# Senior Suptt. Dept. of Post, Moradabad Division & Ors v. Bundu & Anr. 874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2022) 12 ILRA 873
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-11-30
- **Case number:** Matter Under Article 227 No. 1436 of 2015
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/senior-suptt-dept-of-post-moradabad-division-ors-v-bundu-anr-874-indian-law-48057
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

---

Award of compensation of Rs. 4,500/- on
account of loss of articles sent by speed-post-
challenged-Award challenged-Postal services are
Public Utility Services-Permanent Lok Adalat has
the same powers and jurisdiction as civil courts
to decide such cases-award valid.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

12 All. Senior Suptt. Dept. of Post, Moradabad Division & Ors. Vs. Bundu & Anr.
873
that in spite of due diligence the parties
could not have raised the matter before the
commencement of the trial. From the order
passed by the Trial Judge, it is evident that
the respondents had not been able to fulfil
the said precondition."

19. It is true that an amendment can be
permitted
to
avoid,
multiplicity
of
proceedings. But at the same time, Courts
have held that an amendment cannot be
allowed, if it causes prejudice to the right of
the party against whom an amendment is
sought for. It is also a settled law, that the
scope of the Appeal late Court is to test the
correctness of the judgment under the appeal
and any benefit or vested right, on account
of declaration of the rights, inter se be tween
the parties to the lis, by the Trial Court,
cannot be allowed to be taken away by
allowing an amendment to the pleadings, at
the appellate stage, when the party seeking
an amendment could have brought in such
amendment, even at the time of the
commencement of the trial. An amendment
admitting to wipe out the pleadings and
admissions of tine party, already considered
by the Trial Court, for the purpose of
arriving at a decision, in the suit, cannot be
allowed to be substituted with a new case, at
the appellate stage, which would certainly
cause serious prejudice to the party, against
whom the amendment is sought for. The
effect of an admission in earlier pleading
shall not be permitted to be taken away, by
any proposed amendment."

23. There is also another reason, which
ought to have weighed with the Appellate
Court in the opinion of this Court. It is true
that normally amendments are to be granted,
if sought promptly or even with some delay.
An amendment, that is mala fide or not made
in good faith, should never be granted. Here,
the amendment, in the opinion of this Court,
squarely falls into that category. There is not
the slightest of reason for the plaintiffs to
have waited until the stage of appeal to seek
this amendment and introduce a case, of
which they had knowledge all along. The said
fact by itself betrays lack of bona fides on the
plaintiffs' part.

24. So far as the impugned order goes,
it has already been remarked that it is an
entirely cryptic disposition of the amendment
application and the Appellate Court hardly
seems to have bestowed any consideration to
the plea before it, which has been casually
allowed.

25. In the circumstances, the impugned
order in the considered opinion of this Court,
cannot be sustained.

26. This petition succeeds and is
allowed.
The
impugned
order
dated
12.12.2018 passed by the Additional District
Judge, Court No.5, Deoria in Civil Appeal
No. 3 of 2013 is hereby set aside and the
amendment
application
rejected.
The
Appellate Court shall now proceed with the
hearing of the appeal expeditiously, fixing at
least one date of hearing every week
considering that the appeal is of the year
2013. The parties shall appear before the
Appellate Court on 15.12.2022.
----------
(2022) 12 ILRA 873
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.11.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Matter Under Article 227 No. 1436 of 2015

Senior Suptt. Dept. of Post, Moradabad
Division & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Bundu & Anr. ...Respondents
874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Praveen Shukla, Arachana Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
---

Award of compensation of Rs. 4,500/- on
account of loss of articles sent by speed-post-
challenged-Award challenged-Postal services are
Public Utility Services-Permanent Lok Adalat has
the same powers and jurisdiction as civil courts
to decide such cases-award valid.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Dr. Shri Dev Mishra Vs St. of U.P. & ors., WritA No.- 17240 of 2011, judgment dated
05.04.2011

2.Ram Dhari Yadav & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.,
Writ- A No.- 387 of 2015;, judgment dated
09.02.2019

3.
Neena
Chaturvedi
Vs
Public
Service
Commission reported in (2011) 1 All LJ 382

4. The Postmaster General Kerala & ors. Vs
Kiron Rasheed A.S. Manzil reported in 2011
(2)C.P.C. 328

5. Gurgaon Gramin Bank Vs Khazani & ors.
reported in AIR 2012 SC 2881
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. By the present writ petition, the
petitioner is challenging the award/order
dated 30.09.2014, passed by the Permanent
Lok
Adalat,
Moradabad
awarding
compensation to the extent of Rs. 4,500/-
each to the applicants in Application No.
153 of 2013 on account of loss of the
articles
sent
by
speed-post
by
the
complainants
which
contained
their
passports and demand drafts.

