# Satya Prakash Rai v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 1751
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-17
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 68437 of 2009
- **Bench:** Neeraj Tiwari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satya-prakash-rai-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45234
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - termination - U.P.
Police
Officers
of
the
Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1991 - Rule 8(2)(b) - Constitution of
India - Article 311 (2)(b) - while
dispensing
with
the
inquiry,
it
is
necessary to record reasons in writing -
order cannot be passed on the basis of
previous service record as well as
without recording reasons - impugned
order dated 31.8.2009 - bad in law -
set aside.
(Para9, 25)

Petitioner was terminated from service by
exercising the power under Rule 8(2)(b) of
the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991
- no reasons have been recorded - passed
only on the basis of previous service record -
which is contrary to the provisions of Rule
8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 as well as Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India .
(Para2,24)

Held:- Order of termination cannot be
passed on the basis of punishment or past
service record without providing opportunity
of hearing and further while passing any
order under Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991
reasons have to be recorded by authority in
writing as to why inquiry is not reasonably
practicable. (Para-23)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. Satya Prakash Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1751
(2020)02ILR A1751

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.12.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.

Writ A No. 68437 of 2009

Satya Prakash Rai ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Nisheeth Yadav, Sri C.B. Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - termination - U.P.
Police
Officers
of
the
Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1991 - Rule 8(2)(b) - Constitution of
India - Article 311 (2)(b) - while
dispensing
with
the
inquiry,
it
is
necessary to record reasons in writing -
order cannot be passed on the basis of
previous service record as well as
without recording reasons - impugned
order dated 31.8.2009 - bad in law -
set aside.
(Para9, 25)

Petitioner was terminated from service by
exercising the power under Rule 8(2)(b) of
the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate
Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991
- no reasons have been recorded - passed
only on the basis of previous service record -
which is contrary to the provisions of Rule
8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 as well as Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India .
(Para2,24)

Held:- Order of termination cannot be
passed on the basis of punishment or past
service record without providing opportunity
of hearing and further while passing any
order under Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991
reasons have to be recorded by authority in
writing as to why inquiry is not reasonably
practicable. (Para-23)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

1. Union of India and another Vs. Tulsiram
Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416,

2. Chief Security Officer and others Vs.
Singasan Rabi Das, 1991 (1) SCC 729,

3. Jaswant Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
others, (1991) 1 SCC 362,

4. Bishambher Singh Bhadoria Vs. State of
U.P. and others, 2008 (4) ESC 2872 All,

5. Sudesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and
others, (2005) 11 SCC 525,

6. Raksh Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. and
another,2009 (5) ADJ 735 and

7. Yadunath Singh Vs. State of U.P. and
others, 2009 (9) ADJ 86 (DB)

8. Indu Bhushan Dwivedi Vs. State of
Jharkhand and another , 2010 (126) FLR 994

9. Mohd Yunus Khan Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and others , (2010) 10 SCC 539

(Delivered by Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Nisheeth Yadav,
learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned
Standing
Counsel
for
the
respondents.

2. Pleadings have been exchanged
between the parties. With the consent of
parties, writ petition is being decided at
the admission stage itself.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
is assailing the impugned order dated
1752 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
31.8.2009 by which he was terminated
from service by exercising the power
under Rule 8(2)(b) of the U.P. Police
Officers
of
the
Subordinate
Ranks
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991
(hereinafter referred to as Rules, 1991). He
submitted
that
petitioner
is
having
qualification of Intermediate and he was
recruited
as
Police
Constable
on
11.12.1984. During the course of service,
several disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against him in which he was
given minor punishment. He further
submitted that there is allegation against
the petitioner that he was off duty, he has
taken excess liquor and scuffled with the
colleagues and due to this reason,
considering his past conduct, impugned
order has been passed by exercising power
under Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991. He next
submitted
that
in
case
of
termination/dismissal order passed under
Rule 8(2)(b), it is required on the part of
Disciplinary Authority to record reasons in
writing that reasonably it is not practicable
to hold inquiry. Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules,
1991 is pari materia to Article 311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India. He further
submitted that no such reasons was
recorded and only considering his past
conduct, order of termination has been
passed. He next submitted that in light of
judgments of Apex Court in the cases of
Indu Bhushan Dwivedi Vs. State of
Jharkhand and another reported in 2010
(126) FLR 994 and Mohd Yunus Khan
Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others
reported in (2010) 10 SCC 539 wherein
the Apex Court held that for imposing
punishment, Disciplinary Authority cannot
consider his past adverse record or
punishment
without
giving
him
an
opportunity to explain his position. Lastly,
he submitted that in case reasons are not
recorded, order passed under Rule 8(2)(b)
of Rules, 1991 is bad and liable to be set
aside.

