# Saurav Raj v. Sonakshi Verma

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 312
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-29
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 84 of 2025
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/saurav-raj-v-sonakshi-verma-54913
- **Pages:** 13

## Text

_Characters 0–39,867 of 45,302. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39867 for what follows._

312 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. It is apparent that the appellants have failed to produce any documentary evidence to
establish their ownership or any independent right in the disputed property. The appellants allege
that the disputed property was allotted to their father, Paramhans Pandey, in a family partition, and
upon his death, they became the owners in possession of the property. It is apparent that if the
partition took place during the pendency of the original suit, then on this basis no rights can be
claimed by the appellants. The appellants further contend that the plaintiffs and defendants in O.S.
No. 348 of 1988 were neither the rightful owners nor in possession of the disputed property, and, as
such, the decree passed in O.S. No. 348 of 1988 was collusive but no documentary evidence has
been submitted in this regard by the appellants.

21. It is further evident that the suit was contested by Paramhans Pandeys brother,
Shivanand Bharti, and his sons, namely Sri Ram, Ramji, and Basant Kumar. It is also apparent that
Shivanand Bharti and his family and Paramhans Pandey and his family were residing in the same
disputed house, as alleged by the appellants, hence, it is improbable that the appellants were
unaware of the pendency of O.S. No.348 of 1988 and Civil Appeal No.7 of 2012.

22. Since the defendants and the appellants were residing in the same disputed house, if they
had any right in the property, they could have moved an impleadment application in the original
suit. However, despite being aware of the suit, no such application was ever filed by them.

23. It is further apparent that no independent right has vested in the appellants to challenge the
decree passed in that suit. The application under Order 21 Rules 97 and 99 C.P.C. appears to have
been filed merely to frustrate the decree passed in O.S. No. 348 of 1988, in collusion with the
judgment debtors. Since the appellants have failed to demonstrate any independent right or interest
in the disputed property, they are not entitled to resist the decree passed in O.S. No. 348 of 1988.

24. Accordingly, the appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage.

25. The appeal is dismissed at the admission stage.

26. Consequently, the impugned order dated 06.01.2026 is affirmed, albeit on a different ground.
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 312
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.

Special Appeal No. 84 of 2025

Saurav Raj ...Appellant
Versus
Sonakshi Verma ...Respondent
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
313
Issue for Consideration
(1) Maintainability of Special Appeal against an order disposing of contempt application with the direction to
pursue the proceeding filed u/s 379, BNSS before the competent court.

Headnotes
(A) Practice and Procedure - Special Appeal - Maintainability - Contempt application was filed
for filing false affidavit in maintenance case - Single Judge declined to proceed contempt
application in order to curtail the multiplicity of proceedings as a proceeding u/s 379, BNSS was
already filed and pending before the competent court - Validity challenged - Plea of violation of
judgment rendered in Rajnish v. Neha case was raised - Permissibility: (E-1)
Held: In Rajnesh v. Neha, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a general caution that irresponsible
pleadings may invite action under Section 340 Cr.P.C. or contempt, but did not mandate automatic initiation
of such proceedings, particularly in cases of inadvertent or immaterial errors in disclosure affidavits. [Para 15]
Further held: An appeal is a creation of statute and once the legislature in its wisdom has chosen not to
provide for any remedy of appeal against an order passed, whereby the contempt court has declined to
initiate contempt proceeding, then appeal cannot be construed to be maintainable as the proceedings under
the Contempt of Courts Act are self-contained - The learned Single Judge by observing that multiple
proceedings cannot be permitted as a proceeding under Section 379 BNSS was already pending and giving
liberty to approach the competent court to pursue the grievance therein exercising contempt jurisdiction has
neither entered into the merits of dispute nor decided any question, inter alia, which may affect the valuable
rights of the parties as filing contempt against a contemnor does not confer any right against which a special
appeal can be filed. [Para 19 and 21]
(B) Interpretation of statute - Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum
- Meaning - Applicability: (E-1)
Held: If there is no provision of appeal in the statute, one cannot take aid of any other provisions as such of
the Rules as quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum, that is, what cannot be done
directly cannot be done indirectly. [Para 21]

