# Sarvajeet Singh v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 1 ILRA 66
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-01-24
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 41474 of 2024
- **Bench:** Krishan Pahal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sarvajeet-singh-v-state-of-u-p-53057
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302 & 307- Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 - Section 439-Bail - Second
Bail
Application
-
Prolonged
Incarceration - Delay in Trial - Article 21
of the Constitution of India - Accused in
custody for over 7 years and 9 months -
Trial remained stalled due to pendency of
challenge to summoning order under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. before Supreme Court
- Only 3 of 16 prosecution witnesses
examined - No likelihood of conclusion of
trial in near future - Held, prolonged
detention without progress in trial is
violative of right to speedy trial under
Article 21 - Bail not to be withheld as
punishment - Bail granted. (Paras 15,16,
and 17)

HELD:
It is settled principle of law that the object of
bail is to secure the attendance of the accused
at
the
trial.
No
material
particulars
or
circumstances suggestive of the applicant
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of
justice or creating other troubles in the shape of
repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and
the like have been shown by learned AGA. (Para
15)

It is deeply regrettable that the applicant has
been languishing in jail for approximately seven
years and nine months, with the trial having
remained stagnant since 25.10.2019. Such
prolonged incarceration, coupled
with the
complete lack of progress in the trial, is a
serious
infringement
on
the
applicant's
fundamental
right
to
a
speedy
trial
as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. Keeping the applicant in custody under
these circumstances, when there is no realistic
possibility of the trial being concluded in the
near future, is both unjust and unwarranted.
Justice demands that the applicant's continued
detention be reconsidered, and appropriate
relief be granted without delay. (Para 16)

Having heard learned counsels for the parties,
taking into consideration the circumstances of
the instant case as three accused persons are
still absconding, there being no likelihood of
conclusion of trial in near future and the fact
that there are sixteen witnesses to be examined
of
which
three
have
been
examined;
furthermore
in
the
case
of
summoning
additional accused U/s 319 Cr.P.C., the St.ments
of already examined witnesses are to be
recorded again and the trial shall almost
proceed de-novo as also in the light of aforesaid
judgments of the Supreme Court, and without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the
case, the Court is of the view that the applicant
has made out a case for bail. The bail
application is allowed. (Para 17)

Bail application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

66 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and humiliates the victim and where the victim
is a helpless innocent child, it leaves behind a
traumatic
experience.
The
Courts
are,
therefore, expected to deal with the cases of
sexual crime against women with utmost
sensitivity. Such cases need to be dealt with
sternly and severly."

15- The last contention of learned counsel
for the applicant that as per medical
examination report of the victim, there was no
sign of any force is concerned, the same is
misconceived as in supplementary medico-legal
examination report of the victim, final opinion
is reserved pending on the availability of FSL
report and sexual violence cannot be ruled out.
As on date, I do not find any material on record
to presume the false implication of the applicant
and to disbelieve the statements of minor
victim, which is primary for considering the
bail application of accused in rape cases.

16- In Ram Swaroop (Supra) relied
upon by the learned counsel for the applicant,
the nature of assault described by Pws 8 and 9
was inconsistant with medical report. Further
the version given by PW 8 in the course of
deposition was quite different from that he
mentioned in the FIR. Whereas in the instant
case, the statement of the victim and the
informant is intact. Therefore, said case is
distinguishable on the facts of this case, hence
the same is not helpful to the applicant. This
Court is also of the view that each case depends
on its own facts and a close similarity between
one case and another is not enough because
even a single significant detail may alter the
entire aspect. In the light of circumstantial
flexibility, one additional or different fact may
make a word of difference between conclusion
in two cases.

17-The Court must keep in mind while
appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix the
values prevailing in the country, particularly in
rural India. It would be unusual for girl to come
up with a false story of being a victim of sexual
assault so as to implicate an innocent person. In
our country, a minor girl, victim of sexual
aggression, would rather suffer silently than to
falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of a
rape victim is an extremely humiliating
experience for her and until she is a victim of
sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the
real culprit.

18-Considering the overall facts and
circumstances of the case as well as keeping in
view the submissions advanced on behalf of
parties, gravity of offence, role assigned to
applicant and severity of punishment, I do not
find any good ground to release the applicant on
bail.

19-Accordingly, the bail application is
rejected.

