# Sarfaraj & Ors v. State Of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 311
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-19
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 5581 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajnish Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sarfaraj-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-53675
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

G.A., Rakesh Kumar Maurya

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to legality of FIR in civil
disputes.

Headnotes
Criminal proceedings for civil disputesComplaint has been filed only in a counter
blast to F.I.R.- an old enmity between the
parties on account of a land- civil proceedings
are going on- complaint has been filed in a
counter blast to the aforesaid F.I.R.- to give
color of criminal to a civil dispute- applicants
have been summoned- abuse of process of
law.
Held:
The provisions of Section 504 and 506 I.P.C.
cannot be said to have attracted because it
could not be shown that the applicants have any
intention to cause alarm to the complainant and
what exactly was stated has not been disclosed
in the complaint or the statements of the
complainant and witnesses. (E-9)

Case Law Cited

## Text

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8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
311
(2025) 8 ILRA 311
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJNISH KUMAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 5581 of 2022

Sarfaraj & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Mohammad Ahmad

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Rakesh Kumar Maurya

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to legality of FIR in civil
disputes.

Headnotes
Criminal proceedings for civil disputesComplaint has been filed only in a counter
blast to F.I.R.- an old enmity between the
parties on account of a land- civil proceedings
are going on- complaint has been filed in a
counter blast to the aforesaid F.I.R.- to give
color of criminal to a civil dispute- applicants
have been summoned- abuse of process of
law.
Held:
The provisions of Section 504 and 506 I.P.C.
cannot be said to have attracted because it
could not be shown that the applicants have any
intention to cause alarm to the complainant and
what exactly was stated has not been disclosed
in the complaint or the statements of the
complainant and witnesses. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. Lakshan Singh Vs. State of Bihar (Now
Jharkhand); (2021) 9 SCC 191
2. Kashiben Chhaganbhai Koli Vs. State of
Gujarat; (2008) 17 SCC 100
3. Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of Maharashtra
and Another; (2013) 14 SCC 44
4. Mohd. Wajid Vs. State of U.P.; (2023) 20 SCC
219
5. State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal; Supp (1)
SCC 335
6. Mohanbhai Ganeshbhai Lakhani & Ors. Vs.
State of Gujarat & Anr., SLP (Crl.) No(s).10982
of 2023
7. Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of Uttarakhand and
Others; (2013) 11 SCC 673
8. Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr.; (2025) SCC Online SC 823
9. Sharif Ahmad And Another vs State of U.P.
and Another; (2024) SCC Online SC 726

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code

List of Keywords
Civil dispute; counter blast to the aforesaid
F.I.R.' to give colour of criminal to a civil
dispute; summoning order

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Applicant :- Mohammad Ahmad,
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Rakesh
Kumar Maurya

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Mohammad Ahmad,
learned counsel for the applicants, learned
A.G.A. for the State and Sri Rakesh Kumar
Maurya, learned counsel for the respondent
No.2.

2. The instant application under
Section
482
of
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (here-in-after referred as
CrPC) has been filed for setting aside the
summoning order dated 13.04.2021 passed
by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior
Division) / Judicial Magistrate, Raibarelly
in Complaint Case No.9/2019 (new Case
No.22/2019); Mohd. Ismayl Khan Vs.
Sarfaraj and Others, under Sections 147,
427, 504, 506 I.P.C., Police Station Jayas,
District Amethi pending in the court of
learned Fast Track Court / S.D., Raibarelly
and the order dated 18.04.2022 passed by
312 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
learned Fifth Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Raibarelly in Criminal
Revision No.12/2022; Mohd. Jaleel Vs.
Mohd. Ismayl Khan and Others and the
order dated 30.07.2022 passed by learned
Second
Additional
Sessions
Judge,
Raibarelly
in
Criminal
Revision
No.139/2022; Sarfaraj and Others Vs. State
of U.P. and another alongwith the entire
criminal proceedings of Complaint Case
No.9/2019 (new Case No.22/2019); Mohd.
Ismayl Khan Vs. Sarfaraj and Others,
pending in the court of learned Fast Track
Court / S.D., Raibarelly.

