# Sh. Dharmveer Tyagi & Ors. Defendants/ v. Competent Authority Dfcc Special Land Acquisition Joint Officer Organization & Ors. Plaintiffs/

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 674
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-13
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sh-dharmveer-tyagi-ors-defendants-v-competent-authority-dfcc-special-land-51943
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 37 - the appeal was filed beyond
120 days-the discretionary power is only to
be exercised when sufficient cause is made
out and compelling reasons are provided
for condonation of delay-the appellants
have had a lackadaisical and nonchalant
approach to the entire issue and even after
giving benefit of section 14 of the
Limitation Act, section 34 application
would have remained time barred-the
issue with regard to filing an appeal u/s 37
of the Act is no longer res integra as the
same has been settled by the Supreme
Court in various judgment.(Para 1 to 12)

B. The usage of the phrase "but not
thereafter" in section 34(3) the Act is of
immense
significance.
This
seemingly
innocuous
phrase
underscores
the
legislature's intent to impose a strict and
non-negotiable deadline for challenging
arbitral awards, precluding the courts from
exercising any discretion in granting
additional time beyond what is specified in
section 34(3) of the Act. (Para 7,8)

The application is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
has been stated before this Court that once
parties have agreed upon mistake of
deceased then subsequently lodging of
criminal proceeding is not tenable.

6. It is to be seen that documents
placed before this Court being letter dated
30.12.2022
and
agreement
dated
30.12.2022, learned counsel for opposite
party no.2 has not admitted the aforesaid
documents. The aforesaid documents are,
therefore, at present a disputed documents,
which are required to be proved by the
applicant at the stage of trial. At this stage,
the aforesaid documents are mere defence
raised by the applicant, which is to be
considered at proper stage by the court
concerned. The jurisdiction of Section 482
Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to hold mini
trial at this stage.

7. So far as argument of learned
counsel for the applicant that independent
witnesses whose statements were recorded
have not been considered while submitting
charge sheet is concerned, the same is to
be seen by court concerned. A perusal of
statement of informant would demonstrate
that there is allegation with regard to
demand of dowry against applicant and
even specific statement has been recorded
in statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
The independent witnesses relied upon by
the applicant are the resident of the same
area, who have stated that there was a
dispute between husband and wife,
however, with regard to transaction of
demand of dowry, it is not the case that
they were the witnesses to any such
transaction. Once the informant has given
specific statement that there was demand
of dowry, there was no occasion for the
Investigating Officer to have not relied
upon the statement of informant.

8. The third submission of learned
counsel for the applicant is that the wife has
committed suicide in her parental home. No
site plan has been filed along with
application.

9. The effect whether the wife has died
on account of behaviour of applicant or
solely on her own will, it is to be seen at the
time of evidence. At this stage such issue
cannot be considered. It can be a case where
wife goes back to her parental home being
harassed, she commits suicide at her
parental home although the possibility may
be remote, however, in application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., such issue cannot be
looked into. The present application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. is devoid of merits and
is liable to be rejected.

10.

Accordingly,
the
present
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
rejected.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 674
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Appeal U/S 37 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act
1996 No. 257 of 2024

Sh. Dharmveer Tyagi & Ors.
 ...Defendants/Appellants
Versus
Competent Authority Dfcc Special Land
Acquisition Joint Officer Organization &
Ors. ...Plaintiffs/Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Shivam Shukla, Sri Sushil Kumar Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
5 All. Sh. Dharmveer Tyagi & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Dfcc Special Land Acquisition Joint
 Officer Organization & Ors.
675
A. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 37 - the appeal was filed beyond
120 days-the discretionary power is only to
be exercised when sufficient cause is made
out and compelling reasons are provided
for condonation of delay-the appellants
have had a lackadaisical and nonchalant
approach to the entire issue and even after
giving benefit of section 14 of the
Limitation Act, section 34 application
would have remained time barred-the
issue with regard to filing an appeal u/s 37
of the Act is no longer res integra as the
same has been settled by the Supreme
Court in various judgment.(Para 1 to 12)

B. The usage of the phrase "but not
thereafter" in section 34(3) the Act is of
immense
significance.
This
seemingly
innocuous
phrase
underscores
the
legislature's intent to impose a strict and
non-negotiable deadline for challenging
arbitral awards, precluding the courts from
exercising any discretion in granting
additional time beyond what is specified in
section 34(3) of the Act. (Para 7,8)

The application is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. U.O.I. Vs Popular Cons. Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470

2. Bhimashakar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane
Niyamita Vs Walchandnagar Indus. Ltd. (WIL)
(2023) 8 SCC 453

3. Esha Agarwal & ors. Vs Ram Niranjan Ruia
MANU/ WB/0021/2023

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sushil Kumar Shukla,
learned counsel for the appellants.

