# Sanny Kumar & Anr v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 223
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-27
- **Case number:** Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 913 of 2025
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir, Sanjiv Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sanny-kumar-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52646
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Committee's order is an unlawful detention

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950- Article
226, The Indian Penal Code,1860-Sections
363, 366, 376, 504 & 506 , The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012- Sections 5(j)(ii)/ 6, 94(2)- The
detenue being a minor, now aged 15 years
7 months and 13 days, she cannot be set
at liberty forthwith as the petitioners
seek- Detenue has clearly expressed her
mind that she does not wish to go back to
her parents and also said that she wants
to join the company of her husband, the
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
first petitioner- If the detenue set at
liberty now and permitted to go along
with her husband or she goes to him
herself, it would expose her to carnal
relations,
which,
apart
from
being
detrimental to her health, would render
the husband liable for offences under the
POCSO Act and Section 64 BNS on fresh
counts-Petition
allowed
in
part
with
certain directions. (E-15)
Held- The detenue being a minor, now aged 15
years 7 months and 13 days, she cannot be set
at liberty as the petitioners seek. Detenue will
be housed in the Protection Home until
13.03.2028 and no further. On the said date,
she will be released unconditionally with liberty
to go wherever she likes and stay with
whomsoever she wants, including her husband,
the first petitioner.
(Para 14, 15, 16 & 17)

Case Law Cited
Smt. Priyanka Devi v. State of U.P. and others,
2018 (1) ACR 1061;

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The
Indian Penal Code,1860; The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012

List of Keywords
Detenue minor; Cannot be set at liberty as the
petitioners seek; If the detenue; Set at liberty
now ; Expose her to carnal relations

Case Arising From
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition has been instituted
praying that the detenue 'A' be ordered to be
produced before the Court and set at liberty.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for the petitioners : Mr. Kumar
Ashutosh Srivastava and Mr. Nagendra Pratap
Singh
Counsel for the respondents : Mr. Shashi
Shekhar
Tiwari,
Additional
Government
Advocate

## Text

10 All. Sanny Kumar & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
223
not put under any challenge. It was further
held that since the Motor Vehicles Act is a
beneficial legislation, the claimants are to
be awarded compensation as per the law,
which is more advantageous to them, which
affords better or greater benefit.

7. Since, in this case, the provisions
laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Sarla Verma (supra) as affirmed in the
case of Pranay Sethi(supra) are more
beneficial than the statutory provisions
enacted under Rule 220-A (2)(iii) of the
Rules of 1998, as such, the dependency is
to be calculated on a single unit basis,
irrespective of the age of the dependents.

8. The Apex Court in the case of
Magma General Insurance Company
Limited vs. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram
and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, has held
that claimants are entitled to spousal
consortium, parental consortium and filial
consortium and the Apex Court has
awarded each claimant consortium of
Rs.40,000/-.

9. In the instant case, there are four
dependents
of
the
deceased
Sanjeev
Kumar, one is widow Smt. Jyoti, his two
minor sons Shreyansh and Shivay Gangwar
and his mother Smt. Laxmi Devi. The
Tribunal has awarded consortium of
Rs.40,000/- each to all the four claimants
which cannot be said to be erroneous,
keeping in view the law laid down by the
Apex Court in the case of Magma General
Insurance Company Limited (supra).

10.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussion, this appeal has got no merit and
is liable to be dismissed at the admission
stage.

11. The appeal is hereby dismissed at
the admission stage.

12. The impugned judgment and
award of the Tribunal dated 08.08.2025 is
affirmed.

13. Office is directed to remit back the
statutory deposit made by appellant to the
Tribunal concerned, forthwith.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 223
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
THE HON'BLE SANJIV KUMAR, J.

Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 913 of 2025

Sanny Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Mr.
Kumar
Ashutosh
Srivastava,
Mr.
Nagendra Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari (A.G.A.)