3. Learned counsel for the applicants
submitted that the complaint has been filed
only in a counter blast to F.I.R. lodged by
the applicants bearing F.I.R. No.0057 of
2018, under Sections 504, 506 I.P.C. at
Police Station Jayas, District Amethi in
regard to the incident dated 10.04.2018 by
the applicant No.1 against the respondent
No.2 and three other persons and to give
colour of criminal to a civil dispute
between the parties. He further submitted
that the applicant No.1 is aged about 101
years of age and at the time of alleged
incident in 2018, he was about 96 years of
age, therefore, the question of incident as
alleged by the respondent No.2 itself is
misconceived and not tenable.

4. He further submitted that the
impugned orders have been passed without
considering the contradictions in the
statements of the complainant and the
witnesses, in which one of the witness is an
accused in the aforesaid F.I.R. lodged by
the applicant No.1. He further submitted
that the complaint has been filed after about
8 months of the incident after coming to
know about the filing of charge sheet
against the respondent No.2 and others. He
further submitted that the learned revisional
court also failed to consider the grounds
raised by the applicants and dismissed the
revisions, therefore, the applicants are
constraint to approach this Court by means
of present application under Section 482
CrPC.

5. On the basis of above, learned
counsel for the applicants submitted that
the instant application under Section 482
CrPC is liable to be allowed and the
impugned orders are liable to be set aside
alongwith the entire proceedings of the
aforesaid criminal case.

6. Per contra learned counsel for the
respondent No.2 vehemently opposed the
submissions of learned counsel for the
applicants and submitted that the impugned
orders have been passed after considering
the evidence and material on record. He
further submitted that the applicant No.1
got his name recorded fraudulently on the
land of respondent No.2, in regard to which
the civil proceedings are pending and an
interim order has been granted by this
Court, even then the applicants tried to
plough the field of the respondent No.2 and
on being confronted, they had committed
the crime, for which, the complaint has
been filed, in which the applicants have
rightly and in accordance with law been
summoned. Thus, the submission of
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 is
that the instant application under Section
482 CrPC has been filed on misconceived
and baseless grounds, which is liable to be
dismissed.

7. I have considered the submissions
of learned counsel for the parties and
perused the records.

8. There is no dispute among the
learned counsel for the parties that there is
8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
313
an old enmity between the parties on
account of claim of a land bearing Khata
No.4999,
in
regard
to
which,
civil
proceedings are going on between the
parties. It is also not in dispute that the
aforesaid F.I.R. No.0057 of 2018, under
Sections 504, 506 I.P.C. at Police Station
Jayas, District Amethi was lodged on
11.04.2018 with regard to the incident of
10.04.2018 at about 06:00 in the evening
by the applicant No.1; Sarfaraz. It has been
alleged in the F.I.R. that the applicant is
aged about 88 years and there is a deadly
enmity with the accused therein for the last
about 35-40 years in regard to land bearing
Khata No.4999. The accused named therein
came together on 10.04.2018 at about
06:00 in the evening with lathi, danda and
gun and started ploughing the land of the
complainant. The complainant dialed on
No.100, on which the police came on the
spot and when the police came, the accused
persons ran away. Thereafter, when the
police went back, the accused persons came
at the door of the applicants, abused them
and threatened to kill and thereafter again
started ploughing. In the said case, charge
sheet was forwarded on 14.04.2018 against
the respondent No.2; Mohd. Ismayl,
Maksood Alam, Mohd. Ammen and
Ashraf.

