# Sattar Ahmad & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 139
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-12
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 35994 of 2024
- **Bench:** Vinod Diwakar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sattar-ahmad-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54750
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

G.A.

Issue for consideration
Whether the police is empowered to register an
FIR on the basis of a complaint submitted by
the "aggrieved person", carry out investigation,
and thereafter submit a charge-sheet under
Section 31 of the Act, 2005.

Headnotes
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005-sec. 31; Code of
Criminal procedure-sec. 2(d)- Section 2(d)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
explicitly stipulates that a "complaint" does not
include a police report- consequently, a police
report submitted after investigation under the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be treated
as a 'complaint' for the purpose of taking
cognizance under the Act, 2005-if the police
report itself lacks legal foundation- it cannot
form the basis for taking cognizance and
treating it as a complaint amounts to a legal
error- Application allowed.
Held:
Therefore, in the absence of a prior protection
order duly passed by the Magistrate, the police
is not empowered per se to register an FIR
under Section 31 of the Act. The procedural
mandate of the Act requires that the process be
initiated through the civil mechanism envisaged
under Sections 12 to 23 of the Act, and only
upon breach of such an order does criminal
liability under Section 31 of the Act, 2005 arise.
(E-9)

Case Law Cited

## Text

8 All. Sattar Ahmad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
139
private dispute between the parties
rather the allegations which affect the
society at large. While moving the
application seeking withdrawal of the
proceedings and alleging therein that no
such incident has taken place, this gives a
reasonable apprehension to the Court that
the witnesses have either been win over or
have been put under some kind of fear
which compelled them to move such
application in the instant case.

18. In view thereof, though the
parties have entered into the settlement, in
the considered opinion of this Court on the
basis of such settlement as is being alleged,
the proceedings cannot be quashed, which
are affecting the society at large and do not
relate to a private dispute between the
parties. Thus the prayer for quashing of the
proceedings on the basis of the said
compromise is hereby rejected. Since the
proceedings are pending before the trial
court since long and due to the interim
orders granted by this Court in favour of
the applicants, therefore, the trial court is
directed to proceed in the matter as
expeditiously as possible.

19. The instant application is,
accordingly, dismissed. Interim order,
granted to the applicants herein, is hereby
vacated.
---------
(2025) 8 ILRA 139
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VINOD DIWAKAR, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 35994 of 2024

Sattar Ahmad & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Vinod Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Issue for consideration
Whether the police is empowered to register an
FIR on the basis of a complaint submitted by
the "aggrieved person", carry out investigation,
and thereafter submit a charge-sheet under
Section 31 of the Act, 2005.

Headnotes
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005-sec. 31; Code of
Criminal procedure-sec. 2(d)- Section 2(d)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
explicitly stipulates that a "complaint" does not
include a police report- consequently, a police
report submitted after investigation under the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be treated
as a 'complaint' for the purpose of taking
cognizance under the Act, 2005-if the police
report itself lacks legal foundation- it cannot
form the basis for taking cognizance and
treating it as a complaint amounts to a legal
error- Application allowed.
Held:
Therefore, in the absence of a prior protection
order duly passed by the Magistrate, the police
is not empowered per se to register an FIR
under Section 31 of the Act. The procedural
mandate of the Act requires that the process be
initiated through the civil mechanism envisaged
under Sections 12 to 23 of the Act, and only
upon breach of such an order does criminal
liability under Section 31 of the Act, 2005 arise.
(E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC
183
2. Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab,
(2011) 12 SCC 588
List of Acts
1. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
140 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of Keywords
 "complaint"; police report

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Applicant : Vinod Singh, Counsel for
Opposite Party : G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vionod Diwakar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Vinod Singh, learned
counsel for the applicants, Shri Vibhav
Anand Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State,
and perused the material available on
record.

2. The present application has been
filed seeking quashing of the entire
proceedings arising out of Case Crime No.
494 of 2013, under Section 31 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Act, 2005'), registered at Police
Station Swar, District Rampur, which is
presently pending before the Court of Ist
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Rampur.

3. The principal question for
adjudication in this application is whether
the police is empowered to register an FIR
on the basis of a complaint submitted by
the
"aggrieved
person",
carry
out
investigation, and thereafter submit a
charge-sheet under Section 31 of the Act,
2005.

