# Sant Kumar Singh Revisionist v. Nanku Singh & Ors. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2022) 10 ILRA 350
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-08-31
- **Case number:** Civil Revision (D) No. 253 of 2015
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sant-kumar-singh-revisionist-v-nanku-singh-ors-opp-parties-47726
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law- The Limitation Act, 1963-
Section 5- Inordinate delay of 15 years-
The merits of this order are not of
relevance so far as the present application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
concerned. It must be remarked that there
is nothing so startling or shockingly
perverse about the order that may impel
this Court, by a certain principle of remote
resort, to cast aside the bar of a very long
delay. There is indeed no mischief to be
undone that may require the delay of 15
years in moving the present revision to be
condoned. The explanation given by the
applicant-revisionist, though involving the
death of his Counsel, both father and son,
instructed to appear in the case, yet those
events too do not explain the long time
period of 15 years and more in moving
this Court against the order impugned.

Settled law that while considering an application
for condonation of delay, where the delay is
inordinate ,gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of along
with the lack of bonafides, conduct and
behaviour of the party and the prejudice caused
and merits of the case are not relevant.(Para
21)

Application for condonation of delay and
memo of revision accordingly rejected. (E3)

Case Law/Judgements relied upon:-

## Text

350 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
hereinabove, this Court is of the view that
since the charge-sheet was filed on
31.05.2012 and the applicant has not
misused the liberty granted to him vide
various orders, he is entitled to be enlarged
on anticipatory bail.

18. In view of the above, the
anticipatory
bail
application
of
the
applicant is allowed. In the event of arrest,
let the accused-applicant Ramji Singh, be
released forthwith in Criminal Case No.12
of 2012 arising out of Case Crime/R.C. No.
0062011A0006 of 2011, under Sections
120-B, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC and
Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police
Station- CBI, ACB, Lucknow, District-
Lucknow, on bail on furnishing a personal
bond with two sureties each in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the Station
House Officer of the police station
concerned with the following conditions:-

(i) that the applicant shall make
himself available for interrogation by a
police officer as and when required;

(ii) that the applicant shall not, directly
or indirectly make any inducement, threat
or promise to any person acquainted with
the facts of the case so as to dissuade him
from disclosing such facts to the court or to
any police officer or tamper with the
evidence;

(iii) that the applicant shall surrender
his passport, if any, to the concerned trial
Court forthwith. His passport will remain in
custody of the concerned trial Court;

(iv) that the applicant shall not leave
India during the pendency of trial without
prior permission from the concerned trial
Court;

(v) that in default of any of the
conditions
mentioned
above,
the
investigating officer shall be at liberty to
file appropriate application for cancellation
of anticipatory bail granted to the applicant;

(vi) that it is directed that the trial may
be concluded in accordance with law
expeditiously, preferably, within a period
of one year from the date of this order,
independently without being prejudiced by
any observations made by this court while
considering
or
deciding
the
present
anticipatory
bail
application
of
the
applicant;

(vii) that in case charge-sheet is
submitted the applicant shall not tamper
with the evidence during the trial;

(viii) that the applicant shall not
pressurize/
intimidate
the
prosecution
witness;

(ix) that the applicant shall appear
before the trial court on each date fixed
unless personal presence is exempted;

19. In case of breach of any of the
above conditions the court below shall have
the liberty to cancel the bail.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 350
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.08.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Civil Revision (D) No. 253 of 2015

Sant Kumar Singh ...Revisionist
Versus
Nanku Singh & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Sanjeet Kumar Yadav, Sri Avdhesh Kumar
Tiwari, Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh, Dipti Tewari,
Sri Gajendra Singh, Sri Shrawan Kumar Pandey,
Sri Swatantra Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Sri Kunal Ravi Singh, Manjari Singh
10 All. Sant Kumar Singh Vs. Nanku Singh & Ors.
351
Civil Law- The Limitation Act, 1963-
Section 5- Inordinate delay of 15 years-
The merits of this order are not of
relevance so far as the present application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
concerned. It must be remarked that there
is nothing so startling or shockingly
perverse about the order that may impel
this Court, by a certain principle of remote
resort, to cast aside the bar of a very long
delay. There is indeed no mischief to be
undone that may require the delay of 15
years in moving the present revision to be
condoned. The explanation given by the
applicant-revisionist, though involving the
death of his Counsel, both father and son,
instructed to appear in the case, yet those
events too do not explain the long time
period of 15 years and more in moving
this Court against the order impugned.

