# Satyendra Chaturvedi v. Small Scale Indst. Resarch & Development Organization

- **Citation:** (2008) 3 ILRA 824
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2008-08-04
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.33383 of 2008
- **Bench:** Bharti Sapru
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satyendra-chaturvedi-v-small-scale-indst-resarch-development-organization-41236
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 39 Rule-Igrant of Injunction-petitioner running
nursery shot on the land of SIRDO-a
research Institute-initially lease granted
for 11 months with partner extension of
33 months-after expiry of that period
petitioner has no right to continue in
possession-both courts below rightly
declined to grant injunction-petitioner
running
manufacturing
unit
for
commercial use can not be encouraged
contrary
to
scientific
developmentmerely on basis of illegal possession
without prima facie case, in absence of
balance
of
convenience-can
not
be
interfered by writ court.

Held: Para 37 & 38

Lastly in so far as the irreparable injury
is concerned, the petitioner is simply a
manufacturing unit and is individual,
whereas the public at large benefits if
new research projects are set up. No
doubt the petitioner was having a
manufacturing unit, which employed a
few people but when the entire purpose
of respondent SIRDO is to encourage
research and development work by the
new entrepreneurs, it would be in the
larger interest and that is much greater
than the individual's interest like the
petitioner.

Thus in my opinion that both the courts
below have committed no error in
coming to the conclusion that the
petitioner failed to make out a case for
grant of injunction.
Case law discussed:
(2004) 1 SCC 769, (2004) 2 SCC 137, (2006) 8
SCC 367, 2006 (63) ALR 161, AIR 1989 SC
2097, AIR 1968 SC 620, AIR 1984 Alld 60, AIR
1963 Alld 581 (Division Bench), 1885 ILR 7
Alld 900 (Full Bench), AIR 1972 Alld 155, 2004
(55) ALR 260 SC, JT 1996 (8) SC 50, JT 2000
(4) SC 186, (2008) 3 SCC 279

## Text

824 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.08.2008

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE BHARTI SAPRU, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.33383 of 2008

Satyendra Chaturvedi

...Petitioner
Versus
Small Scale Industries Research and
Development Organization ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Manish Goyal

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri R.N. Singh
Sri Anil Kumar Aditya
Sri A. Narayan

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 39 Rule-Igrant of Injunction-petitioner running
nursery shot on the land of SIRDO-a
research Institute-initially lease granted
for 11 months with partner extension of
33 months-after expiry of that period
petitioner has no right to continue in
possession-both courts below rightly
declined to grant injunction-petitioner
running
manufacturing
unit
for
commercial use can not be encouraged
contrary
to
scientific
developmentmerely on basis of illegal possession
without prima facie case, in absence of
balance
of
convenience-can
not
be
interfered by writ court.

Held: Para 37 & 38

Lastly in so far as the irreparable injury
is concerned, the petitioner is simply a
manufacturing unit and is individual,
whereas the public at large benefits if
new research projects are set up. No
doubt the petitioner was having a
manufacturing unit, which employed a
few people but when the entire purpose
of respondent SIRDO is to encourage
research and development work by the
new entrepreneurs, it would be in the
larger interest and that is much greater
than the individual's interest like the
petitioner.

Thus in my opinion that both the courts
below have committed no error in
coming to the conclusion that the
petitioner failed to make out a case for
grant of injunction.
Case law discussed:
(2004) 1 SCC 769, (2004) 2 SCC 137, (2006) 8
SCC 367, 2006 (63) ALR 161, AIR 1989 SC
2097, AIR 1968 SC 620, AIR 1984 Alld 60, AIR
1963 Alld 581 (Division Bench), 1885 ILR 7
Alld 900 (Full Bench), AIR 1972 Alld 155, 2004
(55) ALR 260 SC, JT 1996 (8) SC 50, JT 2000
(4) SC 186, (2008) 3 SCC 279

(Delivered by Hon'ble Bharati Sapru, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manish Goyal learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and Sri R.N. Singh, learned
senior counsel for the respondent.

