# Satya Pal Singh and others v. M.A.C.T./F.T.C., IId Saharanpur and others

- **Citation:** (2002) 3 ILRA 891
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2002-09-11
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 37931 of 2002
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhushan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satya-pal-singh-and-others-v-m-a-c-t-f-t-c-iid-saharanpur-and-others-40031
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Motor Vehicle Act- 1988- Section 166
(3)- Limitation for filing claim petition-
accident took place on 19.4.02- claim
filed on 19.4.01- rightly rejected- in view
of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme
Court AIR 1996 SC 2155- No Limitation
prescribed.

Held- Para 6 and 9
Case law discussed:
AIR 1999 SC-3502, AIR 1966 SC-2155, AIR
1991 SC 2156

From the above pronouncement of the
apex court it is clear that in view of the
amendment made by the Amendment
Act 54 of 1994 there was no limitation
for filing an application in respect of any
accident. The apex court also; held that
when sub section (3) of Section 166 has
been omitted then the Tribunal has to
entertain a claim petition without taking
note of the date on which such accident
had taken place. The Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal has rightly relied on the
said judgment of the apex court while
rejecting the objection raised by the writ
petitioner.

Present case are fully covered by the
apex court judgment in Dhannalal v. D.P.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
892 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
Vijayvargiya and others (supra). The
application filed by respondent no. 2 was
not barred by time and the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly
decided issue no. 4. None of the
submissions raised by the counsel for the
petitioner has any merit.

## Text

http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
3 All] Satya Pal Singh and others V. M.A.C.T./F.T.C. IId Saharanpur and others 891
thereon have to be exempted. No doubt
compensation has to be given for the
building and trees also, but it does not
mean that exemption from acquisition
must be granted to the building or trees or
the land on which the building stands. If
such a view is taken it can disrupt the
entire scheme for which the land is being
acquired.

18. It may be noted that writ petition
no. 20609 of 1998 had been filed in the
year 1998 whereas these three writ
petitions have been filed in the year 2002.
Thus they are clearly belated and it is not
open to the petitioners to challenge the
notifications under section 4 and 6 at this
late stage.

19. As regards the plea of the
petitioner that they have residential plots
we have discussed this aspect in the
decision of Ram Charittar and others vs.
State of U.P. and others decided on
4.10.2002 and have held that even
buildings or trees can be acquired under
the Land Acquisition Act because the
definition of land under section 3 (a) of
the Land Acquisition Act by a legal
fiction includes building and trees.

20. Thus there is no force in these
petition and they are dismissed. The
interim orders are vacated . No order as to
costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.9.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 37931 of 2002

Satya Pal Singh and others ...Petitioners
Versus
M.A.C.T./F.T.C.,
IId
Saharanpur
and
others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Y.K. Sinha

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Motor Vehicle Act- 1988- Section 166
(3)- Limitation for filing claim petition-
accident took place on 19.4.02- claim
filed on 19.4.01- rightly rejected- in view
of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme
Court AIR 1996 SC 2155- No Limitation
prescribed.

Held- Para 6 and 9
Case law discussed:
AIR 1999 SC-3502, AIR 1966 SC-2155, AIR
1991 SC 2156

From the above pronouncement of the
apex court it is clear that in view of the
amendment made by the Amendment
Act 54 of 1994 there was no limitation
for filing an application in respect of any
accident. The apex court also; held that
when sub section (3) of Section 166 has
been omitted then the Tribunal has to
entertain a claim petition without taking
note of the date on which such accident
had taken place. The Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal has rightly relied on the
said judgment of the apex court while
rejecting the objection raised by the writ
petitioner.

Present case are fully covered by the
apex court judgment in Dhannalal v. D.P.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
892 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
Vijayvargiya and others (supra). The
application filed by respondent no. 2 was
not barred by time and the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal has rightly
decided issue no. 4. None of the
submissions raised by the counsel for the
petitioner has any merit.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashok Bhushan, J.)

Heard Sri Y.K. Sinha counsel for the
petitioners.

1. By this writ petition the
petitioners have prayed for quashing of
the order dated 24.8.2002 and entire
proceedings of Motor Accident Claim
Case No. 71 of 2001 pending before the
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/FTC 2nd
Saharanpur.

2. The facts of the case given in the
writ petition are;

Pawan Kumar son of respondent no.
2 died on 2.5.1992, An application for
compensation in accordance with the
provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
was filed on 19.4.2001. Written statement
was filed by the petitioner in which plea
was taken that application having been
filed after nine years of the alleged
accident, is not maintainable as being
barred by limitation. Issues were framed
by the Tribunal including Issue No. 4 as
to whether the application is time barred.
The Tribunal vide order dated 24.8.2002
held that the application is not barred by
time. The order dated 24.8.2002 has been
challenged in this writ petition.