Settled law that while considering an application
for condonation of delay, where the delay is
inordinate ,gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of along
with the lack of bonafides, conduct and
behaviour of the party and the prejudice caused
and merits of the case are not relevant.(Para
21)

Application for condonation of delay and
memo of revision accordingly rejected. (E3)

Case Law/Judgements relied upon:-

1. Esha Bhattacharjee Vs Managing Committee
of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & ors., (2013)
12 SCC 649

2. Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao Vs Reddy
Srivedi & ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

Order
on
Civil
Misc.
Delay
Condonation Application No.426225 of
2015

1. This is a delay condonation
application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act seeking to condone the
delay in preferring the present Civil
Revision under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.

2. The office has reported a delay of
15 years and 244 days, and by the present
application, the applicant-revisionist asks
this Court to condone the said delay.

3. The facts leading to this delay
condonation application are required to be
briefly recounted in order to appreciate
whether a sufficient cause is made out to
condone the long delay of 15 years and 244
days in preferring the Revision. The
defendant is the judgment debtor of
Original Suit No. 11 of 1982, which was
decreed in favour of the plaintiff-opposite
party no.1 on 19.05.1983. The suit was one
for
specific
performance
of
contract
relating to sale of land. The applicantrevisionist and the opposite party no.2
preferred a First Appeal to this Court being
First Appeal No. 274 of 1983. The First
Appeal aforesaid was partly allowed on
19.12.1997 and this Court directed the
plaintiff-opposite party no.1 to deposit
Rs.25,000/- within a period of four months.
The plaintiff-opposite party no.1 was held
entitled to adjustment of Rs.5,000/- while
making the deposit, in case he had already
made good that amount before the
Execution Court.

4. Defendant no.2 to the suit i.e. the
applicant-revisionist was ordered to join
Dharampal,
the
defendant-proforma
opposite party here, in execution of the sale
deed in respect of whatever interest he
acquired under the sale deed executed in
his favour by Dharampal, subsequent to the
suit agreement. It was further provided that
in case the plaintiff fails to make good the
deposit within the period of four months, it
352 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
will be deemed that he is not ready and
willing to perform his part of the suit
agreement
and
the
suit
shall
stand
dismissed.

5. The plaintiff-opposite party no.1
moved Civil Misc. Time Extension No.
15351 of 1998 before this Court in First
Appeal No. 274 of 1983 and prayed for
extension of time by two months to deposit
the sum of Rs.25,000/-, as directed by this
Court. It appears that on 09.10.2003, Civil
Misc. Time Extension Application No.
15351
of
1998
was
rejected.
On
01.07.1998,
when
Civil
Misc.
Time
Extension
Application
aforesaid
was
pending before this Court, the plaintiffopposite party no.1 moved Execution Case
No. 5 of 1998 without depositing the
balance consideration of Rs.20,000/-, the
sum of Rs.5,000/- having already been
deposited.

6. It is the judgment debtor's case that
the opposite party did not comply with the
judgment dated 19.12.1997 passed by this
Court in First Appeal No. 274 of 1983, in
consequence whereof his suit stands
dismissed, in terms of the judgment and
decree passed. It is averred in Paragraph
No.10 of the affidavit that all these
proceedings taken in appeal before this
Court and the Execution Court were not
within
the
applicant-revisionist's
knowledge for reason that at the relevant
time, the revisionist was a minor aged
about six years. However, in the next
Paragraph, it is averred that the time
extension application was pending before
this Court and for the said reason, the
applicant-revisionist had no occasion to
imagine that the the plaintiff-opposite party
no.1 would go to the Execution Court and
levy execution. It is also averred that no
notice of execution was served upon the
applicant-revisionist. There is an averment
further that concealing all facts about the
pendency of the time extension application
and disobeying the orders of this Court
dated 19.12.1997, by not depositing the
additional
sum
of
money
towards
consideration, as directed by this Court, the
plaintiff-opposite party succeeded in his
fraud to secure the impugned order dated
12.01.2000. It is submitted that when the
plaintiff-opposite party no.1 came to take
possession in the year 2006, the revisionistjudgment debtor became aware for the first
time about the order dated 12.01.2000
passed in Execution Case No. 5 of 1998.