2. This writ petition has been filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking writ of certiorari calling
for the records of the case and quashing
the judgment and order dated 2.7.2008
passed by the Addl. District Judge,
Allahabad in MCA no.39 of 2008
(Satyendra Chaturvedi versus Small
Scale
Industries
Research
and
Development Organisation). The second
prayer is also for a writ of certiorari to
quash the judgment and order dated
30.1.2008 passed by the Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Allahabad on the
application paper no.6-C in the Original
Suit no.1300 of 2007. The third prayer
is for a writ of prohibition restraining
the
respondent
from
causing
interference in the running of the unit of
the petitioner on shed no.3 Plot no.4,
SIRDO Campus, Industrial Area P.O.
T.S.L. Naini, Allahabad and the last is
3 All] Satyendra Chaturvedi V. Small Scale Indst. Resarch & Development Organization
825
the residuary prayer seeking appropriate
direction which the Court may deem fit
and
proper
according
to
the
circumstances of the case.

3. The facts of the case are that the
petitioner had entered into an agreement
of lease with the respondent with regard
to Nursery shed no. 3, plot no. B-4,
SIRDO Campus, Industrial Area P.O.
T.S.L. Naini, Allahabad (hereinafter
referred to as the premises). The shed
belongs to the respondent, which has
several sheds and which it gives out to
entrepreneurs
to
set
up
research
projects. A copy of the lease deed dated
16.1.1993 has been filed by way of a
supplementary affidavit.

4. The lease with regard to the
premises is admitted to both sides. The
lease was made between the two parties,
initially for a period of 11 months
started from 16.10.1993 for a sum of
Rs.600/- per month along with taxes and
other charges. Under the terms of the
lease as stated earlier, the lease was for
a period of 11 months initially, which
could be extended but not in any case
for more than 33 months from its
commencement i.e. 16.10.1993. Clause
5 of the lease is reproduced below:

"5. That with the mutual consent in
writing, the period of the agreement can
be extended by the parties, on the same
terms and conditions or on such
modified terms as may be determined
by the first party. But in any case, the
total period of occupations shall not be
for more than thirty three months."

5. Amongst other conditions,
clause 9 and 10 of the lease deed also
indicate the conditions for termination
of lease. The clauses 9 and 10 of the
lease agreement are reproduced below:

"9. That the second party shall be
permitted to use the shed/building on
month-to-month basis. The lease shall
be terminable by the first party by one
month's notice in writing. Likewise if
the second party intends to vacate the
shed/building earlier, he will also have
to give one month's notice or one
month's service charges in advance.
10. That this lease deed is for fixed
term of eleven months. After the expiry
of the fixed period, if one month before
the fixed period is not extended, the
second party shall have no right to
continue as lessee and first party will
have right to take possession of the
shed/building at the expiry of the said
period."

The petitioner, who had established
the manufacturing unit of the sale of
protein
food,
minerals,
vitamins
products etc. under the name and style
of M/s. G.S. Formulations, continued to
occupy the plot leased out to it beyond
the period of 11 months and thereafter
even 33 months.

6. The aims and objects of the
Small
Industries
Research
&
Development Organization (SIRDO) are
to encourage the entrepreneurs engaged
in the research projects and to allot them
sheds for their research projects for
specified period and thereafter the said
sheds are to be allotted to new
entrepreneurs engages in the similar
research work.

7. Since the premises in dispute
i.e. Nursery shed no.3, Plot no.4 was
required to be allotted to a new
826 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
entrepreneur by the respondent, it filed
suit no.93 of 2004 (Small Industries
Research
and
Development
Organization
versus
Satyendra
Chaturvedi) in the Court of J.S.C.C.,
Allahabad,
seeking
the
petitioner's
ejectment from the disputed premises.
The said suit was later on withdrawn by
the order dated 9.10.2007.

8. After the suit was withdrawn by
the respondent SIRDO, it issued to the
petitioner a notice dated 31.10.2007 to
vacate the premises. It is this notice,
which is starting point of the present lis.

