# Sant Harvindar Singh v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 325
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-05
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 39066 of 2025
- **Bench:** Siddharth Nandan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sant-harvindar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52845
- **Pages:** 10

## Text

12 All. Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
325

56. The hard work as well as
arguments advanced by above named State
counsels, are also appreciable.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 325
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J.

Writ C No. 39066 of 2025

Sant Harvindar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
The matter pertains to maintainability of title
suits during the pendency of mutation matters
and the limits of rejecting a plaint at the
threshold.

Headnotes
Constitution of India,1950-Article 226 U.P.
Revenue Code,2006-section 34, 144 &
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order VII
Rule 11-The court held that the pendency
of summary mutation proceedings under
section 34 of the U.P. Revenue Code,2006
does not constitute a legal bar to a
declaratory suit for title under section 144
of the same code-The court clarified that
the jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11
CPC should not be utilized as a "trial
before the trial"-If a controversy involves
purely legal questions without disputed
facts, the High Court may entertain a writ
petition under Article 226 despite the
availability of an alternative statutory
remedy-writ petition allowed.(Para 22 to
33) (E-6)

Held
The court ruled that once a report of succession
is made, the bar under section 37 is removed,
the conclusion of section 34 proceedings is not a
prerequisite for a section 144 suit. The court set
aside the order dated 20,2025. The matter was
remanded to the SDM to re-decide the Order VII
Rule 11 application within two months. In the
eventuality the application is rejected, he shall
proceed to conclude the title suit within a period
as contemplated para 458 of U.P. Revenue
Court Manual.

Case law Cited
Qamar Abbas Vs Additional Commissioner
2024(1) ADJ 640 MANU/UP/4161/2023, Smt.
Kalawati Vs Board of Revenue 2022 (155) RD
169, Nehru Junior High School Taryasujan Vs
State of U.P. & Ors 2023 (161) RD 31-referred
to.
List of Acts
Constitution
of
India,1950,
U.P.
Revenue
Code,2006, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Declaratory
Suit,
Mutation
Proceedings,
Alternative remedy, Summary Nature, Cause of
Action

Case Arising from
Civil Jurisdiction-WRIT-C No. - 39066 of 2025
Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & 3
Ors

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.12.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for parties
Adv. for Petitioner:-
Ajay Shankar, Triveni Shanker
Adv. for Respondent:-
C.S.C., Sher Bahadur Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Siddharth Nandan, J.)

In Re: Civil Misc. Amendment
Application No. Nil of 2025

1. Amendment application has been
filed
to
correct
the
description
of
respondent no.4.

2. Learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel has no objection.
326 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. Counsel for the petitioner is
permitted to correct the array of parties
during the course of the day.

4. Accordingly, the same is allowed.

Order on petition

1. Sri Ajay Shankar has filed an
affidavit of service in pursuance of the
order of this Court dated 28 November,
2025; in Court today; the same is taken on
record.

2. As per the para 4 of the affidavit
Dasti Summons have been served upon the
respondent no.4.

3. Heard Sri Ajay Shankar, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.N.
Srivastava,
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

4. By the consent of the parties, the
present writ petition is being finally
decided at the admission stage, since the
question involved is only legal in nature.

Facts

1. The petitioner is said to have
inherited the property in pursuance of the
Will dated 20.1.2015 which was executed
in his favour by the erstwhile owner late
Makhan Singh, with respect to his 1/4th
share in Khata No.00112, Gata No.129 area
(1.08 hec.) i.e. 0.271 hec. of Village
Ankhey, Puranpur, Pilibhit.