9. The respondent No.2 after about 9
months filed complaint case No.9/2019 on
04.01.2019 against the applicants under
Sections 504, 506, 427 and 147 I.P.C. with
regard to the same incident of 10.04.2018
at about 06:00 in the evening alleging
therein that there is a dispute between the
complainant and the accused with regard to
a land and the respondent No.2 is in
possession of the land in dispute since 1983
but the applicants have got their names
mutated fraudulently, in regard to which
the case is pending in the court of
Consolidation Officer, Amethi and Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Amethi and
there is an interim order of the High Court
also. It has also been alleged that the
respondent No.2 has sown crop of urad on
his
land.
The
applicants
came
on
10.04.2018 at about 06:00 PM with lathi,
danda and gun and started ploughing the
crop of urad and on being confronted, they
abused,
threatened
and
attacked
the
complainant, therefore, the respondent
No.2; complainant ran into his house. It has
further been alleged that Ashraf, Rajjak
sons of Lalla, Maksood Alam S/o Mustafa,
Gazi Gaffar Ali Sher, sons of Sattar, Jabriel
S/o Shareef, Ameen S/o Habeeb etc. saved
the respondent No.2. It has also been stated
in the complaint that on account of
ploughing of crop, he suffered loss of about
Rs.50,000/-. It has further been alleged that
a complaint in this regard was given at the
Police Station Jayas, District Amethi on
11.04.2018 but no action was taken by the
police, therefore, a complaint was sent to
the Superintendent of Police, Amethi, even
then no action was taken, therefore, the
accused may be summoned and punished.

10. The statement of complainant;
Ismayl Khan under Section 200 CrPC was
got recorded, in which he stated the
aforesaid fact but there is no averment of
attack by the applicants. In the statement,
he has stated that Sarfaraz, Jameel, Jaleel,
Shakeel, Nadeem, Shafeeq and Rashid
came with lathi, danda and gun but name of
Iftikar has not been stated. It has further
been
stated
that
they
ploughed his
agricultural farm by a tractor and on being
confronted, they abused, therefore, the
complainant ran and went into his house.
He has also stated that he was not beaten
but after giving threats, the accused persons
went away. Thus, the allegations of attack
made in the complaint has not been alleged
314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the statement. It has also been stated that
the land in dispute is recorded in the name
of Mustafa since 1983, whereas in the
complaint it has been stated that the
respondent No.2 is in possession of the
land in dispute. It has also been stated that
an application was given on the next date
before the Police Station but no proof
thereof has been placed on record. It has
further been stated that when no action was
taken, an application was given about a
month back to the Superintendent of Police.
Thus, the application to the Superintendent
of Police must have been given in the
month of January, 2019 in regard to the
incident of 10.04.2018.

11. The statements of Maksood Alam
S/o Mustak and Gazi S/o Abdul Sattar have
been got recorded under Section 202 CrPC.
Maksood Alam narrated the above story as
told by the complainant but he has not stated
that the agricultural field was ploughed by
tractor. He has further stated that the incident
has been seen by Ashraf, Rajjak, Gazi,
Gaffar, Ali Sher, Jabriel, Ameen etc. and they
tried to save. He has also stated that if we
would have not come, the applicants would
have killed the respondent No.2.

12. The respondent No.2; complainant
and Maksood Alam are accused in the
aforesaid F.I.R. lodged by the applicant
No.1 in regard to same incident of
10.04.2018 with similar allegations and
charge sheet has been filed against both
alongwith others, therefore, he is an
interested witness.

13. Gazi S/o Abdul Sattar has
supported the version of complaint and
stated that he is an eye witness. However,
contrary
to
the
statement
of
the
complainant, he stated the name of Iftikar
also.

14. The complaint was filed on
04.01.2019. The statement of complainant
was recorded on 14.02.2019, the statement
of P.W.-1, Maksood Alam was recorded on
16.03.2019 and P.W.-2, Gazi was recorded
on 03.05.2019 and it is apparent that the
P.W.-2, Gazi has tried to fill up the lacuna
in the statement of the complainant as well
as P.W.-1, Maksood Alam.