3. Counsel for the petitioners in
support of the writ petition has submitted
that the question of limitation for filing
application under Motor Vehicles Act has
to be considered with reference to the date
of death. The counsel submitted that at
the time when death took place i.e.
2.5.1992 Section 166 (3) provided:

"166 (3) No application for such
compensation shall be entertained unless
it is made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident.

Provided that the claims Tribunal
may entertain the application after the
expiry of the said period of six months but
not later than twelve months, if it is
satisfied that the applicant was prevented
by sufficient cause from making the
application in time.

4. The counsel for the petitioners has
also placed reliance on the judgment of
the apex court in AIR 1991 Supreme
Court 2156 Vinod Gurudas Raikar v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others
and AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3502
Kerala State Electricity Board and
another vs. Valsala K. and another etc.
Counsel contended that although the
provision of Section 166 (3) has been
deleted by Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
Act 54 of 1994 with effect from
14.11.1994 but said deletion has no effect
on the present case.

5. I have heard counsel for the
petitioners and perused the record. The
only
issue
which
has
arisen
for
determination in the writ petition is as to
whether the application for compensation
under Motor Vehicles Act filed by the
respondent no. 2 is barred by time or not.
There is no dispute that the death
occurred on 2.5.1992 and the application
has
been
filed
on
19.4.2001.
On
19.4.2001 the provision of Section 166 (3)
as quoted above stood deleted by the
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
3 All] Satya Pal Singh and others V. M.A.C.T./F.T.C. IId Saharanpur and others 893
1994. On the date when the application
was
filed
there
was
no
limitation
prescribed under Section 166. This
question is fully covered by the judgment
of the apex court in AIR 1996 Supreme
Court
2155
Dhannalal
vs.
D.P.
Vijayvargiya and others. Facts in the
case before the apex court were that the
appellant met with an accident on
4.12.1990 and the application was filed
for compensation on 7.12.1991. The apex
court in the aforesaid judgment noted the
effect of omission of sub section (3) of
Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act
with effect from 14.11.1994. The apex
court held that the effect of the
amendment with effect from 14.11.1994
that there is no limitation for filing claim
before the Tribunal in respect of an
accident. In paragraphs 6 and 7 the apex
court laid down:

"6. Before the scope of sub section
(3) of section 166 of the Act is examined,
it may be pointed out that the aforesaid
sub section (3) of Section 166 of the Act
has been omitted by Section 53 of the
Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994,
which came in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994.
The effect of the Amending Act is that
w.e.f. 14.11.1994, there is no limitation
for filing claims before the Tribunal in
respect of any accident. It can be said that
Parliament realized the grave injustice
and injury which was being caused to the
heirs and legal representatives of the
victims who died in accident by rejecting
their claim petitions only on ground of
limitation. It is a matter of common
knowledge that majority of the claimants
for such compensation are ignorant about
the period during which such claims
should be preferred. After the death due
to the accident of the bread earner for the
family, in many cases such claimants are
virtually on the streets. Even in cases
where the victims escopes death some of
such victims are hospitalized for months if
not for years. In the present case itself the
applicant claims that he met with the
accident on 4.12.1990 and he was being
treated
as
an
indoor
patient
till
27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom
the Parliament rightly thought that
prescribing as period of limitation and
restricting the power of Tribunal to
entertain any claim petition beyond the
period of twelve months from the date of
the accident was harsh inequitable and in
many cases was likely to cause in justice
to the claimants. The present case is a
glaring example where the appellant has
been deprived by the order of the High
Court from the claiming the compensation
because of delay of only four days in
preferring the claim petition.

In this background, now it has to be
examined as to what is the effect of
omission of sub section 3 of Section 166
of the Act. From the Amending Act it does
not appear that the said Section has been
deleted retrospectively. But at the same
time there is nothing in the Amending Act
to show that benefit of deletion of sub
section (3) of Section 166 is not to be
extended to pending claim petitions where
a plea of limitation has been raised. The
effect of deletion of sub section (3) from
Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an
illustration. Suppose on accident had
taken place two years before 14.11.1994
when sub section (3) was omitted from
section 166. For one reason or the other
no claim petition had been filed by the
victim or the heirs of the victim till
14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not
filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such
accident ? Where a claim petition filed
after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
894 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
Tribunal on the ground of limitation
saying that the period of twelve months
which had been prescribed when sub
section (3) of Section 166 was in force
having expired the right to prefer the
claim petition had been extinguished and
shall not be revived after deletion of sub
section
(3)
of
Section
166
w.e.f.14.11.1994 ? According to us the
answer should be in negative. When sub
section 3 of Section 166 has been omitted
then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim
petition without taking note of the date on
which such accident had taken place. The
claim petitions cannot be thrown out on
the ground that such claim petitions were
barred by time when sub section (3) of
Section 166 was in force. '

6. From the above pronouncement
of the apex court it is clear that in view of
the amendment made by the Amendment
Act 54 of 1994 there was no limitation for
filing an application in respect of any
accident. The apex court also held that
when sub section 3 of Section 166 has
been omitted then the Tribunal has to
entertain a claim petition without taking
note of the date on which such accident
had taken place. The Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal has rightly relied on the
said judgment of the apex court while
rejecting the objection raised by the writ
petitioner.

