# Seema Padalia & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 803
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-06
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 39180 of 2024
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Vipin Chandra Dixit
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/seema-padalia-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53240
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Law
-
Writ
Jurisdiction - Refund of Stamp Duty -
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Article 226
Constitution of India; Rule 218, U.P.
Stamp
Rules
as
amended
by
5th
Amendment Rules, 2021
- Law of
Limitation
is
procedural
and
retrospective unless it extinguishes a
vested right - Refund cannot be denied
merely
on
technical
grounds
of
limitation - Expiry of limitation may bar
the
remedy
but
not
the
right
-
Technicalities cannot
defeat a
just
claim. (Para -7)

Petitioners purchased stamps in 2015 for
execution of tripartite sale and sublease deed
but agreement could not be executed due to
NOIDA's refusal - application for refund filed in
2024 was rejected on ground of Rule 218 as
amended by U.P. Stamp (5th Amendment)
Rules, 2021 - Claim held time-barred by
authority. (Para - 3,4,5,6)

HELD: - Impugned order rejecting refund on
technical
grounds
quashed.
Agreement
preceded amendment. Refund justified as per
Supreme Court ruling. Authority to reconsider
refund within three months. (Para - 9,10)

Writ petition disposed of. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

3 All. Seema Padalia & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
803
authorities within a period of four
weeks from date. Immediately upon deposit
of the said amount of Rs.50,00,000/-, the
bank guarantee will be released by the
respondent authorities preferably within 48
hours of the said deposit.

9. We make it clear that our
findings above are only tentative in nature
and these findings should not be used in
any proceedings that may take place at a
later stage including the proceedings of
arbitration, if the petitioner so chooses to
go for such arbitration.

10. With the above directions, the
writ petition is disposed of.

11. We make it clear that this order
is peremptory in nature and no further time
shall be granted to the petitioner to deposit
the above Rs.50,00,000/-. In case of default
of deposit of the said amount within the
time frame as aforesaid, the authority shall
be at liberty to act in accordance with law.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 803
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN CHANDRA DIXIT, J.

Writ C No. 39180 of 2024

Seema Padalia & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Rahul Sahai, Sri Saumitra Anand

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh

(A)
Constitutional
Law
-
Writ
Jurisdiction - Refund of Stamp Duty -
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 - Article 226
Constitution of India; Rule 218, U.P.
Stamp
Rules
as
amended
by
5th
Amendment Rules, 2021
- Law of
Limitation
is
procedural
and
retrospective unless it extinguishes a
vested right - Refund cannot be denied
merely
on
technical
grounds
of
limitation - Expiry of limitation may bar
the
remedy
but
not
the
right
-
Technicalities cannot
defeat a
just
claim. (Para -7)

Petitioners purchased stamps in 2015 for
execution of tripartite sale and sublease deed
but agreement could not be executed due to
NOIDA's refusal - application for refund filed in
2024 was rejected on ground of Rule 218 as
amended by U.P. Stamp (5th Amendment)
Rules, 2021 - Claim held time-barred by
authority. (Para - 3,4,5,6)

HELD: - Impugned order rejecting refund on
technical
grounds
quashed.
Agreement
preceded amendment. Refund justified as per
Supreme Court ruling. Authority to reconsider
refund within three months. (Para - 9,10)

Writ petition disposed of. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Harshit Harish Jain & anr. Vs St. of Maha. &
ors., 2025 Law Suit (SC) 105

2. M.P. Steel Corporation Vs Commissioner of
Central Excise, 2015 7 SCC 58

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
& Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

2. This writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India has been
filed by the petitioners with the following
reliefs :-
804 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
"i. Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
for quashing the impugned order
dated
16.05.2024
passed
by
respondent no. 3 vide patrank No.
314/Sa.Ma.
Ni.-Pratham/2024
whereby the petitioners' application
for refund of stamp has been
rejected. (Annexure-1 to the writ
petition).
ii. Issue a suitable order or
direction for declaration of the Rule
218 as substituted/amended by U.P.
Stamp 5th amendment Rules 2021
as ultra vires the Indian Stamp Act,
1899.
iii. Issue a suitable writ,
order or direction in the nature of
mandamus directing the respondent
no. 2 to 4 to refund the stamp duty
in accordance with law by allowing
the application dated 27.04.2024."