15. Learned trial court, by means of
order dated 13.04.2021, summoned the
applicants
without
considering
the
aforesaid contradictions in the complaint
and the statements of the complainant and
witnesses. Perusal of the order dated
13.04.2021, contained as Annexure No.7,
indicates that the application to the
Superintendent of Police may have been
given for the first time in the month of
December, 2018, which was after about 8
months of incident. Thus, the impugned
order dated 13.04.2021 has been passed by
the learned trial court without appropriately
considering and dealing with the evidence
on record.

16.
The
aforesaid
order
dated
13.04.2021 was challenged by the applicant
No.2; Jaleel S/o Sarfaraj in Criminal
Revision No.12/2022, which has been
dismissed by the learned Fifth Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Raibarelly by
means of order dated 18.04.2022 on the
ground that the learned trial court has
summoned the applicants on the basis of
the statements recorded under Section 200
and 202 CrPC. Another revision i.e.
Criminal Revision No.139/2022 was filed
by the applicant No.1 and the applicant
Nos.3 to 8, which has also been dismissed
by means of order dated 30.07.2022
holding that there is no need of examining
the material available on record in depth at
the time of passing of summoning order
8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
315
and only prima facie case against the
respondent is to be seen and the revision
filed by the accused Jaleel has already been
dismissed and accordingly dismissed the
revision. Hence the instant application
under Section 482 CrPC has been filed.

17. The applicant No.1; Sarfaraz,
though has claimed that he was aged about
101 years in 2022, according to which,
presently he must have been aged about
104 years and his date of birth as recorded
in his Aadhaar Card is 05.08.1921 but in
the F.I.R. lodged by him, he himself stated
that he was aged about 88 years. Be that as
it may, he must have been more than 90
years of age at the time of alleged incident.
It is also noticed that a disability certificate
of the applicant No.2; Jaleel has been
placed
on
record
alongwith
a
supplementary affidavit. According to the
disability certificate issued on 26.01.2019,
he has permanent loco disability of 50%. It
has been issued subsequent to the alleged
incident. Thus, it has been alleged that the
applicant No.1; Sarfaraz and applicant
No.2; Jaleel apparently were not in a
position to attack and run behind the
respondent No.2 in the manner stated.

18.
Perusal
of
complaint
and
statements of the complainant and the
witnesses indicates that no specific role has
been assigned to anybody. It has also not
been shown either in the complaint or in
the statements of the complainant and
witnesses as to which of the applicant was
having lathi, danda and gun. In the
statement of the complainant, he has stated
that the applicants ploughed his agricultural
field by a tractor, whereas it has not been
stated in complaint and statement of other
witness. It has also not been disclosed as to
who was driving tractor. The witnesses,
who appeared as P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, have
also nowhere stated that the applicants
ploughed the agricultural field of the
respondent No.2 by the tractor, therefore,
there are material contradictions in the
contents
of
the
complaint
and
the
statements
of
the
complainant
and
witnesses but without considering the
same, the applicants have been summoned.

19. Upon considering the aforesaid
coupled with the fact that a civil dispute is
going on between the parties in regard to
land and F.I.R. has been lodged by the
applicant No.1 in regard to the incident
dated 10.04.2018 at about 06:00 in the
evening on the very next day of the
incident i.e. 11.04.2018 at 12:39 hours at
the Police Station Jayas, District Amethi
and no application dated 11.04.2018, as
alleged by the respondent No.2, made to
the police has been placed on record, it
appears that the complaint has been filed in
a counter blast to the aforesaid F.I.R. and to
give colour of criminal to a civil dispute
with the help of accused in the aforesaid
F.I.R., which is nothing but an abuse of
process of law.