20-It is clarified that observations made
herein above are limited to the extent of
determination of this bail application and will in
no way be construed as an expression on the
merits of the case.

21-The trial Court shall be absolutely free
to arrive at its independent conclusions on the
basis of evidence to be adduced by the parties.
----------
(2025) 1 ILRA 66
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KRISHAN PAHAL, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 41474 of
2024

Sarvajeet Singh ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party
1 All. Sarvajeet Singh Vs. State of U.P.
67
Counsel for the Applicant:
Mayank Mohan Dutt Mishra, Sudhanshu
Pandey

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 302 & 307- Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 - Section 439-Bail - Second
Bail
Application
-
Prolonged
Incarceration - Delay in Trial - Article 21
of the Constitution of India - Accused in
custody for over 7 years and 9 months -
Trial remained stalled due to pendency of
challenge to summoning order under
Section 319 Cr.P.C. before Supreme Court
- Only 3 of 16 prosecution witnesses
examined - No likelihood of conclusion of
trial in near future - Held, prolonged
detention without progress in trial is
violative of right to speedy trial under
Article 21 - Bail not to be withheld as
punishment - Bail granted. (Paras 15,16,
and 17)

HELD:
It is settled principle of law that the object of
bail is to secure the attendance of the accused
at
the
trial.
No
material
particulars
or
circumstances suggestive of the applicant
fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of
justice or creating other troubles in the shape of
repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and
the like have been shown by learned AGA. (Para
15)

It is deeply regrettable that the applicant has
been languishing in jail for approximately seven
years and nine months, with the trial having
remained stagnant since 25.10.2019. Such
prolonged incarceration, coupled
with the
complete lack of progress in the trial, is a
serious
infringement
on
the
applicant's
fundamental
right
to
a
speedy
trial
as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. Keeping the applicant in custody under
these circumstances, when there is no realistic
possibility of the trial being concluded in the
near future, is both unjust and unwarranted.
Justice demands that the applicant's continued
detention be reconsidered, and appropriate
relief be granted without delay. (Para 16)

Having heard learned counsels for the parties,
taking into consideration the circumstances of
the instant case as three accused persons are
still absconding, there being no likelihood of
conclusion of trial in near future and the fact
that there are sixteen witnesses to be examined
of
which
three
have
been
examined;
furthermore
in
the
case
of
summoning
additional accused U/s 319 Cr.P.C., the St.ments
of already examined witnesses are to be
recorded again and the trial shall almost
proceed de-novo as also in the light of aforesaid
judgments of the Supreme Court, and without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the
case, the Court is of the view that the applicant
has made out a case for bail. The bail
application is allowed. (Para 17)

Bail application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs St. of Mah.,
2024 INSC 645

2. Gudikanti Narasimhulu Vs Public Prosecutor,
(1978) 1 SCC 240

3. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia Vs St. of Pun., (1980)
2 SCC 565Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2
SCC 1

4. Hussainara Khatoon Vs St. of Bihar, (1980) 1
SCC 81

5. U.O.I. Vs K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713

6. Mohd Muslim Vs St. (NCT of Delhi), 2023
INSC 311

7. Satender Kumar Antil Vs CBI, (2022) 10 SCC
51

8. Indrani Pratim Mukerjea Vs CBI, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 695

9. V. Senthil Balaji Vs Deputy Director, ED, 2024
INSC 739
68 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
10. Sheikh Javed Iqbal Vs St. of U.P., 2024
LiveLaw (SC) 486

11. Partha Chatterjee Vs ED, 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 3729

(Delivered by Hon'ble Krishan Pahal, J.)

1. List has been revised.

2. Counter affidavit filed by learned
A.G.A. is taken on record.

3. Heard Sri Mayank Mohan Dutt
Mishra and Sri Sudhanshu Pandey, learned
counsel for the applicant as well as Sri
Sunil Kumar, learned A.G.A. for the State
and perused the record.

4. Applicant seeks bail in Session Trial
No.480 of 2017 (State vs. Sarvajeet Singh),
pending in the court of Sessions Judge/E.C.
Act, Gorakhpur, arising out of Case Crime
No.156 of 2017, under Sections 302, 307
I.P.C., Police Station- Jhangaha, District-
Gorakhpur, during the pendency of trial.

