# Satya Pal Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 3 ILRA 231
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-09-20
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 35034 of 2016
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satya-pal-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44838
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

A. Service Law- Dismissal - It is the
primary
duty
of
the
Disciplinary
Authority to record reason of its own - if
an authority has failed to consider the
reply/explanation to the show cause notice
while dealing with the matter of imposition of
proposed penalty then it is a case where it has
to be held that an authority has virtually failed
to discharge its primary duty. (Para 13)

B. Interpretation of word 'ordinarily' -
'ordinarily' means and includes a situation
where not only the procedure adopted is
followed as per the prescribed one but there
has been due application of mind, to make it
just and fair to hold that there has been due
process of law. (Para 14)

Petition allowed (E-4)

Matter Remitted.

Precedent followed:-

## Text

3 All. Satya Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
231
extension of the said benefit, the same
would not give any fresh cause of action
as the said orders can only be considered
to be a consequence to the initial order of
5th and 6th Pay Revision. Thus all the
aforesaid orders would not, in the opinion
of this Court, give any fresh cause of
action to the petitioner to maintain the
present petition.

28. Accordingly, the preliminary
objection raised by Sri Gupta, learned
counsel for the respondents/Corporation
is upheld. The writ petition is dismissed.
----------

(2019)11ILR A231

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ A No. 35034 of 2016

Satya Pal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Satya Prakash Pandey.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law- Dismissal - It is the
primary
duty
of
the
Disciplinary
Authority to record reason of its own - if
an authority has failed to consider the
reply/explanation to the show cause notice
while dealing with the matter of imposition of
proposed penalty then it is a case where it has
to be held that an authority has virtually failed
to discharge its primary duty. (Para 13)

B. Interpretation of word 'ordinarily' -
'ordinarily' means and includes a situation
where not only the procedure adopted is
followed as per the prescribed one but there
has been due application of mind, to make it
just and fair to hold that there has been due
process of law. (Para 14)

Petition allowed (E-4)

Matter Remitted.

Precedent followed:-
1. Umesh Kumar Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
(2018) 5 ADJ 587 (Para 13)

2. Alld. Bank & others Vs Krishna Narayan
Tewari (2017) 2 SCC 308 (Para 15)

3. Mohammad Yunus Khan Vs St. of U.P.,
(2010) 10 SCC 539 (Para 15)

4. Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs B.
Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 (Para 17)
Present petition challenges orders dated
29.04.2011,
passed
by
Disciplinary
Authority,
27.07.2011,
passed
by
appellate authority, 03.10.2012, passed
in
revision
and
02.05.2016,
while
deciding the representation.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J. )

1. Heard Sri Satya Prakash Pandey,
learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned Standing Counsel for the State
respondents.

2. Invoking the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has
questioned the decision making process in
the matter of disciplinary proceeding
which has culminated in the imposition of
penalty of maximum punishment of
dismissal from service.

3. Briefly stated facts of the case are
that the petitioner, who was working as
232 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Clerk with the Police Department, is
alleged to have been assigned the duty
relating to the files in respect of
compassionate appointments under the
office order dated 26.03.1997. It is
alleged that one Jagan Singh had obtained
compassionate appointment fraudulently
and in the process of preparing forged
documents, the petitioner had a crucial
role being the Clerk dealing with the
cases of compassionate appointments at
that
time.
It
is
alleged
that
the
appointment took place only because of
the involvement of the people working in
the office of the Police Department. The
petitioner was issued with the charge
sheet, to which the petitioner submitted
reply and then the departmental inquiry
was held in the matter. The petitioner
while denied the charges, also duly
participated in the inquiry and in the
inquiry report, the charges against the
petitioner were found to be proved.

4. The petitioner was issued with a
show cause notice to which he submitted
a detailed reply. However, disciplinary
authority relying upon the inquiry report
rejected the reply of the petitioner as not
being satisfactory and imposed major
penalty of dismissal from service vide
order dated 24.04.2011. The petitioner
against
the
said
order
preferred
departmental appeal and then revision and
both the forums dismissed the case of the
petitioner vide order dated 27.07.2011
and 03.10.2012 respectively and finally
the representation filed by the petitioner
under the relevant rules also came to be
dismissed on 2nd May, 2016.