Case Law Cited
Rajnesh vs. Neha, AIR 2021 SC 569; Special Appeal No. 372 of 2023, Subhash Chandra vs. Srikant Goswami;
Midnapore Peoples Cooperative vs. Chunni Lal Nanda and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 399; RFA 695/2016, Pratibha
vs. Kunwar Singh Tanwar & Ors., (Delhi High Court); Secretary, Hailkandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam
and Anr., AIR 1996 SC 1925; Civil Appeal No. 4235 of 2014, Board of Cricket Control in India vs. Cricket
Association of Bihar and Ors.); M.S. Ahlawat vs. State of Haryana and another, AIR 2000 SC 168; Dhananjay
Sharma vs. State of Haryana, (1995) 3 SCC 757; Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others vs. State of U.P., AIR 1968
SC 1450; Vinod Kumar Gupta vs. Shri Veer Bahadur Yadav, 2023(7) ADJ 107 (DB) - referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India - Article 215; Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Section 10; Criminal Procedure Code -
Section 340 Cr.P.C.; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Section 12.

List of Keywords
Contempt application, Maintenance application, False affidavit, Transfer application, Multiple litigation, Merit of
dispute, Due course of justice, Ubi jus ibi remedium, Mens rea, Parallel proceedings in two separate courts of
law, Conjunction 'and', Disjunctively, Exclusionary bar, Multiple proceeding, Multiplicity of proceedings, res
integra, Oversteps its jurisdiction, Substantive issue, Amenable to an appeal, Cases of inadvertent or
immaterial errors, Appropriate sanctions, Perjury application, Peripheral to the merits.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 13.08.2024 passed in Contempt Application No. 3201 of 2024.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant: Priyanka Singh, Abhay Pratap Singh.
314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Advs. for the Respondents: Pranshu Agrawal.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

The present Special Appeal has been filed by the appellant under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules, 1952') against the order
dated August 13, 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Contempt Application No. 3201 of
2024 whereby the learned Single Judge disposed of the contempt application on the ground that
proceeding under Section 379 of Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred
to as 'BNSS' ; formerly Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) has already been
filed and is pending before the trial court.

FACTS

1. The factual matrix giving rise to the present special appeal has been delineated below:

a. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent, Sonakshi Verma was
solemnized on February 15, 2021 in accordance with Hindu rites and rituals. Disputes arose soon
thereafter which led respondent to file multiple cases against the appellant and his family members,
including maintenance application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'DV Act') registered as Case No. 3288 of 2022 (P.S.
Aliganj, Lucknow) before the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C., Lucknow.

b. In the said proceedings, the respondent filed an Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities
(A.O.A.) dated June 27, 2022 in accordance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Rajnesh v. Neha reported in AIR 2021 SC 569. In the said affidavit, the respondent stated her
income as 'NA' (Non-Applicable) and stated 'NA' against properties/assets even though the
respondent at that time was a serving judicial officer of the Bihar Judiciary (Civil Judge/Judicial
Magistrate-I, presently posted as Registrar, Bihar Land Tribunal, Patna).

c. The maintenance application was decided ex-parte against the appellant on November
2, 2023, whereby maintenance of ₹10,000 per month was granted alongwith a restraint order in
respect of a matrimonial house and compensation of Rs.2,00,000/-.
d. Aggrieved by allegedly false affidavit filed by the respondent in maintenance proceedings, the
appellant initiated proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. by filing Misc. Application No. 83439 of
2024 before the court of ACJ (J.D.) (Crime Against Women) F.T.C. 50.

e. Thereafter, the appellant also filed Contempt Application (Civil) No. 3201 of 2024
before this Hon'ble Court, seeking initiation of contempt against the respondent for deliberately
filing a false affidavit in violation of the mandate given in Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra), which
expressly provides that false statements and misrepresentations in maintenance affidavits may
invite proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and contempt of court. The learned Single Judge
disposed of the contempt application by the judgment and order dated August 13, 2024 without
recording any finding whether prima facie contempt was made out or not and directed the appellant
to pursue the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. before the learned trial court. It is this
judgmnet dated 13.08.2024, which has been impugned in the present intra-court appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
315