4.
Learned
counsel
for
the
applicants contends that the registration of
an FIR under Section 31 of the Act, 2005,
is legally impermissible, thereby rendering
all
subsequent
proceedings
arising
therefrom void ab initio. It is further
submitted that the procedure adopted by the
then learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate in the present case has not been
in conformity with the settled principles of
criminal jurisprudence and appears to be
procedurally flawed. Apart from other
submissions on merits, learned counsel for
the applicants also submits that the present
application has been filed on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the parties.

5. This Court, by order dated
21.01.2025, directed the then Station House
Officer (SHO), the Investigating Officer
(I.O.), and the officer who had forwarded
the charge-sheet to the Court to remain
present
virtually
through
video
conferencing on the next date of hearing to
explain the reasons for filing the chargesheet under Section 31 of the Act, 2005.

6. In compliance with the aforesaid
order,
Sub-Inspector
Shri
Javed
Ali
appeared virtually and submitted that he
was
not
fully
conversant
with
the
applicable legal provisions at the relevant
time, as he had joined the service only a
month prior to the completion of the
investigation. Circle Officer Shri Ravi
Shankar, who had forwarded the chargesheet, submitted that he had assumed the
charge merely a day before filing of the
charge-sheet
and,
therefore,
sought
leniency for the procedural lapse. A similar
explanation was tendered by the then
Station House Officer (S.H.O.). Upon due
consideration of their submissions and the
circumstances on record, their personal
appearance was exempted. The concerned
officers were accordingly let off with a
stern warning and were duly sensitized to
exercise greater caution, legal awareness,
and diligence in the discharge of their
official duties in the future.

7. By order dated 18.02.2025, this
Court had called for an explanation from
the then learned Magistrate, through the
Registrar General of this Court, who had
8 All. Sattar Ahmad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
141
taken cognizance on the basis of a police
report filed for an offence under Section 31
of the Act, 2005. Upon perusal of the office
report dated 03.03.2025, it transpires that
the said Judicial Officer is presently posted
as Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Ghaziabad.

8. In compliance with the order
dated 04.03.2024, the learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad,
submitted a report stating that, while
serving as the ACJM, Rampur, cognizance
was taken against the applicants on
26.07.2016 in a case arising out of FIR No.
494 of 2013, registered under Section 31 of
the Domestic Violence Act at Police
Station Swar, District Rampur. The report
further mentions that cognizance under
Section 31 of the Act, 2005 was taken by
invoking Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C., which
defines a "complaint," and thereby treating
the police report as a "complaint."

9. In order to assist the Court in
arriving at a just and legally sound
conclusion, learned Senior Advocate Shri
Mangla
Prasad
Rai,
has
graciously
consented
to
render
his
assistance.
Accordingly, he was appointed as Amicus
Curiae to assist the Court in examining the
legal issues involved.

10. Shri Mangla Prasad Rai,
learned Amicus Curiae, submitted that
under Section 154(1) of the Cr.P.C., the
police is empowered to register an FIR,
investigate the matter, and, upon submission
of the charge-sheet, the Magistrate may take
cognizance of offences, except in those
categories of cases where there exists an
explicit bar on the Court to take cognizance
unless a complaint is made by the appropriate
authority or by a person duly authorized by
the central or state government. In the present
case, it was submitted that the learned ACJM
could have taken cognizance only on an
application filed before the Court under
Section 12 of the Act, 2005, by the
"aggrieved person", and not on the police
report, expressly barred by Section 2(d)
CrPC.

11. He further submitted that an
"aggrieved person" may file a complaint
before a service provider, a police officer, or
a Magistrate, and the respective duties of
these authorities are set out under Section 5
of the Act, 2005. However, the learned
Amicus Curiae emphasized that the offence
under Section 31 of the Act, 2005, stands on
a distinct footing, and the police is
empowered to register an FIR only in
instances involving a breach of a protection
order.

11.1 In this context, the learned
Amicus Curiae further contented that Section
2(a) of the Act, 2005 defines an "aggrieved
person" as any woman who is, or has been,
in
a
domestic
relationship
with
the
respondent and claims to have suffered
domestic violence by the respondent. Section
2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
defines a "complaint" as any allegation made
orally or in writing to a Magistrate with the
intention of initiating action under the Code,
excluding a police report. Rule 2(b) of the
Domestic Violence Rules, 2006, defines a
"complaint" as any allegation, either oral or
written, made by any person to the Protection
Officer.
Collectively,
these
provisions
distinguish between who can seek protection
under the Act, 2005 and the formal modes of
initiating legal action, either before a
Magistrate or a Protection Officer.