20.
The
applicants
have
been
summoned under Section 147, 504, 506
and 427 I.P.C.

21. Section 147 I.P.C. provides the
punishment for rioting. Rioting has been
defined under Section 146 I.P.C. as
whenever force or violence is used by an
unlawful assembly, or by any member
thereof, in prosecution of the common
object of such assembly, every member of
such assembly is guilty of the offence of
rioting. In the present case, firstly there is
contradiction in regard to the presence of
the applicants on the spot and secondly no
force or violence could be shown to have
taken place because the only allegation is
316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the applicants came on the spot and
started ploughing the agricultural field of
the
respondent
No.2
and
on
being
confronted, they abused and threatened
with dire consequences and attacked but
there is no injury report on record and it has
also not been alleged that the respondent
No.2 had suffered any injury.

22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Lakshan Singh Vs. State of Bihar
(Now Jharkhand); (2021) 9 SCC 191, has
held that once the unlawful assembly is
established in prosecution of the common
object, each member of the unlawful
assembly is guilty for the offence of
rioting. The use of force, even though it be
the slightest possible character by any one
member of the assembly, once established
as unlawful constitutes rioting. It is not
necessary that force or violence must be by
all but the liability accrues to all the
members of the unlawful assembly. In the
present case, not even a single instance of
use of force has been pleaded or deposed or
shown even before this Court.

23. Section 427 I.P.C. provides
mischief causing damage to the amount of
fifty rupees or upwards. It provides that
whoever commits mischief and thereby
causes loss or damage to the amount of
fifty rupees or upwards, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both. Mischief has been
defined under Section 425 I.P.C., according
to which, whoever with intent to cause, or
knowing that he is likely to cause, wrongful
loss or damage to the public or to any person,
causes the destruction of any property, or any
such change in any property or in the
situation thereof as destroys or diminishes its
value or utility, or affects it injuriously,
commits "mischief". As per Explanation 1, it
is not essential to the offence of mischief that
the offender should intend to cause loss or
damage to the owner of the property injured
or destroyed. It is sufficient if he intends to
cause, or knows that he is likely to cause,
wrongful loss or damage to any person by
injuring any property, whether it belongs to
that person or not. As per Explanation 2,
Mischief may be committed by an act
affecting property belonging to the person
who commits the act, or to that person and
others jointly.

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Kashiben Chhaganbhai Koli Vs.
State of Gujarat; (2008) 17 SCC 100, has
held that so far as Section 427 I.P.C. is
concerned, the expression "mischief" has
been defined in Section 425 I.P.C. to mean an
act done with intent to cause or knowing that
it is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage
to the public or to any person causes the
destruction of any property etc. In the instant
case
the
evidence
on
record
clearly
establishes that the sugarcane stems in the
fields of the claimants were totally destroyed
by using a tractor, therefore, Section 427
I.P.C. is clearly established. In the instant
case, the allegations have been levelled that
on account of ploughing of crop by the
applicants, the complainant suffered loss
of Rs.50,000/- but the contents of the
complaint and the evidence on record
does not indicate as discussed above.
There is contradiction in regard to the
ploughing of crop and no material in
support of the averments have been
shown or placed on record. It has also not
been disclosed as to who was driving the
tractor. It is also very strange that if a
person suffered a loss of Rs.50,000/-, he
would keep mum for about 9 months,
particularly when the F.I.R. was lodged
by the applicants promptly and on the
very next date of the incident.
8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
317

25. Section 504 I.P.C. provides
'intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of the peace'. It is provided that
whoever intentionally insults, and thereby
gives provocation to any person, intending
or knowing it to be likely that such
provocation will cause him to break the
public peace, or to commit any other
offence,
shall
be
punished
with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both.

26. Section 506 I.P.C. provides
'Punishment for criminal intimidation'. It
provides, whoever commits the offence
of
criminal
intimidation
shall
be
punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both
and if threat be to cause death or
grievous hurt, etc. or to cause the
destruction of any property by fire, or to
cause an offence punishable with death
or [imprisonment for life], or with
imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years, or to impute
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven
years, or with fine, or with both.

