# Sant Kumar v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 392
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-04
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 19015 of 2021
- **Bench:** Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sant-kumar-v-u-o-i-ors-48337
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 -
Territorial jurisdiction - Cause of action -
Petitioner, resident of Gorakhpur, U.P.,
was posted at the Office of Commandant,
149 Btn, Shib Sagar, Assam at the time
when his wife suffered from Covid-19 -
representation/application
for
medical
claim has been made before the DGP,
CRPF, New Delhi - Held - merely because
petitioner is resident of this State, no
cause of action would arise within the
territorial limits of Allahabad High Court -
it is open to the petitioner to move an
application/representation
before
the
appropriate authority having jurisdiction -
Dismissed as not maintainable (Para 11)

Dismissed. (E-5)
4 All. Sant Kumar Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
393
List of Cases cited :-

## Text

392 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and unjustly in a particular case, but if the
law provides for a limitation, it is to be
enforced even at the risk of hardship to a
particular party as the Judge cannot, on
applicable grounds, enlarge the time
allowed by the law, postpone its operation,
or introduce exceptions not recognised by
law."

 8. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.
Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC
133, the Apex Court explained the scope of
limitation and condonation of delay,
observing as under:-

 "The primary function of a
Court is to adjudicate the dispute between
the parties and to advance substantial
justice.
The
time-limit
fixed
for
approaching
the
Court
in
different
situations is not because on the expiry of
such time a bad cause would transform into
a good cause. Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy the rights of parties. They
are meant to see that parties do not resort
to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for
the redress of the legal injury so suffered.
The law of limitation is thus founded on
public policy."

 9. In the case of Northern Indian
Glass Industries Vs. Jaswant Singh &
ors., reported in AIR 2003 SC 234, the
Apex Court has held that the High Court
cannot ignore the delay and laches in
approaching the writ court and there must
be satisfactory explanation by the petitioner
as how he could not come to the Court well
in time.

 10. Further in the the case of Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed & Anr.
reported in (2004) 4 SCC 460, the Apex
Court has held that the High Court should
dismiss the writ petition on the ground of
unexplained inordinate delay.

 11. In view of the aforesaid, this
Court finds no good ground to entertain the
present writ petition. It is, accordingly,
dismissed on the ground of inordinate
delay.
----------
(2022)04ILR A392
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Writ A No. 19015 of 2021

Sant Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Mohammad Umar Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Ms. Suman Jaiswal

Constitution of India,1950 - Article 226 -
Territorial jurisdiction - Cause of action -
Petitioner, resident of Gorakhpur, U.P.,
was posted at the Office of Commandant,
149 Btn, Shib Sagar, Assam at the time
when his wife suffered from Covid-19 -
representation/application
for
medical
claim has been made before the DGP,
CRPF, New Delhi - Held - merely because
petitioner is resident of this State, no
cause of action would arise within the
territorial limits of Allahabad High Court -
it is open to the petitioner to move an
application/representation
before
the
appropriate authority having jurisdiction -
Dismissed as not maintainable (Para 11)

Dismissed. (E-5)
4 All. Sant Kumar Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
393
List of Cases cited :-

1. Rajendra Kumar Mishra Vs U.O.I. & ors.
reported in (2005) 5 AWC 4542 All,

2. U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad Vs
St.of U.P. reported in (1995) 4 SCC 738

3. Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs S. of Mah.
reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640

4. Ambrish Kumar Saxena Vs S. Of U.P. Thru.
Prin.Secy.(Karmik) U.P. Sectt. Lko. & Ors. Writ
Petition No. 10001 (SS) of 2018 decided on
11.4.2018.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani
Chauhan, J.)

1. Instructions passed on to the Court
today is kept on record.

2. Heard Mr. Mohammad Umar Khan,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Ms.
Suman Jaiswal, learned counsel for the
respondents.

3. This writ petition has been filed
interalia for the following relief:-

"A. Issue a writ order or
direction in the nature of mandamus,
directing the respondents to release the
amount of Rs. 4,88,570/- in favour of the
petitioner after considering his claim
regarding treatment of his wife from
09.05.2021 till the date of her death
within a short stipulated period which
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper under the facts and circumstances
of the case.

B. Issue a writ order or direction
in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondents to pass a reasoned and
speaking order on the application of the
petitioner dated 21.06.2021 within a short
stipulated period."

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that while the petitioner was posted
as Sub-Inspector at Shiv Sagar situated in
the State of Assam, his wife suffered from
Covid-19, therefore, treatment was given to
her at Gorakhpur, which is permanent place
of resident of the petitioner. He further
submitted that certain expenses were
incurred during the treatment of the
petitioner's
wife
for
which
claim/representation
has
been
moved
before the respondent no.2, i.e. Director
General of Police, Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF), C.G.O. Complex, New
Delhi. However, the respondent no.4 has
sent a letter dated 24.08.2021 to the
respondent no.5 to proceed in accordance
with law with respect to the medical claim
made by the petitioner as the petitioner was
posted at the Office within the jurisdiction
of respondent no.5 at the time when the
petitioner's wife suffered from Covid-19.,
therefore, it was within the jurisdiction of
respondent no.5, who shall take decision in
accordance with law.

5.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents, on the basis of instructions
received by her, submits that regarding
similar issue, several writ petitions, one
being Writ-A No.6850 of 2021, have been
dismissed. She further submits that the
medical
reimbursement
claim of the
petitioner has been returned by the DIG,
Group
Centre,
CRPF,
Bhuvneshwar,
Odisha to the Commandant-149 Bn, CRPF
located in Jay Sagar, Shiv Sagar, Assam,
vide letter dated 24.08.2021 with a
direction that after looking into the
objections, the file may be placed before
the DIG, Range Hqr, CRPF, Bhuvneshwar.
Therefore, neither the cause of action nor
even part of cause of action arises under the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, as such,
the
present
writ
petition
is
not
394 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
maintainable. However, it is always open to
the
petitioner
to
move
an
application/representation
before
the
appropriate authority having jurisdiction.