3. The factual matrix of the case is
that the petitioners sought to enter into a
tripartite agreement of sale-deed and
sublease deed with respect to super
structure of residential unit and land,
respectively, with the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (lessor) and one
M/s AGC Realty Private Ltd. (lessee) for
dwelling unit No. W-1101 on 11th Floor,
Tower W in complex known as "Homes
121" constructed over Plot No. GH - Sector
121 Noida, Gautambudh Nagar. In this
behalf the total sale consideration was to be
of Rs. 87,37,470/- and the stamp duty was
assessed at Rs. 4,37,000/-. The petitioners
being desirous of entering into the said
agreement purchased the requisite stamp as
per the following breakup on 22.09.2015 :

25,000 x 17
10,000 x 1
1,000 x 2
4. Thereafter, an agreement was
drawn upon the aforesaid stamps, however,
the same was not presented for registration
and accordingly remained unused and
unutilized. There was a restriction imposed
on transfer and sale of flats by NOIDa in
the project "Home 121" of which the
property
in
question
was
a
part.
Consequently, the agreement did not
fructify as the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority did not assent/join
in the said transaction. The petitioners were
not aware as to the restriction on sale and
transfer of flats in project "Home 121" till
the time Noida Authority backed out from
the agreement. The petitioners were under a
bonafide belief that the agreement would
be executed soon and kept awaiting its
execution and registration.

5. When it became clear that the
sale/sublease agreement would not be
processed, the petitioners surrendered their
allotment of the flat in November, 2023 as
the builder expressed its inability to
execute the agreement without the consent
of NOIDA. Thereafter, by means of
application
dated
27.04.2024,
the
petitioners approached the respondent nos.
2 and 4 seeking refund of stamps worth Rs.
4,37,000/-.

6. The matter was placed before
the respondent no. 3 who proceeded to pass
the impugned order dated 16.05.2024 on
the pretext that an amendment has been
introduced
being
U.P.
Stamp
(5th
Amendment) Rules, 2021, whereby the
Rule 2018 has been substituted and a
condition
had
been
imposed
which
contemplates that stamp would not be
renewed or returned after 8 years from its
purchase and therefore, the claim of the
petitioners was time barred.
3 All. Seema Padalia & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
805
7. Counsel on behalf of petitioners
submits that the amended provision that
took place in the year 2021 would not
apply to the present case as the stamps
were purchased in the year 2015 before the
amendment. Learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance on a
judgment of Supreme Court in Harshit
Harish Jain & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors. reported in 2025 Law Suit (SC)
105, wherein, a three Judges Bench had
dealt with a similar issue with regard to the
Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. The issue before
the Supreme Court has been delineated in
paragraph no. 5 and thereafter, the Supreme
Court
has
relied
upon
M.P.
Steel
Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central
Excise, 2015 7 SCC 58 to examine the
applicability of amending the limitation
period on an accrued cause of action. The
Supreme Court has, however, gone on to
hold in paragraph nos. 10 and 11 that a
legitimate refund should not be denied on
technical grounds of limitation and has held
that equitable balance is required to be kept
in mind in fiscal or quasi judicial orders.
Relevant paragraph nos. 5,9,10 and 11 are
reproduced herein below :-

