Shukla
has further submitted that looking into the
seriousness of the charges the U.P.P.S.C.
had recommended twice that instead of
imposing the punishment of withdrawing
three
increments
of
the
petitioner
permanently he should be removed from
service but the disciplinary authority was of
the opinion that instead of punishment of
removal the three increments should have
been stopped with cumulative effect. Since
the punishment order has been withdrawn,
therefore, on the allegations wherein the
punishment order was passed, the petitioner
should not be absolved and shall not remain
scott-free; at least a major punishment is
required
to
be passed
against
him,
therefore, the present application should
have been allowed and liberty may be
given to the disciplinary authority to pass
appropriate order against the petitioner
strictly
in
accordance
with
law
by
concluding the disciplinary proceedings.

17. Sri Royekwar, learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the manner
under which the present application has
been filed by the State authorities may not
be appreciated and the said application may
be dismissed at the threshold, in view of the
facts
and
circumstances
and
his
submissions submitted before this Court
but so far as the submission of learned
Addl. C.S.C. regarding seriousness of the
charges are concerned he has drawn
attention towards Annexure A-12 of the
application of the State opposite parties
which is an office order dated 24.12.2020
issued by the Additional Chief Secretary,
Department of Basic Education analyzing
all the three charges levelled against the
petitioner vide para 6 of the aforesaid order.
In para 6 of the aforesaid order dated
24.12.2020 the Additional Chief Secretary
has categorically indicated that so far as
charge no. 1 is concerned which provides
that incompetent Assistant Teachers, who
were not having required qualification,
have been appointed by the petitioner. The
authority has stated that after verification of
the document it emerged that those
Assistant Teachers have been appointed by
the District Selection Committee wherein
the petitioner was also one of the member
and as soon as the petitioner came to know
that those Assistant Teachers were not
having proper qualification and documents
and those documents were fictitious, the
petitioner had lodged the F.I.R. against
those Assistant Teachers and did not permit
them to submit their joining, resultant
thereof no loss of government exchequer
occurred, therefore, the petitioner may be
held responsible only to take some more
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
465
due care and precaution. So far as charge
no. 2 is concerned which is relating to
forged and fictitious appointment letters, on
verification it has been found that on those
forged and fictitious appointment letters
neither there are any signatures of the
petitioner nor those appointment letters
were issued from the office of the
petitioner, rather those appointment letters
were prepared by the candidates themselves
and as soon as this fact came into the notice
of the petitioner he immediately lodged
F.I.R. against all those candidates /
Assistant Teachers, resultant thereof none
of them could withdraw their salary. The
only lapse on the part of the petitioner is
that had names of those teachers been
published those teachers would not have
tried to submit their joining. So far as the
charge no. 3 relating to permission to
accept joining of those erring teachers is
concerned, it is clear that the petitioner has
not permitted to submit their joining rather
some Principals of some educational
institutions have permitted to submit the
joining of some erring teachers. Therefore,
the Additional Chief Secretary has opined
that looking into the aforesaid charge
against the petitioner the recommendation
of Public Service Commission to impose
major punishment upon the petitioner is not
proper as it would be an excessive
punishment, so if the need be the three
increments of salary of the petitioner may
be withheld for the reason that being a
Basic Education Officer and Member
Secretary
of
the
District
Selection
Committee he should have taken some
more
care
and
precaution
and
due
diligence. Therefore, Sri Royekwar has
stated that the seriousness of the charges, so
exhibited by the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel is not proper, rather he is
trying to exaggerate the charges contrary to
the subjective satisfaction of the appointing
authority / disciplinary authority itself.
Therefore, the aforesaid submission of
learned Additional C.S.C. is not liable to be
accepted.
Hence,
Sri
Royekwar
has
requested that the aforesaid application
may be dismissed.

18. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the material available
on record.

19. Learned Addl. C.S.C. as well as
learned counsel for the writ petitioner are
placing reliance of the judgment of Bull
Bench of this Court in re: Abhishek
Prabhakar Awasthi (supra) inasmuch as
learned Addl. C.S.C. has stated that the
Hon'ble Full Bench has stated that this
Court can extend the time on the
application, if the charges are serious and
such extension of time has to be considered
in the interest of justice balancing both the
need for expeditious conclusion of the
inquiry in the interest of fairness and the
office administration, which is, as per him
is applicable in the present case. Whereas,
the learned writ petitioner has submitted
that the order of the Court may not be taken
so lightly or may not be taken for granted
and if the Full Bench has opined that the
time may be extended on an application
filed by the authority concerned looking
into the seriousness and gravity of the
charges, at least such application should
have been filed on or before the date which
has been stipulated by the Court and since
the aforesaid aspect has not been adhered
by the opposite parties, therefore, the
aforesaid application may be dismissed at
the threshold.