2. This is an appeal filed against an
order dated March 22, 2024 passed by the
Additional District Judge, Court No.1,
Saharanpur in an application filed under
Section
34
of
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
Application
Act,
1996
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act")
whereby the said application was dismissed
as time barred.

3. Acquisition of the land of the
appellants was carried out in the year 2015
and thereafter an arbitration award was
passed
by
the
learned
Arbitrator/Commissioner, Saharanpur on
March
15,
2018.
Subsequently,
on
November 21, 2019, the appellants filed a
writ petition before this Court bearing WritC No.4985 of 2020. This writ petition was
disposed of by this Court on February 20,
2020 with the following direction:

"Upon perusal of the averments
made in the writ petition and the documents
appended thereto, it transpires that the
petitioners are challenging the validity of
the award made under Section 20F(6) of The
Railways Act, 1989.

In our opinion, the remedy if any,
available to the petitioners against the
impugned award is to file an objection under
Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996.

Subject to aforesaid observations,
writ petition stands disposed of."

4. Upon being reverted by this Court,
the appellants filed an application under
Section 34 of the Act before the court of
Additional District Judge on July 13, 2020.
Learned Additional District Judge, after
granting hearing to the appellants, passed a
detailed order taking into consideration the
submissions made by the appellants and
dismissed the said application on the ground
that the application was beyond 120 days
and, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Limitation
Act') would not apply. Accordingly, the
learned Additional District Judge dismissed
676 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the application under Section 34 of the Act
as time barred. Relevant portion of the
judgment is extracted herein:

"15. That in this case, the
impugned order was passed by Ld.
Arbitrator/Commissioner, Saharanpur on
15.03.2018 and it is the case of the
applicants that they went to the Hon'ble
High Court against that order and filed writ
petition, but it is not mentioned on what date
that writ petition was filed before the
Hon'ble High Court. The Court can condone
the time spent before the Hon'ble High
Court while pursuing writ petition as per
Section 14 of the Limitation Act. However,
in this case, as the applicants have not
mentioned when they have filed the writ
petition before the Hon'ble High Court and
therefore, it is not possible to calculate the
time spent by the applicants before the
Hon'ble High Court. Even though, the writ
petition was disposed off on 20.02.2020 and
the present application filed by the
applicants before this Court on 13.07.2020
i.e. after five months from the date of order
of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, when
the writ petition of the applicants were
disposed off. Though, the applicants have
mentioned that certain times were taken for
getting certified copy of the order, but the
applicants were already aware about the
impugned order and also went to the
Hon'ble High Court against that order.
Thus, the applicants cannot take the
advantage of its own mistake. Admittedly, in
this case the objection was filed beyond 120
days and therefore, the present application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not
maintainable and the same is liable to be
dismissed.

The present application of the
applicants under Section 5 read with Section
34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 is hereby dismissed.

The file be consigned to the record
room."

5. Upon a perusal of the order passed
by the learned Additional District Judge, it
appears that the appellants did not inform
the Court of the date of the filing of the writ
petition before the High Court. This factual
matrix has, however, been addressed before
this Court and it appears that the writ
petition was filed on November 21, 2019. As
the order was passed by the learned
Arbitrator/Commissioner on March 15,
2018, it is clear that the writ petition was
filed after a period of eighteen months.
Subsequently, after dismissal of the writ
petition
on February 20, 2020,
the
arbitration application was filed once again
after the delay of five months, that is, on July
17, 2020.

6. Section 34 of the Act delineates the
procedural contours governing recourse
against the arbitral awards. Central to this
section is the stipulation regarding the
timeline within which an application for
setting aside an arbitral award must be
made.
Section
34(3)
of
the
Act
unequivocally mandates that such an
application cannot be made after three
months from the date on which the party
received the arbitral award or, if a request
under Section 33 of the Act was made, from
the date on which such request was disposed
of by the arbitral tribunal. Section 34(3) of
the Act also provides that the courts may
allow an application filed under Section 34
of the Act within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter. This temporal
constrain is not merely a procedural
formality but embodies crucial legal
principles essential for maintaining the
integrity, efficiency, and finality of the
arbitral process. The imposition of a strict
timeline serves to promote legal certainty,
5 All. Sh. Dharmveer Tyagi & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Dfcc Special Land Acquisition Joint
 Officer Organization & Ors.
677
preserve the integrity of the arbitral process,
and safeguard against dilatory tactics
employed by parties dissatisfied with
arbitral outcomes. By setting a clear
deadline for challenging arbitral awards,
parties are compelled to act promptly,
ensuring that awards are either upheld or set
aside within a reasonable time frame.