2. Counsel for the petitioner contends
that as per Section 6 of the Indian Post
Office Act, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act, 1898), the Postal Department
enjoys immunity with regard to any
liability arising out of any loss, misdelivery, delay or damage of any postal
article in the course of its transmission. She
further adds that the Permanent Lok Adalat
can not entertain an application for award
against the Postal Department in light of
the immunity of the Postal Department as
provided under Section 6 of the Act, 1898.
Counsel for petitioner has also relied upon
judgments of this Court in the cases of (i)
unreported judgment dated 05.04.2011 in
Writ-A No.- 17240 of 2011; Dr. Shri Dev
Mishra vs. State of U.P. And Others, (ii)
unreported judgment dated 09.02.2019 in
Writ- A No.- 387 of 2015; Ram Dhari
Yadav and 7 Ors vs. State of U.P. And
Anr, and (iii) A reported judgment dated
13.08.2010 by a full bench of this Court in
the case of Neena Chaturvedi vs. Public
Service Commission reported in (2011) 1
All LJ 382.

3. Heard Counsel for the petitioner
and perused the record with her assistance.

4. The judgments of this Court relied
upon by the petitioner do not apply to the
facts of this petition. The judgments in the
case of Dr. Shri Dev Mishra (Supra) and
Ram Dhari Yadav (Supra) relate to
whether
relief
could
be
granted
to
petitioners who sent their applications
through India Post, but due to delay their
applications could not reach in time to the
recruitment body and therefore their prayer
was that the respondents should admit their
applications even after a delay. Both these
judgments have relied upon the full bench
judgment of Neena Chaturvedi (Supra),
which is also relied upon by the counsel for
the petitioner in the present petition. The
Full Bench of this Court in the case of
12 All. Senior Suptt. Dept. of Post, Moradabad Division & Ors. Vs. Bundu & Anr.
875
Neena Chaturvedi (Supra) was deciding
upon the issue whether the post office acts
as an agent of the sender or the receiver.
The relevant paragraph 5 of the Neena
Chaturvedi (Supra) where the Full Bench
formulated the question of reference is as
follows:

"5.
The
question
that
can
be
formulated for consideration would be
"when
applications
are
invited,
one
through post office and the other by any
other means or only through post, does the
post office become the agent of the
addressee, because there is express or
implied authorisation by the addressee to
send the articles by post."

In its judgment, the Full Bench has not
settled whether the protection from liability
of the post office extends to all the
activities carried on by it apart from the
regular post. Therefore, for the issues
involved in this petition, the law settled in
Neena
Chaturvedi
(Supra)
has
no
applicability.

5. The primary contention of the
learned counsel for the petitioner is that the
Postal Department enjoys immunity from
any liability in light of immunity under
Section 6 of the Act, 1898, which reads as
under:

"6. Exemption from liability for loss,
misdelivery,
delay
or
damage:-
The
Government shall not incur any liability by
reason of the loss, mis delivery or delay of,
or damage to, any postal article in course
of transmission by post, except in so far as
such liability may in express terms be
undertaken
by
the
Government
as
hereinafter provided; and no officer of the
Post Office shall incur any liability by
reason of any such loss, mis delivery, delay
or damage, unless he has caused the same
fraudulently or by his willful act or
default."

He submits that it protects the
Government and the Officers of the Post
Office from any liability by reason of loss,
mis-delivery or delays for damage to any
postal article except insofar as such liability
is undertaken, in expressed terms, by the
Central Government. However, in the
present petition, the respondents have
availed the services of speed-post and not
that of a regular post. Speed post as a value
added faster service was first introduced in
the year 1986, some eighty-eight years after
the Act, 1898 was enacted and therefore by
any stretch of the imagination, the
immunity under Section 6 of the Act, 1898
can not be expected to also cover the same.
The National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission in the case of The Postmaster
General Kerala and Ors. vs. Kiron
Rasheed A.S. Manzil reported in 2011
(2)C.P.C. 328 has taken the same view
while rejecting a revision petition filed by
the Postal Department against an order for
payment of damages for delay in the arrival
of a speed post. The relevant paragraph 3 of
The Postmaster Genral (Supra) reads as
under:

"3. Coming to the merits, the only
substantive ground for challenge to the
order of the Kerala State Disputes
Redressal Commission is that under
Section 6 of the Indian Post Office Act
1898, the RP/OP incurs no liability for
loss, mis-delivery or damage/delay in
delivery, except when caused fraudulently
or willfully. This ground was raised before,
and examined in sufficient detail, in the
impugned order. The State Commission has
very rightly observed that this provision "is
not in any way connected with the
876 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
modernized forms of transactions like
speed post, e-mail, money transfer etc."

This Court agrees with and approves
the view taken by the National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission.

6. Next contention of counsel for the
petitioner is that Permanent Lok Adalat has
no
jurisdiction
to
decide
the
cases
involving the loss or mis-delivery of a
postal article in light of the immunity that
the Postal Department enjoys by virtue of
Section 6 of the Act, 1898. This Court does
not find any force in his contention.
Permanent Lok Adalat is a special
adjudicatory body set up under The Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, 1987). Powers of
Permanent Lok Adalat are provided under
Section 22 of the Act, 1987. It reads as
under:

"22. Powers of Lok Adalat or
Permanent Lok Adalat.--(1) The Lok Adalat
or Permanent Lok Adalat shall, for the
purposes of holding any determination
under this Act, have the same powers as
are vested in a Civil Court under the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while
trying a suit in respect of the following
matters, namely:--

(a) the summoning and enforcing the
attendance of any witness and examining
him on oath;

(b) the discovery and production of
any document;

(c) the reception of evidence on
affidavits;

(d) the requisitioning of any public
record or document or copy of such record
or document from any court or office; and

(e) such other matters as may be
prescribed.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality
of the powers contained in sub-section (1),
every Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat
shall have the requisite powers to specify
its own procedure for the determination of
any dispute coming before it.

(3) All proceedings before a Lok
Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat shall be
deemed to be judicial proceedings within
the meaning of sections 193,219 and 228 of
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and
every Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat
shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the
purpose of section195 and Chapter XXVI of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974)."

Section 22A of the Act, 1987 defines
"Permanent Lok Adalat" and "Public
Utility Services", which reads as follows:

"22A. Definitions.--In this Chapter
and for the purposes of sections 22 and 23,
unless the context otherwise requires,--

(a) "Permanent Lok Adalat" means a
Permanent Lok Adalat established under
sub-section (1) of section22B;

(b) "public utility service" means any--

(i) transport service for the carriage of
passengers or goods by air, road or water;
or \

(ii) postal, telegraph or telephone
service; or

(iii) supply of power, light or water to
the public by any establishment; or

(iv) system of public conservancy or
sanitation; or

(v) service in hospital or dispensary;
or

(vi)insurance service,

and includes any service which the
Central
Government
or
the
State
Government, as the case may be, in the
public interest, by notification, declare to
12 All. Senior Suptt. Dept. of Post, Moradabad Division & Ors. Vs. Bundu & Anr.
877
be a public utility service for the purposes
of this Chapter."

Furthermore, Section 22B of the Act,
1987
provides
the
establishment
of
Permanent Lok Adalat for exercising
jurisdiction
regarding
Public
utility
services, which reads as follows:

"22B. Establishment of Permanent
Lok Adalat.--(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained
in
section19,
the
Central
Authority or, as the case may be, every
State Authority shall, by notification,
establish Permanent Lok Adalat at such
places and for exercising such jurisdiction
in respect of one or more public utility
services and for such areas as may be
specified in the notification.

(2) Every Permanent Lok Adalat
established for an area notified under subsection (1) shall consist of--

(a) a person who is, or has been, a
district judge or additional district judge or
has held judicial office higher in rank than
that of a district judge, shall be the
Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat;
and

(b) two other persons having adequate
experience in public utility service to be
nominated by the Central Government or,
as the case may be, the State Government
on the recommendation of the Central
Authority or, as the case may be, the State
Authority,
appointed
by
the
Central
Authority or, as the case may be, the State
Authority, establishing such Permanent Lok
Adalat and the other terms and conditions
of the appointment of the Chairman and
other persons referred to in clause (b) shall
be such as may be prescribed by the
Central Government."