4. In support of his contention, he
has placed reliance upon the judgments of
Apex Court as well as this Court in the
cases of Union of India and another v.
Tulsiram Patel; AIR 1985 SC 1416, Chief
Security Officer and others v. Singasan
Rabi Das; 1991 (1) SCC 729, Jaswant
Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others;
(1991) 1 SCC 362, Bishambher Singh
Bhadoria Vs. State of U.P. and others;
2008(4) ESC 2872 All, Sudesh Kumar v.
State of Haryana and others; (2005) 11
SCC 525, Raksh Pal Singh Vs. State of
U.P. and another; 2009 (5) ADJ 735 and
Yadunath Singh Vs. State of U.P. and
others; 2009 (9) ADJ 86 (DB) in which
Courts have held that even if reason is
assigned that has to be based on germane
grounds and not ipse dixit of the
disciplinary authority. It has to be
supported by the evidence.

5.

Learned
Standing
Counsel
appearing for the respondents submitted
that considering the past conduct of
petitioner, there is no need to conduct
enquiry and order has rightly been passed
by exercising power under Rule 8(2)(b) of
Rules, 1991, therefore, there is no
illegality in the order and Disciplinary
Authority has rightly passed the order.

6. I have considered the rival
submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the judgments
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
parties.

7. The facts of the case are not
disputed. Even in the counter affidavit,
there is no denial of the fact that as
required under Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991
reasons have not been recorded by the
2 All. Satya Prakash Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1753
Disciplinary Authority while passing the
impugned order.

8. Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 as well as
Article 311 (2)(b) of Constitution of India
reads as under:-

Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991

"8 (2)(b) Where the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove a person or
to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason to be recorded by that authority in
writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold
such inquiry."

Article 311 (2)(b) of Constitution
of India

"311 (2)(b) Where the authority
empowered to dismiss or remove a person or
to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason to be recorded by that authority in
writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold
such inquiry."

9. By perusal of Rule 8(2)(b) of Rules,
1991 as well as Article 311 (2)(b) of
Constitution of India, it is absolutely clear that
while dispensing with the inquiry, it is
necessary to record reasons in writing.

10. The issues, whether on the basis of
past service record any punishment order can
be passed or not and recording reasons to
dispense with the inquiry as provided under
Rule 8 (2)(b) of Rules, 1991 as well as Article
311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India came
many times before this Court as well as Apex
Court and Courts have decided the same.

11. The Apex Court in the matter of
Indu Bhushan Dwivedi (Supra) has clearly
held that if any employee is found guilty of
misconduct, Disciplinary Authority cannot
consider
his
past
adverse
record
for
punishment without giving opportunity of
hearing. Relevant paragraph no.20 of the said
judgment is being quoted hereinbelow:-

"20. An analysis of the two
judgments shows that while recommending or
imposing punishment on an employee, who is
found
guilty
of
misconduct,
the
disciplinary/competent
authority
cannot
consider
his
past
adverse
record
or
punishment without giving him an opportunity
to explain his position and considering his
explanation. However, such an opportunity is
not required to be given if the final punishment
is lesser than the proposed punishment."

12. Again in the matter of Mohd Yunus
Khan (Supra), Supreme Court reiterated the
same ratio of law. Relevant paragraph no.34 of
the
said
judgment
is
being
quoted
hereinbelow:-

"34. The courts below and the
statutory authorities failed to appreciate that if
the disciplinary authority wants to consider the
past conduct of the employee in imposing a
punishment, the delinquent is entitled to notice
thereof and generally the charge-sheet should
contain such an article or at least he should be
informed of the same at the stage of the show
cause notice, before imposing the punishment."

13. Apex Court in the matter of
Tulsiram Patel (Supra) has considered and
ruled that while dispensing with the inquiry it
is incumbent upon the authority to record
reasons as to why inquiry is reasonably not
practicable to hold. Relevant paragraph is
being quoted hereinbelow:-

"The language precedent for the
application of clause(b) the satisfaction of
the disciplinary authority that "it is not
reasonably practicable to hold" the
1754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of
Article 311...

