# Satendra Singh v. State of U.P. and others

- **Citation:** (2009) 1 ILRA 284
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2009-03-30
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30188 of 2008
- **Bench:** Vineet Saran
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satendra-singh-v-state-of-u-p-and-others-41363
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Punchayat Raj Act 1947-Section 95 (g)-
ceasure of financial Power of elected
village
Pradhan-order
passed
by
authority
other
than
the
Distt.
Magistrate- Preliminary as well as final
Inquiry conducted by same authority-
even the explanation given by Pradhan
not
considered-
held-the
authorities
acted wholly arbitrary manner-order not
sustainable- cost of Rs.50,000/- imposed

Held: Para 19

Democracy in out country begins at the
grass root level with elections of Gram
Pradhan in villages and the same is the
very foundation of out democracy. No
doubt, the District Magistrate has the
power to either cease the financial and
administrative
powers
or
oust
the
democratically elected Gram Pradhan
under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act, but
the said power is to be exercised with
utmost caution and not in a routine
manner at the whims and fancies of the
administrative
authorities,
without
following
the
procedure
prescribed
under the Act and the Rules. The present
case is a glaring example where action
has been taken in gross violation of the
Act and the Rules of 1997 framed
thereunder and a democratically elected
Pradhan has been wrongly kept away
and deprived of this elected office for
several months.

## Text

284 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009

15. We do not find any merit in this
writ petition. On the contrary, we find that
the petitioner is guilty of not only filing
successive writ petition but also of
misleading this Court by twisting and
camouflages. Such an approach by the
petitioner who is well educated person
and had good legal assistance also is
nothing but gross abuse of the process of
law besides wastage of Court's precious
time which could have been utilized for
deciding other deserving cases. Such an
attitude of the litigant deserves to be
curbed. It is a fit case where this Court
must impose exemplary costs so that such
persons may deter from wasting precious
public time which may be utilized for
other substantial matters where the
litigants are waiting for their turn to get
justice.

16. The writ petition is, therefore,
dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/-.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.03.2009

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VINEET SARAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 30188 of 2008

Satendra Singh

...Petitioner

Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri K.R.Sirohi
Sri Ramesh Pundir
Smt. Rekha Pundir
Sri Brijesh Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.S.Diwakar
Sri Govind Saxena
Sri Raj Kumar
S.C.

Punchayat Raj Act 1947-Section 95 (g)-
ceasure of financial Power of elected
village
Pradhan-order
passed
by
authority
other
than
the
Distt.
Magistrate- Preliminary as well as final
Inquiry conducted by same authority-
even the explanation given by Pradhan
not
considered-
held-the
authorities
acted wholly arbitrary manner-order not
sustainable- cost of Rs.50,000/- imposed

Held: Para 19

Democracy in out country begins at the
grass root level with elections of Gram
Pradhan in villages and the same is the
very foundation of out democracy. No
doubt, the District Magistrate has the
power to either cease the financial and
administrative
powers
or
oust
the
democratically elected Gram Pradhan
under Section 95 (1) (g) of the Act, but
the said power is to be exercised with
utmost caution and not in a routine
manner at the whims and fancies of the
administrative
authorities,
without
following
the
procedure
prescribed
under the Act and the Rules. The present
case is a glaring example where action
has been taken in gross violation of the
Act and the Rules of 1997 framed
thereunder and a democratically elected
Pradhan has been wrongly kept away
and deprived of this elected office for
several months.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vineet Saran, J.)

1. The petitioner is an elected
Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Sapnawat,
District Ghaziabad. By an order dated
14.3.2008
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Ghaziabad the financial and
administrative powers of the petitioner
had been ceased. Challenging the said
order, the petitioner filed writ petition no.
16368 of 2008 in which a detailed
reasoned interim order dated 01.4.2008
1 All] Satendra Singh V. State of U.P. and others
285
had been passed whereby the effect and
operation of the order dated 14.03.2008
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate,
Ghaziabad had been stayed. The said writ
petition is pending and the interim order
is also continuing. While passing the
interim order dated 01.4.2008, this Court
had permitted that the formal inquiry may
go on and be concluded expeditiously.
Thereafter, a final enquiry report was
submitted on 12.5.2008. The District
Magistrate then issued a show cause
notice to the petitioner on 17.5.2008,
which was served on the petitioner on
27.5.2008
to
which
the
petitioner
submitted his reply on 11.6.2008. Then,
by means of the impugned order dated
16.6.2008, passed under Section 95)(1)(g)
of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the
petitioner has been removed from the post
of Pradhan. Challenging the order dated
16.6.2008
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate, Gahziabad, this writ petition
has been filed. Subsequently, by an order,
passed under Section 12 (J) of the Act,
one Rajveer Singh has been nominated as
Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat in
question.

