# Shamshad Ali & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 9 ILRA 564
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-20
- **Case number:** WRIT - C No. 27848 of 2018
- **Bench:** B. Amit Sthalekar, Piyush Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shamshad-ali-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46004
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law -Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 4-notification, Section 6-declaration,
Section
11-compensation-Section
18reference, Section 20-Cognizance of cases
by
lok
Adalats-section
28-A-Redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court-Legal Services Authority Act, 1987
-Section 21-Award of Lok Adalat- impugned
order set aside.

land of the petitioners - covered by the
notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquistion Act, 1894 - an award under Section
11 of the Act was published on 28.11.1984
fixing Rs. 20/- per square yard as compensation
for the land acquired - reference made under
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
565
Section 18 of the Act, 1894 - compromise and
settlement between the parties - claim of the
petitioners rejected by the Additional District
magistrate (land acquisition ) - ground - not
filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act,
1894 - award was only between the parties
before the Lok Adalat or before the court under
Section 18 of the Act, 1894 - reasoning given by
the
Additional
District
magistrate
(land
acquisition ) - absolutely illegal and arbitrary
and against the statutory mandate of Section
28A of the Act, 1894. (Para-47,48)

HELD: - The petitioners would be entitled for
payment of compensation as determined in the
Award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016.
Addl.
District
Magistrate
(Land
Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, is
directed to pass fresh order on the application
of the petitioners dated 12.5.2016. (Para-48)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,934 of 93,981. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39934 for what follows._

564 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
forum which is a complete hierarchy at
District level, State level, Central level and
upto Supreme Court. Therefore, on the later
aspect, i.e., deficiency in service and
adjudicatory forum U.P. Act, 1976 is not a
special Act but Central Act, 1986 is an
special Act and shall override.

14. Learned counsel for petitioners
placed reliance on a Single Judge judgment
of this Court of Lucknow Bench in Writ
Petition No. 557 (MS) of 2009 (M/s
Behari
Colds
(P)
Ltd.
vs.
State
Consumer
Disputes
Redressal
Commission and others), decided on
21.08.2009 wherein it is held that if two
remedies are available the incumbent
cannot avail both of them.

15. We find that learned Single Judge has
misconstrued the Supreme Court's judgment in
Chairman,
Thiruvalluvar
Transport
Corporation
vs.
Consumer
Protection
Council, AIR 1995 SC 1384 and, therefore,
aforesaid judgment cannot be said to be correct.
When a specific right is created in a statute and
the same statute provides an adjudicatory forum
also, the aggrieved person may claim such right
before forum under the same statute and not
elsewhere but here right to claim damages and
compensation has been conferred upon
aggrieved person or the Farmer, as the case may
be, under both statutes, i.e., U.P. Act, 1976 and
Central Act, 1986, therefore, the right to claim
damages was conferred by both statutes and
forums for adjudication was also provided
therein, hence it is open to person concerned to
elect the forum where he wants to have his right
adjudicated.

16. We, therefore, find no error in the
order passed by District Consumer Forum
on the ground of jurisdiction. Writ petition
lacks merit. Dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2020)09ILR A564
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.05.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

WRIT - C No. 27848 of 2018
connected with
WRIT - C No. 27876 of 2018
&
WRIT - C No. 20101 of 2018
&
WRIT - C No. 27873 of 2018
&
WRIT - C No. 1947 of 2020
&
WRIT - C No. 27846 of 2018

Shamshad Ali & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Shailesh Upadhyay, Sri Manu Khare, Sri
Rishi Kant Rai, Sri Vijay Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Kaushlendra Nath Singh, Sri
Raghvendra Dwivedi

(A) Civil Law -Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -
Section 4-notification, Section 6-declaration,
Section
11-compensation-Section
18reference, Section 20-Cognizance of cases
by
lok
Adalats-section
28-A-Redetermination
of
the
amount
of
compensation on the basis of the award of
the Court-Legal Services Authority Act, 1987
-Section 21-Award of Lok Adalat- impugned
order set aside.

land of the petitioners - covered by the
notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquistion Act, 1894 - an award under Section
11 of the Act was published on 28.11.1984
fixing Rs. 20/- per square yard as compensation
for the land acquired - reference made under
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
565
Section 18 of the Act, 1894 - compromise and
settlement between the parties - claim of the
petitioners rejected by the Additional District
magistrate (land acquisition ) - ground - not
filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act,
1894 - award was only between the parties
before the Lok Adalat or before the court under
Section 18 of the Act, 1894 - reasoning given by
the
Additional
District
magistrate
(land
acquisition ) - absolutely illegal and arbitrary
and against the statutory mandate of Section
28A of the Act, 1894. (Para-47,48)