"Thus,
whether
it
was
practicable to hold the inquiry or not must
be judged in the context of whether it was
reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a
total or absolute impracticability, which is
required by clause (b). What is requisite is
that the holding of the inquiry is not
practicable in the opinion of a reasonable
man taking a reasonable view of the
prevailing situation."

"........The reasonable practicability
of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment
to be made by the disciplinary authority."

".......A disciplinary authority is not
expected to dispense with a disciplinary
inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior
motives or merely in order to avoid the holding
of an inquiry or because the Department's case
against the Government servant is weak and
must fail."

14. The Supreme Court further
held:-

"The second condition necessary
for the valid application of clause (b) of
the second proviso is that the disciplinary
authority should record in writing its
reason for its satisfaction that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry
contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a
Constitutional obligation and if such
reason is not recorded in writing, the
order dispensing with the inquiry and the
order of penalty following thereupon
would both be void and unconstitutional.

It is obvious that the recording
in writing of the reason for dispensing
with the inquiry must precede the order
imposing the penalty."

15. The Supreme Court further went
on to say:-

"If the Court finds that the
reasons are irrelevant, then the recording
of its satisfaction by the disciplinary
authority would be an abuse of power
conferred upon it by clause (b) and would
take the case out of the purview of that
clause and the impugned order of penalty
would stand invalidated."

16. In Chief Security Officer
(Supra), the Supreme Court held that there
was a total absence of sufficient material
or good ground for dispensing with the
inquiry and accordingly held that the order
of termination dispensing with the inquiry
was illegal.

17. In the matter of Jaswant
Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court
held:-

"It was incumbent on the
respondents to disclose to the Court
the material in existence at the date of
the passing of the impugned order in
support of the subjective satisfaction
recorded by respondent No.3, in the
impugned order. Clause (b) of the
second proviso to Article 311(2) can be
invoked only when the authority is
satisfied from the material place before
him
that
it
is
not
reasonably
practicable to hold a departmental
inquiry."

18. The Supreme Court further held:

"The decision to dispense with
the
departmental
inquiry
cannot,
therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit
of the concerned authority. When the
satisfaction of the concerned authority is
questioned in a Court of law, it is
incumbent on those who support the order
to show that the satisfaction is based on
2 All. Satya Prakash Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1755
certain objective facts and is not the
outcome of the whim of caprice of the
concerned officer."

19. Following the judgments of
Apex Court, this Court in the matter of
Bishambher Singh Bhadoria (Supra)
has allowed the writ petition by quashing
the order of termination. Relevant
paragraphs no. 13 & 14 of the said
judgment are being quoted hereinbelow:-

"13. In view of the aforesaid, I
am of the opinion that the impugned
order of termination does not contain
sufficient reasons for dispensing with the
inquiry. The charges so leveled are such
that it can easily be enquired through a
departmental enquiry. It is not a case
where it could be said that it was not
reasonably
practicable
to hold
an
inquiry. In my opinion, the decision of
the disciplinary authority was wholly
arbitrary.
The
reasons
given
for
dispensing with the enquiry was wholly
irrelevant. I am of the view that the
disciplinary authority has misused the
provision of Rule 8(2)(b) of the Rules.
Similar view was taken by me in Dharam
Pal Singh Vs. State of U.P. And others,
2005(1) ESC 566 and in writ petition
No.33057 of 2006, Virendra Kumar
Premi v. State of U.P. And another,
decided on 7.8.2008.

14. In view of the aforesaid, the
exercise of the powers under Rule
8(2)(b)
of
the
Rules
was
totally
arbitrary. Consequently, the impugned
order
terminating
the
services
of
petitioners cannot be sustained and is
quashed. The writ petitions are allowed
and the matter is remitted to the
authority to proceed from the stage prior
to passing of the impugned order and
conclude the inquiry and pass a final
order within six months from the date of
the production of a certified copy of this
order."