Issue for Consideration
Whether housing of the detenue in the
Protection Home, pursuant to the Child Welfare
Committee's order is an unlawful detention

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950- Article
226, The Indian Penal Code,1860-Sections
363, 366, 376, 504 & 506 , The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012- Sections 5(j)(ii)/ 6, 94(2)- The
detenue being a minor, now aged 15 years
7 months and 13 days, she cannot be set
at liberty forthwith as the petitioners
seek- Detenue has clearly expressed her
mind that she does not wish to go back to
her parents and also said that she wants
to join the company of her husband, the
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
first petitioner- If the detenue set at
liberty now and permitted to go along
with her husband or she goes to him
herself, it would expose her to carnal
relations,
which,
apart
from
being
detrimental to her health, would render
the husband liable for offences under the
POCSO Act and Section 64 BNS on fresh
counts-Petition
allowed
in
part
with
certain directions. (E-15)
Held- The detenue being a minor, now aged 15
years 7 months and 13 days, she cannot be set
at liberty as the petitioners seek. Detenue will
be housed in the Protection Home until
13.03.2028 and no further. On the said date,
she will be released unconditionally with liberty
to go wherever she likes and stay with
whomsoever she wants, including her husband,
the first petitioner.
(Para 14, 15, 16 & 17)

Case Law Cited
Smt. Priyanka Devi v. State of U.P. and others,
2018 (1) ACR 1061;

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The
Indian Penal Code,1860; The Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012

List of Keywords
Detenue minor; Cannot be set at liberty as the
petitioners seek; If the detenue; Set at liberty
now ; Expose her to carnal relations

Case Arising From
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition has been instituted
praying that the detenue 'A' be ordered to be
produced before the Court and set at liberty.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for the petitioners : Mr. Kumar
Ashutosh Srivastava and Mr. Nagendra Pratap
Singh
Counsel for the respondents : Mr. Shashi
Shekhar
Tiwari,
Additional
Government
Advocate
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This Habeas Corpus Writ Petition
has been instituted by Sanny Kumar and his
wife, 'A' through Sanny Kumar, praying
that the detenue 'A' be ordered to be
produced before the Court and set at
liberty.

2. The petitioners assert that a First
Information Report (for short, 'the FIR')
was registered against petitioner No.1 on
13.04.2024, giving rise to Case Crime
No.158 of 2024, under Sections 363, 366,
376, 504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for
short, 'the IPC'), and Sections 5(j)(ii)/ 6 of
the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (for short, 'the POCSO
Act'), Police Station Gauri Bazar, District
Deoria with allegations to the effect that the
first
petitioner
has
kidnapped
the
informant's
minor
daughter
by
blandishment. The minor, said to have been
kidnapped, that is to say, 'A' is reported in
the FIR to be aged about 14 years. The
occurrence took place on 12.04.2024 in the
wee hours at 1 o'clock. It all happened in
the parties' native village Deogaon, Gauri
Bazar, Deoria. According to the informant,
the detenue was missing and untraceable
since she went away with the first
petitioner.

3. As it appears, the petitioners were
apprehended in connection with the crime,
where the first petitioner was challaned and
sent to jail, and later released on bail by
this Court vide order dated 11.03.2025. The
detenue was produced before the Doctor
for her medical-examination. She declined
an internal examination, regarding which
there is an endorsement by the Doctor in
the medical report dated 03.09.2024. The
detenue stated before the Doctor as
follows:

"मैं अपने ग ाँव के लड़के सन्नी के स थ तरकुलह
मंदिर में दिन ंक 20/1/2024 को श िी उसके ब ि घर व पस आ
गई श िी को मेरे पररव र व ले नही म ने तो मैं और सन्नी दिन ंक
10 All. Sanny Kumar & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
225
12/4/2024 को घर से र जस्थ न चले गये और वह ं पदत-पत्नी
के रूप में रहने लगी।"

4. A further medical examination was
done in order to determine if she was in the
family way. She was examined at the
Maharishi Devraha Baba Autonomous
State Medical College, Deoria (U.P.) on
04.09.2024.
The
Doctor
reported
as
follows:

"Single
Intrauterine
Live
Pregnancy of Average Gestational Age 29
weeks."