5. Assailing the order passed by the
disciplinary authority confirmed in appeal
and revision, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has argued that the findings
returned by the inquiry officer were
perverse as the petitioner had taken
specific plea to the effect that he had been
handed over the charge relating to the
files of compassionate appointments by
the then dealing clerk only on 20.11.1997,
whereas, the records relating to the claim
of compassionate appointment of Jagan
Singh had already been completed on
19.05.1997 and forwarded to the Police
Headquarter and which is quite proved
from the letter of Police Headquarter
dated 20.05.1997. The further plea taken
was that file of Jagan Singh was not the
file
mentioned
in
the
charge
list.
However,
the
disciplinary
authority,
according to petitioner, dealt with the
reply of the petitioner to the show cause
notice in a quite casual manner and
without referring to the grounds taken and
submissions
made
in
the
reply
questioning the findings returned by the
inquiry officer, has brushed aside the
reply on the ground that the reasons/ facts
stated in the explanation to the show
cause notice, were not of such nature
which might render any help to the
petitioner and therefore, the explanation
of the petitioner, being devoid of reasons,
have been rejected and the penalty of
dismissal has been awarded.

6. He further argues that the
appellate authority has simply affirmed
the order passed by the disciplinary
authority in its order dated 27.07.2011
and therefore, the inherent defect with
which the order of disciplinary authority
suffered, did not stand cured and
therefore, the order of appellate authority
is also liable to be quashed. He further
submits that the authority sitting in
revision has again without discussing any
fact stated in the explanation to the show
cause notice has simply affirmed the
3 All. Satya Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
233
inquiry report and the order passed by
disciplinary as well as appellate authority
and the said order also deserves to be
quashed. The order passed on his
representation has also been questioned
on the same grounds.

7. Per contra, the argument
advanced by learned Standing Counsel is
that the petitioner, in his reply to the show
cause notice, has stated that his reply
already submitted to the charge sheet
should be taken as a reply to the show
cause notice as well and nothing new has
been stated in the explanation submitted
to the show cause notice which could
have required consideration by the
disciplinary authority and, therefore,
according
to
him
the
disciplinary
authority is right in recording fact that the
petitioner having not stated anything new
which would have supported his claim
and would have given benefit to him to
question the inquiry report.

8. In such above view of the matter,
therefore, it is submitted on behalf of the
State that the disciplinary authority has
rightly rejected the explanation submitted
by the petitioner to the show cause notice.

9. It is further submitted that in
matters of disciplinary proceedings, this
Court would not ordinarily interfere in the
findings of fact arrived by the Inquiry
Committee and then affirmed by the
disciplinary
authority
unless
such
perversity is pointed out which would go
to the root of charges to question the
finding on the proof of charges and then
the propriety in conducting the inquiry
and non consideration of such material
aspect as would have vitiated the findings
and would have contributed to the charge
of lack of due procedure to be adopted by
the disciplinary authority rendering entire
action in law being bad. He submits that
there is no such legal error much less a
substantial one traceable in the entire
conduct of disciplinary authority to
interfere with the orders passed by the
disciplinary authority confirmed in appeal
and revision. The writ petition, therefore,
according
to
him, deserves
to
be
dismissed.

10. I have heard learned counsels
for the parties and submissions advanced
across the bar and perused the record.

11. The petitioner has brought on
record the explanation submitted by him
to the show cause notice before the
disciplinary authority. From the perusal of
the reply it is revealed that the petitioner
has questioned the findings of the Inquiry
Committee on various factual grounds
which according to the petitioner, if
considered, would have made the Inquiry
Officer to arrive at a different finding of
fact exonerating him from the charges but
I find that in its order passed by the
disciplinary authority, though various
legal aspects have been mentioned
regarding continuance of disciplinary
proceeding
along
with
criminal
prosecution, but in its ultimate paragraph
no. 3, the authority has recorded finding
only in three lines. The Court fails to
understand as to when the facts were
detailed out in the explanation submitted
to the show cause notice why the
authority has chosen not to refer the same
before arriving at a finding that the reply/
explanation submitted by the petitioner
was not satisfactory.

12. In the above facts and
circumstances, this Court finds merit in
the submissions advanced by learned
234 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
counsel for the petitioner that the
Disciplinary Authority has virtually failed
to address the basic charge in the light of
the explanation submitted by him and,
therefore, it is rightly submitted that the
Disciplinary Authority is not justified in
rejecting the explanation submitted by the
petitioner to the show cause notice in
such a cursory manner.

13. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has placed heavy reliance upon
the judgment of this Court in the case of
Umesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P.
and others (2018 5 ADJ 587, in which
this Court while considering various other
aspects has held that it is primary duty of
the Disciplinary Authority to record
reason of its own and if an authority has
failed to consider the reply/ explanation to
the show cause notice while dealing with
the matter of imposition of proposed
penalty then it is a case where it has to be
held that an authority has virtually failed
to discharge its primary duty. Such an
exercise of power in the said case was
held to be an arbitrary exercise of power
that cannot pass testing the anvil of the
Article 14 of the Constitution. As I have
noticed in the present case that the
Disciplinary Authority while referring to
the various other aspects of the matter in
the order impugned, it was necessary to
refer
the
contents
of
the
reply/
explanation submitted by the petitioner to
the show cause notice, an effort much less
than the discussion on the same. It
appears that the Disciplinary Authority
has got swayed away by the findings
returned by the Inquiry Committee
though that were questioned by the
petitioner in his explanation to the show
cause notice and in a very casual manner
rejecting the same it held in one line that
reply was unsatisfactory.

