# Satyendra Yadav v. State of U.P. and another

- **Citation:** (2007) 1 ILRA 224
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2006-09-13
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Bail Cancellation Application No.12170 of 2004
- **Bench:** Vinod Prasad
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/satyendra-yadav-v-state-of-u-p-and-another-40836
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Code of Criminal Procedure-Section 482Cancellation of Bail granted by Session
judge-on
the
ground-counsel
who
appeared before the session court-power
of appearance bears no signature of the
counsel-No allegation about fleeing from
justice
or
hampering
trail-held-said
technicality can not be ground for
cancellation by bail.

Held: Para 10
Further the contentions of the counsel
for the applicant that the power filed on
behalf of the accused did not contain the
signature of the counsel, I am of the
view that the said technicality is no
ground to cancel the bail. A perusal of
the power definitely shows that the
counsel who appeared on behalf of the
applicant had got his stamp affixed in
the memo. That, in my view is sufficient
compliance so far as engagement of a
counsel is concerned in a criminal
matter.

## Text

224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.09.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VINOD PRASAD, J.

Criminal
Misc.
Bail
Cancellation
Application No.12170 of 2004

Satyendra Yadav

...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & another ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Code of Criminal Procedure-Section 482Cancellation of Bail granted by Session
judge-on
the
ground-counsel
who
appeared before the session court-power
of appearance bears no signature of the
counsel-No allegation about fleeing from
justice
or
hampering
trail-held-said
technicality can not be ground for
cancellation by bail.

Held: Para 10
Further the contentions of the counsel
for the applicant that the power filed on
behalf of the accused did not contain the
signature of the counsel, I am of the
view that the said technicality is no
ground to cancel the bail. A perusal of
the power definitely shows that the
counsel who appeared on behalf of the
applicant had got his stamp affixed in
the memo. That, in my view is sufficient
compliance so far as engagement of a
counsel is concerned in a criminal
matter.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vinod Prasad. J.)

1. Heard Sri R.K. Sharma, learned
counsel for the applicant and the learned
A.G.A.

2. The accused respondent was
granted bail on 6.7.2004 by Additional
Sessions Judge/Special Judge S.C./S.T.
Act, Ghaziabad. The bail granting order
has been filed along with this bail
cancellation application, which indicates
that the Lower Court considered three
aspect of the matter while granting ball to
the accused respondent.

3. The first aspect was that there was
no intention to commit murder of the
deceased as he had received a single fatal
injury by assault made by a cricket bat
and therefore, the offence will not travel
beyond the scope of Section 304 part II
I.P.C. and no offence under Section 302
I.P.C. was prima-facie made out.

4. The second reason for granting of
bail was that it was a casa of a sudden
fight at the spur of the moment without
any pre-meditation.

5. The third reason was that a cross
case under Sections 452, 323, 504 and
506 I.P.C. initiated by the wife of the
present accused, respondent, was also
lodged. The said F.I.R. was registered as
crime no.436A of 2004. The ancillary
reason, which is mentioned by the
Additional Sessions Judge was that the
accused is an athlete champion and son of
a senior advocate. He also belongs to a
respectable family and there was no
chance of his absconding. The Additional
Sessions
Judge
has
observed
in
concluding portion of the order that there
was a single injury on the head. The wife
of the accused had also sustained simple
injuries in the same incident. The incident
had taken place at the spur of the moment
regarding the return of two lacs rupees.
1 All] Satyendra Yadav V. State of U.P. and another
225
6. On all these aspect of the matter
considering
the
totality
of
the
circumstance, the trial court exercised the
discretionary power to grant bail to the
accused respondent.

7. Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma learned
counsel for the applicant contended that
the bail was granted to the accused
respondent on the ground that he was the
son of a senior advocate and was an
athlete champion and he belonged to a
respective family and there was no chance
of his absconding is wholly illegal.
Learned counsel for the applicant also
contended that the memo filed in the trial
court did not contain the signature of the
counsel and hence bail application filed
by
accused
respondent
was
not
maintainable. He has field certified copy
of the said memo of the engagement.