5. The Serological Report reported the
pregnancy test to be positive. Another
medical test, that was done to determine
A's age on 04.09.2024, led a Medical
Board, comprising the Chief Medical
Officer, Deoria and a Radiologist, to
conclude that she was about 17 years. The
said report was submitted on 12.09.2024.
The detenue had passed her Class 8th from
the Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter College,
Deogaon, Gauri Bazar, Deoria and her
scholar's register and transfer certificate
dated 19.11.2024, a copy whereof is
annexed to the affidavit of compliance filed
on behalf of the Superintendent of Police,
Deoria, shows her date of birth to be
14.03.2010. This would reckon her to be
about 14 years old on the date of
occurrence.
The
Police,
during
investigation, took down the statement of
the Principal, Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter
College, Deogaon, Gauri Bazar, Deoria,
who affirmed the contents of the scholar's
register and the transfer certificate, relating
to the detenue and her date of birth
recorded therein as 14.03.2010. The
relevant part of the Case Diary, SCD-03
dated 13.10.2024, is also annexed to the
SP's return.

6. In these circumstances, the detenue
was produced before the Child Welfare
Committee, Deoria, who remarked that the
papers and the preliminary investigation
showed that she was a student of the
Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter College,
Deogaon, Gauri Bazar, Deoria, who passed
her Class-VIII, and according to the records
there, her date of birth was 14.03.2010. It is
then remarked that she is a child within the
meaning of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for
short, 'the Act of 2015'), but her guardians,
present before the Committee, were not
inclined
to
take
her
custody.
The
Committee has also remarked that they
spoke to the detenue in accordance with the
provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO
Act read with Rule 4 of the relevant Rules.
During this inquiry, described by the
Committee as a preliminary inquiry, the
detenue told the members of the Committee
that she did not trust her family members.
In these circumstances, the Committee
directed the detenue to be lodged in the
Rajkiya Bal Grih (Balika), Nirdhariya,
Ballia (for short, 'the Protection Home')
vide order dated 13.09.2024. A formal
order in Form-18 was also issued on the
said day, authorizing housing the detenue
in the Protection Home.

7. It is this housing of the detenue in
the Protection Home, pursuant to the Child
Welfare Committee's order, that the first
petitioner regards as unlawful detention and
has petitioned this Court, seeking her
release by the issue of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.

8. Heard Mr. Akhil Tiwari, Advocate
holding brief of Mr. Kumar Ashutosh
Srivastava,
learned
Counsel
for
the
petitioners and Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari,
226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
learned Additional Government Advocate,
appearing on behalf of the State.

9. The law relating to determination of
age for a victim is mostly governed by the
provisions of Section 94(2) of the Act of
2015. Section 94 of the said Act reads:

"94.
Presumption
and
determination of age.-(1) Where, it is
obvious to the Committee or the Board,
based on the appearance of the person
brought before it under any of the
provisions of this Act (other than for the
purpose of giving evidence) that the said
person is a child, the Committee or the
Board shall record such observation stating
the age of the child as nearly as may be and
proceed with the inquiry under Section 14
or Section 36, as the case may be, without
waiting for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the
Board has reasonable grounds for doubt
regarding whether the person brought
before it is a child or not, the Committee or
the Board, as the case may be, shall
undertake the process of age determination,
by seeking evidence by obtaining-

(i) the date of birth certificate
from the school, or the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; and in the
absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i)
and (ii) above, age shall be determined by
an ossification test or any other latest
medical age determination test conducted
on the orders of the Committee or the
Board:

Provided such age determination
test conducted on the order of the
Committee or the Board shall be completed
within fifteen days from the date of such
order.