2. According to the petitioner his
cause of action arose on account of a Will
dated 12.1.2023 which was setup by
respondent no.4. He has attracted the
attention of the Court to para 12 of his
plaint filed in Case No.5788 of 2024 (Sant
Harvindar Singh vs. Amandeep Singh and
others) filed under Section 144 of the U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006, (hereinafter referred
as Code, 2006). For the convenience of
ready reference para 2 and 4 are quoted
below:-

"2. यह कक मक्खन कसंह पुत्र बहािुर कसंह कन०ग्राम
पंजाग्राई कलां तह० कोटकपूरा कजला फरीिकोट के रहने र्ाले थे
कजन्होंने ग्राहथथ जीर्न त्याग कर सन्यास ग्रहण कर कलया इनका
सम्बन्ध प्राकृकतक र्ाररसों से टूट गया इनकी सम्पकत्त उसी किन से
कर्कधक र्ाररसों की हो गई। इनकी प्राकृकतक मृत्यु हो गई मानी
जायेगी।

(I) शीतल िास Vs संतराम 1954 S.C. 606
में उद्धररत है जो सन्यासी बन जाता है। र्ह अपने प्राकृकतक पररर्ार
के सिथयों से नाता तोड़ िेता है। कर्रासत से बाहर रखा गया है।
धाकमवक व्यर्थथा में प्रर्ेश नागररक मृत्यु के समान है। यही मन्तव्य
कहन्िू लॉ (मुल्ला) के पैरा-111 र् जमुना प्रसाि र्नाम परमेश्वरिीन
1977 आर०डी० 606 में उद्धररत है। इस प्रकार जो व्यकक्त
कर्कधक र्ाररसों के कलए 1984 से पूर्व मृतक हो गया उसके पिात्
क्रय भूकम में कर्रासत प्राप्त करने का प्रश्न ही नहीं पैिा होता है। जो
कर्कधक र्ाररसों के कलए 1984 से पूर्व मृतक हो गया है। र्ह उनके
पक्ष में 2023 में र्सीयत कैसे कनष्पाकित कर सकता है

4. यह कक यकि ककसी गद्दी नशीन महन्त द्वारा अपने
िेले के पक्ष में र्सीयत की जाती है र्ह गद्दी प्राप्त करता है तो भेक को
ही अकधकार है कक र्ह र्सीयत को थर्ीकार या अथर्ीकार करें। यकि
ककसी महन्त की मूल्य कबना नाकमत ककये हो जाती है। तो भी भेक के
पास महन्त की कनयुकक्त का अकधकार होगा। कोटव को भेक का सम्मान
करना िाकहए यहां पर भेक द्वारा किनांक 19.02.23 को हरकर्न्िर
कसंह को गद्दी नशीन महन्त घोकित ककया है। भेक द्वारा इनकी र्सीयत
20.01.15 को प्रभार्ी माना है कजस कारण अन्य ककसी र्सीयत पर
कर्िार ककये जाने का प्रश्न ही नहीं पैिा होता है। इस प्रकार भेक द्वारा
हरकर्न्िर कसंह को गद्दी नशीन महन्त घोकित ककया है। उनके पक्ष में
कनष्पाकित र्सीयत मान्य र् प्रभार्ी है। अन्य शून्य र् कनष्प्रभार्ी होगी।,
क्योंकक थर्ंय द्वारा हरकर्न्िर कसंह को गद्दी नशीन महन्त घोकित करने के
बाि र्सीयत का प्रश्न ही नहीं पैिा होता है, क्योंकक कजस किन हरकर्न्िर
कसंह गद्दी नशीन महन्त घोकित हुये थे सम्पूणव सम्पकत्तयों का पूणव
हथतांतरण (Absolute Transfer) उसी किन हरकर्न्िर कसंह के
पक्ष में हो गया था। उसके बाि भूतपूर्व महन्त के द्वारा कोई भी िथतार्ेज
ककसी के पक्ष में कनष्पाकित नहीं ककया गया था।"
12 All. Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
327

3. It transpires that the respondent no.4
filed his objection and also subsequently he
filed an application under Order VII Rule
11 of C.P.C. dated 16th May, 2025 inter
alia taking a ground that the proceedings
under Section 34 of the Code, 2006 is
pending and in view of the same Suit under
Section 144 of the Code, 2006 is not
maintainable. For convenience the relevant
paragraph 3 of the objection dated
16.5.2025 is quoted below.