6. I have considered the submissions
made by learned counsel for the parties as
well as gone through the entire materials
brought on record.

7. The petitioner, who is resident of
Gorakhpur, U.P., was posted at the Office
of respondent no.5, i.e. Commandant, 149
Btn, Shib Sagar, Assam at the time when
his wife suffered from Covid-19 whereas
the representation/application for medical
claim has been made before the respondent
no.2, DGP, CRPF, New Delhi. Therefore,
merely because petitioner is resident of this
State, no cause of action would arise within
the territorial limits of this Court. Law in
that regard has already been settled by a
larger bench of this Court in Rajendra
Kumar Mishra Vs. Union of India and
others reported in (2005) 5 AWC 4542 All,
wherein this Court in paras-39, 40 and 41
has observed as under:-

"39. Therefore, in order to
understand and appreciate the binding
force of a decision it is always necessary to
see what were the facts in the case in which
the decision was given and what was the
point which had to be decided. No
judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A
word or a clause or a sentence in the
judgment cannot be regarded as a full
exposition of law.

40. For the reasons given above
we are of the opinion that the Chief of Army
Staff can only be sued either at Delhi where
he is located or at a place where the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises.

41. We may mention that a "cause
of action" is the bundle of facts which,
taken with the law applicable., gives the
plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. However, it must include some
act done by the defendant, since in the
absence of an act, no cause of action can
possibly occur."

8. In case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini
Mill Adhikari Parishad vs. State of U.P.
reported in (1995) 4 SCC 738, the Apex
Court in para-14 has held as under:-

"14.
.....The
territorial
jurisdiction of a Court and the "cause of
action" are interlinked. To decide the
question of territorial jurisdiction it is
necessary to find out the place where the
"cause of action" arose. We, with respect,
reiterate that the law laid down by a fourJudge Bench of this Court in Nasiruddin
case holds good even today despite the
incorporation of an Explanation to
Section 141 to the Code of Civil
Procedure."

9. In case of Navinchandra N.
Majithia
vs.
State
of
Maharashtra
reported in (2000) 7 SCC 640, the Apex
Court in para-38 has held as under:-

"38. "Cause of action" is a
phenomenon well understood in legal
parlance.
Mohapatra,
J.
has
well
delineated the import of the said expression
by
referring
to
the
celebrated
lexicographies. The collocation of the
words "cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises" seems to have been lifted from
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which
section
also
deals
with
the
jurisdictional aspect of the courts. As per
that section the suit could be instituted in a
court within the legal limits of whose
jurisdiction the "cause of action wholly or
part arises....?"
4 All. C/M Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur, Dist. Moradabad & Ors.Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
395

10. This Court has also decided the
same controversy in Writ Petition No.
10001 (SS) of 2018 (Ambrish Kumar
Saxena
vs.
State
Of
U.P.
Thru.
Prin.Secy.(Karmik) U.P. Sectt. Lko. &
Ors.) decided on 11.4.2018.

11. In view of the above, this Court
under special circumstances can not direct
the respondents, which is not within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court to pass
any positive orders in favour of the
petitioner
regarding
medical
claim.
However, it is always open to the petitioner
to
move
an
application/representation
before the appropriate authority having
jurisdiction.

12. Accordingly, the present writ
petition is dismissed as not maintainable.
----------
(2022)04ILR A395
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.03.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS. SADHNA RANI
(THAKUR), J.

Writ A No. 20751 of 2019
along with
other connected cases

C/M Adarsh Gramin Vidyalaya Sonakpur,
Dist. Moradabad & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Arun Kumar Rana, Sri Sujeet Kumar, Sri
Ashok Khare (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Seemant Singh

A. Civil Law - Uttar Pradesh Junior High
Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and other Employees) Act, 1978 - U.P.
Basic Education (Amendment) Act' 2017
(U.P. Act No.2 of 2018) - U.P. Junior High
School (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and other Employees) (Amendment) Act
2017
(U.P.
Act
No.3
of
2018)
-
Amendment in Section 2, insertion of
clause (ee) in Section 2 of the definition
clause - "Junior High School" means
an

institution
in which education
is impart from class sixth to class eight -
petitioners institutions denied grant on
the ground that the grant-in-aid cannot be
accorded to a primary institution after
introduction of the amendments - as per
the stand of the State, Junior Basic School
(primary institutions) imparting education
upto Class V are outside the purview of
1978' Act - Held - primary sections which
are integral part of Junior High Schools,
whether established prior or later to the
establishment of recognized and aided
Junior High Schools shall have to be
brought
within
the
purview
of
the
Payment of Salaries Act' 1978 as amended
by the U.P. Act No.3 of 2018. (Amendment
Act' 2017) - primary sections (class I to V)
of a junior high school being its integral
part or part of 'One school' cannot be
discriminated by excluding it from the
purview of the Act' 1978 - excluding
primary sections of a recognized and
aided Junior High School is not found
based on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes the teachers of Classes VI to
VIII from the teachers of Classes I to V of
'one
institution'
which
are
grouped
together in a homogeneous class and
cannot be differentiated - petitioners
institutions falling in Group 'B' (Primary
Sections recognized first and Junior High
School) & Group 'C' (Junior High School
recognized first and attached primary
sections later) held to be covered under
the provisions of the Payment of Salaries
Act'
1978,
as
amended
by
2017
Amendment namely U.P. Act No.3 of 2018
- State directed to reconsider their claims
for providing grant-in-aid in light of the
principle of 'composite integrality' or