# Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 1 ILRA 1309
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-17
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 24 of 2023
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanni-nitish-nitish-agrahari-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49590
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code -
Sections 323 & 307 - Arms Act, 1959 -
Section 30-Application for quashing of charge
sheet - Charged under sec 323 and 307 of ipc
and sec 30 of arms act -Act involved firing gun
shots in broad day light hitting two persons -
offence was treated as crime against society
and was heinous and serious offence -
Proceeding cannot be quashed by compromise.
Application dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1 All. Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1309
quashing of the impugned summoning
order as well as proceedings of the
impugned case.

9. Accordingly, the reliefs sought by
the applicants is refused.

10. However, it is open for the
applicants to raise their grievance in view
of provisions under Section 227 of the
Code, at appropriate stage.

11.

Application
is
accordingly
disposed of.

12. Interim order, if any, stands
discharged.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1309
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 24 of 2023

Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors.
 ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Raghvendra Singh, Anil Kumar Tiwari

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code -
Sections 323 & 307 - Arms Act, 1959 -
Section 30-Application for quashing of charge
sheet - Charged under sec 323 and 307 of ipc
and sec 30 of arms act -Act involved firing gun
shots in broad day light hitting two persons -
offence was treated as crime against society
and was heinous and serious offence -
Proceeding cannot be quashed by compromise.
Application dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Gian Singh Vs St. of Pun., (2012) 10 SCC 303

2. Narinder Singh & ors. Vs St. of Pun. & anr.,
(2014) 6 SCC 466,

3. Gold Quest International (P) Ltd. v. St. of
T.N., (2014) 15 SCC 235,

4. St. of M. P. Vs Laxmi Narayan & ors. (2019) 5
SCC 688

5. Arun Singh Vs St. of U. P. Through its
Secretary & ors. (2020) 3 SCC 736

6. Daxaben VsThe St. of Gujarat & ors. 2022
SCC OnLine SC 936

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Raghvendra Singh,
learned counsel for the applicants, Sri Tilak
Raj Singh, learned AGA-I on behalf of the
State and Sri Ramendra Kumar, learned
counsel for the opposite parties no. 2 to 4.

2. By means of the instant application
the applicants are seeking quashing of the
charge sheet dated 26.03.2015 filed in
respect of Case Crime No. 511/2014, under
Sections 307, 323 IPC, Police Station
Kotwali Akbarpur,
District Ambedkar
Nagar and proceedings of Session Trial No.
111/2015 titled State v. Sunni @ Nitish &
Ors. pending in the Court of IIIrd
Additional District and Session Judge,
Ambedkar Nagar arising out of the
aforesaid charge sheet on the ground that
on 09.12.2022 a compromise has been
entered into between the parties settling the
dispute and now the opposite parties no. 2
to 4 do not want to pursue the matter.

3. The aforesaid case was initiated on
the basis of an FIR bearing Case Crime No.
1310 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
511/2014 lodged on 19.12.2014 by the
opposite party no. 2 Ram Prasad against the
petitioners stating that the petitioner no. 2
Narendra Kumar was raising construction
of a wall on a land in dispute. The
informant asked him not to raise any
construction till the decision of the court
whereupon the petitioner no. 1, who is son
of petitioner no. 2, started beating the
informant. When the informant's sons came
to intervene, the petitioner no. 2 Narendra
shot at the informant's son Sanjeev and
another accused person shot at Umesh,
another son of the informant. The petitioner
no. 1 Sanni assaulted the informant with a
rod causing injury in his head. The
informant's youngest son Santosh was also
shot at but he was not hurt.

4. After investigation, the police
submitted a charge sheet against the
petitioner no. 1 Sunni under Sections 323
and 307 IPC and against the petitioner no. 2
Narendra for offences under Section 30 of
the Arms Act and on 08.11.2015, the
learned court passed an order summoning
the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 for being tried for
the aforesaid offences.

5. The injury form of Sanjeev Kumar
mentions a firearm entry wound on the
right side of his chest and exit wound on
the
shoulder,
however,
his
X-ray
examination did not reveal any bonny
injury.