12. As per Section 4 of the Act,
2005 any person who has reason to believe
that an act of domestic violence has been,
142 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or is being, or is likely to be committed,
may give information about it to the
concerned
Protection
Officer.
And
thereafter the Protection Officer would
assist the Magistrate and to the "aggrieved
person" either by approaching to the
Magistrate by way of filing an application
or by preparing the "incident report" and
forwarding the same to the Magistrate and
a Police Officer, Protection Officer, Service
Provider or Magistrate who has received a
complaint of domestic violence or person at
the place of incident of domestic violence
or when the incident of domestic violence
reported to him, shall inform to the
"aggrieved person" about his legal rights
to approach to the Magistrate by way of
filing an application under Section 12 of
the Act, 2005, or to the police for
registration of FIR under Indian Penal
Code or other Special Act, like Dowry
Prohibition Act etc.

13. The Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, is a
significant piece of beneficial social
welfare legislation enacted to provide
effective protection to women who are
victims
of
violence
within
domestic
relationships.
The
Act
adopts
a
comprehensive definition of 'domestic
violence', encompassing physical, sexual,
verbal, emotional, and economic abuse.

14. Notably, the Act, 2005 does not
contain any specific provision empowering
the police to register a First Information
Report (FIR) solely under its provisions.
Instead, where the acts complained of
amount to cognizable offences under penal
law-such as cruelty, assault, criminal
intimidation,
or
dowry-related
harassment-an FIR can be registered
under the relevant provisions of the IPC,
and investigated accordingly, except in
instances invoking breach of protection
order.

15. The Supreme Court in V.D.
Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot1 has held that
that the civil remedies provided under the
Domestic Violence Act coexist with
criminal remedies available under general
penal law. Further, the Supreme Court in
Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab2
clarified that the Domestic Violence Act
primarily envisages civil reliefs and does
not, by itself, create criminal liability
unless read with corresponding provisions
of the IPC. Thus, while the Act provides a
civil adjudicatory framework, criminal
prosecution for acts constituting domestic
violence must be pursued under the
substantive provisions of the IPC or other
applicable criminal statutes.

16. Section 31 of the Protection of
Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005, provides that any breach of a
protection order or an interim protection
order by the respondent shall constitute a
cognizable
and
non
bailable-offence,
punishable with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
one year, or with a fine which may extend
to twenty thousand rupees, or both. The
underlying object of this provision is to
ensure
the
effective
enforcement
of
"protection orders" and to deter any act of
non-compliance by the respondent.

17. Sub-section (2) of Section 31 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, provides that, as far as
practicable, the offence of breach of a
protection order under sub-section (1) shall
be tried by the same Magistrate who
originally passed the said order. Crucially,
an offence under Section 31 arises only
upon the violation of a "protection order"
8 All. Sattar Ahmad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
143
or "interim protection" order duly issued
by the Magistrate. It is only such a breach
that is treated as a cognizable offence under
the Act. In the absence of such an order, no
cognizable offence under Section 31 can be
said to exist.

18. Therefore, in the absence of a
prior protection order duly passed by the
Magistrate, the police is not empowered
per se to register an FIR under Section 31
of the Act. The procedural mandate of the
Act requires that the process be initiated
through the civil mechanism envisaged
under Sections 12 to 23 of the Act, and
only upon breach of such an order does
criminal liability under Section 31 of the
Act, 2005 arise.

19. The explanation furnished by
the
then
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Rampur, is found to be legally
untenable. Section 2(d) of the Code of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973,
explicitly
stipulates that a "complaint" does not include
a police report. Consequently, a police report
submitted after investigation under the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 cannot be
treated as a 'complaint' for the purpose of
taking cognizance under the Act, 2005. If the
police report itself lacks legal foundation, it
cannot form the basis for taking cognizance
and treating it as a complaint amounts to a
legal error. Therefore, the explanation offered
by the learned Additional District and
Sessions Judge is legally flawed and without
merit. He has accordingly been cautioned and
warned to exercise due care and apply proper
judicial mind in future while discharging
judicial functions. Mere submission of an
explanation cannot validate a legal or
procedural illegality.