8. Learned A.G.A. on the other hand
contended that contentions raised by
counsel for the applicant is not correct. He
submitted that the Additional Sessions
Judge did not grant the order of bail on
the contentions raised by the counsel for
the applicant but he had taken into
consideration the material in the case
diary and the medical report. He pointed
out to paragraph 7 of the bail granting
order. He contended that the bail was
granted on the factual aspect of the matter
and not on the considerations, which has
been stated by learned counsel for the
applicant. Learned A.G.A. also submitted
that the contentions, which has been
raised by the counsel for the applicant is
wrong in as much as it were the
arguments which were raised by the rival
sides which has been mentioned by the
Additional Sessions Judge in the bail
granting order.

9. I have considered the submissions
raised by both sides. In this case it is clear
that Additional Sessions Judge/Special
Judge S.C/S.T. Act, Ghaziabad while
allowing bail to the respondent on
6.7.2004 has observed that there was a
single injury sustained by the deceased
Pintoo on his head, which subsequently
proved fatal. The wife of the deceased
also sustained some simple injuries. He
had further observed that the incident has
taken place all of a sudden for the
recovery of Rs. 2 lac. Thus on these
considerations the Additional Sessions
Judge allowed the bail. I am also of the
view that this Court is not sitting on the
appeal over the bail granting order passed
by the Lower Court. Power under Section
439 Cr.P.C. given to this Court in bail
matters also gives to the power to the
Sessions Judge. Grant of bail is one thing
and cancellation thereof is quite another.
Bail once granted cannot be cancelled as a
punitive measure. The relevant ground for
cancellation of bail is tampering with the
course of justice or fleeing from justice or
hampering the trial or otherwise like
reasons such as, it is not in the interest of
justice to r allow the accused to remain on
bail. None of these conditions are present
in the present case. Whatever learned
counsel for the applicant has submitted
was the argument, which was raised by
both the sides and which was referred to
by the lower court, as is perceptable from
the order granting bail. The Additional
Sessions Judge has referred to the
submissions raised by both the sides and
finding the case to be fit for bail, taking
and over all view of the matter, as was
argued before him by the rival sides, that
he had allowed the bail. The view taken
by the Additional Sessions Judge cannot
be said to be perverse or illegal in any
manner. It cannot be said that the grant of
226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2007
bail was because of extraneous reasons
than those, which are relevant under the
law. Moreover, this bail cancellation
application was filed on 29th July 2004. It
has come up for final disposal after a gap
of two years. During this period of two
years there has been no complaint at all
against accused respondents. The gap of
two years is sufficient enough not to
interfere with the bail granting order once
there is no allegation of tampering with
the record or evidences or fleeing from
justice.

10. Further the contentions of the
counsel for the applicant that the power
filed on behalf of the accused did not
contain the signature of the counsel, I am
of the view that the said technicality is no
ground to cancel the bail. A perusal of the
power definitely shows that the counsel
who appeared on behalf of the applicant
had got his stamp affixed in the memo.
That, in my view is sufficient compliance
so far as engagement of a counsel is
concerned in a criminal matter.

11. In view of what has been stated
herein before, I am of the opinion that
there is no reason to cancel bail of
accused respondent no.2 which has been
allowed by the Additional Sessions
Judge/Special
Judge
SC/S.T.
Act,
Ghaziabad vide his Impugned order dated
6.7.2004 in Crime No. 436 of 2004 under
Section 302, 504 I.P.C., P.S. Kavi Nagar,
district
Ghaziabad.
Resultantly,
this
criminal miscellaneous bail cancellation
application being devoid of merit is
hereby dismissed.
----------
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.11.2006

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VINOD PRASAD, J.

Criminal Revision No. 6130 of 2006

Revati Raman & others ...Revisionists
Versus
State of U.P. & another ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionists:
Sri D.K. Tiwari

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure-397(2)-
Revision-Order passed under Section
146(1) Cr.P.C. being preventive measure
an interlocutory in nature-not a final
order-hence revision not maintainable.

Held Para 7

In view of the above, the order under
Section 146(1) Cr.P.C. can be bracketed
only within the purview of an order
which is interlocutory in nature and not
as an order which is final. Hence
revision under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. is
barred against such an order.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vinod Prasad, J.)

1. The applicants have filed this
revision aggrieved by an order dated
11/10/2006 passed by Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Handia in Case No. 44 of
2006 Gauri Shanker Vs. Revati Raman
and others under Section 145 Cr. P.C. by
the
impugned
order,
the
S.D.M.
concerned has passed an order under
Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. for attachment.

2.

Learned
counsel
for
the
revisionists contended that the Magistrate