27. Criminal intimidation has been
defined under Section 503 I.P.C., according
to which, whoever threatens another with
any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of
any one in whom that person is interested,
with intent to cause alarm to that person, or
to cause that person to do any act which he
is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
any act which that person is legally entitled
to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal
intimidation.

28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another; (2013) 14
SCC 44, has held that Section 504 I.P.C.
comprises of the following ingredients,
viz., (a) intentional insult, (b) the insult
must be such as to give provocation to the
person insulted, and (c) the accused must
intend or know that such provocation
would cause another to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence. It
has been further held that there should have
been an act or conduct amounting to
intentional insult and the mere fact that the
accused abused the complainant, as such, is
not sufficient by itself to warrant a
conviction under Section 504 I.P.C. It is
not the law that the actual words or
language should figure in the complaint.
One has to read the complaint as a whole.
The relevant paragraphs 12 to 14 are
extracted here-in-below:-

"12. Having noticed the scope of
Section 202 Cr.P.C., let us examine
whether the ingredients of Section 504 IPC
have been made out for the Magistrate to
initiate
proceedings.
Section
504
is
extracted for easy reference:

"504. Intentional insult with
intent to provoke breach of the peace.-
Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby
gives provocation to any person, intending
or knowing it to be likely that such
provocation will cause him to break the
public peace, or to commit any other
offence,
shall
be
punished
with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or
with fine, or with both."

13. Section 504 IPC comprises of
the
following
ingredients,
viz.,
(a)
intentional insult, (b) the insult must be
318 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
such as to give provocation to the person
insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or
know that such provocation would cause
another to break the public peace or to
commit any other offence. The intentional
insult must be of such a degree that should
provoke a person to break the public peace
or to commit any other offence. The person
who intentionally insults intending or
knowing it to be likely that it will give
provocation to any other person and such
provocation will cause to break the public
peace or to commit any other offence, in
such a situation, the ingredients of Section
504 are satisfied. One of the essential
elements constituting the offence is that
there should have been an act or conduct
amounting to intentional insult and the
mere fact that the accused abused the
complainant, as such, is not sufficient by
itself to warrant a conviction under Section
504 IPC.

14. We may also indicate that it is
not the law that the actual words or
language should figure in the complaint.
One has to read the complaint as a whole
and, by doing so, if the Magistrate comes to
a conclusion, prima facie, that there has
been an intentional insult so as to provoke
any person to break the public peace or to
commit any other offence, that is sufficient
to bring the complaint within the ambit of
Section 504 IPC. It is not the law that a
complainant should verbatim reproduce
each word or words capable of provoking the
other person to commit any other offence.
The background facts, circumstances, the
occasion, the manner in which they are used,
the person or persons to whom they are
addressed, the time, the conduct of the person
who has indulged in such actions are all
relevant factors to be borne in mind while
examining a complaint lodged for initiating
proceedings under Section 504 IPC."

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Mohd. Wajid Vs. State of U.P.;
(2023) 20 SCC 219, has held that in judging
whether particular abusive language is
attracted by Section 504 I.P.C., the court has
to
find
out
what,
in
the
ordinary
circumstances, would be the effect of the
abusive language used and not what the
complainant actually did as a result of his
peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or
sense of discipline. Mere abuse, discourtesy,
rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an
intentional insult within the meaning of
Section 504 I.P.C., if it does not have the
necessary element of being likely to incite the
person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace of an offence and the other element of
the accused intending to provoke the person
insulted to commit a breach of the peace or
knowing that the person insulted is likely to
commit a breach of the peace. Each case of
abusive language shall have to be decided in
the light of the facts and circumstances of that
case and there cannot be a general
proposition that no one commits an offence
under Section 504 I.P.C. if he merely uses
abusive language against the complainant. In
regard to Section 506 I.P.C., it has been held
that a bare perusal of Section 506 I.P.C.
makes it clear that a part of it relates to
criminal intimidation. Before an offence of
criminal intimidation is made out, it must be
established that the accused had an intention
to cause alarm to the complainant. The
relevant paragraphs 28 to 32 are extracted
here-in-below:-

"28. An offence under Section
503 has following essentials:-

1) Threatening a person with any
injury;

(i) to his person, reputation or
property; or
8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
319

(ii) to the person, or reputation of
any one in whom that person is interested.