"3: यह कक र्ािी द्वारा धारा 34 यू०पी०आर०सी०
के अन्तगवत तहसीलिार महोिय पूरनपुर के द्वारा पाररत आिेश
किनांक-26.06.2024 के कर्रूद्ध एक कनगरानी माननीय राजथर्
पररिि इलाहाबाि के समक्ष किनांक-08.07.2024 को प्रथतुत की
गयी है जो कक र्तवमान समय मे कर्िाराधीन है उक्त कनगरानी अभी
राजथर् पररिि इलाहाबाि द्वारा अकन्तम रूप से कनकणवत नही की गयी
है इस कारण धारा 34 के अन्तगवत मुकिमें बाली भूकम के सम्बन्ध मे
र्ाि के कर्िाराधीन रहते हुये धारा 144 उ०प्र० राजथर् संकहता
र्ािी का उपरोक्त र्ाि पोिणीय नही है क्योकक एक ही रेमेडी के कलये
िो न्यायालय में एक साथ कायवर्ाही नही की जा सकती है।"

4. The said application under Order
VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. was allowed by the
impugned order dated 20.9.2025, hence the
present petition.

Issues:-

(I) whether the impugned order
by way of which an application under
Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. has been
allowed, is amenable to writ jurisdiction, in
view of Section 207 of the Code, 2006,
which provides for an appeal;

(II) whether a suit under Section
144 of the Code, 2006 can be said to be
barred by law on account of the pendency
of the proceedings under Section 34 of the
Code, 2006.

Arguments-Issue No. I

5.
Sri
S.N.
Srivastava,
learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel has
raised a preliminary objection that the order
passed on application under Order VII Rule
11 of C.P.C. is appealable under Section
207 of the Code, 2006; and accordingly the
petitioner may be relegated to avail the
alternative remedy, which according to him
is an efficacious remedy and in view of the
facts stated in the present writ petition, the
same is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of alternative remedy.

6. Per contra Sri Ajay Shankar,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
submitted
that
since
the
authority
concerned has exceeded its jurisdiction and
has
considered
the
pendency
of
proceedings under Section 34 of the Code,
2006 to be a bar which is in the teeth of the
settled position of law and being a purely
question of law; the present writ petition is
maintainable. He has relied upon the
judgement in the case of Qamar Abbas
Vs. Additional Commissioner 2024(1)
ADJ 640 MANU/UP/4161/2023. For the
convenience of reference, para 9 and 10 are
quoted below:-

"9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court,
in the case of Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v.
Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority and others; 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 95, has held that where the controversy
is a purely legal one and it does not involve
disputed questions of fact but only question
of law, then it should be decided by the
high Court instead of dismissing the writ
petition on the ground of an alternative
remedy being available. The relevant
paragraphs 6 to 8 are extracted here-inbelow :

''6. At the end of the last century,
this Court in paragraph 15 of the its
328 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decision in Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and
others, (1998) 8 SCC 1, carved out the
exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ
Court would be justified in entertaining a
writ petition despite the party approaching
it not having availed the alternative remedy
provided by the statute. The same read as
under:

(i) where the writ petition seeks
enforcement of any of the fundamental
rights;

(ii) where there is violation of
principles of natural justice;

(iii) where the order or the
proceedings
are
wholly
without
jurisdiction; or

(iv) where the vires of an Act is
challenged.

7. Not too long ago, this Court in
its decision in Assistant Commissioner of
State Tax v. M/s. Commercial Steel
Limited, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884, has
reiterated
the
same
principles
in
paragraph11.

8. That apart, we may also
usefully refer to the decisions of this Court
in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC
724 and Union of India v. State of
Haryana, (2000) 10 SCC 482. What
appears on a plain reading of the former
decision is that whether a certain item falls
within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises
a pure question of law and if investigation
into facts is unnecessary, the high Court
could entertain a writ petition in its
discretion even though the alternative
remedy was not availed of; and, unless
exercise of discretion is shown to be
unreasonable or perverse, this Court would
not interfere. In the latter decision, this
Court found the issue raised by the
appellant to be pristinely legal requiring
determination by the high Court without
putting the appellant through the mill of
statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What
follows from the said decisions is that
where the controversy is a purely legal one
and it does not involve disputed questions
of fact but only questions of law, then it
should be decided by the high Court
instead of dismissing the writ petition on
the ground of an alternative remedy being
available.''

10. In view of above law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and
also admitted to the parties that only
question of law is involved in this petition,
it is being entertained, instead of relegating
to the alternative remedy, and this Court
proceeds to decide it considering the rival
contentions.