7. Counsel for the petitioner placed
reliance on the apex courts 'judgment in
the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others
(supra) reported in AIR 1991 Supreme
Court, 2156. In the aforesaid case the
apex court considered the question as to
what will be effect on limitation after
repeal of the old act i.e. 1939 Act. The
apex Court in the aforesaid judgment
considered the provisions of Section 6 of
General Clauses Act for considering the
effect of repeal. The apex court in the
aforesaid case has held that the question
of condonation of delay must, therefore,
be governed by the new law. The
aforesaid case is not attracted in the facts
of present case since in the aforesaid case
the apex court considered the effect of
repeal of old Act and further in paragraph
11 it was laid down that the question of
condonation of delay be governed by new
law. The aforesaid judgment does not
help the petitioner in any manner.

8. The next judgment of the apex
court in the case of Kerala State
Electricity Board and another vs.
Valsala K. and another etc. etc. (supra)
reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court
3502 was with regard to workmen 's
compensation Act, 1923 as amended with
effect from 1995. The question before the
apex court was as to what is the relevant
date for determination of amount of
compensation. The apex court held that
the relevant date for determination is the
date of accident and not the date of
adjudication of the claim. The aforesaid
case relates to determination of question
of compensation payable. It was held that
the workmen immediately after the
accident
became
entitled
for
compensation hence the relevant date is
the date of accident. The amendment
made in 1955 regarding enhancing the
amount of compensation and rate of
interest was held not to be attracted in the
above case. The aforesaid case is clearly
distinguishable and is not applicable in
the present case. The question in the
present case is not the question regarding
determination of amount of compensation
rather the question of limitation for filing
the application. When an application is
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
3 All] Jagdish Singh and others V. The A.D.M. and another 895
filed for compensation the question as to
whether the said application is barred by
time or not, has to be considered with
regard to date on which the said
application has been filed and the law
governing the limitation on the said date.

9. In view of what has been said
above, the facts of the present case are
fully covered by the apex court judgment
in Dhannalal vs. D.P. Vijayvargiya and
others (supra). The application filed by
respondent no. 2 was not barred by time
and the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
has rightly decided issue no. 4. None of
the submissions raised by the counsel for
the petitioner has any merit.

The writ petition lacks merit and is
dismissed.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 1.10.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE K.N. SINHA, J.

Special Appeal No. 516 of 2002

Jagdish Singh and others ...Petitioners
Versus
The Additional District Magistrate and
another

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri A.P. Tewari
Sri S.S. Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri H.N. Sharma, S.C.

Allahabad
High
Court
Rules
1952-
Chapter VIII rule-5- Special Appeal-
Maintainability-
appeal
against
the
judgment of single Judge - arises out
from the order passed by revisional court
under Consolidation of Holdings Act
1953- statutory born emposed by section
4 of the U.P. High Court ( Abolition of
letters Patent Appeal) Act 1962- held-
Special Appeal not maintainable.

Held- Para 8 and 14
Case law discussed.
2001 (2) JLJ page I
In view of the statutory prohibition
envisaged under section 4 of the Act, no
appeal arising from a suit or proceedings
instituted or commenced whether prior
or subsequent to the commencement of
that Section was to lie to the High Court
from a judgment or order of one Judge of
the High Court made in the exercise of
jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or
Article 227 of the Constitution, in respect
of a judgment, decree or order made or
purported to be made by the Board of
Revenue under the United Provisions
Land Revenue Act, 1901, or the U.P.
Tenancy Act, 1939, or the Uttar Pradesh
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950 or the Uttar Pradesh Urban
Area
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms Act, 1956 or the Jaunsar-Bawar
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act,
1956,
or
the
Kumaun
and
Uttarkhand Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1960, or by the Director of
Consolidation
(including
any
other
officer purporting to exercise the powers
and to perform the duties of the Director
of
Consolidation)
under
the
U.P.
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953.

As has already been noticed herein
above, the judgment/order impugned in
the writ petition giving rise to this
Special Appeal had been passed in the
proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation
of Holdings Act, 1953 as amended and
the said order had been passed by the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation
exercising the revisional powers vesting
in the Director of Consolidation. The
order of the learned single Judge under
Appeal has only maintained the order
passed
by
the
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation by dismissing the writ