2. I have heard Sri K.R.Sirohi,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Ramesh Pundhir on behalf of the
petitioner and learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent. Pleading
have been exchanged and with the
consent of learned counsel for the parties,
this petition is taken up for final disposal
at this stage. Sri A.S. Diwakar along with
Sri Raj Kumar, learned counsel, who
appear for Rajveer Singh, have also been
heard.

3. Sri K.R. Sirohi, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the petitioner has
summarized his arguments in five points,
which are as follows:

(i) The complaint against the petitioner
was not accompanied by an affidavit
which is in violation of Rule 3 of
U.P. Panchayat Raj (Removal of
Pradhans, Up-Pradhan and Members)
Enquiry Rules 1997 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Rules of 1997') . It
is also stated that the complaint was
also not presented to the District
Magistrate directly but to a political
person, who had forwarded the same
to the District Magistrate.

(ii) The preliminary enquiry in the
matter had been directed by the Chief
Development Officer and not by the
District Magistrate and thus the same
was in violation of Rule 2(c) read
with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1997.

(iii) Both, preliminary enquiry as well as
the final enquiry were conducted by
the same enquiry officers, which is in
violation of Rule 5 of the Rules of
1997.

(iv) Neither any charges were framed
against
the
petitioner
nor
any
opportunity to him to rebut the
charges against him, which was in
violation of Rule 6 of the Rules of
1997.

(v) After submission of final enquiry
report the petitioner had submitted
his reply to the District Magistrate on
11.6.2008, which has not been
considered
while
passing
the
impugned order.

4. Learned Standing Counsel had,
however, submitted that the preliminary
286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
enquiry as well as the final enquiry, were
conducted
in
accordance
with
the
procedure prescribed and after it was
found that the petitioner was guilty of
embezzlement of over Rs.1.5 lacs, the
District
Magistrate
has
passed
the
impugned order, which is perfectly
justified in law and does not call for
interference by this Court.

5. Sri Diwakar, who appears on
behalf of the nominated Pradhan, has
however submitted that even if there was
violation of the provisions of any Rule, no
prejudice has been caused to the petitioner
as during the conduct of preliminary
enquiry report, he had been given notice
on 19.2.2008 and as such, this Court
should not interfere with the impugned
order merely on technical grounds.

6. As regard the first point raised by
the petitioner, which is with regard to the
violation of Rule 3 of the Rules of 1997, it
would be appropriate to notice the
aforesaid rule, which is as under:

3. Procedure relating to complaints:- (1)
Any person making a complaint against a
Pradhan or Up-Pradhan may send his
complaint to the State Government or any
officer empowered in this behalf by the
State Government.

(2) Every complaint referred to in subrule (1) shall be accompanied by the
complainant's
own
affidavit
in
support thereof and also affidavits of
all persons from whom he claims to
have received information of facts
relating to the accusation, verified
before a notary together with all
documents in his possession or
power pertaining to the accusation.

(3) Every complaint and affidavit under
this rule as well as any schedule or
annexure thereto shall be verified in
the manner laid down in the Code of
Civil
Procedure,
1908,for
the
verification
of
pleadings
and
affidavits, respectively.

(4) Not less than three copies of
complaint as well as each of its
annexures of this rules shall not be
entertained.

(5) It shall not be necessary to follow the
procedure laid down in the foregoing
provisions of this rule, if a complaint
against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan is
made by a public servant.