"5.
Having
heard
the
learned counsel for the Appellants
and the Respondents, the primary
issue for consideration before us is
whether the amended six-month
limitation,
introduced
by
the
24.04.2015 amendment to Section
48(1) of the Act governs the
Appellants' claim for stamp duty
refund,
particularly
when
the
Cancellation Deed was executed
prior
to
the
amendment
but
registered thereafter.
***********
9. Moreover, in M.P. Steel
Corporation v. Commissioner of
Central Excise, 2015 7 SCC 58,
this Court has held that amendment
to provision as to limitation is
inapplicable to accrued cause of
action where the amendment has
reduced the period earlier provided.
The
relevant
paras
of
this
judgement have been extracted
hereunder:
"53. Shri A.K. Sanghi,
learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Revenue, has
strongly contended before us that
the present appeal must attract the
limitation period as on the date of
its filing. That being so, it is clear
that the present appeal having been
filed before Cestat only on 23-52003, it is Section 128 post
amendment that would apply and
therefore the maximum period
available to the (2015)7 SCC 58
appellant would be 60 plus 30 days.
Even if time taken in the abortive
proceedings is to be excluded, the
appeal filed will be out of time
being beyond the aforesaid period.
54. It is settled law that
periods of limitation are procedural
in nature and would ordinarily be
applied
retrospectively.
This,
however, is subject to a rider. In
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Shanti Misra, [(1975) 2 SCC 840 :
(1976) 2 SCR 266] , this Court held
: (SCC p. 844, para 5)
5. "On the plain language
of Sections 110-A and 110-F there
should be no difficulty in taking the
view that the change in law was
merely a change of forum i.e. a
change of adjectival or procedural
law and not of substantive law. It is
a well-established proposition that
such a change of law operates
806 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
retrospectively and the person has
to go to the new forum even if his
cause of action or right of action
accrued prior to the change of
forum. He will have a vested right
of action but not a vested right of
forum. If by express words the new
forum is made available only to
causes of action arising after the
creation of the forum, then the
retrospective operation of the law is
taken away. Otherwise, the general
rule is to make it retrospective."
55. In answering a question
which arose under Section 110-A of
the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court
held : (Shanti Misra case [(1975) 2
SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR 266] ,
SCC p. 846, para 7)
7. "... '(1) Time for the
purpose of filing the application
under Section 110-A did not start
running before the constitution of
the tribunal. Time had started
running for the filing of the suit but
before it had expired the forum was
changed. And for the purpose of the
changed forum, time could not be
deemed to have started running
before a remedy of going to the
new forum is made available.