7. The usage of the phrase "but not
thereafter" in Section 34(3) of the Act
is
of
immense
significance.
This
seemingly
innocuous
phrase
underscores the legislature's intent to
impose a strict and non-negotiable
deadline
for
challenging
arbitral
awards, precluding the courts from
exercising any discretion in granting
additional
time
beyond
what
is
specified in Section 34(3) of the Act.

8. The language of Section 34(3) of
the Act is clear and unambiguous,
leaving no room for discretionary
interpretation. This language reflects a
deliberate policy decision to impose a
rigid temporal constraint, emphasizing
the importance of adherence to statutory
timelines in the arbitration regime.
Allowing
indefinite
delays
in
challenging awards would undermine the
efficiency and credibility of arbitration,
eroding
trust
in
the
process
and
detracting from its efficacy as a viable
alternative to traditional litigation.

9. In Union of India -v- Popular
Construction Co. reported in (2001) 8 SCC
470,
the
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
propounded that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act would not apply to applications made
under Section 34 of the Act and the time
period prescribed by Section 34(3) of the
Act is absolute and unextendible. Relevant
paragraphs are extracted herein:

"12. As far as the language of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are "but not thereafter" used
in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our
opinion, this phrase would amount to an
express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and
would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not
need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside
the award beyond the extended period under
the proviso, would render the phrase "but
not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle
of interpretation would justify such a result.

13. Apart from the language,
"express exclusion" may follow from the
scheme and object of the special or local
law:

"[E]ven in a case where the
special law does not exclude the provisions
of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by
an express reference, it would nonetheless
be open to the court to examine whether and
to what extent the nature of those provisions
or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation." [(1974) 2 SCC 133] (SCC p.
146, para 17)

14. Here the history and scheme of
the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the
time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and
unextendible by court under Section 5 of the
Limitation
Act.
The
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the
1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives
the need "to minimise the supervisory role
of courts in the arbitral process" [ Para 4(v)
of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996]
. This objective has found expression in
Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the
extent of judicial intervention in no
uncertain terms:
678 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"5.
Extent
of
judicial
intervention.-Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any other law for the time being
in force, in matters governed by this Part, no
judicial authority shall intervene except
where so provided in this Part."

15. The "Part" referred to in
Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which
deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34
is contained in Part I and is therefore
subject to the sweep of the prohibition
contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act.

16. Furthermore, Section 34(1)
itself provides that recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made only
by an application for setting aside such
award "in accordance with" sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates
to grounds for setting aside an award and is
not relevant for our purposes. But an
application
filed
beyond
the
period
mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3)
would not be an application "in accordance
with" that sub-section. Consequently by
virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be made
beyond
the
period
prescribed.
The
importance of the period fixed under Section
34 is emphasised by the provisions of
Section 36 which provide that "where the
time for making an application to set aside
the arbitral award under Section 34 has
expired ... the award shall be enforced
under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in
the same manner as if it were a decree of the
court". This is a significant departure from
the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set
aside the award expired, the court was
required
to
"proceed
to
pronounce
judgment according to the award, and upon
the judgment so pronounced a decree shall
follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence
of the time expiring under Section 34 of the
1996 Act is that the award becomes
immediately enforceable without any further
act of the court. If there were any residual
doubt on the interpretation of the language
used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996
Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the
exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act."

10. Referring to it's judgment in
Popular Construction Co. (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhimashankar
Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita -
v- Walchandnagar Industries Limited
(WIL) reported in (2023) 8 SCC 453 held
that Limitation Act will apply to the Act
except where it has been specifically
excluded:

"54. Now, so far as the submission
on behalf of the appellant that the Limitation
Act shall not be applicable to the
proceedings under the Arbitration Act is
concerned, the aforesaid has no substance.
Section 43(1) of the Arbitration Act
specifically provides that the Limitation Act,
1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies
to proceeding in Court. However, as
observed and held by this Court in Assam
Urban [Assam Urban Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg.
Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)
831] , the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be
applicable to the matters of arbitration
covered by the 1996 Act save and except to
the extent its applicability has been excluded
by virtue of express provision contained in
Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.

55. In Popular Construction Co.
[Union of India v. Popular Construction
Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] , when Section 5 of
the Limitation Act was pressed into service
to proceedings under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act for setting aside the arbitral
award, this Court has observed that the
5 All. Sh. Dharmveer Tyagi & Ors. Vs. Competent Authority Dfcc Special Land Acquisition Joint
 Officer Organization & Ors.
679
Arbitration Act being a special law and
provides a period of limitation different
from that prescribed under the Limitation
Act, the period of limitation prescribed
under the Arbitration Act shall prevail and
shall be applicable and to that extent the
Limitation Act shall be excluded. That,
thereafter, it is observed and held that
application challenging an award filed
beyond period mentioned in Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration Act would not be an
application "in accordance with" subsection (3) as required under Section 34(1)
of the Arbitration Act."