20. In the matter of Sudesh Kumar
(Supra), the Supreme Court observed as
follows:-

"It is now established principle
of law that an inquiry under Article 311(2)
is a rule and dispensing with the inquiry is
an exception. The authority dispensing
with the inquiry under Article 311(2)(b)
must satisfy for reasons to be recorded
that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry. A reading of the
termination order by invoking Article
311(2)(b), as extracted above, would
clearly show that no reasons whatsoever
have been assigned as to why it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.
The reasons disclosed in the termination
order are that the complainant refused to
name the accused out of fear of
harassment; the complainant, being a
foreign national, is likely to leave the
country and once he left the country, it
may not be reasonably practicable to
bring him to the inquiry. This is no ground
for dispensing with the inquiry. On the
other hand, it is not disputed that, by order
dated
23-12-1999,
the
visa
of
the
complainant was extended up to 22-122000. Therefore, there was no difficulty in
securing the presence of Mr Kenichi
Tanaka in the inquiry.35

A reasonable opportunity of
hearing enshrined in Article 311(2) of the
Constitution would include an opportunity
to defend himself and establish his
innocence
by
cross-examining
the
prosecution witnesses produced against
him and by examining the defence
witnesses in his favour, if any. This he can
do only if inquiry is held where he has
1756 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
been informed of the charges levelled
against him. In the instant case, the
mandate
of
Article
311(2)
of
the
Constitution has been violated depriving
reasonable opportunity of being heard to
the appellant."

21. Following the judgment of Apex
Court in the matter of Raksh Pal Singh
(Supra), this Court observed as follows:-

"10. In the present case the
order passed by the Superintendent of
Police, Badaun does not give any reason
as to why it was not reasonable
practicable to hold the inquiry. The
impugned order merely refers to the
charges leveled against the petitioner but
is delightfully vague about the statutory
requirement contained in the second
proviso to Rule 8(2) of the 1991 Rules
relating to dispensing with the inquiry. In
such circumstances, the order dated 19th
January,
2001
passed
by
the
Superintendent
of
Police
cannot
be
sustained."

22. Similarly again placing reliance
upon the judgments of Apex Court, this
Court in the matter of Yadunath Singh
(Supra) has observed as follows:-

"4. It is common ground that the
service of the writ petitioner-appellant is
governed by the Uttar Pradesh Police
Officers
of
the
Subordinate
Ranks
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991
(hereinafter referred to as "the Rules").
Rule 8 of the aforesaid Rules provides for
dismissal and removal of police officers of
the subordinate rank only after proper
inquiry. However, proviso (b) to Rule 8 (2)
contemplates that where the government is
satisfied, that in the interest of the security
of the State, it is not expedient to hold such
inquiry, it can be dispensed with. It further
provides
that
where
the
authority
empowered to dismiss or remove a person
or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that
for some reason to be recorded by that
authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold such an inquiry, it may
dispense with the inquiry. Here in the
present
case,
the
disciplinary
had
recorded its satisfaction but it is well
settled that satisfaction has to be based on
germane grounds and not ipse dixit of the
disciplinary authority. Here the only
ground to dispense with the inquiry is that
if writ petitioner-appellant is allowed to
continue in service, a departmental inquiry
shall
consume
sufficient
time
and,
therefore, such continuance will have
ground recorded by the disciplinary
authority while dispensing with the inquiry
is not germane nor is it on any material
that may be relevant, as such, the ground
set forth cannot justify dispensing the
inquiry at all."

5. The provisions contained
under Rule 8 (2(b) have been incorporated
keeping in view the provisions of Article
311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The
power conferred on the authority to
dispense with an inquiry in a given
situation where it is reasonably not
practicable to hold an inquiry, has been
envisaged therein. The Apex Court in the
case of Union of India and another v. Tulsi
Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398, had the
occasion to consider the scope of the
aforesaid provision and the Apex Court
laid down the test of reasonableness in the
said case to be reflected by the authority
while proposing to dispense with an
inquiry. Paragraph 130 of the said
decision is reproduced below:-