2) The threat must be with intent;

(i) to cause alarm to that person;
or

(ii) to cause that person to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do as
the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat; or

(iii) to cause that person to omit
to do any act which that person is legally
entitled to do as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat.

29. Section 504 of the IPC
contemplates
intentionally
insulting
a
person and thereby provoking such person
insulted
to
breach
the
peace
or
intentionally insulting a person knowing it
to be likely that the person insulted may be
provoked so as to cause a breach of the
public peace or to commit any other offence.
Mere abuse may not come within the purview
of the section. But, the words of abuse in a
particular
case
might amount
to
an
intentional insult provoking the person
insulted to commit a breach of the public
peace or to commit any other offence. If
abusive language is used intentionally and is
of such a nature as would in the ordinary
course of events lead the person insulted to
break the peace or to commit an offence
under the law, the case is not taken away
from the purview of the Section merely
because the insulted person did not actually
break the peace or commit any offence
having exercised self control or having been
subjected to abject terror by the offender.

30. In judging whether particular
abusive language is attracted by Section
504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in
the ordinary circumstances, would be the
effect of the abusive language used and not
what the complainant actually did as a
result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the
ordinary general nature of the abusive
language that is the test for considering
whether the abusive language is an
intentional insult likely to provoke the
person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace and not the particular conduct or
temperament of the complainant.

31. Mere abuse, discourtesy,
rudeness or insolence, may not amount to
an intentional insult within the meaning of
Section 504, IPC if it does not have the
necessary element of being likely to incite
the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace of an offence and the other
element of the accused intending to provoke
the person insulted to commit a breach of the
peace or knowing that the person insulted is
likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each
case of abusive language shall have to be
decided in the light of the facts and
circumstances of that case and there cannot be
a general proposition that no one commits an
offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely
uses abusive language against the complainant.
In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai,
(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court pointed out that:-

"To constitute an offence under
Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the
insult is of a kind calculated to cause the
other party to lose his temper and say or do
something violent. Public peace can be
broken by angry words as well as deeds."
(Emphasis supplied)

32. A bare perusal of Section 506
of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it
320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relates to criminal intimidation. Before an
offence of criminal intimidation is made
out, it must be established that the accused
had an intention to cause alarm to the
complainant."

30. In the facts and circumstances of
the present case as discussed above, the
provisions of Section 504 and 506 I.P.C.
cannot be said to have attracted because it
could not be shown that the applicants have
any intention to cause alarm to the
complainant and what exactly was stated
has not been disclosed in the complaint or
the statements of the complainant and
witnesses.

31. In view of above and considering
the overall facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the view that the
learned
Magistrate
has
passed
the
impugned
summoning
order
without
considering the contents of the complaint,
statements and as to whether the aforesaid
offences are prima facie made out or not,
whereas as discussed above they are not
prima facie made out.

32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid
down certain parameters for quashing of the
first information report or the complaint in
para 102 in the case of State of Haryana Vs.
Bhajan Lal; Supp (1) SCC 335, which are
extracted here-in-below:-

"102...."(1)
Where
the
allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the
first
information
report
and
other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted
allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the
accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the
FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence
but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section
155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in
the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express
legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned
Act,
providing
efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding
is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
8 All. Sarfaraj & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
321
with a view to spite him due to private and
personal grudge."