7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the
Rules of 1997 clearly provides that every
complaint shall be accompanied by the
complainant's own affidavit in support
thereof. In the present case, admittedly,
the complaint is undated and even though
it is addressed to the Chief Minister and
the District Magistrate, but the same was
not given to the District Magistrate
directly but was forwarded to him by the
President of a political party, on which
action was initiated. In para 24 of the writ
petition, it has been categorically stated
that the said complaint was neither
accompanied by an affidavit of the
complainant nor the complainant had
shorn the same before the Notary. It has
further been stated that the complaints
were not duly verified nor three copies of
the complaint were filed, as required
under Sub-rule (3) and (4) of Rule of
1997. Reply to the said paragraph has
been given in para 19 of the counter
affidavit filed by the State in which a bald
denial has been made, without giving any
specific reply as to whether the complaint
1 All] Satendra Singh V. State of U.P. and others
287
was accompanied by an affidavit or
properly
sworn
or
as
to
whether
compliance of Sub-rule 3,4 and 5 of Rule
3 of the Rules of 1997 had been done or
not.

8. In such view of the matter, the
ground raised by the petitioner that the
complaint itself was in violation of Rule 3
of the Rules of 1997 appears to be correct.
This Court in the case of Mahak Singh
Vs. State of U.P. 1999 (90) RD 433 has in
para 6 of the judgement, held that "the
complaint
was
necessarily
to
be
accompanied by the complainant's own
affidavit in support thereof verified before
a Notary". In another decision of this
Court, passed in Writ Petition No. 36889
of 2008 Smt. Bhoori Devi Vs. State of
U.P. DECIDED ON 28.7.2008 this Court
has held that "The complaint can be
entertained only when the procedure
prescribed in Rule 3 of the Rules 1997 is
specified.................Any complaint which
does not specify the procedure prescribed
under Rule 3 has to be thrown out as not
entertainable."

9. In such view of the matter, since
in the present case, the complaint itself
was not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed under Rule 3 of the Rules of
1997, the authorities ought not to have
taken any action on the basis of such
complaint. As such, this Court is of the
view that the entire action initiated under
Section 95(1)(g) of the Act, in the present
case, was in violation of the procedure
prescribed under law.

10. As regards the second point
raised by the petitioner, which is with
regard to the appointment of the enquiry
officer by the Chief Development Officer
and not by the District Magistrate, Rule 2
(c) of the Rules of 1997 itself specifies
that "Enquiry Officer" means the District
Panchayat Raj Officer or any other district
level officer, to be nominated by the
District Magistrate."

11. In the present case, admittedly, it
was the Chief Development Officer who
had nominated the enquiry officer and not
the District Magistrate. This would be
clear from the reading of the impugned
order itself, as well as from the
preliminary enquiry report (annexure 3 to
the writ petition) which specifies that the
enquiry officers (the District Panchayat
Raj Officer and the Assistant Engineer)
had submitted the report on being
appointed as enquiry officer by the Chief
Development Officer by his order dated
29.11.2007. Along with the counter
affidavit, the respondents have filed a
notification dated 30th April, 1997 which
states that 'the Governor is pleased to
delegate all the powers of the State
Government under clause (g) of subsection (1) of Section 95 of the said Act
no. 26 of 1947, to all the District
Magistrate in Uttar Pradesh within the
local
limits
of
their
respective
jurisdiction.' As such, it is clear that it is
the District Magistrate alone, who can
initiate proceedings under Section 95
(1)(g), including directing holding of
enquiry, and not any other officer.
Accordingly,
the
very
initiation
of
enquiry, in the present case, which has
been done by the Chief Development
Officer and not by the District Magistrate,
was against the prescribed procedure
under the Rules of 1997.