5. This is the second bail application
on behalf of the applicant. The first bail
application was rejected by the Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court vide order dated
3.12.2020 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail
Application No.33241 of 2020.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
has stated that the trial is not moving ahead
and is at a standstill. There is no likelihood
of conclusion of trial in near future. The
applicant is incarcerated since 23.5.2017,
i.e. for a period of more than seven years
and nine months. The fundamental right of
the applicant enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India stands violated as
he has been incarcerated for a substantial
period of time for no fault of his. The
applicant is ready to cooperate with trial. In
case, the applicant is released on bail, he
will not misuse the liberty of bail.

7. Per contra, the bail application has
been opposed on the ground that applicant
is the main accused person as it was he who
had fired at the deceased person causing his
death.

8. This Court had called the status of
trial from the trial court concerned and the
report of Additional Sessions Judge/Special
Judge
(E.C.
Act),
Gorakhpur
dated
10.12.2024 is on record. Perusal of the said
report reveals as under:

(i) The final report (charge-sheet)
was filed in the instant case on 16.8.2017
and after framing the charge on 25.1.2018,
prosecution evidence was recorded.

(ii) Three witnesses of fact,
namely,
PW-1
Ram
Bilas
Yadav
(informant), PW-2 Farchina Devi (injured)
and PW-3 Kamlesh, were examined in
court on 5.2.2018, 5.6.2018 and 6.12.2018,
respectively, and after that the prosecution
moved an application U/s 319 Cr.P.C. for
summoning the other accused persons who
were exonerated by the police during
investigation, the same was allowed by the
trial court vide order dated 23.7.2019 as
such summoned other five accused persons,
namely, Surya Nath Singh, Pinkal Singh,
Varudhan Singh, Arjun Singh and Meena
Singh U/s 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 323,
504, 506 I.P.C.

(iii)
The
aforesaid
accused
persons challenged the said summoning
order before the Supreme Court by filing
SLP No.9360 of 2019. Supreme Court was
pleased to order for staying the proceedings
of the trial court vide its order dated
25.10.2019.

(iv) The trial court issued nonbailable warrants against the said five
1 All. Sarvajeet Singh Vs. State of U.P.
69
accused persons summoned U/s 319
Cr.P.C. vide its order dated 8.12.2023, as
such, the said order of the trial court was
also placed before the Supreme Court and
the same was again stayed.

(v) The Supreme Court was
pleased to dispose of the said SLP vide its
order dated 21.2.2024, as such, again the
trial court issued non-bailable warrants
against the said 05 accused persons vide
order dated 21.3.2024. In the meantime, the
court was informed that one of the accused
persons, namely, Arjun Singh had expired,
as such, his death report was sent for
verification.

(vi) One of the five accused
persons summoned, Surya Nath Singh
surrendered before the court on 13.9.2024
and his bail application was disposed of on
18.9.2024, but his bail application was
allowed by this Court vide order dated
12.11.2024.

CONCLUSION:

9. Allowing the bail of the accused in
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Another1, the Supreme
Court has observed as follows:

"7. Having heard the learned
counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on
record, we are inclined to exercise our
discretion in favour of the appellant herein
keeping in mind the following aspects:

(i) The appellant is in jail as an
under-trial prisoner past four years;

(ii) Till this date, the trial court
has not been able to even proceed to frame
charge; and

(iii) As pointed out by the counsel
appearing for the State as well as NIA, the
prosecution intends to examine not less
than eighty witnesses.

8.
Having
regard
to
the
aforesaid, we wonder by what period of
time, the trial will
ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a
crime may be, an accused has a right to
speedy trial as enshrined under the
Constitution of India.

9. Over a period of time, the trial
courts and the High Courts have forgotten
a very well settled principle of law that bail
is not to be withheld as a punishment.

10. In the aforesaid context, we
may remind the trial courts and the High
Courts of what came to be observed by this
Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v.
Public Prosecutor, High Court,2. We
quote:

"What is often forgotten, and
therefore warrants reminder, is the object
to keep a person in judicial custody
pending trial or disposal of an appeal.
Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898)
18 Cox]:

"I observe that in this case bail
was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be
too strongly impressed on the, magistracy
of the country that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment, but that the requirements
as to bail are merely to secure the
attendance of the prisoner at trial."

11. The same principle has been
reiterated by this Court in Gurbaksh Singh
Sibba v. State of Punjab,3 that the object
of bail is to secure the attendance of the
accused at the trial, that the proper test to
be applied in the solution of the question
whether bail should be granted or refused
is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is
indisputable that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment.