(3) The age recorded by the
Committee or the Board to be the age of
person so brought before it shall, for the
purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the
true age of that person."

10. The learned Counsel for the
petitioners made a rather feeble attempt to
say that the provisions of Section 94(2) of
the Act of 2015 may not govern the
question of determination of the detenue's
age because she is not a juvenile. The issue
is long settled against the petitioners on the
point and the authority is consistent that
principles applicable for determination of a
juvenile's age under the Act of 2015 would
apply equally to the determination of a
victim's age. This question was considered
by a Division Bench of this Court in Smt.
Priyanka Devi v. State of U.P. and
others, 2018 (1) ACR 1061, a decision to
which one of us (J.J. Munir, J.) was party.
In Smt. Priyanka Devi (supra), it was
held:

"13. Learned counsel for the
petitioner lastly urged that provisions of
Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015
do not apply to the case in hand as the same
are
available
for
the
purposes
of
determination of age for a juvenile or a
child in conflict with the law but would not
apply to the determination of age in the
case of a victim.

14. We are afraid that the
aforesaid submission is not correct. The
issue was examined by the Supreme Court
in the case of Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske
v. State of Maharashtra and Another;
10 All. Sanny Kumar & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
227
(2013) 14 SCC 637 where in paragraph no.
12 of the report it was held as under:

"Under
rule
12(3)(b),
it
is
specifically provided that only in the
absence of alternative methods described
under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical
opinion can be sought for. In the light of
such a statutory rule prevailing for
ascertainment of the age of the juvenile in
our considered opinion, the same yardstick
can be rightly followed by the courts for the
purpose of the ascertaining the age of a
victim as well."

(Emphasis supplied)

15. This issue has also been
considered in an earlier judgment of the
Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh v. State
of Haryana; 2013 (7) SCC 263, where too
it has been held that rule 12(3) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007 must apply both to a
child in conflict with law as well as to a
victim of a crime. Paragraph 23 of the said
report reads thus:

"Even though Rule 12 is strictly
applicable only to determine the age of a
child in conflict with law, we are of the
view that the aforesaid statutory provision
should be the basis for determining age,
even for a child who is a victim of crime.
For, in our view, there is hardly any
difference in so far as the issue of minority
is concerned, between a child in conflict
with law, and a child who is a victim of
crime.
Therefore,
in
our
considered
opinion, it would be just and appropriate to
apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to
determine the age of the prosecutrix VWPW6. The manner of determining age
conclusively, has been expressed in subrule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under
the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is
ascertained, by adopting the first available
basis, out of a number of options postulated
in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options
under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in
a preceding clause, it has overriding effect
over an option expressed in a subsequent
clause. The highest rated option available,
would conclusively determine the age of a
minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),
matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of
the concerned child, is the highest rated
option. In case, the said certificate is
available, no other evidence can be relied
upon. Only in the absence of the said
certificate,
Rule
12(3),
envisages
consideration of the date of birth entered, in
the school first attended by the child. In
case such an entry of date of birth is
available, the date of birth depicted therein
is liable to be treated as final and
conclusive, and no other material is to be
relied upon. Only in the absence of such
entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a
birth certificate issued by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet
again, if such a certificate is available, then
no other material whatsoever is to be taken
into consideration, for determining the age
of the child concerned, as the said
certificate would conclusively determine
the age of the child. It is only in the
absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule
12(3) postulates the determination of age of
the concerned child, on the basis of medical
opinion."