2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has made the following
submissions:

a. The learned Single Judge erred in failing to decide the core issue as to whether
contempt was made out against the respondent in light of the clear dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra), particularly para (h) of the guidelines, which mandates initiation
of contempt proceedings for making false statements in the affidavit of assets and liabilities.

b. There is no bar against proceeding simultaneously under Section 379 of BNSS and
Contempt of Court.

c. A Special Appeal is maintainable against an order of the Contempt Court where it has
overstepped its jurisdiction. In the present case, the Hon'ble Single Judge exceeded the bounds of
contempt jurisdiction by directing the appellant to file a transfer application and pursue proceedings
under Section 340 Cr.P.C. and inter alia holding that multiple litigations cannot be permitted,
thereby delving into the merits of the original controversy. Such an order is therefore liable to be
challenged by way of the present Special Appeal.

d. If the learned Single Judge, for any reason, decides an issue or issues any direction
relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties in contempt proceedings, then the aggrieved
party is not without a remedy and may challenge the same by way of an intra-court appeal, where
such a remedy is available.

e. The swearing of a false affidavit in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency to
obstruct the due course of justice but also to impede, obstruct, and interfere with the administration
of justice.

f. The respondent has deliberately and intentionally filed a false afffidavit before the
learned Civil Court which is in gross violation of the directions issued by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra). The specific false statements include:

i. Stating her source of income as 'N/A' (Non-Applicable), despite being a serving Civil
Judge/Judicial Magistrate-I in the Bihar Judiciary since 2018 and drawing a regular salary from the
State exchequer.

ii. Stating 'N/A' against properties/assets, despite having purchased a four-wheeler car
(Hyundai Creta, Reg. No. UP 32 NX 2057) on 12-09-2023 while the PWDVA proceedings were
still pending.

iii. Stating her mother and brother as dependents without any supporting documentary
evidence, when in fact her brother is a married man, practicing lawyer, and manager/managing
director of a hotel.

iv. Projecting medical expenses of Rs. 40,000/- as a personal liability, when as a judicial
officer, her medical expenses are borne out by the State.

g. The respondent, by filing a false affidavit, misled the learned Civil Judge F.T.C.,
Lucknow, who passed the ex-parte order dated November 2, 2023 on the basis of such affidavit.
The appellant being aggrieved party, is left without any remedy, which is contrary to the wellsettled maxim 'Ubi jus ibi remedium'.

h. To buttress her arguments, counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:

(i) Subhash Chandra v. Srikant Goswami, Managing Director, Sahkari Gram Vikas
Bank Ltd., Lucknow in Special Appeal No. 372 of 2023; to contend that a special appeal would
be maintainable against the order of contempt court if it has overstepped its jurisdiction.
316 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(ii) Midnapore Peoples Cooperative v. Chunni Lal Nanda and Others reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 399; to contend that special appeal would be maintainable, if the learned Single
Judge has made any direction relating to merits of the dispute in contempt jurisdiction .

(iii) Pratibha v. Kunwar Singh Tanwar & Ors.; RFA 695/2016 (Delhi High Court); to
contend that misleading statements made before the court can invoke its contempt jurisdiction.

(iv) Secretary, Hailkandi Bar Association v. State of Assam and Anr. reported in AIR
1996 SC 1925; to contend that contempt of court and proceedings under Section 340 CrPC can run
simultaneously.

(v) Board of Cricket Control in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar and Ors. in
(Civil Appeal No. 4235 of 2014); wherein the court has issued notice to explain as to why
proceedings under Section 340 CrPC and contempt of court should not be initiated against the
contemnor.

(vii) M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana and another reported in AIR 2000 SC 168; to
contend that petitioner therein was prosecuted for giving false evidence as well as for contempt of
court.