6. The injury form of Umesh Kumar
also mentions a firearm injury on the right
side of his chest and his X-ray examination
too did not reveal any bonny injury.

7. In his statement recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C., the informant had
stated that the petitioner no. 2 had fired at
his son Sunni and the petitioner no. 3
Sushil had fired a shot at his second son
Umesh. Sunni had assaulted the informant
with the iron rod causing injury on his head
and a shot was fired towards his youngest
son Santosh also he he was not hurt.

8. The injured Sanjeev also stated that
the petitioner no. 2 Narendra had fired a
shot at him. The other injured Umesh
Kumar stated that the petitioner no. 2 had
fired a shot at Sanjeev and the petitioner
no. 3 Sushil, son of Jamuna had fired a shot
which hit him.

9. As per the averments made in
support of the application, the parties have
entered into a compromise. A copy of the
compromise has been annexed with the
affidavit, which does not bear any date. It
has been mentioned in the compromise that
the accused persons and the injured persons
have entered into a compromise and the
injured persons have pardoned the accused
persons and they do not want any
proceedings to continue against the accused
persons.

10. In Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court summarized the legal
position regarding power of the High Court
in quashing criminal proceedings on the
basis of a compromise, in the following
words: -

61. The position that emerges
from
the
above
discussion
can
be
summarised thus : the power of the High
Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from
the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it
1 All. Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1311
has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i)
to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court.
In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the
victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of
such power, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the
crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between
the victim and the offender in relation to
the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominatingly civil flavour stand on
a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute.
In this category of cases, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceedings if in its
view, because of the compromise between
the offender and the victim, the possibility
of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to
the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the
criminal proceeding would tantamount to
abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends
of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal
case is put to an end and if the answer to
the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction
to
quash
the
criminal
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

11. In Narinder Singh and Others
Vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2014)
6 SCC 466, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
been pleased to sum up and lay down the
principles by which the High Court would
be guided in giving adequate treatment to
the
settlement
between
parties
and
exercising its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement in the following
words:-

"29.1 Power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution.
1312 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

29.2 When the parties have
reached the settlement and on that basis
petition
for
quashing
the
criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in
such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court.

While exercising the power the
High Court is to form an opinion on either
of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3 Such a power is not be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact
on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to
have been committed under special statute
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by Public Servants
while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender.

29.4 On the other, those criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
those
arising
out
of
commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be
quashed when the parties have resolved
their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5 While exercising its powers,
the High Court is to examine as to whether
the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would
be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal cases.

29.6 offences under Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous
and serious offences and therefore is to be
generally treated as crime against the
society and not against the individual
alone. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or
the charge is framed under this provision.
It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it
or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to
proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of
injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the
victim can generally be the guiding factor.
On the basis of this prima facie analysis,
the High Court can examine as to whether
there is a strong possibility of conviction or
the chances of conviction are remote and
bleak. In the former case it can refuse to
accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the later
case it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the
offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to
result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.

29.7 While deciding whether to
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after
the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High
Court may be liberal in accepting the
settlement
to
quash
the
criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of
the
reason
that
at
this
stage
the
investigation is still on and even the charge
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
1 All. Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1313
cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can
show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably,
but
after
prima
facie
assessment of the circumstances/material
mentioned above. On the other hand, where
the prosecution evidence is almost complete
or after the conclusion of the evidence the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally
the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case
finally on merits and to come a conclusion
as to whether the offence under Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those
cases where the conviction is already
recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High
Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the
same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already recorded
of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is
no question of sparing a convict found
guilty of such a crime."