16. Thus, principles applicable to
the determination of age in the case of a
juvenile would in terms apply to cases of
determination of the age of a victim as
well. It may be pointed out that at the point
of time when Mahadeo (supra) was decided
by their lordships of the Supreme Court,
228 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 was in force
and their lordships were interpreting the
provision of Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Child)
Rules, 2007. The said Act of 2000 has
since been repealed and has been replaced
by the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The rules
framed under the Act of 2000 are thus no
longer on the statute book. However, the
provisions that found place in Rule 12(3) of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Child) Rules, 2007 framed under the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are now, with
certain modifications engrafted into the the
Principal Act vide section 94 of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The inter se
priority of criteria to determine age under
Rule 12(3) of the Rules, 2007 (supra) and
section 94 of the Act, 2015 remains the
same albeit with certain modifications
which are of no consequences to the facts
in hand. In short, provisions of Rule 12(3)
of the Rules, 2007 framed under the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 are para meteria
to the provision of Section 94 of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. This being the
comparative position, the principles of law
laid down by their lordships in the case of
Mahadeo (supra) would apply with equal
force to the provisions of section 94(2) of
the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 while
determining the age of a victim of an
offence under Sections 363 and 366 IPC.
Thus, the submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioners, on this score, is not
tenable."

11. Now, turning to the certification of
the detenue's age in this case, we have on
record a copy of the scholar's register and
transfer certificate dated 19.11.2024 issued
by the Principal of the Chandra Shekhar
Azad Inter College, Deogaon, Gauri Bazar,
Deoria. A perusal of the said transfer
certificate reveals that the detenue passed
her Class-VIII from the said institution on
30.03.2024. The transfer certificate shows
the detenue's date of birth as 14.03.2010.
This certificate has been affirmed during
investigation by the Principal of the said
institution. The perusal of a copy of the
said certificate shows it to be flawless
record. On its own terms, there is no reason
to doubt its veracity. The only matter of
doubt, that could have been about this
certificate, was if indeed the detenue was a
scholar of this institution, or the certificate
produced related to some other person or
was bogus.

12. During the hearing of the matter,
we have noted down the detenue's
statement on 16.10.2025. It forms part of
record. In answer to a specific question as
to what is the detenue's age, she said,
"sixteen". By this figure, she obviously
meant that she was sixteen years old. In
answer to the last question, where the Court
asked her the name of her school, the
detenue said, Chandra Shekhar Azad Inter
College, Deogaon, Gauri Bazar, Deoria.
This puts to end all cavil that may be about
the veracity of the transfer certificate dated
19.11.2024 and also the detenue's age. By
the stand taken before the Court, the
detenue does not say that she is a major;
instead, she acknowledges that she is 16
years old. This would clearly make her a
minor.

13. So far as the detenue's precise date
of birth is concerned, once we have found
her school record to be impeccable, the
date of birth entered there has to be
accepted by dint of Section 94(2)(i) of the
Act of 2015. There being a flawless record
of her age in the school certificate, there is
no authority with this Court to rely on
medical evidence that comes last in the
order of preference as to evidence of age
10 All. Sanny Kumar & Anr. Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
229
under Section 94(2) of the Act of 2015.
Therefore, whatever be the opinion of the
Doctor,
it
cannot
be
looked
into,
considering that there is a rule of priority
prescribed by the statute regarding the class
of evidence that can be considered for the
determination of a victim's age. It is only in
the eventualities, if there is no school
certificate regarding a victim's age, or one
from the Board of Education, if the victim
is a matriculate, and, further, if there is no
birth certificate given by a Corporation or a
Municipal
Authority
or
a
Panchayat
relating to the victim, that Authorities
under the Act of 2015 or the Court may
order determination of the victim's age,
medically by an ossification test or any
other latest medical age determination test.
In the presence of the first two categories
of evidence, medical opinion cannot be
looked into about the victim's age. This is
precisely the case here, considering that
there is flawless record regarding the
detenue's age forthcoming from her school.

14. In addition, it has also to be
remembered that a medical determination
of age, is after all opinion evidence.
According to first principles of the law of
the evidence as well, it has to give way to
authentic and well proven documentary and
oral evidence, which is forthcoming in this
case. In the circumstances, we are of
opinion that the detenue being a minor,
now aged 15 years 7 months and 13 days,
she cannot be set at liberty forthwith as the
petitioners seek. The reason is that if we
were to set the detenue at liberty now, she
being a minor, she would have to be
entrusted to the custody of a guardian. She
cannot be left to herself like a major.