7. It is further pleaded that the
applicant-revisionist came to know about
the order dated 12.01.2000 in the month of
December, 2006 and thereupon approached
Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate, High
Court, who assured the revisionist that the
order dated 12.01.2000 being one obtained
by playing fraud upon the Execution Court,
is liable to be set aside. It is also asserted
that Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate was ill
at that time, when the revisionist met him,
and he assured the revisionist that once he
regains health, he would take appropriate
action to get the order dated 12.01.2000 set
aside. It is then asserted in Paragraph No.16
that the revisionist lost his son, Prince and
himself developed some eye ailment. There
are some medical reports annexed in
support of the aforesaid averments. It is the
revisionist's further case that when no
status about the proceedings taken by Mr.
U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate against the
order under challenge were intimated to
him, he inquired about the current status of
the case. The revisionist was informed by
the learned Counsel that he had not been
able to attend Court in all this while and,
therefore, nothing has happened so far. It is
asserted further that Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi,
10 All. Sant Kumar Singh Vs. Nanku Singh & Ors.
353
Advocate assured the revisionist that he
would take necessary steps in the case at
the earliest.

8. There is then a further averment
that the applicant-revisionist has become
blind in the left eye and met his Counsel,
Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate asking him
to return his papers so that he could engage
some other Counsel. It is asserted that on
all these occasions that the applicantrevisionist contacted his Counsel, Mr.
U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate, the learned
Counsel assured him that on regaining
health, he would take the necessary steps.
Unfortunately, in the year 2011, Mr.
U.S.M. Tripathi, Advocate passed away
after a long ailment. The aforesaid facts
came to the revisionist's knowledge through
a postcard sent by the office of Mr.
Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate, who
had taken over Mr. U.S.M. Tripathi,
Advocate's Chamber. He assured the
applicant-revisionist that he would contest
the case. The revisionist signed a fresh
Vakalatnama, furnishing the necessary
power to Mr. Satyendra Mani Tripathi,
Advocate.

9. It is the applicant-revisionist's
further case that in the month of January,
2013,
Mr.
Satyendra
Mani
Tripathi,
Advocate filed Civil Misc. Application No.
38991 of 2013, under Article 215 of
Constitution before this Court in First
Appeal No. 274 of 1983, detailing all
irregularities and fraud done by the
plaintiff-opposite party no.1 before the
Execution Court. The said application,
however, was dismissed by this Court on
25.05.2015 with an observation that the
applicant has a remedy under the Code of
Civil Procedure. Thereupon, the applicantrevisionist was advised to prefer present a
Civil Revision against the impugned order
dated 12.01.2000 with the assurance that
the cause would be pursued as per remedy
available under the law.

10. It is stated that the learned
Counsel for the applicant-revisionist, Mr.
Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate fell
seriously ill and medical investigations
revealed some serious health problems that
prevented him from carrying out his daily
routine of life. He underwent treatment at
the Tata Memorial Hospital, Mumbai and
unfortunately died in the month of
September, 2015. The revisionist, hearing
of the sad news, went to Mr. Satyendra
Mani Tripathi's house in the second week
of October, 2015, where his wife met the
revisionist and asked him to come over
after a week to collect his papers.
Thereupon, on 26.12.2015, the applicantrevisionist collected the papers from the
late Satyendra Mani Tripathi, Advocate's
residence.

11. On 11.11.2015, the applicantrevisionist met Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Yadav,
Advocate and left papers with him with a
request that he may look into the case. On
16.11.2015, Mr. Sanjeet Kumar Yadav,
Advocate advised the revisionist to file a
civil revision against the impugned order
dated 12.01.2000 before this Court. On
05.12.2015, the applicant-revisionist came
over to him with the necessary expenses to
institute the present civil revision against
the order impugned dated 12.01.2000. Mr.
Sanjeet Kumar Yadav, Advocate drafted
the revision and upon completion of papers
instituted the same on 09.12.2015.

12. It is on the basis of all these facts
and events that the applicant-revisionist
says that there is sufficient cause to
condone the long delay of 15 years and 244
days in preferring the revisionist.
354 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. Heard Mr. Shrawan Kumar
Pandey, learned Counsel for the applicantrevisionist
in
support
of
the
delay
condonation application and Mr. Kunal
Ravi, learned Counsel for the respondents.

14. The delay is indeed very huge and
the learned Counsel for plaintiff-opposite
party no.2 submits that even without a
counter affidavit, there is absolutely no
cause to condone this mammoth delay of
15 years and much more in preferring the
present civil revision.