(2) Even though by and
large the law of limitation has been
held to be a procedural law, there
are exceptions to this principle.
Generally the law of limitation
which is in vogue on the date of the
commencement
of
the
action
governs it. But there are certain
exceptions to this principle. The
new law of limitation providing a
longer period cannot revive a dead
remedy. Nor can it suddenly
extinguish a vested right of action
by providing for a shorter period of
limitation.'"
56. This statement of the
law was referred to with approval
in Vinod Gurudas Rajak v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., [(1991) 4 SCC
333] as follows : (SCC p. 337, para
7).
7. "It is true that the
appellant earlier could file an
application even more than six
months after the expiry of the
period of limitation, but can this be
treated to be a right which the
appellant had acquired. The answer
is in the negative. The claim to
compensation which the appellant
was entitled to, by reason of the
accident was certainly enforceable
as a right. So far the period of
limitation for commencing a legal
proceeding is concerned, it is
adjectival in nature, and has to be
governed by the new Act-subject
to two conditions. If under the
repealing Act the remedy suddenly
stands barred as a result of a shorter
period of limitation, the same
cannot be held to govern the case,
otherwise the result will be to
deprive the suitor of an accrued
right. The second exception is
where the new enactment leaves
the claimant with such a short
period for commencing the legal
proceeding so as to make it
unpractical for him to avail of the
remedy. This principle has been
followed by this Court in many
cases and by way of illustration we
would like to mention New India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra,
[(1975) 2 SCC 840 : (1976) 2 SCR
266]
.
The
husband
of
the
respondent in that case died in an
3 All. Seema Padalia & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
807
accident in 1966. A period of two
years
was
available
to
the
respondent for instituting a suit for
recovery of damages. In March
1967 the Claims Tribunal under
Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 was constituted, barring
the jurisdiction of the civil court
and prescribed 60 days as the
period
of
limitation.
The
respondent filed the application in
July 1967. It was held that not
having filed a suit before March
1967 the only remedy of the
respondent was by way of an
application before the Tribunal. So
far the period of limitation was
concerned, it was observed that a
new law of limitation providing for
a shorter period cannot certainly
extinguish a vested right of action.
In view of the change of the law it
was held that the application could
be filed within a reasonable time
after
the
constitution
of
the
Tribunal; and, that the time of
about four months taken by the
respondent in approaching the
Tribunal after its constitution, could
be held to be either reasonable time
or the delay of about two months
could be condoned under the
proviso to Section 110-A(3)." Both
these judgments were referred to
and followed in Union of India v.
Harnam Singh, [(1993) 2 SCC 162
: 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1993) 24
ATC 92] , see para 12.
57. The aforesaid principle
is also contained in Section 30(a) of
the Limitation Act, 1963:
30. "Provision for suits,
etc., for which the prescribed
period is shorter than the period
prescribed by the Indian Limitation
Act,
1908.-Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act-
(a) any suit for which the
period of limitation is shorter than
the period of limitation prescribed
by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
may be instituted within a period of
seven
years
next
after
the
commencement of this Act or
within the period prescribed for
such suit by the Indian Limitation
Act,
1908,
whichever
period
expires earlier:"
58. The reason for the said
principle is not far to seek. Though
periods
of
limitation,
being
procedural law, are to be applied
retrospectively, yet if a shorter
period of limitation is provided by
a later amendment to a statute, such
period would render the vested
right of action contained in the
statute nugatory as such right of
action would now become time-
barred
under
the
amended
provision."

10. Even if one were to hold that
the Appellants' claim is examined under the
amended six-month period, we are of the
considered opinion that a mere technical
delay should not, by itself, extinguish an
otherwise valid claim. The scheme of
stamp duty refund provisions is designed to
ensure fairness when the underlying
transaction is rescinded for bona fide
reasons. The Appellants were compelled to
cancel the purchase due to the developer's
inability to deliver timely possession, and
were in no way remiss or at fault.

11. Denying a legitimate refund
solely on technical grounds of limitation,
especially when the timing of registration
fell close to the legislative amendment,
808 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
fails to strike the equitable balance
ordinarily expected in fiscal or quasijudicial determinations. A measure of
discretion or consideration for good faith
conduct is not alien to statutory processes
that
safeguard
citizens
from
unjust
enrichment by the State. It has been laid
down by this Court in Bano Saiyed Parwaz
v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
&Inspector
General
of
Registration
&Controller of Stamps, 2024 SCC Online
SC 979 that the limitation provision in
stamp law (to seek refund of stamp duty)
should not be enforced so as to oust the
remedy when the applicant is otherwise not
blameworthy. The relevant paras of the
same have been reproduced hereunder:

"14. In Committee-GFIL v.
Libra Buildtech Private Limited,
wherein the issue of refund of
stamp duty under the same Act was
in question, this Court has observed
and held inter alia as under:
"29. This case reminds us
of the observations made by M.C.
Chagla, C.J. in Firm Kaluram
Sitaram v. Dominion of India,
[1953 SCC OnLine Bom 39: AIR
1954 Bom 50]. The learned Chief
Justice in his distinctive style of
writing observed as under in para
19: (Firm Kaluram case, SCC
OnLine Bom) 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 979
"19. ... we have often had
occasion to say that when the State
deals with a citizen it should not
ordinarily rely on technicalities,
and if the State is satisfied that the
case of the citizen is a just one,
even though legal defences may be
open to it, it must act, as has been
said by eminent Judges, as an
honest person."
We
are
in
respectful
agreement with the aforementioned
observations, as in our considered
opinion these observations apply
fully to the case in hand against the
State because except the plea of
limitation, the State has no case to
defend their action.
**********
32.
In
our
considered
opinion, even if we find that
applications for claiming refund of
stamp duty amount were rightly
dismissed by the SDM on the
ground of limitation prescribed
under Section 50 of the Act yet
keeping
in
view
the
settled
principle of law that the expiry of
period of limitation prescribed
under any law may bar the remedy
but not the right, the applicants are
still held entitled to claim the
refund of stamp duty amount on the
basis of the grounds mentioned
above.
In
other
words,
notwithstanding dismissal of the
applications on the ground of
limitation, we are of the view that
the applicants are entitled to claim
the refund of stamp duty amount
from the State in the light of the
grounds mentioned above."

15. The legal position is thus
settled in Libra Buildtech (supra) that when
the State deals with a citizen it should not
ordinarily rely on technicalities, even
though such defences may be open to it.
16. We draw weight from the
aforesaid judgment and are of the opinion
that the case of the appellant is fit for
refund of stamp duty in so far as it is settled
law that the period of expiry of limitation
prescribed under any law may bar the
remedy but not the right and the appellant
3 All. Vijay Kumar Dixit Vs. Union of India & Ors.
809
is held entitled to claim the refund
of stamp duty amount on the basis of the
fact that the appellant has been pursuing
her case as per remedies available to her in
law and she should not be denied the said
refund merely on technicalities as the case
of the appellant is a just one wherein she
had in bonafide paid the stamp duty for
registration but fraud was played on her by
the Vendor which led to the cancellation of
the conveyance deed."

8.

Counsel
on
behalf
of
respondents submits that the amended U.P.
Stamp Act would apply in the present case
as the petitioners' application for refund
was
made
subsequent
to
the
said
amendment.

9. Upon perusal of the averments
made, the documents annexed and after
going through the ratio of Supreme Court
in Harshit Harish Jain & Anr (supra), we
are of the view that in the present case the
impugned order rejecting the refund of the
petitioners is passed on technical reasons
only. From the facts, it is clear that the
agreement between the parties has taken
place prior to the amendment that has been
carried
in
the
stamp
papers,
and
accordingly, following the ratio of the
Supreme Court Judgment, it is crystal clear
that the benefit of refund of the stamp duty
would be applicable in the present case.

10. The impugned order does not
take into consideration the ratio of the
Supreme Court judgement. Accordingly,
the said order is quashed and set aside with
the direction upon the authority concerned
to
once
again
examine
the
refund
application of the petitioners keeping in
view the judgment of the Supreme Court
cited above within a period of three months
from date.
11. With the above observation,
the writ petition is disposed of.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 809
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ C No. 41735 of 2024

Vijay Kumar Dixit ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Manoj Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Nishant Mehrotra, Pranjal Mehrotra

(A) Constitutional Law - Writ Jurisdiction
- Recovery of professional fees from
empanelled advocate based on internal
inquiry - Constitution of India - Article
226 - Principles of natural justice to be
followed when stigma is cast - Orders
demanding recovery of excess payment
without hearing and inquiry report held
stigmatic and violative of natural justice -
Internal financial investigation - Denial of
inquiry report - Absence of show cause -
Stigmatic action by State instrumentality
- Authority casting stigma must ensure
due process including copy of inquiry
report and opportunity of response.(Para -
3,6,7,8,9,11)

Petitioner, an empanelled advocate with FCI -
was served multiple orders demanding refund of
Rs.17,16,767/- as excess payment based on an
internal committee report - without being served
a copy of such report or given opportunity to
participate in the inquiry - recovery was being
sought by the client (F.C.I.) against the
Advocate (petitioner) by way of setting off
alleged excess payments against the payments