11. In Esha Agarwal and Ors. -v-
Ram
Niranjan
Ruia
reported
in
MANU/WB/0021/2023, I had dealt with the
question of limitation under Section 34(3) of
the Act as follows:

"6. The question of limitation
takes centre stage in the present application
and needs to be adjudicated upon first and
foremost. With respect to limitation for filing
a challenge to an arbitral award, Section
34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 provides that an application under
the section cannot be made after 'three
months have elapsed from the date on which
the party making that application had
received the arbitral award'. The courts can
condone the delay within a further period of
thirty days, provided sufficient cause is
present, but not 'thereafter'. I believe the
term 'thereafter' used in the section does not
need any further interpretation. A plain
reading of the said section and the proviso
makes it as clear as the sky on a summer
morning that courts cannot condone a delay
beyond the extendable period of thirty days
provided in the section.

7. It is necessary at this point to
make reference to the recent decision of the
apex court in Mahindra and Mahindra
Financial Services Limited v. Maheshbhai
Tinabhai Rathod And Others reported in
MANU/SC/1338/2021 : (2022) 4 SCC 162
wherein the restricted scope of the courts'
power to condone the delay in case of an
application under Section 34 was reiterated
by the Supreme Court. Relevant portions
have been extracted below-

9.
The
scope
available
for
condonation of delay being self-contained in
the proviso to Section 34(3) and Section 5 of
the Limitation Act not being applicable has
been taken note by this Court in its earlier
decisions, which we may note. In Union of
India v. Popular Construction Co. [Union of
India
v.
Popular
Construction
Co.,
MANU/SC/0613/2001 : (2001) 8 SCC 470]
it has been held as hereunder:

"12. As far as the language of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are "but not thereafter" used
in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our
opinion, this phrase would amount to an
express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and
would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not
need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside
the award beyond the extended period under
the proviso, would render the phrase "but
not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle
of interpretation would justify such a result.
***

14. Here the history and scheme of
the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the
time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and
unextendible by court under Section 5 of the
Limitation
Act.
The
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the
1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives
the need "to minimise the supervisory role of
courts in the arbitral process" [Para 4(v) of
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
680 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.]. This
objective has found expression in Section 5 of the
Act which prescribes the extent of judicial
intervention in no uncertain terms:

'5. Extent of judicial intervention.--
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in matters
governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall
intervene except where so provided in this Part.'
***

16. This is a significant departure from
the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under
the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award
expired, the court was required to "proceed to
pronounce judgment according to the award, and
upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall
follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the
time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
that the award becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the court. If there were
any residual doubt on the interpretation of the
language used in Section 34, the scheme of the
1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion
of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.'

8. While I express my sympathy
towards the petitioner, my judicial hands are
curtailed by the law, as mentioned above. There
is no runway of merit for the present application
to land on. The present application has been filed
forty-two days after the prescribed period of
limitation under the Act, and given that the court
has the power to condone a delay of only up to
thirty days, the present application fails and is
bound to be sacrificed at the altar of limitation."

12. From the above factual matrix, it is clear
that the appellants have had a lackadaisical and
nonchalant approach to the entire affair and even
after giving the benefit of Section 14 of the
Limitation Act, Section 34 application would
have remained time barred.

13. Before I part with this judgement, it
is essential to underscore the importance of
adhering to statutory timelines especially
within the context of arbitration. Unlike
traditional litigation, where cases may
languish in the court system for years,
arbitration offers parties a streamlined and
expeditious mechanism for resolving disputes.
Central to the efficacy of arbitration is the
timely administration of proceedings, which
necessitates adherence to prescribed timelines
at every stage of the arbitral process. Delay in
challenging arbitral awards can prejudice the
rights for the parties involved, particularly the
party seeking to enforce the award. When
disputes are resolved expeditiously, parties
can obtain closure and move forward with
their lives, rather than being mired in
prolonged legal battles. Moreover, timely
resolution reduces the burden on the court
system, allowing courts to focus their
resources on cases that require judicial
intervention.

14. In light of the aforesaid, I find no
reason to interfere with the order passed by the
learned Additional District Judge under
Section 34 of the Act dismissing the
application as time barred.

15. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
dismissed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 680
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Appeal U/S 37 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act
1996 Defective No. 593 of 2023

Nirankar Dutt Tyagi & Anr.
 ...Defendants/Appellants
Versus
N.H.I. Unit Dehradun & Anr.