12. Long back, in Hussainara
Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar4,
this court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal
70 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
charges is "implicit in the broad sweep and
content of Article 21 as interpreted by this
Court". Remarking that a valid procedure
under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is "reasonable, fair and
just" it was held that:

"Now
obviously
procedure
prescribed by law for depriving a person of
liberty cannot be "reasonable, fair or just"
unless that procedure ensures a speedy
trial for determination of the guilt of such
person. No procedure which does not
ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as "reasonable, fair or just" and
it would fall foul of Article 21. There can,
therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial,
and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to
life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The
question which would, however, arise is as
to what would be the consequence if a
person accused of an offence is denied
speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long delayed trial in violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21."

13. The aforesaid observations
have resonated, time and again, in several
judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors.
v. State of Bihar5 and Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak6. In the latter the
court re-emphasized the right to speedy
trial, and further held that an accused,
facing prolonged trial, has no option:

"The
State
or
complainant
prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of
the State or the complainant, as the case
may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in
this country, where the large majority of
accused come from poorer and weaker
sections of the society, not versed in the
ways of law, where they do not often get
competent legal advice, the application of
the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused
demands speedy trial and yet he is not
given one, may be a relevant factor in his
favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his
right to speedy trial on the ground that he
did not ask for or insist upon a speedy
trial."

14. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain
v. State (NCT of Delhi)7, this Court
observed as under:

"21. Before parting, it would be
important to reflect that laws which impose
stringent conditions for grant of bail, may
be necessary in public interest; yet, if trials
are not concluded in time, the injustice
wrecked on the individual is immeasurable.
Jails are overcrowded and their living
conditions, more often than not, appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry's
response to Parliament, the National Crime
Records Bureau had recorded that as on
31st
December
2021,
over
5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against total
capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country.
Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest
4,27,165 were undertrials.

22.
The
danger
of
unjust
imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk of
"prisonisation" a term described by the
Kerala High Court in A Convict Prisoner
v. State reported in 1993 Cri LJ 3242, as
"a radical transformation" whereby the
prisoner:

"loses his identity. He is known
by
a
number.
He
loses
personal
possessions.
He
has
no
personal
relationships.
Psychological
problems
result from loss of freedom, status,
possessions, dignity any autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison
turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner
becomes hostile by ordinary standards.
Self-perception changes."
1 All. Sarvajeet Singh Vs. State of U.P.
71

23. There is a further danger of
the prisoner turning to crime, "as crime not
only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid
to
the
criminal"
(also
see
Donald
Clemmer's
'The
Prison
Community'
published in 1940). Incarceration has
further deleterious effects where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic
strata: immediate loss of livelihood, and in
several cases, scattering of families as well
as loss of family bonds and alienation from
society. The courts therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the
event of an acquittal, the loss to the
accused is irreparable), and ensure that
trials - especially in cases, where special
laws enact stringent provisions, are taken
up and concluded speedily."

15. The requirement of law as
being envisaged under Section 19 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008
(hereinafter being referred to as "the 2008
Act") mandates that the trial under the Act
of any offence by a Special Court shall be
held on day-to-day basis on all working
days and have precedence over the trial of
any other case and Special Courts are to be
designated for such an offence by the
Central Government in consultation with
the Chief Justice of the High Court as
contemplated under Section 11 of the 2008.

16. A three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb8
had an occasion to consider the long
incarceration and at the same time the
effect of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act
and observed as under: (SCC p. 722, para
17)

"17. It is thus clear to us that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional
courts to grant bail on grounds of violation
of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both
the restrictions under a statute as well as
the powers exercisable under constitutional
jurisdiction can be well harmonised.
Whereas at commencement of proceedings,
the courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail but
the rigours of such provisions will melt
down where there is no likelihood of trial
being completed within a reasonable time
and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part
of the prescribed sentence. Such an
approach would safeguard against the
possibility of provisions like Section 43D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole
metric for denial of bail or for wholesale
breach of constitutional right to speedy
trial."