 (Emphasis supplied)

12. In Gold Quest International (P)
Ltd. v. State of T.N., (2014) 15 SCC 235,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"8. In view of the principle laid
down by this Court in the aforesaid cases,
we are of the view that in the disputes
which are substantially matrimonial in
nature, or the civil property disputes with
criminal facets, if the parties have entered
into settlement, and it has become clear
that there are no chances of conviction,
there is no illegality in quashing the
proceedings under Section 482 CrPC read
with Article 226 of the Constitution.
However, the same would not apply where
the nature of offence is very serious like
rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, cases
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act and other similar kind of
offences in which punishment of life
imprisonment or death can be awarded."

 (Emphasis supplied)

13. The aforesaid decision in
Narinder Singh (supra) has been followed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan &
Others (2019) 5 SCC 688 and in that case
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-

"15.1 that the power conferred
under Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal
proceedings
for
the
noncompoundable offences under Section 320
of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the
civil character, particularly those arising
out of commercial transactions or arising
out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes and when the parties have
resolved
the
entire
dispute
amongst
themselves;

15.2 such power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which
involved heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact
on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not
to be exercised for the offences under the
special
statutes
like
Prevention
of
Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on
the basis of compromise between the victim
and the offender;
1314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15.4 offences under Section 307
IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in
the category of heinous and serious
offences and therefore are to be treated as
crime against the society and not against
the individual alone, and therefore, the
criminal proceedings for the offence
under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms
Act etc. which have a serious impact on
the society cannot be quashed in exercise
of powers under Section 482 of the Code,
on the ground that the parties have
resolved their entire dispute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court
would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High
Court
to
examine
as
to
whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there
for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose,
it would be open to the High Court to go
by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such
injury
is
inflicted
on
the
vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is
collected after investigation and the charge
sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or
during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation.
Therefore,
the
ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole
and
in
the
circumstances
stated
hereinabove;" (Emphasis supplied)

14. In Arun Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh Through its Secretary & Ors.
(2020) 3 SCC 736, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held:--

"14. In another decision in
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6
SCC 466 it has been observed that in
respect of offence against the society it is
the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even
where there is a settlement between the
offender and victim the same shall not
prevail since it is in interests of the society
that offender should be punished which
acts
as
deterrent
for
others
from
committing similar crime. On the other
hand, there may be offences falling in the
category where the correctional objective
of criminal law would have to be given
more weightage than the theory of deterrent
punishment. In such cases, the court may
be of the opinion that a settlement between
the parties would lead to better relations
between them and would resolve a festering
private dispute and thus may exercise
power under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing the proceedings or the complaint
or the FIR as the case may be.

15. Bearing in mind the above
principles which have been laid down, we
are of the view that offences for which the
appellants have been charged are in fact
offences against society and not private in
nature. Such offences have serious impact
upon society and continuance of trial of
such cases is founded on the overriding
effect of public interests in punishing
persons for such serious offences. It is
neither
an
offence
arising
out
of
commercial,
financial,
mercantile,
partnership or such similar transactions
or has any element of civil dispute thus it
stands on a distinct footing. In such cases,
settlement even if arrived at between the
complainant and the accused, the same
cannot constitute a valid ground to quash
the FIR or the charge-sheet.
1 All. Sanni @ Nitish @ Nitish Agrahari & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1315

16. Thus the High Court cannot
be said to be unjustified in refusing to
quash the charge-sheet on the ground of
compromise between the parties."

 (Emphasis supplied)

15. In Daxaben v. The State of
Gujarat & Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-

"50. In our considered opinion,
the Criminal Proceeding cannot be nipped
in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because
there is a settlement, in this case a
monetary settlement, between the accused
and the complainant and other relatives of
the deceased to the exclusion of the hapless
widow of the deceased. As held by the
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi
Narayan (supra), Section 307 of the IPC
falls in the category of heinous and serious
offences and are to be treated as crime
against society and not against the
individual alone. On a parity of reasoning,
offence under section 306 of the IPC would
fall in the same category. An FIR under
Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be
quashed on the basis of any financial
settlement with the informant, surviving
spouse, parents, children, guardians, caregivers or anyone else. It is clarified that it
was not necessary for this Court to examine
the question whether the FIR in this case
discloses any offence under Section 306 of
the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise
of its power under Section 482 CrPC,
quashed the proceedings on the sole ground
that the disputes between the accused and
the informant had been compromised."