12. With regard to third-point
raised, which relates to preliminary and
final enquiry being conducted by the same
enquiry officer in violation of Rule 5 of
288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
Rules of 1997, the said rule 5 may be
noticed, which is as under:

Enquiry
Officer.-
Where
the
State
Government is of the opinion on the basis
of the report to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 4
or otherwise, that an enquiry should be
held against a Pradhan or Up-Pradhan or
Member under the proviso to clause (g) of
sub-section (1) of Section 95, it shall
forthwith
constitute
a
committee
envisaged by proviso to clause (g) of subsection (1) of Section 95 of the Act and by
an order ask on Enquiry Officer, other
than the Enquiry Officer nominated under
sub-rule(2) of Rule 4, to hold the enquiry.
(emphasis supplied)

13. The later part of the rule
specifies that for the purpose of final
enquiry, the enquiry officer should be
other than the enquiry officer nominated
under sub-rule 2 of Rule 4, which relates
to the preliminary enquiry. In the present
case, admittedly, the preliminary enquiry
was conducted by G. Chandra, District
Panchayat Raj Officer and V.K.Malik,
Assistant Engineer. The same officers
conducted the final enquiry and submitted
the final enquiry report. As such, in the
present case, there has been clear
violation of Rule 5 of the Rules of 1997
also in the holding of enquiry against the
petitioner.

14. As regard the fourth point,
which is with regard to non-compliance of
Rule 6 of the Rules of 1997, inasmuch as
non framing of charges and consequently,
non service of any charge sheet and no
opportunity being given to the petitioner
to rebut the charges, specific averments in
this regard have been made in paras 28,
29, 30 and 31 of the writ petition, to
which there is a vague denial in paras 23,
24, 25 and 26 of the counter affidavit. It
appears that the author of the counter
affidavit had not understood the contents
made in the paragraph of the writ petition
and while replying to the allegation with
regard to non submission of charge sheet
and affording of para 25 of the counter
affidavit is that the show cause notice
dated 17.5.2008 had been issued to the
petitioner,
which
was
sufficient
compliance. A show cause notice was
issued
to
the
petitioner
after
the
submission of the final enquiry report on
12.5.2008. In the counter affidavit it has
not been stated that any charge sheet was
ever given to the petitioner or any
opportunity was given to him by the
enquiry officer to rebut the charges. As
such, it is clear that the enquiry was held
in violation of provisions of Rule 6 of the
Rules of 1997, which gives a detailed
procedure, including the enquiry officer
providing the petitioner with copy of the
complaints and drawing of charges, which
were required to be delivered to the
petitioner and opportunity be given to the
petitioner to submit his reply and file his
written statement of defence and produce
his witnesses etc.

15. From the above, it is clear that
the enquiry was conducted in violation of
the provisions of Rule 6 of the Rules of
1997.

16. As regards the last point raised
by the petitioner, that after submission of
the final enquiry report, the petitioner had
submitted his reply, which was not
considered by the District Magistrate
while passing the impugned order dated
16.6.2008, the specific case of the
petitioner is that after having receiving the
show cause notice dated 17.5.2008 on
27.5.2008, a reply was submitted by the
1 All] Satendra Singh V. State of U.P. and others
289
petitioner on 11.6.2008 9 a copy of which
has been filed as annexure 12 to the writ
petition, with the endorsement of receipt
by the office of the District Magistrate,
Ghaziabad).
The
petitioner
has
specifically averred in paragraphs 15 and
16 that the reply was submitted on
11.6.2008. Reply to the same has been
given in para 11 of the counter affidavit to
the effect that there is no need to reply to
the same and in paragraph 12 to the effect
that enquiry was got conducted and an
enquiry report was submitted without any
political pressure. However, it has not
been denied that the reply to the show
cause notice was submitted by the
petitioner on 11.6.2008. However, in the
impugned order, it has been mentioned
that no reply had been submitted to the
show cause notice given to the petitioner
and thus it was stated in the impugned
order that the petitioner had nothing to
say and the charge of embezzlement of
over Rs.1.5 lacs against the petitioner
stood proved.

17. It is unfortunate that even though
it is not denied that the reply to the show
cause notice had been received on
11.6.2008, in the impugned order it has
been mentioned that no reply had been
submitted by the petitioner. It is thus clear
that the District Magistrate proceeded to
decide the matter without considering the
reply given by the petitioner to the show
cause notice dated 17.5.2008.