15. The question about the principles
on which a prayer for condonation of delay,
particularly long ones, are to be considered
and dealt with, were enumerated by the
Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v.
Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12
SCC 649. In Esha Bhattacharjee (supra),
it was held:

21. From the aforesaid authorities the
principles that can broadly be culled out
are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic
approach while dealing with an application
for condonation of delay, for the courts are
not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit,
philosophy and purpose regard being had to
the fact that these terms are basically elastic
and are to be applied in proper perspective
to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being
paramount
and
pivotal
the
technical
considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be
attached to deliberate causation of delay
but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable
to a party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not affect
public justice and cause public mischief
because the courts are required to be
vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate
there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the conception
of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of
short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
That apart, the first one warrants strict
approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its inaction or
negligence are relevant factors to be taken
into consideration. It is so as the
fundamental principle is that the courts are
required to weigh the scale of balance of
justice in respect of both parties and the
said principle cannot be given a total go by
in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should
be vigilant not to expose the other side
unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind
that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking
recourse to the technicalities of law of
limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts
are to be carefully scrutinised and the
approach should be based on the paradigm
10 All. Sant Kumar Singh Vs. Nanku Singh & Ors.
355
of judicial discretion which is founded on
objective reasoning and not on individual
perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body
or an entity representing a collective cause
should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may
add some more guidelines taking note of
the present day scenario. They are:

22.1.
(a)
An
application
for
condonation of delay should be drafted
with careful concern and not in a haphazard
manner harbouring the notion that the
courts are required to condone delay on the
bedrock of the principle that adjudication
of a lis on merits is seminal to justice
dispensation system.

22.2.
(b)
An
application
for
condonation of delay should not be dealt
with in a routine manner on the base of
individual philosophy which is basically
subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula
can be laid down regard being had to the
concept of judicial discretion, yet a
conscious effort for achieving consistency
and collegiality of the adjudicatory system
should be made as that is the ultimate
institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to
perceive delay as a non-serious matter and,
hence, lackadaisical propensity can be
exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires
to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.

16. In Majji Sannemma alias
Sanyasirao v. Reddy Srivedi and others,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Supreme
Court very recently reversed an order of the
High Court, condoning a delay of 1011
days in filing a second appeal, subject to
payment of Rs.2000/- in cost. In Majji
Sannemma alias Sanyasirao (supra), it
was held:

"20. In the case of Basawaraj (supra),
it is observed and held by this Court that
the discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case. It is further
observed that the expression "sufficient
cause" cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is
attributed to the party. It is further
observed that even though limitation may
harshly affect rights of a party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when
prescribed by statute. It is further observed
that in case a party has acted with
negligence, lack of bona fides or there is
inaction then there cannot be any justified
ground for condoning the delay even by
imposing conditions. It is observed that
each application for condonation of delay
has to be decided within the framework laid
down by this Court. It is further observed
that if courts start condoning delay where
no sufficient cause is made out by imposing
conditions then that would amount to
violation
of
statutory
principles
and
showing utter disregard to legislature.

21. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil
(supra), it is observed by this Court that the
court cannot enquire into belated and stale
claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The Courts help those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights".

22. Applying the law laid down by this
Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts
of the case on hand and considering the
averments
in
the
application
for
condonation of delay, we are of the opinion
that as such no explanation much less a
sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had
been offered by respondent Nos. 1 and 2
herein - appellants before the High Court
for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days
in preferring the Second Appeal. The High
Court is not at all justified in exercising its
356 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
discretion to condone such a huge delay.
The High Court has not exercised the
discretion judiciously. The reasoning given
by the High Court while condoning huge
delay of 1011 days is not germane.
Therefore, the High Court has erred in
condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in
preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1
and 2 herein - original defendants.
Impugned order passed by the High Court
is unsustainable both, on law as well as on
facts."

17. The sequence of events leading to
the impugned order have to be seen in
order to ascertain, whether the applicantrevisionist
had
knowledge
of
the
proceedings and the order impugned order
and whether he acted with due diligence, to
entitle him to the condonation of delay
spanning over a period of more than 15
years.

18. For one, First Appeal No. 274 of
1983 arose out of Original Suit No. 11 of
1982, decided by the District Judge of
Fatehpur vide judgment and decree dated
19.05.1983.
The
applicant-revisionist/
judgment
debtor,
Sant
Kumar
was
impleaded as a party to the suit as soon as
the plaintiff-opposite party no.1, Nanku
Singh learnt about execution of the sale
deed in favour of Sant Kumar Singh by
Dharampal,
subsequent
to
the
suit
agreement in the plaintiff's favour..