33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Mohd. Wajid Vs. State of U.P.
(Supra), has also considered the above
parameters and further observed that
whenever an accused comes before the
Court invoking either the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
(CrPC)
or
extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution to get the F.I.R. or the
criminal proceedings quashed essentially
on the ground that such proceedings are
manifestly
frivolous
or
vexatious
or
instituted with the ulterior motive for
wreaking
vengeance,
then
in
such
circumstances the Court owes a duty to
look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely.

34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Fiona Shrikhande Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another (Supra), has
held that the Magistrate has to decide the
question purely from the point of view of
the complaint, without at all adverting to
any defence that the accused may have and
the magistrate is not expected to embark
upon a detailed discussion of the merits or
demerits of the case, but only consider the
inherent probabilities apparent on the
statement made in the complaint.

35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Mohanbhai Ganeshbhai Lakhani
& Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.;
Criminal Appeal No(s)........ of 2024
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No(s).10982 of
2023), by means of the judgment and order
dated 16.04.2024 has held that while
considering a plea for quashing of F.I.R., it
will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR
alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed
or
not.
In
frivolous
or
vexatious
proceedings, the court owes a duty to look
into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over
and above the averments and, if need be,
with due care and circumspection try to
read in between the lines and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court found that in the said case
dispute between the parties is admittedly a
civil dispute, which has been given the
colour of criminal case and the civil suit is
also pending between the parties.

36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Paramjeet Batra Vs. State of
Uttarakhand and Others; (2013) 11 SCC
673, has held that while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for
the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure
ends of justice. The relevant paragraph 12
is extracted here-in-below:-

"12.
While
exercising
its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for
the purpose of preventing abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure
ends of justice. Whether a complaint
discloses a criminal offence or not depends
upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged
by the High Court. A complaint disclosing
civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. But the High Court must see
whether a dispute which is essentially of a
civil nature is given a cloak of criminal
offence. In such a situation, if a civil
322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted
as has happened in this case, the High
Court should not hesitate to quash criminal
proceedings to prevent abuse of process of
court."

37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Rikhab Birani & Anr. Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.; (2025) SCC
Online SC 823, has held that the
summoning order has to be passed when
the complaint or chargesheet discloses an
offence and when there is material that
supports
and
constitutes
essential
ingredients of the offence. The summoning
order should not be passed lightly or as a
matter of course. The relevant portion of
paragraph 20 is extracted here-in-below:-

"20.
.............................Further,
there has to be a conscious application of
mind on these aspects by the Magistrate, as
a
summoning
order
has
grave
consequences
of
setting
criminal
proceedings
in
motion.
Though
the
Magistrate is not required to record
detailed reasons, there should be adequate
evidence on record to set criminal
proceedings into motion. The Magistrate
should carefully scrutinize the evidence on
record and may even put questions to the
complainant/investigating officer etc. to
elicit answers to find out the truth about the
allegations. The summoning order has to
be
passed
when
the
complaint
or
chargesheet discloses an offence and when
there is material that supports and
constitutes essential ingredients of the
offence. The summoning order should not
be passed lightly or as a matter of course."

38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Sharif Ahmad And Another vs
State of U.P. and Another; (2024) SCC
Online SC 726, has cautioned the Courts to
check such attempts to make vague and ex
facie false assertions.

39. Adverting to the facts of the
present case, specific case was set up by the
respondent No.2 that there is an old dispute
between the respondent No.2 and the
applicants in regard to the land and the
respondent No.2 is in possession since
1983 and the case before the Consolidation
Officer
and
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation,
Amethi
is
pending
consideration but without considering the
same and making any enquiry in regard to
the same and only on the basis of the vague
allegations
made
in
the
subsequent
paragraphs, the applicants have been
summoned on a complaint filed by the
respondent No.2, admittedly who is an
advocate by profession. In view of the
vague allegations made in the complaint as
well as the statements and contradictions in
them as discussed above and considering
the over all facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the view that the
impugned orders alongwith the proceedings
of the Complaint Case No.9/2019 (new
Case No.22/2019); Mohd.