15. The detenue has clearly expressed
her mind that she does not wish to go back
to her parents and also said that she wants
to join the company of her husband, the
first petitioner. If we set the detenue at
liberty now and permit her to go along with
her husband or she goes to him herself, it
would expose her to carnal relations,
which, apart from being detrimental to her
health, would render the husband liable for
offences under the POCSO Act and Section
64 BNS on fresh counts. After all, in
choosing that course, we cannot ourselves
permit parties to inevitably commit acts
that are offences under the law.

16. Before parting with the matter,
there is another aspect of the cause, of
which we must take due note. A child was
born to the detenue in the Protection Home
on 09.11.2024. It is said that the
Superintendent of the Protection Home did
not extend proper care to the child and he
died due to negligence on 17.01.2025. It is
pleaded in the petition that the child had
fallen sick and there was no proper
treatment at hand to save him. After the
first petitioner was released from prison, he
appears to have gone and met the detenue
at the Protection Home and came to know
about the death of his son due to the
callousness
of
the
Protection
Home
employees. In circumstances, such as these,
while the child cannot be brought back to
life, the detenue, who is said to be in a state
of depression, on account of her child's
demise in infancy, requires utmost care and
caution about her health and well being,
both psychological and emotional.

17. We, accordingly, allow this
Habeas Corpus Writ Petition in part and
issue the following directions:

1. The detenue will be housed in
the Protection Home until 13.03.2028 and
no further. On the said date, she will be
released unconditionally with liberty to go
230 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
wherever
she
likes
and
stay
with
whomsoever she wants, including her
husband, the first petitioner, Sanny Kumar.

2. The Chief Medical Officer,
Deoria is directed to nominate a competent
doctor, who would visit the detenue in the
Protection Home at least once a month and
check on her health. He/ she would also be
available on call, whenever the detenue
requires the doctor's presence to attend on
her. The nominated doctor shall be duty
bound under this order of ours to attend to
the detenue on schedule and on call,
without fail.

3. The learned District Judge,
Deoria will nominate a senior lady Judicial
Officer to visit the detenue, also once a
month, and ascertain her well being,
including her emotional well being. Should
need arise, the lady Judicial Officer will be
free to take the assistance of a counsellor in
the concerned field or a psychiatrist.

4. If the Judicial Officer notices
any lapse on the part of the Protection
Home
Administration,
she
will
take
necessary steps to remedy it. If for some
reason, she finds herself unable to remedy a
wrong to the detenue that she notices, or a
lapse that is not made good despite her
directions, she can make a report to this
Court in that regard, upon which this matter
will be listed for orders on the report.

5. The administration of the
Protection Home, where the detenue is
housed, shall be bound by all directions
that the Judicial Officer makes regarding
the detenue, which shall be carried out by
the Superintendent of the Protection Home,
ignoring any directions to the contrary
made by the local civil and police
administration.

18. Any lapse to comply with these
directions on part of the Superintendent of
the Protection Home, will render liable the
Superintendent personally answerable to
this Court.

19. Let a copy of this judgment be
communicated to the learned District
Judge, Deoria, the Collector, Deoria, the
Superintendent of Police, Deoria, the Chief
Medical
Officer,
Deoria
and
the
Superintendent, Rajkiya Bal Grih (Balika),
Nirdhariya,
Ballia,
by
the
Registrar
(Compliance).
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 230
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, C.J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Public Interest Litigation (P.I.L.) No. 542 of
2025

Girja Shankar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Azad Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Rajiv
Singh,
S.C.,
Chandan
Sharma,
Shubham Tripathi

Issue for consideration
Seeking
a
direction
to
the
respondent
authorities to stop Commercial Mela being
organised within the premises of Brahmanand
Degree College (Government aided College) at
Rath, District Hamirpur, as the same is meant
for imparting education.

Headnotes