From the joint reading of both the
above provisions regarding the power and
subject matters that can be entertained by
the Permanent Lok Adalat, it becomes clear
that postal services are Public Utility
Services as Section 22A of the Act, 1987
and as per Section 22 and Section 22B,
Permanent Lok Adalat has the same powers
and jurisdiction as civil courts to decide
such cases. Therefore, this Court does not
find any strength in the contention that
Permanent Lok Adalat can not decide cases
against the Postal Department.

7. In view of the aforesaid, all the
grounds of challenge to the impugned order
could not be sustained. The petitioners have
approached this Court against an award of
Rs.4,500/- in favour of each respondent.
This petition has been pending before this
Court since 2015, seven years of litigation
challenging damages worth only Rs.4,500/-
, that too by a Department of Government
seems a cruel joke on the judiciary. The
Department has definitely lost much more
amount throughout this litigation than it
was ordered to pay as damages to the
respondents. What speaks volumes is that
even the respondents are not contesting this
petition. Furthermore, it is worth pointing
out that even in a suit for recovery of less
than Rs.25,000/-, a second appeal is barred
under Section 102 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908.

8. The Supreme Court has time and
again warned against unnecessary and
frivolous litigations taking up valuable time
of courts. In the case of Gurgaon Gramin
Bank vs. Khazani and Ors. reported in
AIR 2012 SC 2881, the Supreme Court has
lamented upon the conduct of the appellant
bank and asked for an affidavit detailing
total expenditure on litigation till the
Special Leave Petition. On finding that the
total expenditure was Rs.15,950/- and the
award challenged by the bank was a paltry
878 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
sum of just Rs.15,000/-, the Court was
shocked
and
made
the
following
observations:-

13.
Gramin
Bank
like
the
Appellant should stand for the benefit of the
gramins who sometimes avail of loan for
buying buffaloes, to purchase agricultural
implements, manure, seeds and so on.
Repayment, to a large extent, depends upon
the income which they get out of that. Crop
failure,
due
to
drought
or
natural
calamities, disease to cattle or their death
may cause difficulties to gramins to repay
the amount. Rather than coming to their
rescue, banks often drive them to litigation
leading them extreme penury. Assuming
that the bank is right, but once an authority
like District Forum takes a view, the bank
should graciously accept it rather than
going in for further litigation and even to
the level of Supreme Court. Driving poor
gramins to various litigative forums should
be strongly deprecated because they have
also to spend large amounts for conducting
litigation. We condemn this type of
practice, unless the stake is very high or the
matter affects large number of persons or
affects a general policy of the Bank which
has far reaching consequences."

9. In light of the above observations,
this Court does not find any illegality in the
award dated 30.09.2014 passed by the
Permanent Lok Adalat. Devoid of any
merit,
this
petition
is,
accordingly
dismissed.
----------
(2022) 12 ILRA 878
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.11.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.
Matter Under Article 227 No. 1459 of 2017

Raja Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
Saroj Bala ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, Sri Rajesh Chandra
Gupta, Sri Abu Bakht, Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Sri
P.K. Jain

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Manish Goyal (Sr. Advocate),Ms. Akanksha
Sharma, Sri Siddharth Singhal

Civil Law -The Uttar Pradesh Urban
Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and
Eviction)
Act,
1972-Decree
of
evictionMonthly tenant-arrears of rent-deposits made
u/s 30 to deposit rent at own risk-invalid-no
compliance of the provisions of section 30 r/w
Rule 21 -short deposits of rent-tenant did not
remit the entire outstandings of rent-on the date
of institution of the suit-not paid within 30 days
of service of notice-case of actionable defaultcomplete payment no made on the date of first
hearing.

Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Smt. Chameli Devi 13 Vs VIth A.D.J., Pilibhit
& anr., 2004 All LJ 1945

2. Smt. Siddheshwari Dixit & anr. Vs Hasina
Begum & ors., 2019 (3) ALJ 725

3. Shekhar Bahuguna Vs Suresh Chandra
Kapoor, 2010 SCC OnLine All 1891,

4. Rani Devi Vs Addl. Distt. & Sessions Judge,
2018 SCC OnLine All 6406
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

This is a tenant's petition arising out of
a decree for eviction passed by the Judge,
Small Cause Court in a suit for eviction and
recovery of arrears of rent and mesne