19. The other relevant fact is that Sant
Kumar Singh though a minor of six years
when the suit was filed, impleading him
through his guardian ad litem, Udaibhan
Singh, but he came of age pending
proceedings.
The
First
Appeal
was
admitted to hearing on 19.05.1983, but
decided on 19.07.1997. By that time, the
revisionist, Sant Kumar Singh, who was a
party to the First Appeal, must have turned
a young man of 20 years. There is no
reason why he would not know of the
proceedings, after the appellate decree of
this Court, including those of the Execution
Case. Besides the aforesaid facts, it is
beyond cavil that parties to the lis are
relatives.

20. It has been recorded by this Court
in the judgment rendered in First Appeal
No. 274 of 1983 that the plaintiff, Nanaku
Singh is admittedly the father-in-law of the
defendant, Dharampal's daughter, Kamla.
Sant Kumar Singh is the son of another
daughter of Dharampal's, to wit, Natthi. In
the conspectus of a close relationship
between parties, it is difficult to infer lack
of knowledge about proceedings taken
before the Execution Court. The impugned
order passed by the Execution Court is the
result of an attempt by the judgment debtor
to frustrate the decree, passed by this Court
in First Appeal, on the ground that the
enhanced sale consideration directed was
not deposited within limitation.

21. For whatever reason assigned, the
District Judge held that the sum of
Rs.20,000/- required to be deposited under
the decree of this Court was deposited
within time, in terms of this Court's decree.
The merits of this order are not of
relevance so far as the present application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
concerned. It must be remarked that there is
nothing so startling or shockingly perverse
about the order that may impel this Court,
by a certain principle of remote resort, to
cast aside the bar of a very long delay.
There is indeed no mischief to be undone
that may require the delay of 15 years in
moving
the
present
revision
to
be
condoned. The explanation given by the
applicant-revisionist, though involving the
10 All. Jabiullah & Anr. Vs. Sakir
357
death of his Counsel, both father and son,
instructed to appear in the case, yet those
events too do not explain the long time
period of 15 years and more in moving this
Court against the order impugned.

22. In the considered opinion of this
Court, there is no sufficient cause made out
to condone the delay on the basis of which
this Court may exercise its discretion in
favour of the applicant-revisionist.

23. The application is, accordingly,
dismissed.

Order
on
CIVIL
REVISION
DEFECTIVE No. - 253 of 2015

24. The delay condonation application
filed in aid of the present belated revision
having been rejected by my order of date,
the memo of revision is rejected as barred
by time.
----------
(2022) 10 ILRA 357
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.09.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Transfer Application (Civil) No. 425 of 2021

Jabiullah & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
Sakir ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appplicants:
Sri Hanuman Deen

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Sheetala Prasad Pandey

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908
- Section 24: - Transfer Application - to
transfer the original Suit from district Basti
to new district Sant Kabir Nagar - on the
ground that the property in question & both
the parties of suit are belongs to district
Sant
kabir
Nagar
-
question
of
maintainability - suit was instituted in year
1994 at a time when the new district Sant
Kabir Nagar had not been exist later on, in
year 2008 said new district has been carved
out - court find that, the venue of litigation,
subject to territorial and other jurisdiction,
ought to be convenient to parties - thus,
transfer application is succeeds and is
allowed - However, since suit is pending
since last 27 years - therefore, the Trial
Court shall proceed with the suit and shall
conclude the trial within four months -
direction accordingly.(Para - 6, 7, 9)

Transfer Application Allowed. (E-11)

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is an application, seeking
transfer of Original Suit No.1099 of 1994,
Sakir Vs. Ilake and others, from the Court
of the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Vth,
Basti be transferred to the Court of
competent jurisdiction at Sant Kabir Nagar.

2. Heard Mr. Hanuman Deen, learned
Counsel for the applicants and Mr. Sheetala
Prasad Pandey, learned Counsel appearing
on behalf of the opposite party.

3. The opposite party has not filed a
counter affidavit. As such, the averments in
the affidavit remain unrebutted. However,
the learned Counsel for the opposite party
vehemently opposes the prayer for transfer
on ground that will shortly be indicated.

4. According to the applicants, both
parties are residents of Sant Kabir Nagar
and the property is also located there. The
suit was instituted prior to carvation of new
District Sant Kabir Nagar in the year 1997.
The Court was established later on. The
submission is that now the said case ought