20. In view of the aforesaid facts
and circumstances, charge-sheet No. 47 of
2014 dated 14.2.2014, the cognizance order
dated 26.7.2016, as well as the entire
proceedings of Case No. 1660 of 2016,
State v. Sattar Ahmad & Ors, arising out of
Case Crime No. 494 of 2013 under Section
31 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, registered at
P.S. Swar, District Rampur, and pending
before the Court of the Ist Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Rampur, are hereby
quashed.
Accordingly,
the
application
stands allowed.

21. Parting with the case, this
Court finds it necessary to issue a detailed
order due to the erroneous justification
provided by the learned District and
Sessions Judge for taking cognizance under
Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. in a matter that,
by law, can only be tried as a complaint
case after the "aggrieved person" files
an application under Section 12 of the
Domestic Violence Act, 2005-a basic
and routine judicial exercise carried out
by the learned Magistrates. While this
Court acknowledges the overburdened
nature of Magistrates' Courts, had the
learned Additional District and Sessions
Judge's explanation been based on a
simple mistake of fact or oversight, this
Court would have refrained from issuing
a detailed order. However, the erroneous
explanation
provided
by
a
senior
member
of
the
District
Judiciary
necessitates a thorough review, thereby
prompting this Court to pass the present
detailed order.

22.
Registrar
(Compliance)
is
hereby directed to forward a copy of this
order to the then ACJM, Rampur, who had
passed the impugned order and is presently
posted as Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Ghaziabad.
---------
144 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2025) 8 ILRA 144
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR PACHORI, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 40906 of 2022

Taj Karan Meena ...Applicant
Versus
Union of India & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Mithilesh
Kumar
Shukla,Shiv
Sagar
Singh,Sudhir Kumar Shukla

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.,Nand Lal

Issue for consideration
Matter pertains to criminal proceedings if
accused exonerated in disciplinary proceedings.

Headnotes
If an accused has been exonerated and held
innocent in the disciplinary proceedings - the
criminal prosecution premised on the same/
identical set of allegations cannot be permitted
to continue-the allegations against the applicant
has already been tested during the disciplinary
proceedings- no pre- summoning evidence with
regard to offence, as alleged against the
applicant- Application allowed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited

1. P.S. Rajya vs. State of Bihar, 1996 9 SCC 1
2. Jagdish Singh @ Jagdish Kumar Singh vs.
State of U.P. and Another, 2024 0 Supreme (All)
1358
3. Suneeti Toteja vs. State of U.P. and Another,
2025 LawSuit (SC) 276
4. Illias Vs. The Collector of Customs, Madras
1968 0 Supreme (SC) 305
5. Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
1973 0 Supreme (MP) 62
6. Badri Vishal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
1969 0 Supreme (MP) 117
7. State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal
and others (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335)
8. Ashoo Surendranath Tewari Vs. Deputy
Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and
Another, (2020) 9 SCC 636;
9. Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West
Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581
10. J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy Vs. Directorate of
Enforcement (2022) 7 SCC 370

List of Acts
1. Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act,
1966
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

List of Keywords
Cognizance/summoning order; exonerated in
the
Departmental
enquiry;
pre-summoning
evidence;
preponderance
of
probability;
standard of proof required to establish the guilt
is far higher than the standard of proof required
to
establish
the
guilt
in
departmental
proceedings;

Appearances of parties
Petitioner Counsels-Mithilesh Kumar Shukla,
Shiv Sagar Singh, Sudhir Kumar Shukla,
Respondent Counsels-A.G.A., Nand Lal

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar
Pachori, J.)

1. Present application under Section
482 of Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C." has
been filed with a prayer to quash the entire
proceedings of Criminal Case No. 252 of
2022, arising out of Case Crime No. 17 of
2021, under Section 3/4 of Railway
Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966,
Police Station R.P.F. Ghaziabad, District
Ghaziabad,
as
well
as
cognizance/summoning
order
dated
8.2.2022,
pending
in
the
court
of
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
(N.R.), Ghaziabad.

2. Brief facts of the case are that
complaint dated 10.10.2021 has been filed