"130 The condition precedent for
the application of clause (b) is the
satisfaction of the disciplinary authority
2 All. Satya Prakash Rai Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1757
that "it is not reasonably practicable to
hold" the inquiry contemplated by clause
(2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to
note that the words used are "not
reasonably
practicable"
and
not
"impracticable". According to the Oxford
English Dictionary "practicable" means
"Capable of being put into practice,
carried
out
in
action,
effected
accomplished, or done; feasible. Webster's
Third
New
International
Dictionary
defines the word "practicable" inter alia
as meaning "possible to practice or
perform: capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished: feasible".
Further, the words used are not "not
practicable"
but
"not
reasonably
practicable".
Webster's
Third
New
International Dictionary defines the word
"reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner :
to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether
it was practicable to hold the inquiry or
not must be judged in the context of
whether it was reasonably practicable to
do so. It is not a total or absolute
impracticability which is required by
clause (b). What is requisite is that the
holding of the inquiry is not practicable in
the opinion of a reasonable man taking a
reasonable
view
of
the
prevailing
situation. It is not possible to enumerate
the cases in which it would not be
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry,
but some instances by way of illustration
may, however, be given. It would not be
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry
where
the
government
servant,
particularly through or together with his
associates, so terrorizes, threatens or
intimidate witnesses who are going to give
evidence against him with fear of reprisal
as to prevent them from doing so or where
the government servant by himself or
together with or through other threatens,
intimidates and terrorizes the Officer who
is the disciplinary authority or member of
his family so that he is afraid to hold the
inquiry or direct it to be held. It would
also not be reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry where an atmosphere of
violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination
prevails,
and
it
is
immaterial
whether
the
concerned
government servant is or is not a party to
bringing about such an atmosphere. In this
connection, we must bear in mind that
numbers coerce and terrify while an
individual may not. The reasonable
practicability of holding an inquiry is a
matter of assessment to be made by the
disciplinary authority. Such authority is
generally on the spot and knows what is
happening. It is because the disciplinary
authority is the best judge of this that
clause (3) of Article 311 makes the
decision of the disciplinary authority on
this question final. A disciplinary authority
is not expected to dispense with a
disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily
or out of ulterior motives or merely in
order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or
because the Department's case against the
government servant is weak and must fail.
The finality given to the decision of the
disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is
not binding upon the court so far its power
of judicial review is concerned and in such
a case the court will strike down the order
dispensing with the inquiry as also the
order imposing penalty. The case of Arjun
Chaubey v. Union of India is an instance
in point."

The ratio of the decision in
Tulsiram Patel's case (supra) has been
further explained in paragraph 128 to 132,
133, 135, 138 and 141. Applying the
aforesaid test, in the present case, the
question is as to whether the loss of rifle
carried by the petitioner makes out a
situation for not holding an enquiry. The
1758 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reason given in the impugned order that the
continuance of the petitioner in service
would have an adverse moral effect has
absolutely no rational connection with the
subject matter of inquiry. Whether the rifle
was lost in transit by the petitioner or not
could have been enquired into and it is not
the case of the respondent that there was any
threat to security or anything otherwise
which may obstruct the smooth holding of an
inquiry. The reason given in the impugned
order, therefore, proceeds on an assumption
which cannot be accepted as reasonable. It
cannot stand the scrutiny as indicated by the
Apex Court in the decision of Tulsi Ram
Patel (supra) and we are, therefore, unable
to approve the same.

23. From the perusal of judgments
referred in above, this fact is very much clear
that order of termination cannot be passed on
the basis of punishment or past service record
without providing opportunity of hearing and
further while passing any order under Rule
8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 reasons have to be
recorded by authority in writing as to why
inquiry is not reasonably practicable.

24. In the present case, there is no
dispute that while passing the impugned order,
no reasons have been recorded and it is passed
only on the basis of previous service record,
which is contrary to the provisions of Rule
8(2)(b) of Rules, 1991 as well as Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The
Court has repeatedly held that order cannot be
passed on the basis of previous service record
as well as without recording reasons. Not only
this Court had gone to the extent that in case
reasons are recorded that must be satisfactory
and mere formality of recording reasons
cannot be accepted.

25. Therefore, in light of factual and
legal discussions made hereinabove, impugned
order dated 31.8.2009 is bad in law and is
hereby set aside.

26. Accordingly, the writ petition is
allowed. No order as to costs.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1758

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABHINAVA UPADHYA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Writ C No. 2248 of 2020

M/s K.D.P. Build Well Pvt. Ltd.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sanjeev Kumar Pandey, Sri Rohit
Nandan Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Anil Tiwari, Sri Wasim Masood
Khan

A. U.P. Real Extate ( Regulation and
Development)
(
Agreement
for
sale/Lease) Rules, 2018; Real estate
(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016Petitioner-a private limited company-didnot
delivered the possession of the flat to the
Respondent purchased by him-Real Estate
Regulatory Authority-diected the Petitioner-to
repay all the deposited amount plus 1%
interest from date of deposit-interest chargedaccurate-as per clause9.2(ii) of form of
agreement in Rules, 2018 -Petition dismissed.

Held,

It is further not denied by the petitioner that
the order of the U.P. Real Estate Regulatory
Authority, Gautam Budh Nagar was passed in