HELD: - The petitioners would be entitled for
payment of compensation as determined in the
Award of the Lok Adalat dated 12.03.2016.
Addl.
District
Magistrate
(Land
Acquisition)/Special Land Acquisition Officer, is
directed to pass fresh order on the application
of the petitioners dated 12.5.2016. (Para-48)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. ITI Ltd. Vs Siemens Public Communications
Network Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 510

2. P.T. Thomas Vs Thomes Job, (2002) 6 SCC
478

3. Pradeep Kumar Vs St. of U.P. & ors., First
Appeal No. 522 of 2009

4. St. of Punj. Vs Jalauar Singh, (2018) 2 SCC 660

5. Vasudave & ors. Vs The Commissioner and
Secretary Government Revenue Department &
ors. ,ILR 2007 KAR 4533

6. Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs Krishna
Travel Agency, (2008) 6 SCC 741

7. Northern Coal Fields, Singrauli Vs Aluminium
Industries Ltd., Kundara (Kerala)., 2013 6 ADJ
104

8. Kunwar Singh Saini Vs High Court of Delhi ,
(2012) 4 SCC 307

9. St. of Punj. & anr. Vs Jalaur Singh & anr.,
(2008) 2 SCC 660
10. Surendra Singh & ors. Vs Deo Muni Singh &
ors., Civil Writ jurisdiction case no. 13375 of
2011

11. Dheer Singh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition no. 5899 of
2017

12. Bhagti (Smt.) deceased through her legal
heirs Jagdish Ram Sharma Vs St. of Har., (1997)
4 SCC 473

13. UOI & anr. Vs Pradeep Kumari & ors., AIR
1995 SC 2259

14. Babua Ram & ors. vs St. of U.P. & anr.,
(1995) 2 SCC 689

15. Writ petition (C) no. 611 of 2017 (Smt.
Kamla Tomar Vs St. of U.P. & ors.)

16. Writ Petition (C) No. 7218 of 2019 (Tezpal
Singh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.)

(Delivered by Hon'ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manu Khare, Sri
Shailesh Upadhyay as well as Sri Vijay
Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the
petitioners and Sri Suresh Singh, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel, Sri
Kaushalendra Nath Singh as well as Sri
Raghvendra Dwivedi, learned counsel for
the respondents.

2. These bunch of writ petitions are
being decided by this common judgment
and order as they involve identical question
of facts and law, as agreed by the learned
counsel for the parties.

3. We take up the leading case being
Writ
Petition
No.
27848
of
2018
(Shamshad Ali and another Vs. State of
U.P. and others). Briefly stated the facts of
the case are that the father of the petitioners
is said to be the recorded tenure holder of
Plot No. 197 area 0-7-0, plot no.198 area 0-
566 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
9-0, total area 0-16-0 situate in village
Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur,
Pargana
and
Tehsil Dadri, district Gautam Budh Nagar.
It is stated that by notification dated
22.3.1983 issued under section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act, 1894) the said plots
were notified for acquisition alongwith
certain
other
plots
in
village
Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur,
Pargana
and
Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar.
Thereafter a declaration was made on
23.3.1983 under section 6 of the Act, 1894
with respect of these lands. The Award was
published
on
28.11.1984
fixing
compensation payable for the land acquired
at Rs.20/- per sq. yard. It is stated that one
Fateh Mohammad who was the recorded
tenure holder of Plot No. 180 Ka area 1-9-0
situate in village Aliwardipur/Alabadirpur,
Pargana and Tehsil Dadri being not
satisfied with the Award preferred a
reference under section 18 of Act, 1894
before
the
Collector/Special
Land
Acquisition Officer. This reference was
proceeded as LAR No. 06 of 2002 (Fateh
Mohd. Vs. State of U.P.). It is also stated
that LAR No. 6 of 2002 was thereafter
referred to Lok Adalat presided by Addl.
District and Sessions Judge/FTC No. 2,
Gautam Budh Nagar constituted under the
provisions of Legal Services Authority Act,
1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,
1987). Learned Addl. District Judge by his
order dated 12.3.2016 allowed the said
reference on the basis of a compromise
between
the
parties
alongwith
other
references being LAR No. 7 of 2002, LAR
No. 8 of 2002 and LAR No. 9 of 2002 and
the compensation was enhanced and fixed
at Rs. 297.50/- per sq. yard on the ground
that the High Court while deciding the first
appeal with respect to the said village had
enhanced the compensation to Rs.297.50/-
per sq. yard. When the petitioners came to
know about the order of the Lok Adalat,
they moved an application under section
28-A of the Act, 1894 before the A.D.M.
(Land
Acquisition)/Special
Land
Acquisition Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar
as heirs of the previous tenure holders Niaz
Mohd., Shah Mohd. and Buniyad Ali. It is
also stated that the Addl. District Judge
(Land
Acquisition)/Special
Land
Acquisition Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar
delayed consideration of the application of
the petitioners, therefore, the petitioners left
with no other option approached the High
Court by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No. 4368 of 2018 (Shamshad Ali and
another Vs. State of UI.P. And others). This
writ petition was disposed of by the High
Court by its order dated 1.2.2018 with a
direction to the competent authority to take
a decision on the application of the
petitioners in accordance with law and in
accordance with the direction contained in
the judgement of a Division Bench of the
High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 38674
of 2017 (Satyapal Singh and 21 others Vs.
State of U.P. and others) decided on
21.9.2017. Order of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court dated 01.02.2018
reads as under:-