17.
In
the
recent
decision,
Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau
of Investigation9, prolonged incarceration
and inordinate delay engaged the attention
of the court, which considered the correct
approach towards bail, with respect to
several enactments, including Section 37
NDPS Act. The court expressed the opinion
that Section 436A (which requires inter
alia the accused to be enlarged on bail if
the trial is not concluded within specified
periods) of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 would apply:

"We do not wish to deal with
individual enactments as each special Act
has got an objective behind it, followed by
the rigour imposed. The general principle
governing delay would apply to these
categories also. To make it clear, the
provision contained in Section 436-A of the
Code would apply to the Special Acts also
in the absence of any specific provision.
For example, the rigour as provided under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not
come in the way in such a case as we are
dealing with the liberty of a person. We do
feel that more the rigour, the quicker the
72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
adjudication ought to be. After all, in these
types of cases number of witnesses would
be very less and there may not be any
justification for prolonging the trial.
Perhaps there is a need to comply with the
directions of this Court to expedite the
process and also a stricter compliance of
Section 309 of the Code."

18. Criminals are not born out
but made. The human potential in everyone
is good and so, never write off any criminal
as beyond redemption. This humanist
fundamental is often missed when dealing
with delinquents, juvenile and adult.
Indeed, every saint has a past and every
sinner a future. When a crime is committed,
a variety of factors is responsible for
making the offender commit the crime.
Those factors may be social and economic,
may be, the result of value erosion or
parental neglect; may be, because of the
stress
of
circumstances,
or
the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu of
affluence contrasted with indigence or
other privations.

19. If the State or any prosecuting
agency including the court concerned has
no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a
speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21
of the Constitution then the State or any
other prosecuting agency should not
oppose the plea for bail on the ground that
the crime committed is serious. Article 21
of the Constitution applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime.

20. We may hasten to add that the
petitioner is still an accused; not a convict.
The over-arching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed
to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be
brushed aside lightly, howsoever stringent
the penal law may be."

10. The Supreme Court has also
allowed the bail of the accused on ground
of her long period of incarceration i.e. 61⁄2
years and there being no likelihood of
conclusion of trial in near future in the
case of Indrani Pratim Mukerjea v.
CBI10.

11. In the money laundering case of V.
Senthil Balaji V. The Deputy Director,
Directorate of Enforcement11, the accused
was incarcerated for more than 15 months
as such the Supreme Court declared
"inordinate delay in the conclusion of the
trial and the higher threshold for the grant
of bail cannot go together".

12. In a significant judgment of
Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @
Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh12
granting bail to an undertrial prisoner
facing
charges
under
the
Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA),
the
Supreme
Court
held
that
a
constitutional court can grant bail despite
statutory restrictions if it finds that the right
to speedy trial under Article 21 of the
Constitution has been infringed.

13. While granting bail to ex-West
Bengal minister in Partha Chatterjee v.
Enforcement Directorate13, the Supreme
Court reiterated the principle that "a
suspect
cannot
be
held
in
custody
indefinitely
and
that
undertrial
incarceration should not amount to punitive
detention."

"The Court would, nevertheless,
ensure that affluent or influential accused
do not obstruct the ongoing investigation,
tamper
with
evidence,
or
influence
witnesses, namely, actions that undermine
the fundamental doctrine of a fair trial,"
observed the bench.
1 All. Sarvajeet Singh Vs. State of U.P.
73

14. Learned AGA could not bring
forth any exceptional circumstances which
would warrant denial of bail to the
applicant.

15. It is settled principle of law that
the object of bail is to secure the attendance
of the accused at the trial. No material
particulars or circumstances suggestive of
the applicant fleeing from justice or
thwarting the course of justice or creating
other troubles in the shape of repeating
offences or intimidating witnesses and the
like have been shown by learned AGA.

16. It is deeply regrettable that the
applicant has been languishing in jail for
approximately
seven
years
and
nine
months, with the trial having remained
stagnant since 25.10.2019. Such prolonged
incarceration, coupled with the complete
lack of progress in the trial, is a serious
infringement
on
the
applicant's
fundamental right to a speedy trial as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution
of
India.
Keeping
the
applicant
in
custody
under
these
circumstances, when there is no realistic
possibility of the trial being concluded in
the near future, is both unjust and
unwarranted. Justice demands that the
applicant's
continued
detention
be
reconsidered, and appropriate relief be
granted without delay.