7. The perusal of the aforesaid
judgement reaffirms the settled position of
law that in case of violation of (i)
fundamental
rights
(ii)
violation
of
statutory principles or (iii) where the order
or the proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction or (iv) where the vires of an
Act is challenged (v) where there is a
violation of principles of natural justice;
and (vi) where the question is pristinely
legal, it cannot be said that the writ petition
should be dismissed on the ground of
alternative remedy alone.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further relied upon on the case of Smt.
Kalawati vs. Board of Revenue 2022
(155) RD 169 to contend that 'rule of
alternate remedy' in the context of
12 All. Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
329
maintainability of the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
being examined, demonstrates that the
power under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to issue Writs can be exercised not
only for enforcement of fundamental rights
but for any other purpose as well. The High
Court has the discretion not to entertain the
writ petition and one of the restrictions
placed on the power of the High Court is
where an effective alternative remedy is
available to the aggrieved persons; but the
same are subject to various exceptions, as
already examined herein above. He has
further
contended
that
the
Rule
of
exhaustion of an alternative remedy has
been held to be a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion and existence
of an alternative remedy cannot be said to
be an absolute bar, in exercise of power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.

9. Accordingly, I find that from time
to time the 'rule of alternative remedy' has
been examined by this Court as well as the
Apex Court and the consistent view is that
the same is only to be construed as a policy
and not a complete bar to exercise powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.

10. In the facts of the present case in
order to give a reasonable meaning to the
question referred herein above, we proceed
to examine the Order VII Rule 11 of the
C.P.C.; and again for the convenience of
reference the same is quoted herein below:-

" 11. Rejection of plaint.- The
plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:

(a) where it does not disclose a
cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is
undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the Court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the
Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is
properly valued, but the plaint is returned
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
supply the requisite stamp-paper within a
time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from
the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;

1[(e) where it is not filed in
duplicate;]

2[(f) where the plaintiff fails to
comply with the provisions of rule 9:]

3[Provided that the time fixed by
the Court for the correction of the
valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless
the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is
satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by
any cause of an exceptional nature from
correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be,
within the time fixed by the Court and that
refusal to extend such time would cause
grave injustice to the plaintiff.]"

11. For the purposes of rejecting the
plaint what is to be examined is whether
the plaint discloses a cause of action or the
relief claimed is under valued and in spite
of the opportunity the plaintiff had failed to
make good the under valuation; or the
plaint is insufficiently stamped and the
plaintiff has failed to supply requisite
stamp-paper within the time fixed by the
330 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court; or whether the suit appears from the
statement in the plaint to be barred by any
law.

12. At this stage the petitioner has
attracted the attention of the Court to the
impugned order wherein primarily the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the
C.P.C. has been allowed on the pretext that
the proceedings under Section 34 of the
Code, 2006 is pending; and submits that the
proceedings under section 34 being summary
in nature, has no bearing on the proceedings
under Section 144 of the Code, 2006; and
accordingly the impugned order is in the teeth
of law. He further contends that the said
question is purely legal in question and there
are no disputed question of facts; and such
the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, is maintainable.

13. Per contra the learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel has tried to justify
the impugned order by stating that the
rejection was not merely on the said
contingency but also the authorities had come
to the conclusion that no cause of action has
been spelled out in the plaint.

Conclusion

14. I have examined the plaint and
find that the plaintiff had spelled out his
cause of action categorically in the plaint,
by stating that a Will dated 12.1.2023,
which is allegedly in favour of a third
person could not have been executed for
want of title and accordingly the same was
void; and furthermore that the registered
Will dated 20.1.2015 which has been
executed in his favour is a valid Will and
consequently a cause of action for a suit of
declaration of title, arises, for which
proceedings under Section 144 of Code,
2006 has been initiated.

Arguments-II

15. The second argument which was
advanced by the learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel was relying upon the
provisions of Section 207 of the Code,
2006 and the availability of the alternative
remedy, to state that the present writ
petition is not maintainable and there is an
efficacious alternative remedy.