9.

Under
the
notice
dated
31.10.2007, the respondent asked the
petitioner to vacate the premises within
a period of 30 days.

10. Before 30 days could expire,
the petitioner filed a suit for injunction
being
O.S.
no.1300
of
2007
on
22.11.2007 and also filed an application
for an ad interim injunction under Order
39 Rule 1 C.P.C. The said application
filed by the petitioner was rejected by
the trial court on 30.1.2008 holding that
the petitioner could not fulfil the
requirement for the grant of a temporary
injunction i.e. prima facie case, balance
of convenience an irreparable injury.

11. Aggrieved by the order dated
30.1.2008 passed by then trial court, the
plaintiff petitioner filed MCA no. 39 of
2008 and the said appeal of the
petitioner has also been rejected by the
order dated 2.7.2008. It is these two
orders, against which the petitioner has
filed present writ petition.

12. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has argued at length that the
appellate order is bad because the
appellate order does not contain any
reason for dismissing the appeal filed by
the petitioner. It merely notices certain
case laws and has recorded conclusions
without going into the depth of the
matter. He has further argued that the
trial court while refusing to grant a
temporary injunction has acted upon
irrelevant
consideration.
His
first
argument is that the trial court has
wrongly passed its findings upon initial
agreement, which was only for 33
months and the date of that agreement
was dated 16.10.1993.

13. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, the so-called
agreement dated 16.10.1993 had already
lapsed by efflus of time and therefore
the agreement was of no consequence
for consideration of the grant of
injunction because even after expiry of
agreement, the petitioner had continued
to pay rent and the same was being
accepted by the defendant-respondent.

14. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, notice dated
31.10.2007 fully establishes that the
authority under which the petitioner was
occupying the premises and the nonrenewal of the agreement of lease was
of no consequence as it did not wipe out
the right of the petitioner to continue in
the premises as a tenant by holding
over.

15. The argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the
petitioner was in possession by virtue of
holding over as a tenant and therefore
only way, by which he could be
dispossessed, was by the institution of
suit for eviction filed by the respondent
3 All] Satyendra Chaturvedi V. Small Scale Indst. Resarch & Development Organization
827
landlord on the basis of a decree which
would have to be passed by the court of
competent jurisdiction.

16. Learned counsel for the
petitioner further argued that in any case
his lease had not been terminated by the
issuance of the notice dated 31.10.2007
as it did not amount to a valid order of
termination but simply it asked the
petitioner to vacate the premises.

17. Learned counsel for the
petitioner next argued that in so far as
the
balance
of
convenience
was
concerned, the court below had failed to
properly assess as to in whose favour
balance of convenience lay. According
to him, because no injury was being
caused the respondent who had several
sheds in its possession and as the
petitioner was a manufacturing unit, if it
shuts down, the grievous prejudice
would be caused to the petitioner.

18. Other than this, learned
counsel for the petitioner has argued
that the trial court ignored material
which was placed by the petitioner
before it. He argued that the trial court
ignored the notice dated 31.10.2007
which
was
a
notice
demanding
possession and was not a notice
terminating the tenancy.

19. Secondly learned counsel for
the petitioner further argued that the
earlier suit for eviction being O.S. no.93
of 2004 had been withdrawn by the
respondent on 9.10.2007 without taking
any liberty to file a fresh suit.

20. Thirdly he argued that the trial
court
ignored
the
facts
that
the
petitioner had continuous possession of
the premises in question and since 1993
had continued to pay rent, which was
accepted by the respondent. He further
argued that the trial court had ignored
the facts brought to its notice that the
entry of the petitioner was being
obstructed from 20.11.2007 onwards.
The trial court also ignored the rent
receipts showing the regular deposit of
the rent by the petitioner as lessee,
which had continued right from 1993
and the legal right of the petitioner as
tenant by holding over particularly
when the notice dated 31.10.2007 was
confined to a demand for possession and
did not terminate the lease. Most of all
the trial court ignored the status, which
the petitioner has secured as tenancy on
month-to-month basis and secondly the
legal right vested in it.

21. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has argued that balance of
convenience lies in his favour because
the petitioner has been running a factory
since 1993 and was utilizing the
premises for the purpose for which he
was let out to the petitioner and if the
running of the factory was stopped, it
would result grievous prejudice to the
petitioner and it is sufficient to establish
that the balance of convenience was in
favour of the petitioner.

On the point of irreparable Injury,
the learned counsel for the petitioner
argued that in case the factory of the
petitioner shuts down, it would result
unemployment of several persons and
loss of capital invested. It would further
result in loss of revenue to the State
Government and this will be detrimental
to the public exchequer. On the other
hand, he argued that by grant of
injunction, no loss would be caused to
828 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
the respondent. He had several sheds
vacant, which could be allotted to other
entrepreneurs
who
are
willing
to
undertake research projects.

Learned counsel for the petitioner
argued at length that inference could be
drawn from conduct of the respondent
who has taken the recourse of filing of
the suit for vacation in the year 2004 but
subsequently withdrawn the suit without
seeking liberty to file a fresh suit and
therefore such conduct on their part
amount to acquiesce and also accepts
the petitioner as tenant by holding over.

22. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has cited several decisions to
establish his point of settled possession
and sought to establish that once a
person is in possession then he cannot
be ousted except in accordance with
law. In support of this argument, the
learned counsel for the petitioner has
cited the following decisions:

1.
Ram Gowda versus M. Varadappa
Naidu, reported in (2004) 1 SCC
769;

2.
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others
versus
Assistant
Charity
Commissioner and others, reported
in (2004) 2 SCC 137;

3.
M. Guridas and others versus
Rasaranjan and others, reported in
(2006) 8 SCC 367;

4.
Anupam Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd.
versus Additional District Judge
and another, reported in 2006 (63)
ALR 161;

5.
Krishna Ram Mahale versu Mrs.
Shobha Venkat Rao, reported in
AIR 1989 SC 2097;

6. Lallu Yashwant Singh versus Rao
Jagdish Singh others, reported in
AIR 1968 SC 620;

7.
Bhola Nath and others versus
Maharao Raja Saheb Bundi State,
reported in AIR 1984 Alld 60.

The
other
than
the
settled
possession, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has also argued at length on
the point that notice dated 31.10.2007
was not a proper notice as it was only a
notice demanding possession and did
not actually terminate the tenancy.

Learned counsel for the petitioner
has cited the following decisions with
regard to this point:

(i) Ahmad Ali versus Mohd. Jamal
Uddin,
AIR
1963
Alld
581
(Division Bench);
(ii) Bradley versus Atkinson, 1885 ILR
7 Alld 900 (Full Bench);
(iii) Farooq Ahmad versus Muneshwar
Bux Singh, AIR 1972 Alld 155.

23. In reply to the argument of the
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri
R.N. Singh Senior Advocate has argued
that
the
petitioner
is
seeking
discretionary relief under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India by the present
writ petition against refusal to grant ad
interim injunction by both the courts
below. He has argued that after both the
courts
below
have
recorded
clear
findings that in his favour, the petitioner
has neither prima facie case nor
irreparable
injury
nor
balance
of
3 All] Satyendra Chaturvedi V. Small Scale Indst. Resarch & Development Organization
829
convenience, which are the necessary
ingredients for the grant of an ad interim
injunction. He has also argued that the
admitted position is that the plaintiffpetitioner had continued in possession
of the premises after the expiry of the
terms of lease. The Original lease was
made on 16.10.1993 for a period of 11
months and thereafter under its terms
lease could have been extended for
another period of 33 months and after
this extension, the lease automatically
came to an end. He has also argued that
after the expiry of period of 33 months,
the possession of the premises by the
petitioner is illegal and he is a trespasser
and the other admitted position is that
the respondent organization is the true
owner. He has next argued that it is not
open to a trespasser to obtain injunction
against the true owner. In support of this
argument, he has placed complete
reliance on a decision of Delhi High
Court
rendered
in
the
case
of
D.T.T.D.C. versus M/s D.R. Mehara &
sons, reported in AIR 1996 Delhi 351
and has relied on para 16, 17 and 18 of
the said judgment, which are quoted
herein below:

"16.
It is argued for the appellant
that this may be anomalous. It is said
that the trespasser has a "right" to an
injunction against the true owner, and
this is complementary to the duty of the
owner not to evict the trespasser outside
the judicial process. In our view, there
is no anomaly. Each of these is based on
a different legal principle. If the
plaintiff wants the defendant to act in
accordance with law he must first abide
by the law himself and vacate the
property as one would expect a law
abiding citizen to behave.
17. It is then argued that this may lead
to multiplicity of proceedings. Should
the plaintiff be allowed to be forcibly
evicted so as to compel him again to
seek restoration of possession under
section 6, Specific Relief Act, or
otherwise?
The
danger
could
be
prevented? This argument based on
multiplicity of proceedings, in fact, goes
against the trespasser in possession. The
plaintiff can, on the same parity on
reasoning - behave in such a manner as
to make it unnecessary for the owner to
sue for possession separately. The duty
to be a lawful citizen is not one sided. It
does not apply only to the owner but
applies to the trespasser as well.
18. For the above reasons, we are of
the clear view that the appellant plaintiff
whose licence has expired and which
had itself pleaded in 1992 for a short
period to vacate from the shop and
which had been given a large number of
notices to vacate and where the owners
have even show alternative premises,
which appellant could have, occupied,
cannot be granted the helping hands of
the Court for temporary injunction. The
appeal is therefore dismissed in limine."

24. Learned counsel for the
respondent also drew the attention of
the Court to the decision in the case of
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and others
versus
Assistant
Charity
Commissioner, reported in 2004 (55)
ALR 260 SC, in which the Apex Court
has approved the judgment of Delhi
High Court rendered in the case of
D.T.T.D.C. versus M/s D.R. Mehara &
sons (supra) in para 22,23, 24.

25. Learned Senior Advocate for
the respondents has argued that anybody
who seeks justice must abide by the law
830 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
himself as would be expected of law
abiding citizens.

26. He has argued that duty of the
lawful abiding citizen is not one sided.
It does not apply to true owner alone but
also applies to a trespasser on the
principle that "he who seeks equity must
do equity." He has further argued that
judicial proceedings cannot be used to
protect or to perpetuate a wrong
committed by a person who approaches
the Court. He has also argued that the
petitioner had entered into a lease
agreement with the respondent and was
bound by the terms of agreement and
even after the agreement came to an
end, he should have respected terms of
the agreement rather than seeking to
take advantage of his own wrong. He
has argued that by way of a lease
agreement, the petitioner has entered
into a contract with the respondent
SIRDO
and
he
cannot
seek
the
protection of the Court to wriggle out
of the contract. For this purpose, he has
relied upon the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of State of Orrisa
versus
Narain
Prasad
&
Ors.,
reported in JT 1996 (8) SC 50 and has
also relied on State of Rajasthan &
ors. Versus Anil Kumar Sunil Kumar
& party & another, reported in JT
2000 (4) SC 186.

27. I have heard learned counsel
for the parties at length and have also
perused both the orders of trial court as
well as the order of the appellate court.

28. The admitted position, which
emerges is that there was a lease
agreement between two parties, which
was initially for a period of 11 months
and
thereafter
could
have
been
extended under the terms of the
agreement for a maximum period 33
months. The lease deed was dated
16.10.1993. Therefore the relationship
between
the
petitioner
and
the
respondent was found on the lease
agreement. There is no dispute about
the fact that the lease agreement came
to an end on 16.7.1996. After that the
possession of the petition would be at
the most of a tenant who stayed by
holding over month by month or at the
most
for
six
months
under
the
provisions of section 116 of the
Transfer of Property Act.