18. From the aforesaid, it is clear
that besides the appointment of the
enquiry officer being made in total
violation of provisions of Rule of 1997,
the entire preliminary enquiry as well as
final enquiry had also been conducted in
violation of the Rules and in arbitrary
manner. Further, even the final order
passed by the District Magistrate on
16.6.2008 is totally unjustified, inasmuch
as, the same has been passed without
considering the reply of the petitioner
submitted on 11.6.2208. It is further
absolutely clear from the aforesaid that
the entire action against the petitioner was
motivated and with predetermined mind
to oust the petitioner. This Court does not
want to go into the question as to whether
there was any political pressure on the
authorities, as has been alleged in the writ
petition, but the entire action against the
petitioner and the order passed by the
District Magistrate clearly shows that the
same has been done without having any
regard for the procedure prescribed under
the Act and the Rules.

19. Democracy in out country
begins at the grass root level with
elections of Gram Pradhan in villages and
the same is the very foundation of out
democracy.
No
doubt,
the
District
Magistrate has the power to either cease
the financial and administrative powers or
oust the democratically elected Gram
Pradhan under Section 95 (1) (g) of the
Act, but the said power is to be exercised
with utmost caution and not in a routine
manner at the whims and fancies of the
administrative
authorities,
without
following the procedure prescribed under
the Act and the Rules. The present case is
a glaring example where action has been
taken in gross violation of the Act and the
Rules of 1997 framed thereunder and a
democratically elected Pradhan has been
wrongly kept away and deprived of this
elected office for several months.

20. For the reason hereinabove, this
writ petition deserves to be allowed and is
accordingly allowed. The order dated
16.6.2008
is
hereby
quashed.
The
290 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009
respondents are directed to ensure that
charge of Pradhan of the village is
question is handed over to the petitioner
forthwith.

21. Besides allowing this petition,
since this Court is of the firm view that
the respondents authorities acted in an
arbitrary manner and passed the order
under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act in
complete violation of the provisions of the
Rule of 1997, due to which the petitioner
had to suffer and remain out of office for
a considerably long period. In the facts of
this case, this Court liable to pays costs to
the petitioner. In the facts of this case, this
Court quantifies the cost at Rs.50,000/-
which would be adequate. This amount of
Rs.50,000/-
shall
be
paid
by
the
respondents to the petitioner within two
months from today.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.03.2009

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19196 of 2008

Social
Upliftment
of
Village
Down
Trodden and Health Action, Jaunpur and
others

 ...Petitioners

Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri B.K. Srivastava
Sri Dhiraj Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.P. Kesarwani
S.C.

Indian Stamps Act, 1899, as amended by
Act
No,
9
of
01-Lease
deed
of
agricultural plots for a period of 30
years-with increase of premium at the
rate of 10% after expiring of 10 yearsstamp duty paid as per section 2(16)-
objection that stamp duty payable as per
valuation
of
land-apart
from
contravention of Section 156 and 157 of
UPZALR Act-held-as per Bal Krishna
case-considering guiding principle-stamp
duty properly paid-demand of addition
duty as well penalty-illegal.

Held: Para 17:

Keeping in mind the above proposition of
law, I find sufficient force in the
instrument in question is a 'lease deed'
for agricultural land. The fact that the
said lease has been executed in violation
of the provisions of U.P.Z.A.& L.R. Act
will not affect the relevant Article
relating to the lease for the purposes of
determining the stamp duty. The said
lease may be void or invalid under the
provisions of U.P.Z.A.& L.R.Act or under
any other Act, but so far as the Stamp
Act is concerned, the instrument shall be
chargeable as a 'lease deed'.
Case Law Discussed:
U.P., AIR 1976 Allahabad 476, 1965 SC 1092,
1970 MP 74, 1961 Supreme Court 1047.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Krishna, J.)

1. The present writ petition arises
out of the proceedings initiated against the
petitioners under the provisions of Indian
Stamp
Act.
The
sole
point
for
consideration is whether the instrument in
question which is a lease deed is
chargeable to stamp duty under Article
35(v) or under Article 35 (vi) of Schedule
1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as
amended in the State of U.P by U.P. Act
No. 9 of 2001 w.e.f. 25.4.2001. The
petitioner is a society registered under the
provisions of Societies Registration Act.
The aims and objects of the society is to
render effective services to the poor and