Conclusion

16.
From
the
perusal
of
the
impugned order, I find that the authority
has proceeded to hold that since the
proceedings under Section 34 of the
Code, 2006 has not attained finality,
therefore, the application under Order VII
Rule 11 of C.P.C. is bound to be allowed.
I find that it is a patent error of law and it
is also in conflict with the provisions of
Order VII Rule 13 of C.P.C. For ready
reference the Order VII Rule 13 is
quoted below:-

13. Where rejection of plaint
does not preclude presentation of fresh
plaint. -The rejection of the plaint on any
of the grounds hereinbefore mentioned
shall not of its own force preclude the
plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in
respect of the same cause of action.

17. A reading of Order VII Rule 11
and Order VII Rule 13 of C.P.C. conjointly,
provides a procedural coherence, that in a
contingency where a plaint is rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 of the C.P.C., it
shall not of its own course preclude the
plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in
respect of the same cause of action that
both the provisions has to be interpreted in
a manner, to not make the other provisions
obsolete.
12 All. Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
331

18. Since the question which is to be
determined is purely a legal question; and
further that the reliance placed by the
authority is on a decision of Board of
Revenue, which is eventually the Second
Appellate Authority, I do not find the
availability of the remedy of appeal under
Section 207 of the Code, 2006 and second
appeal under Section 208 of the Code,
2006, an efficacious remedy.

19.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussion, the preliminary objection with
respect to availability of the alternative
remedy, I find that the same is liable to be
rejected in the facts of the present case.

Issue no. II (Arguments)

20. Counsel for the petitioner has
taken the Court through the impugned
order dated 20.9.2025, to contend that non
application of mind is evident from the fact
that firstly the authority has quoted the
entire
plaint
and
thereafter
the
objection/application under Order VII Rule
11 of C.P.C.; and eventually without any
discussion on the issue, has directly
concluded that the plaint does not disclose
any cause of action and while allowing the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of
C.P.C., it had merely stated that since the
proceedings under Section 34 of the Code,
2006 is pending, therefore, till the same
attains finality, the present proceedings
under Section 144 of the Code, 2006 is
liable to be rejected.

21. Per contra learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel placing reliance on
the plaint as well as the application under
Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C. has contended
that the authorities had duly applied its
mind, while concluding that the plaint does
not disclose any cause of action.

Discussion

22. A pointed query was put to the
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
that whether the conclusion which has been
relied upon by the State while justifying the
impugned order dated 20.9.2025, to the
effect that the plaint does not disclose any
cause of action; is based on any discussion
or not, he could not point out any such
discussion
or
consideration
in
the
impugned order dated 20.9.2025. At this
stage he had specifically stated that in the
personal affidavit which has been filed on
behalf of the respondent no.2, he has
categorically taken a stand that due to an
oversight, inadvertently the reliance which
has been placed on the decision of Board of
Revenue, was misplaced; and but for the
same, he would have examined the correct
position of law and in future he undertakes
to be more vigilant.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied on the judgment passed by the
coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
Nehru Junior High School Taryasujan Vs.
State of U.P. and others 2023 (161) RD 31
to contend that the jurisdiction under Order
VII Rule 11 C.P.C. is not to be utilized as
trial before the trial; while relying upon para
20 and 22 of the said judgement. For ready
reference para 20 and 22 are quoted below:-