17. Having heard learned counsels for
the parties, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the instant case as three
accused persons are still absconding, there
being no likelihood of conclusion of trial in
near future and the fact that there are
sixteen witnesses to be examined of which
three have been examined; furthermore in
the case of summoning additional accused
U/s 319 Cr.P.C., the statements of already
examined witnesses are to be recorded
again and the trial shall almost proceed denovo as also in the light of aforesaid
judgments of the Supreme Court, and
without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the case, the Court is of the view
that the applicant has made out a case for
bail. The bail application is allowed.

18. Let the applicant- Sarvajeet
Singh involved in aforementioned case
crime number be released on bail on
furnishing a personal bond and two
sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the court concerned subject
to following conditions.

(i) The applicant shall not tamper
with evidence.

(ii) The applicant shall remain
present, in person, before the Trial Court on
dates fixed for (1) opening of the case, (2)
framing of charge and (3) recording of
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C./351
B.N.S.S. If in the opinion of the Trial Court
absence of the applicant is deliberate or
without sufficient cause, then it shall be
open for the Trial Court to treat such
default as abuse of liberty of bail and
proceed against him in accordance with
law.

19. In case of breach of any of the
above conditions, it shall be a ground for
cancellation of bail. Identity, status and
residence proof of the applicant and
sureties be verified by the court concerned
before the bonds are accepted.

20. It is made clear that observations
made in granting bail to the applicant shall
not in any way affect the learned trial Judge
in forming his independent opinion based
on the testimony of the witnesses.
----------
74 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2025) 1 ILRA 74
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.01.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.
THE HON'BLE MOHD. FAIZ ALAM KHAN, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 351 of 2005
And
Criminal Appeal No. 532 of 2005
And
Criminal Appeal No. 402 of 2005

Annu Khatik & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
C.L.Yadav, A A Zaidi, Bipin Kumar Rai,
Mohd. Shahnawaz Khan, Nagendra Kumar
Dwivedi,
P.K.
Mishra,
R
K
Dwivedi,
S.K.Srivastava, Sagar Singh, Shatrughan
Yadav, Shri Ram Maurya

Counsel for the Respondent:
Govt. Advocate

A. Criminal Law - Murder - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Section 302 - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 8 - Motive -
In cases based on the direct evidence of
witnesses, the same should be decided on
the basis of the quality and probative
value of such eye-witnesses. Where the
direct evidence is worthy of credence and
can be believed, the question of motive
becomes more or less academic. Motive
does not have a major role to play in cases
based on eye-witness account of the
incident. It assumes importance only in
cases that rest on circumstantial evidence.
Mere absence of proof of motive for the
commission of a crime cannot be a ground
to presume the innocence of an accused if
his involvement is otherwise established.
Prosecution is not obliged to prove those
facts which are either impossible to prove
or are locked up in the mind of the
accused as to what made them commit
the crime. In the instant case, the family
of the deceased and the accused were
having enmity regarding a land. The
accused had made hindrance in the access
of the informant to the said land, and
altercations had occurred many times
regarding the same. (Paras 28, 29)

B. Criminal Law - Credibility of Related
Witnesses - Natural witness - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 3, 118 &
134 - Merely because the witnesses are
close
relatives
of
the
victim,
their
testimonies
cannot
be
discarded.
Relationship with one of the parties is not
a factor that affects the credibility of a
witness. A relative would not conceal the
actual
culprit
and
make
allegations
against
an
innocent
person.
If
the
prosecution witnesses, who claim to have
seen the incident, are natural witnesses
and their presence at the place of
occurrence is natural and cannot be
doubted, then their relationship with the
deceased or the informant is not of much
importance. However, the Court has to
adopt a careful approach and analyse the
evidence to find out whether it is cogent
and credible. (Para 39)

C. Criminal Law
- Murder
- Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Independent witness
- If an independent witness has not been
produced by the prosecution, the same
may not be sufficient to discard the
evidence of other prosecution witnesses,
who in the opinion of the Court, appears
to be the natural witnesses of the
incident. (Para 43)

D. Criminal Law - Murder - Indian
Evidence
Act,
1872
-
Credibility
of
Witnesses contradictions, embellishments
in
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
witnesses - Court must bear in mind the
set up and the circumstances in which the
crime
is
committed,
the
quality
of
evidence, nature and temperament of the
witnesses, the level of understanding and
power of perception and examination of
individual
witness
and
probability
in