(viii) Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana reported in (1995) 3 SCC 757; to contend
that swearing of false affidavit in judicial proceedings had the tendency to impede, obstruct, and
interfere with the administration of justice and therefore amounts to criminal contempt of court.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has made the following submissions:

a. The impugned order passed by contempt court does not contain any direction nor does
it discuss the merits of the original controversy. The learned Single Judge merely observed that
multiple proceedings on the same subject matter are not permissible when an application under
Section 340 Cr.P.C. was already pending before the competent court. Hence, the contempt court
has rightly declined to entertain parallel proceedings, and accordingly, the Special Appeal is liable
to be dismissed on the ground of maintainability itself.

b. The affidavit in question did not contain the notation 'NIL', rather, the entry 'N/A' was
merely an inadvertent slip of the pen, constituting a human error and without any mens rea to
mislead the learned Court. This contention is corroborated by the affidavit itself, wherein the
respondent declared her occupation as 'Civil Judge, Bihar Judicial Service.' Furthermore, in her
maintenance application under Section 12 of the DV Act, the respondent had expressly
acknowledged her status as a Judicial Officer, as well as in the final order dated November 2, 2023,
the learned magistrate expressly recorded that the respondent was working as Sub-Divisional
Judicial Magistrate (East), Muzaffarpur, Bihar and that both parties are working persons.

c. The appellant had already filed an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. on the same
subject matter before the learned trial court. The initiation of parallel proceedings in two separate
courts of law pertaining to the same subject matter is not permissible. The Contempt Court rightly
observed that multiple proceedings should not be permitted. The respondent relied on the proviso to
Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which stipulates that no High Court shall take
cognizance of contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a subordinate court where
such contempt constitutes an offence punishable under the IPC.
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
317

d. The appellant had filed more than nine cases against the respondent and her family. He
also has a habit of lodging complaints against the presiding officer of the Court whenever he fails
to secure a favourable order and in effect to it, he has filed a complaint against the Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate who accepted the final report in an FIR lodged by the appellant.

e. The appellant has wrongly interpreted the directions contained in para h of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra). The conjunction 'and' in the
expression 'u/s. 340 Cr.P.C., and for contempt of Court' must be read disjunctively, i.e., as 'or', to
give effect to the true intention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The jurisdiction to punish for
contempt is vested exclusively in the High Courts under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme
Court's observation cannot be read to mean that both remedies must be pursued cumulatively.

f. To buttress his arguments counsel has placed reliance on the following judgment:

(i) Ishwar Singh Bindra and Others v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1968 SC 1450,
wherein it was held that 'and' may, by force of context, be read as 'or' to effectuate legislative intent.

ANALYSIS

4. After hearing the arguments canvassed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the
parties and perusal of materials placed on record, the following issue emerges:

I. Whether Special Appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952 is maintainable
against the order of the Contempt Court? If so, under what circumstances?

5. The petitioner contends that a Special Appeal/Intra- Court appeal would be maintainable as
the learned Single Judge by declining to initiate contempt proceedings had traversed its jurisdiction
by not deciding as to whether any contempt has been made out or not but instead relegated the
parties to approach the lower court in a pending proceeding under Section 379 BNSS. As per the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra) , the pleadings made in the
applications for maintenance and replies should be responsible; if false statements are made, the
court may consider initiation of proceedings under Section 379 BNSS and for contempt of court.
There is no exclusionary bar for filing proceeding under contempt of court and Section 379 BNSS.
Furthermore, the discovery of the fact that the proceedings under Section 379 BNSS has been
dismissed will render the appellant remediless.

6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has vehemently opposed the
aforesaid arguments and submits that the present special appeal is not maintainable as the order
passed by the Contempt Court neither adjudicated the merits of the dispute nor issued any
substantive directions, and rightly discouraged multiplicity of proceedings since the appellant had
already invoked Section 379 BNSS on the same subject matter before the court below. It is
contended that the appellant has attempted to mislead the Court regarding the respondent's
affidavit, whereas the alleged discrepancy ('N/A') was merely an inadvertent error without any
intention to misrepresent, which stands contradicted by consistent disclosures of her status as a
judicial officer in prior proceedings and orders. The respondent emphasizes that parallel
proceedings on the same issue are impermissible, and in view of the proviso to Section 10 of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, contempt jurisdiction is barred where the alleged act constitutes an
offence under the IPC, which the appellant himself has invoked through Section 340 Cr.P.C.
318 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings. The appellant's reliance on Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra) is misconceived, as the
expression 'and' therein must be read disjunctively as 'or', in line with settled principles of
interpretation. It is further pointed out that the appellant's application under Section 340 has already
been dismissed on merits.

7. Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 refers to the power of a High Court to
punish for contempt of its subordinate courts which is sanctioned by Article 215 of the Constitution
of India. The proviso excludes the jurisdiction of the High Court only in cases where the act alleged
to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, but not where such acts merely amount to offences of other
description for which punishment has been provided in the IPC, 1860.

8. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that the appellant has initiated a contempt
proceedings before the High Court under Section 10 of the Act wherein the learned Single Judge in
its contempt jurisdiction has passed the following order. The relevant part of the order is extracted
hereinbelow:

'4. It is evident from the pleading that application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. has already
been filed and is pending before the Competent Court, in such circumstances, multiple proceeding
not to be permitted. As in case, the Court is vacant then it is appropriate to move transfer
application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned.

5. In view of the above, the present contempt application is disposed of with liberty to
applicant to move transfer application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned for transfer
of application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. pending before Civil Judge, Junior Division, FTC,
(Women related offences). In case, such application is filed within a period of two weeks from
today then it is expected from the Chief Judicial Magistrate to pass appropriate order on the
application.'

9. The question is whether the observation of learned Single Judge that 'multiple proceedings
not be permitted' defies the right of the appellant to pursue the two remedies as per the judgment of
Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra), wherein it was observed that for filing false affidavits, court may initiate
proceedings under Section 340 CrPC and for contempt of court.

10. The power of the intra-court appeal has been conferred on this Court by Chapter VIII Rule
5 of the Rules, 1952 which reads as under:-

"Chapter VIII [5. Special appeal :- An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order
made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the
exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of superintendence or in the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction [or in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or
Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award'

(a) of a tribunal, Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the
exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
319
Act, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or the Concurrent List in the
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or

(b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the
exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act of one
Judge.]'

11. From the perusal of the impugned order passed in contempt proceedings, it transpires that
learned Single Judge had declined to initiate the contempt proceedings in order to curtail the
multiplicity of proceedings as a proceeding under Section 379 of the BNSS was already filed and
was pending before the competent court.

12. The issue with regard to maintainability of a special appeal relating to a contempt
proceeding is no more res integra. The Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd.
(Supra) has culled out the following circumstances for filing special appeal against orders passed in
contempt proceedings:

'11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in
contempt proceedings may be summarised thus:

I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the
High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing
punishment for contempt.

II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating
proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order
acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special
circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.

III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of
court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto.
In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits
of the dispute between the parties.

IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute
between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and,
therefore, not appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where such
direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for
contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental
or inextricably connected directions.

V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction,
relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved
person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the
order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by
seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).'
(Emphasis added)

13. The co-ordinate bench of this Court in Subhash Chandra (Supra) relying upon the
judgment of Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. (Supra) has held that
generally special appeal under Rules, 1952 against the order of learned Single Judge in contempt
320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceeding is not maintainable unless the contempt court oversteps its jurisdiction by deciding into
the merits of the dispute and inter-alia observed that 'merits' refers to the substantive issues of the
original case that led to the contempt proceedings. It encompasses the core legal and factual
questions that were or are being contested in the original litigation. The relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

'46. Thus, it cannot be said as an inflexible rule that an intra-court appeal in no
circumstance can be maintained. If an order passed in contempt jurisdiction has the trappings of a
final order and/or it has the impact of diluting, varying the original order by which the disputes
between the parties have been decided on merits or the Contempt Court touches the merit or passes
an order beyond its scope then in such cases an intra court appeal can be maintained.
***

69. The pith and substance of the aforesaid discussion, the legal principles involved and
circumstances when an appeal may lie under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and
when a Special Appeal may lie from an order passed in contempt jurisdiction can be summarized
as under:-

(A) Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act can be invoked only when the Contempt
Court has exercised its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The essence of this provision is to
provide a remedy against decision where the court has taken a definitive action to penalize a
contemnor. This includes orders that impose fines, imprisonment, or other punitive measures
directly related to the contemptuous behavior. Interlocutory orders, which do not entail punishment
for contempt, do not fall within the ambit of Section 19. Such orders may include directions to
produce documents, file affidavits, or procedural directives necessary for the continuation of the
contempt proceedings. These are routine judicial actions that facilitate the progress of the case but
do not constitute a final determination on the issue of contempt. Routine orders passed during the
pendency of contempt proceedings are also excluded from the scope of Section 19. These orders
are typically procedural and administrative in nature, ensuring that the proceedings move forward
without addressing the substantive issues of the original case or the merits of the contempt.