"20. The exercise of jurisdiction
under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. in respect
to the suit under Section 229 - B of U.P.
Z.A. & L.R. Act, this Court in the case
reported in 2019(145) RD 411 Roshan
Singh @ Bunti Vs.Board of Revenue and
Others has held that jurisdiction under
Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. is not to be
utilised as a trial before the trial.
Paragraph No.6 of the judgment is relevant
for perusal which is as under:-
332 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"6. This Court has perused the
plaint, a copy of which is annexed as
Annexure-3 to the writ petition. A perusal
of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the plaint
shows that the plaintiff has come forward
seeking declaration of his rights to Khasra
No.213, admeasuring 1 Bigha, 9 Biswa and
6 biswansi situate at Village Kheda,
Pargana Dasna, District Hapur, (then
Ghaziabad) and to hold the Will dated
06.06.1977 void. The cause of action
clearly indicates that the petitioner alleges
fraud played upon him by the defendants. It
has been averred in paragraph-6 of the
plaint that the fact that the name of the
defendants had been recorded over the
property in dispute, was kept back from the
plaintiff until the month of May, 2006. It is
claimed that the plaintiff Charan Singh,
never knew it before the said date. It is
claimed by the plaintiff that he is a cosharer along with deceased, Balbeer Singh
through whom the defendants claim, on the
basis of a Will. It is also averred in
paragraph-8 that the entire mutation
proceedings, wherein the order dated
18.11.1998 has been passed in favour of
the defendant, were all taken behind his
back. These are pleadings which prima
facie require to be examined on the basis of
evidence, even if the cause of action is
ultimately held to be barred by limitation.
It is not a case where on a reading of the
plaint, the cause of action is ex facie barred
by limitation. The law about exercise of
jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC
is settled beyond the slightest doubt. It is
that, that allegations in the plaint alone are
to be seen, in order to determine whether
the plaint is to be rejected, on any of the
grounds mentioned in Order VII Rule 11
CPC. The defence put forward by the
defendant or the evidence is not at all to be
considered. The jurisdiction under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC is not to be utilized as a
trial before the trial.

22.
The
aforementioned
paragraph nos. 3,4,5 and 6 of the plaint
discloses the cause of action to the plaintiff
to file suit for declaration of her right
under Section 144 of U.P. Revenue Code,
2006 as such rejection of plaint or
dismissal of suit under Section 144 of U.P.
Revenue Code, 2006 at the very initial
stage will be illegal."

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further contended that in order to
ascertain the intent of the legislature, no
provision can be interpreted in isolation
and the same has to be read as a whole. He
has pointed out that Section 37 of the Code,
2006 is not attracted once a report under
Section 33 or Section 34 has been made.
He has also contended that once such a
report has been made, the bar under Section
37 of the Code, 2006 cannot be said to be
attracted and the same is also not
contingent upon the conclusion of the said
proceedings. For ready reference Section
37 of the Code, 2006 is quoted below:-

"37. Bar Against Certain Suits:
No suit or other proceeding shall lie in any
revenue court at the instance of any person
obtaining possession of any land by
succession or transfer, until he has made a
report under section 33 or section 34, as
the case may be."

25. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has further relied upon Section 39 of the
Code, 2006 to contend that no order passed
by the Revenue Inspector in mutation
proceedings shall debar any person from
establishing his right to the land by means of
a suit under Section 144 of the Code, 2006.
12 All. Sant Harvindar Singh Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
333

Conclusion

26. I find substance in the arguments
that once an incumbent has reported the
factum of succession or acquisition of his
right as contemplated under Section 33
read with Section 34 of the Code, 2006, the
bar as contemplated under Section 37 of the
Code, 2006 cannot be said to be attracted or
that the conclusion of the said proceedings
can act as a bar. It may also be noted at this
juncture that even if an order under Section
34 of the Code, 2006 goes against the
incumbent, the same may also not have any
impact on the proceedings under Section
144 of the Code, 2006, as the proceedings
under section 34 of the Code, 2006 are
summary in nature and does not give title
to the incumbent whose name is mutated in
the said proceedings. The said proceedings
are merely for the purpose of revenue and
does not decide title.

27. Once the aforesaid provisions are
interpreted harmoniously, there is an
inescapable conclusion that proceedings
under Section 34 of the Code, 2006 and
Section 144 of the Code, 2006 are distinct
proceedings and does not impact each
other. However, in the scale, Section 144 of
the Code, 2006 carries weight since it
eventually adjudicates on the title and the
same can be done only after framing issues
and leading evidence, while Section 34 are
summary in nature and can be undertaken,
only based on Memo of Evidence.

28. In the aforesaid framework, it can
only be construed that once the proceedings
under Section 144 of the Code, 2006 is
initiated, if otherwise it does not attract any
legal bar, the same has to be brought its
logical end after framing issues and leading
evidence.

29. I am also in respectful agreement
with the judgement of the coordinate Bench
of this Court, in the case of Nehru Junior
High School Taryasujan (Supra) which
hold that jurisdiction under Order VII Rule
11 C.P.C. is not to be utilized as trial before
the trial and if plaint discloses cause of
action, the same cannot be rejected as such
under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C.