20. Since I had occasion to deal such
aspect in a case of Gopal Chandra Sinha
vs. State of U.P. & others, (2005) 3
UPLBEC 2929 and (Atma Singh vs. U.P.
466 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
State Bridge Corporation Ltd. through
M.D. and ors. ) in re: Service Single No.
11867 of 2020 connected with Service
Single No. 12047 of 2021 (Atma Singh vs.
U.P. State Bridge Corp. Ltd. and ors.),
therefore, I would like to refer some
relevant paragraphs of those judgments. It
has been informed at the Bar that both the
aforesaid judgments have not been assailed
before the superior court and have attained
finality. Para 30 to 32 in re: Gopal Chandra
Sinha (supra) is being reproduced herein
below :

"30. The Full Bench of this Court has
given its dictum on two issues, which are
relevant for the adjudication of the present
issue. The Hon'ble Full Bench in re:
Abhishek Prabhakar Awasthi vs. The New
India Assurance Company Limited and
others reported in [2014 (32) LCD 405]
has answered the questions in reference.
Vide para-2, the question so referred before
the Full Bench have been indicated as
under:-

"2. The following questions have been
referred in the order of the learned Single
Judge for determination by the Full
Bench:-

(a) Whether if an inquiry proceeding is
not concluded within a time frame fixed by
a court and concluded thereafter, without
seeking extension from the Court then on
the
said
ground
the
entire
inquiry
proceeding as well as punishment order
passed, is vitiated in view of the judgment
in the case of P.N. Srivastava; and

(b) Whether the law as laid down by a
Division Bench of this Court in the case of
P.N.
Srivastava
that
if
an
inquiry
proceeding is not concluded within a time
frame as fixed by a Court, it stands vitiated
is still a good law in view of the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court in the case
of Suresh Chandra as well as a judgment
dated 27.07.2009 of a Division Bench of
this Court in Writ Petition No. 1056 (SB) of
2009 (Union of India and others Vs.
Satendra Kumar Sahai and another)."

31. This Court has answered the
aforesaid question vide para-19 of the
judgment, which is being reproduced herein-below:-

"19. In view of the above discussion,
we now proceed to answer the questions
which have been referred to the Full Bench.

(A) Question No. (a): We hold that if
an enquiry is not concluded within the time
which has been fixed by the Court, it is
open to the employer to seek an extension
of
time
by
making
an
appropriate
application to the court setting out the
reasons for the delay in the conclusion of
the enquiry. In such an event, it is for the
court to consider whether time should be
extended,
based
on
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case. However, where
there is a stipulation of time by the Court, it
will not be open to the employer to
disregard that stipulation and an extension
of time must be sought;

(B) Question No. (b): The judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh
Chandra (supra) as well as the judgment of
the Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Satyendra Kumar Sahai (supra) clearly
indicate that a mere delay on the part of the
employer in concluding a disciplinary
enquiry will not ipso facto nullify the entire
proceedings in every case. The court which
has fixed a stipulation of time has
jurisdiction to extend the time and it is
open to the court, while exercising that
jurisdiction, to consider whether the delay
has been satisfactorily explained. The court
can suitably extend time for conclusion of
the enquiry either in a proceeding instituted
by the employee challenging the enquiry on
the ground that it was not completed within
the stipulated period or even upon an
12 All. Sanjeeva Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
467
independent application moved by the
employer. The court has the inherent
jurisdiction to grant an extension of time,
the original stipulation of time having been
fixed by the court itself. Such an extension
of time has to be considered in the interests
of justice balancing both the need for
expeditious conclusion of the enquiry in the
interests of
fairness and an honest
administration. In an appropriate case, it
would be open to the Court to extend time
suo motu in order to ensure that a serious
charge
of
misconduct
does
not
go
unpunished leading to a serious detriment
to the public interest. The court has
sufficient powers to grant an extension of
time both before and after the period
stipulated by the court has come to an
end."

32. In the light of the aforesaid
judgment of Hon'ble Full Bench of this
Court, I am of the considered view that
since the Disciplinary Authority has not
filed any application before this Court
seeking extension of time, which was
granted vide judgment and order dated
14.09.2005,
therefore,
conducting
the
enquiry against the petitioner in defiance of
the judgment and order dated 14.09.2005,
is per se illegal and void ab initio. Had any
appropriate application been filed before
this Court for seeking extension of time, the
Court could have considered and decided
the same but this occasion did not come
before the Court for the reason that no such
application was filed and the Disciplinary
Authority has taken the dictum of this Court
for granted, which shall not be permissible
in any circumstances.