14. The argument advanced by
learned Standing Counsel that this Court
will not ordinarily interfere in matters of
disciplinary
proceedings
cannot
be
questioned but the issue is what would be
the import of the word 'ordinarily'. In
several English dictionaries the word
'ordinarily' is defined as 'usually' or
'generally'. In my view ordinarily means
and includes a situation where not only
the procedure adopted is followed as per
the prescribed one but there has been due
application of mind, to make it just and
fair to hold that there has been due
process of law. A procedure prescribed
would entail details of various steps to
arrive at a final result but then to make it
worth calling an action not judicially
reviewable, every such steps in the
process of arriving at final result, should
have due application of mind. Findings, in
inquiry, its approval rejecting the reply
and imposition of penalty all require an
articulated effort at the end of the
authorities accountable under the rules. It
is in the above sense if proceedings are
held and the procedure adopted can be
justified that this Court would not
'ordinarily' interfere with the findings
arrived at, by the disciplinary authority.
However, on facts of this case, I do not
see any due application of mind by the
disciplinary authority.

15. The further argument advanced
by the learned Standing Counsel that the
appellate authority has dealt with the
matter of the inquiry report and has found
no error and, therefore, the order of
Disciplinary Authority cannot be accepted
either. The appellate authority has simply
relied upon the findings returned by the
Inquiry Committee and has affirmed the
decision of the Disciplinary Authority
without referring to the explanation
3 All. Manoj Kumar & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
235
submitted by the petitioner. In the case of
Allahabad Bank & others v. Krishna
Narayan Tewari (2017) 2 SCC 308, the
Court has already held that if there is no
proper appreciation at the end of the
Disciplinary Authority and if it has failed
to record any reason for the conclusion
drawn by it and if the appellate authority
has simply referred to the findings
returned by the Disciplinary Authority
and Inquiry Committee, such authority
has also faulted in discharge of its duty
resulting
in
miscarriage
of
justice.
Further, in the case of Mohammad
Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. (2010) 10
SCC 539, the Court has already held that
if there is a defect at the initial stage
rendering proceedings bad, null and void,
such an inherent defect with which the
order suffers, cannot be cured at the
appellate stage. So also, in my view, the
orders passed by the authority in revision
and representation are bad and deserves to
be set aside.

16. In view of the above, the writ
petition succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The orders passed by the Disciplinary
Authority dated 29th April, 2011 and of
the appellate authority dated 27th July,
2011 and of the authority deciding the
revision dated 3rd October, 2012 and 2nd
May, 2016, Annexures- 2, 3, 5 and 7
respectively are hereby quashed.

17. The matter is remitted to the
Disciplinary Authority to revisit the
matter from the stage of show cause
notice and explanation already submitted
by the petitioner. The status of the
petitioner shall be that of the suspended
employee in the light the of judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Managing
Director,
Ecil,
Hyderabad
v.
B.
Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, and shall
be abide by the ultimate decision to be
taken by the Disciplinary Authority as
directed hereinabove within a period of
three months from the date of production
of certified copy of this order.
----------

(2019)11ILR A235

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL , J.

Civil Misc .Writ Petition No. 35705 of 2013
Connected with
WRIT -A No.43960 of 2012

Manoj Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Irshad Ali, Sri Ashok Khare, Sri Deepak
Kumar Srivastava, Sri Sidharth Khare, Sri
Utkarsh Birla.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Vishal Tandon.

A.ServiceLaw-Appointment/Recruitment
- Irrigation Department Patrols Service
Rules, 1953: Rule 5, 12, 14, 15 - 'Wait
list' is not 'wait list in perpetuity'.

Petitioners approached the Court in the year
2013-14
for
appointment
against
four
vacancies which occurred in the year 2012-13,
on the basis of a 'wait list' dated 21.10.2011.
High Court held that the expression "wait list"
(wait list of approved candidates) used in Rule
14 to the list which is prepared for the
purpose of appointment under sub-rule (1) &
(2) of Rule 15 cannot be given the meaning as
contended by the petitioners, of being a "wait
list in perpetuity" for substantive appointment
against the future vacancies. (Para 33, 36)