29. In the instant case, the
petitioner continued to hold over uptil
31.10.2007 when the petitioner was
given
a
notice
to
give
vacant
possession after a period of one month.

30. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has argued that the notice to
terminate was not a valid notice
terminating the tenancy and has cited
decisions to the effect that unless the
language of the notice clearly explicits
that the tenancy itself be terminated, it
would not amount to notice of the
termination. However such a plea could
be taken only when there was a valid
tenancy not in case where the petitioner
was continued by way of holding over.

31. Moreover under clause 9 of
the agreement, a notice was to be given
by the respondent, a notice was to be
given by the respondent. Even if the
notice was not happily worded, the
intention of the notice was to give to
the petitioner a month's notice to
vacate
the
premises.
The
clumsy
drafting of the notice would not render
the notice either illegal or invalid.
3 All] Satyendra Chaturvedi V. Small Scale Indst. Resarch & Development Organization
831

32. In so far as the question of
settled possession is concerned, I am
not
inclined
to
agree
with
the
arguments as advanced by the learned
counsel for the petitioner in the facts
and circumstances of the case, because
here the petitioner was seeking to take
advantage of by holding over. The true
owner had resorted to give a legal
notice to terminate the holding over
thereby bringing a legal end to the
holding over. The so-called settled
possession as claimed by the petitioner
was brought to an end by the issuance
of a valid notice to terminate the socalled tenancy. It could not have been
claimed thereafter against a true owner.

33. Reference may be had to the
contents of para 27 of the judgment of
Supreme Court in the case of New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. versus Nusli
Neville Wadia, reported in (2008) 3
SCC 279 "The occupant may have been
a trespasser or may have breached the
conditions of the tenancy or may have
been occupying the premises as a
condition of service but in any of these
cases continued to occupy the premises
despite cession of contract but the fact
remains that no matter what the
relationship was, it was brought to an
end and after that it ceased to exist.

34. The law is well settled that no
judicial proceedings can be initiated to
protect or perpetuate wrongs.

35. The court below while
examining three ingredients that are
required for the grant of ad interim
injunction also came to the conclusion
after
examining
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case that the
petitioner was not able to make out any
ground for the grant of ad interim
injunction.

36. I am not in agreement with the
arguments as made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the trial
court or the appellate court has failed
to examine the basic ingredients for the
grant of ad interim injunction. In so far
as the prima facie case is concerned, it
is abundantly clear that the lease on the
strength of which the petitioner had
entered as a tenant, had expired. The
petitioner
was
petitioner
was
continuing simply by holding over. In
so far as the balance of convenience is
concerned, the balance was in favour of
the respondents who is the organization
which encourages the entrepreneurs to
set up more and more new research
projects. Their intention by leasing out
the premises to the petitioner was not
to aid to set up his commercial and
manufacturing
unit.
Moreover
the
public at large which is desirous to set
up the research projects is prevented
from getting the new units established
if the petitioner is allowed to hold over
the premises in dispute his commercial
entrepreneurs. The very purpose of
giving the shed was not to set up a
manufacturing unit for commercial use
by the petitioner but to encourage the
new entrepreneur such the petitioner
for research projects for development
of scientific pursuits.

37. Lastly in so far as the
irreparable injury is concerned, the
petitioner is simply a manufacturing
unit and is individual, whereas the
public at large benefits if new research
projects are set up. No doubt the
petitioner was having a manufacturing
unit, which employed a few people but
832 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2008
when the entire purpose of respondent
SIRDO is to encourage research and
development
work
by
the
new
entrepreneurs, it would be in the larger
interest and that is much greater than
the
individual's
interest
like
the
petitioner.

38. Thus in my opinion that both
the courts below have committed no
error in coming to the conclusion that
the petitioner failed to make out a case
for grant of injunction.

39. This writ petition is dismissed
as above. The observation made by this
court is only with regard to the grant of
an ad interim injunction and shall not
prejudice the case of the petitioner
arising out of the suit to be decided by
the court below.
---------