30. In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, issue no. 2 is decided in
favour of the petitioner and consequently it
is held that the pendency of proceedings
under Section 34 of the Code, 2006 cannot
be construed to be a bar to the proceedings
under Section 144 of the Code, 2006.

31. Accordingly, in view of the
affidavit of compliance which has been
filed today in Court on behalf of respondent
no.2 and the observations made herein
above, the parties have consented that
illegality which has been committed by the
impugned order dated 20.9.2025 can be
cured, in case the matter is remanded back
to
the
respondent
no.2
for
fresh
adjudication on the proceedings initiated by
the petitioner under Section 144 of the
Code,
2006,
keeping
in
view
the
observation made herein above.

Relief/Directions

32. In view of above, the impugned
order dated 20.9.2025 is set aside and the
matter is remanded back to the S.D.M.
Tehsil Puranpur, District Pilibhit with the
following directions:-

(i) he may decide the application
dated 16.5.2025 under Order VII Rule 11
C.P.C. within a period of two months from
the date of production of certified copy of
334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this order is filed before him after giving
due opportunity to the affected parties;

(ii) In the eventuality the
application under Order VII Rule 11
C.P.C. is rejected, he shall proceed to
conclude the proceedings of Case
No.5788 of 2024 (Sant Harvindar Singh
vs. Amandeep Singh and others) filed
under Section 144 of the U.P. Revenue
Code,
2006,
within
a
period
as
contemplated para 458 of U.P. Revenue
Court Manual.

33. With the aforesaid observations
the writ petition is allowed, with no
order as to costs.

Exemption Application

In view of the order passed
today, the application is disposed of.
The presence of respondent no.2 is
exempted.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 334
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 3000129 of 2002

Ram Yggya ...Petitioner
Versus
Addl. Commissioner J Faizabad & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to rejection of objection under
S. 11(2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on
Land Holdings Act in respect of Gata No. 613,
on the ground that the declaratory decree dated
03-01-1978 was post cut-off date 24-01-1971,
and whether the ceiling authorities were
justified in ignoring the decree, mutation entries
and long possession without adjudication on
merits. (Paras 2, 6, 7, 22)

Headnotes
Imposition of ceiling on land holdings act,
1960 - S. 11(2) - Objection by third
party/claimant - Maintainability - Persons
claiming
to
be
tenure-holders,
third
parties or those who assert possessory
rights are entitled to file objections under
S. 11(2) of the Ceiling Act and their
objections are required to be adjudicated
on merits - U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Declaratory
decree under S. 229-B - Finality - Effect in
ceiling proceedings - Cannot be brushed
aside mechanically - Cut-off date (24-011971)
-
Post
cut-off
transactions
-
Distinction between fraudulent orders and
final unchallenged decrees - Revenue
entries (Class-9, Khasra, Khatauni)
-
Evidentiary value - Procedural compliance
under Land Records Manual - Requirement
of factual determination - Double entry of
land in ceiling khata and tenure-holder's
khatauni
-
Effect
-
Vitiates
ceiling
determination
if
proved
-
Fraud
-
Allegation
of
-
Nullity
doctrine
-
Requirement of adjudication - Cannot be
presumed. (Paras 23 - 38)
Held: A decree which has attained finality and
has not been challenged ordinarily must be
given effect to and is a relevant piece of
adjudicatory material - Persons claiming to be
tenure-holders, third parties or those who assert
possessory rights are entitled to file objections
under S. 11(2) of the Ceiling Act and their
objections are required to be adjudicated on
merits - The statutory bar against taking into
account transactions occurring after the cut-off
date 24.01.1971 is not an instrument for
obliterating antecedent rights - Procedural
irregularity is a question of fact to be
established by cogent material - and a summary
dismissal of the petitioner's objection without
examining such material is impermissible -
Double-recording of the same plot, if proved to
be a result of error or misidentification, vitiates
the ceiling determination - Neither authority
conducted
a
full
factual
inquiry
-
The
consequence is that the petitioner's right to
have his objections decided on merits was