16. From a perusal of the aforesaid
decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
the principles governing quashing of
criminal proceedings on the basis of
compromise are that there is no thumb rule
in this regard and each case has to be
decided on the facts and circumstances of
its case. Before exercising such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime and the
power to quash is to be exercised sparingly
and with caution. Such a power is not to be
exercised in cases involving heinous and
serious offences, which include offence
under Section 307 IPC.

17. In the present case, the FIR
allegations are that a land dispute is existing
between the parties regarding which a case
was pending. In spite of pendency of the civil
dispute, the accused persons started raising a
wall at about 10 a.m. and upon being
objected by the informant and his sons, the
petitioner no. 2 fired a shot which hit the
informant's sons Sanjeev on hischest and the
petitioner no. 3 fired another shot which hit
Umesh, another son of the informant, on his
chest. The medico-legal examination report
of Sanjeev and Umesh are available on
record, which support the FIR allegations.
The statements of the informant and his
injured sons Sanjeev and Umesh also support
the FIR allegations. The police had submitted
a charge sheet against the petitioners no. 1 &
2 and thereafter the name of the petitioner no.
3 has been added on 25.10.2021 on an
application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

18. Since there was an old property
dispute between the parties, the accused
persons were known to the informant and
his sons. The incident took place in broad
day light and there is no reason to doubt the
identity of the persons who caused the
incident.

19. The accused persons have sought
quashing of the charge-sheet and the
1316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings merely on the ground that on
09.12.2022 the parties have entered into a
compromise stating that the informant and
the injured persons have pardoned the
accused persons and they do not want any
further proceedings in the matter and the
accused persons may get the proceedings
terminated in terms of the compromise. The
acts allegedly committed by the petitioners
involve firing gun shots in broad day light
hitting two persons in their chests and such
offence is a very serious offence and the
material on record, namely, the medico
legal examination report of the injured
persons and the statements recorded during
investigation,
fully
support
the
FIR
allegations. The offence alleged has to be
treated as a crime against the society and
not against the injured sons of the
informant alone and, therefore, this Court is
of the view that the informant and his sons
have no authority to pardon the accused
persons.

20. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion, this Court is of the considered
view that the proceedings of the case
against the petitioners cannot be quashed
on the basis of a compromise entered into
between the parties. The application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying quashing of the
charge sheet and the entire proceedings
initiated on the basis thereof, on the sole
ground that the parties have entered into a
compromise, lacks merits and, accordingly,
the same is dismissed.
----------
(2023) 1 ILRA 1316
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.12.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Civil Revision No. 467 of 2012

Kesheri Nandan Agrawal ...Revisionist
Versus
Smt. Indu Bajpayee ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri
Arvind
Srivastava,
Sri
Pushkar
Srivastava

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri S.K. Chaturvedi

The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
1887-Section 25- Civil revision challenges the
order - Rejecting revisionist's application under
Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
stay proceedings in SSC Suit No.9 of 2011 -
Defendant is a defaulter tenant - Defendant
contends that the relationship is that of a seller
and buyer due to an alleged oral agreement for
sale - Filed injunction against Plaintiff -
revisionist moves the court to stay citing the
pendency of the earlier suit - Court holds that
Section 10 CPC is not applicable .

Dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:
1. Kanhaiya Lal Vs Draupadi, AIR 1992 MP 88

2. Lachaman Vs Badan Kayalu, AIR 1989 Orissa
154

3. Karri Satya Narayana Vs Pichika, 1996 AIHC
2642 (AP)

4. Aspi Jal & anr. Vs Khushroo Rustom
Dadyburjor, (2013) 4 SCC 333
(Delivered by Hon'ble Umesh Chandra
Sharma, J.)

1. Heard Sri Arvind Srivastava,
learned counsel for the revisionist and
perused the record. None appears for the
opposite party. Since service of notice upon
the opposite party has been presumed to be