(B) The crux of the matter lies in the nuanced interpretation of what constitutes "merit"
within the context of contempt proceedings, as referenced by the Supreme Court in the Midnapore
Peoples Cooperative Bank Limited case. The term "merit" has not been defined in a straight jacket
formula, leading to varying interpretations. However, a cumulative reading of the judgments
provide clarity on several key aspects. In the Midnapore case, the Supreme Court held that in
contempt proceedings, it is inappropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue related to the merits of
the dispute between the parties. This principle aims to ensure that contempt proceedings do not
encroach upon the substantive rights of the parties involved in the original dispute. The focus of
contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, not to resolve the
underlying dispute. The term "merit" in this context refers to the substantive issues of the original
case that led to the contempt proceedings. It encompasses the core legal and factual questions that
were or are being contested in the original litigation.

(C) Special appeals from the order or judgment of a single judge bench in contempt cases
hinge on the distinction between addressing the merits of the original dispute and the conduct
constituting contempt. The primary responsibility of the Contempt Court is to determine whether
contempt has occurred and to impose appropriate sanctions if it has. The merits of the original
controversy are outside the domain of the contempt court. However, when the Contempt Court
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
321
issues directions or discusses the merits of the original controversy, it oversteps its jurisdiction. In
such cases, a special appeal would lie to the High Court. This ensures that the original substantive
issues are not inadvertently decided within the limited scope of contempt proceedings, preserving
the parties' rights to a fair adjudication of their dispute.

(D) The interpretation of each case depends on its specific facts and circumstances.
Courts must carefully distinguish between orders that address the procedural aspects of contempt
proceedings and those that encroach upon the substantive issues of the original case. This
distinction is crucial to maintaining the integrity of contempt jurisdiction and ensuring that appeals
under Section 19 of the Act of 1971 are appropriately limited to cases where punitive action for
contempt has been taken.

Thus, Special appeals in contempt cases are warranted only when the Contempt Court
oversteps its jurisdiction by addressing the merits of the original dispute, ensuring that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected. The interpretation of each case must consider the
specific facts and circumstances to uphold the integrity of contempt jurisdiction and provide
appropriate remedies for aggrieved parties.'
(Emphasis added)

14. The coordinate bench of this court in Vinod Kumar Gupta v. Shri Veer Bahadur Yadav
reported in 2023(7) ADJ 107 (DB) dealing with a similar issue has held that an order of Single
Judge exercising contempt jurisdiction in a contingency, when contempt proceedings are not being
initiated, is not amenable to an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules, 1952. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

'30. Further in the case of Hemendra Swaroop Bhatnagar v. Sri P.S. Gosain, 2006(1)
ADJ 483 (DB), this Hon'ble Court had the occasion to consider the issue of maintainability of
special appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the 1952 Rules against the judgment and order
dropping the contempt proceedings wherein this Court has observed as under:

''7. Appeal under Section 19 is maintainable when the order is passed by Contempt Judge
in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In the present case the Contempt Judge has
discharged the notice, hence, there is no question of filing of appeal under Section 19.

8. The question regarding maintainability of the special appeal against an order rejecting
a contempt application or discharging a contempt has come for consideration before this Court
earlier. A Division Bench judgment of this Court in A.P. Verma, Principal Secretary, Medical
Health and Family Welfare, U.P., Lucknow and others v. U.P. Laboratory Technicians
Association, Lucknow and others, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 2333, had considered the said question. That
Division Bench held in the said judgment that special appeal against an order refusing to initiate
contempt proceeding is not maintainable.

9....

10.... ...

11. The learned contempt Judge while discharging the contempt notice has not issued any
direction or passed any order. The submission of the appellant's counsel that learned Judge has
decided an issue on merit also cannot be accepted. The learned contempt Judge has only taken into
consideration the earlier judgments of this Court contempt of which was alleged. The learned
contempt Judge after taking into consideration all facts and circumstances observed that from the
facts there does not appear to be any wilful or deliberate disobedience committed either by the
322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Collector or by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. The order of contempt Judge discharging
contempt notice cannot be said to be a judgment issuing any direction or deciding any issue on
merits. ''

33. As noticed above, the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court has consistently held that an
intra-Court appeal is not maintainable against the order of the learned Single Judge exercising
contempt jurisdiction in a contingency, when the contempt proceedings are not being initiated. The
reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Durga Nagpal (supra) is misconceived and
misplaced as in the said case, the Hon'ble Judges while exercising appellate jurisdiction were
confronted with the situation where the contempt Court reviewed its own order after entertaining
miscellaneous application for modification of the final judgment. The Division Bench opined that
when accused are discharged and proceedings are closed, miscellaneous application for
modification is not maintainable. In the said perspective, the Special Appeal was held to be
maintainable. Since the present case originates from a judgment and order of the contempt Court
declining to exercise contempt jurisdiction, thus, the said judgment is of no aid to the appellants.'

15. Before proceeding further this court would like to deal with the judgments that have been
relied upon by the appellant. In Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down a
general caution that irresponsible pleadings may invite action under Section 340 Cr.P.C. or
contempt, but did not mandate automatic initiation of such proceedings, particularly in cases of
inadvertent or immaterial errors in disclosure affidavits.

16. We need not join issue with judgments of the Supreme Court in The Secretary,
Hailkandi Bar Association (Supra) and Board of Control for Cricket in India (Supra) wherein
the Supreme Court has stated that simultaneous proceedings of contempt and proceedings under
Section 379 BNSS are possible. The above principles only allow a person to invoke both the
jurisdictions simultaneously but that does not mean that the courts are bound to initiate action under
both the provisions.

17. We make it further clear that we do not join issue with judgments cited in M.S. Ahlawat
(Supra), Dhananjay Sharma (Supra) and Pratibha (Supra) wherein the courts have identified
instances that would lead to the invocation of the contempt jurisdiction. With respect to the
judgement of the Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd (Supra), the judgment
of Allahabad High Court in Subhash Chandra (Supra) and Vinod Kumar Gupta (Supra), we are
at consensus at idem with the said judgments wherein the courts have held that a special appeal
would be maintainable against the order of contempt court, if the contempt court has overstepped
its jurisdiction and/or made a direction relating to the merits of the dispute in the original order, the
contempt of which is being sought for.

18. It may be noted that the scope of jurisdiction of Contempt Court is to determine whether
contempt is committed and to impose appropriate sanctions if it has been committed. The merits of
the original controversy are outside the domain of the contempt court. However, when the
Contempt Court issues directions or discusses on the merits of the original controversy, it oversteps
its jurisdiction.
4 All. Saurav Raj Vs. Sonakshi Verma
323

19. The learned Single Judge by observing that multiple proceedings cannot be permitted as a
proceeding under Section 379 BNSS was already pending and giving liberty to approach the
competent court to pursue the grievance therein exercising contempt jurisdiction has neither
entered into the merits of dispute nor decided any question, inter alia, which may affect the
valuable rights of the parties as filing contempt against a contemnor does not confer any right
against which a special appeal can be filed.

20. There is another aspect of the matter, inasmuch as it has been vehemently argued by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Single Judge, by conflating these observation of
'multiplicity of proceedings', with the direction of 'relegating the parties to pursue perjury
application' has actually commented on the merits of the contempt petition and as such the present
Special Appeal was maintainable. We are afraid that the said submissions cannot be suscribed by
us in any manner as the observation and/or direction of the learned Single Judge are not even
peripheral to the merits of the contempt petition. Arguendo, one cannot argue that these observation
and/or direction amounts to refusal of the Contempt Court to exercise its jurisdiction and/or has a
trapping of dismissal of the said petition.