"The petitioners claim to have
filed an application under Section 28-A of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
'Act')
for
redetermination of the compensation on the
basis of the award made by the Reference
Court in regard to the same notification
issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and the
declaration made under Section 6(1) of the
Act. The grievance is that till date the
application has not been decided.

The application which has been
filed under Section 28-A of the Act has to
be decided in terms of the conditions set
out under Section 28-A of the Act which
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
567
have also been elaborately dealt by a
Division Bench of this Court in Writ CNo.38674 of 2017 (Satyapal Singh & 21
Ors., Vs. State of U.P. & 3 Ors.,) decided
on 21 September 2017.

Learned
Standing
Counsel
appears for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. Sri
Kaushalendra Nath Singh, appears for
respondent No.3. Learned counsel for the
respondents state that the application shall
be decided in accordance with law at an
early date.

This petition is, accordingly,
disposed of with a direction to the
Competent Authority to take a decision on
the application filed by the petitioners after
hearing
the
parties
concerned
in
accordance with law and in accordance
with the directions contained in Satyapal
Singh & 21 Ors,."

4. It is in pursuance of the order of the
High Court dated 1.2.2018 that the
respondents have proceeded to pass the
impugned
order
dated
19.5.2018,
Annexure-10 to the writ petition.

5. The contention of the petitioners is
that the A.D.M., Land Acquisition/Special
Land Acquisition Officer, respondent no. 4
has held that the writ petition no. 4368 of
2018 was filed by Shamshad Ali and
another who have not preferred any
reference under section 18 of the Act, 1894
and since the reference under section 18
was only between the parties therein,
therefore, the order passed in that reference
would not be applicable in the case of the
petitioners.

6. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel
for
the
petitioners
referring
to
the
provisions of Section 21 of the Act, 1987
submits that section 21 of the Act, 1987
provides that every award of the Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a
civil court. Section 21 of the Act, 1987
reads as under:

"21. Award of Lok Adalat.--(1)
Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be
deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as
the case may be, an order of any other
court
and
where
a
compromise
or
settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
Adalat in a case referred to it under subsection (1) of section 20, the court-fee paid
in such case shall be refunded in the
manner provided under the Court Fees Act,
1870 (7 of 1870).

(2) Every award made by a Lok
Adalat shall be final and binding on all the
parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall
lie to any court against the award."

7. He next referred to the provisions
of Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 and
submits that where there is an award under
Part III, and the court allows to the
applicant any amount of compensation in
excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under section 11 of the Act, 1894,
the persons interested in all the other land
covered by the same notification under
section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 and who are
also aggrieved by the award of the
Collector may, notwithstanding that they
had not made an application to the
Collector under section 18 of the Act, 1894,
by written application to the Collector
within three months from the date of the
award of the Court require that the amount
of compensation payable to them may be
re-determined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the court.
Section 28-A of the Act, 1894 reads as
under:

"28A. Re-determination of the
amount of compensation on the basis of
568 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the award of the Court.--(1) Where in an
award under this Part, the Court allows to
the applicant any amount of compensation
in excess of the amount awarded by the
Collector under section 11, the persons
interested in all the other land covered by
the same notification under section 4, subsection (1) and who are also aggrieved by
the
award
of
the
Collector
may,
notwithstanding that they had not made any
application to the Collector under section
18, by written application to the Collector
within three months from the date of the
award of the Court require that the amount
of compensation payable to them may be
re-determined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the Court:

Provided that in computing the
period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made
under this sub-section, the day on which
the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award
shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt
of an application under sub-section (1),
conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all
the persons interested and giving them a
reasonable opportunity of being heard, and
make an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who had not
accepted the award under sub-section (2)
may,
by
writted
application
to
the
Collector, require that the matter be
referred
by
the
Collector
for
the
determination of the Court and the
provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far
as may be, apply to such reference as they
apply to a reference under section 18."

8. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel,
therefore, submitted that since the reference
under section 18 of the Act, 1894 filed by
the other tenure holders being LAR No. 6
of 2002, LAR. No. 7 of 2002, LAR No. 8 of
2002 and LAR No. 9 of 2002 having been
referred to the Lok Adalat and decided
therein by the Addl. District Judge/FTC No.
2, Gautambudh Nagar under the Act, 1987 by
Award dated 12.3.2016 on the basis of a
compromise arrived at between the parties
therein and the compensation having been
enhanced to Rs.297.50/- sq. yard, such order
of the Lok Adalat would be deemed to be a
decree of the civil court under section 21 of
the Act, 1987, and the petitioners herein,
therefore, would be entitled to the same
compensation of Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard for
the same village, covered by the same land
acquisition notification under section 4 and 6
of the Act, 1894 in terms of the provisions of
section 28-A of the Act, 1894.

9. Shri Suresh Singh, learned Addl.
Chief Standing Counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents no. 1, 2 and 4, on
the other hand, submitted that the decision
of the Lok Adalat dated 12.3.2016 was
based upon a compromise between the
parties to the references being LAR No.
6/2002, LAR No. 7/2002, LAR No. 8/2002
and LAR No. 9/2002 and it was on the
basis
of
such
compromise
that
the
compensation payable to the applicants
therein had been enhanced from Rs.20/- per
sq. yard as given in the award dated
28.11.1984 to Rs.297.50/- per sq. yard. He
submitted that since the present petitioners
had not preferred any reference under
section 18 of the Act, 1894 against the
award dated 28.11.1984 therefore, they
cannot be said to be parties to the
compromise Award of 12.3.2016 of the
Lok Adalat which was passed in the LARs
No. 6/2002, 7/2002, 8/2002 and 9/2002.

10. Shri Kaushlendra Nath Singh,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent no. 3 adopted the submissions
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
569
of the learned Addl. Chief Standing
Counsel and further submitted that the
Award dated 12.3.2016 was an order
passed by the Lok Adalat and not by a civil
court. He further submitted that the Award
of 12.3.2016 was passed on the basis of a
compromise entered into between the
parties to the references which was referred
to the Lok Adalat by the Civil Court before
whom the reference under section 18 of the
Act, 1894 had been filed and therefore,
such an order cannot be said to be a decree
of the civil court and, therefore, the
provisions of section 28-A of the Act, 1894
would have no application in the present
case.

11. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel
for the petitioners, at the outset submitted
that admittedly the petitioners had not filed
any reference under section 18 of the Act,
1894 but on that basis alone they cannot be
denied the benefit of the Award of the Lok
Adalat since the Award dated 12.3.2016
was passed by the Lok Adalat on the matter
being referred by the civil court to the Lok
Adalat in the references LAR No. 6/2002,
7/2002, 8/2002 and 9/2002 filed under
section 18 of the Act, 1894 before the civil
court. The submission is that section 21 of
the Act, 1987 itself ordains that every
award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to
be a decree of a civil court and where a
compromise or settlement has been arrived
at by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it
under section 20(1) of the Act, 1987, the
court fee paid in such cases shall be
refunded in the manner provided in the
Court Fees Act, 1870.

12. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel
submitted that the question in the present
case is not one of refund of court fees but
one where the present petitioners are
relying upon an Award of the Lok Adalat
on the reference under section 18 of the
Act, 1894 being transferred to it under the
provisions of Section 20(1) of the Act,
1987. Shri Manu Khare further submitted
that Section 22 of the Act, 1987 itself
provides that Lok Adalat for the purposes
of holding any determination under the Act
shall have the same powers as are vested in
a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure and sub-section (3) of Section 22
of the Act, 1987 provides that all
proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be
deemed to be judicial proceedings within
the meaning of Section 193, 219 and 228 of
the Indian Penal Code and every Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be a civil court
for the purposes of Section 195 chapter
XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. The submission, therefore, is that the
Act of 1987 itself deems the Lok Adalat to
be a civil court and an award passed by it to
be a decree of a civil court and, therefore,
even if the petitioners have not preferred
any reference under section 18 of the Act,
1894, they, by virtue of mandate of Section
28-A of the Act, 1894 being interested in
all other land covered by the same
notification under section 4(1) and being
aggrieved by the award of the Collector
would be entitled to the amount of
compensation as determined by the court.

13. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel
submits that since the Lok Adalat has been
vested with the powers of a civil court and
its award shall be deemed to be a decree of
a civil court, such decree/award passed on
12.3.2016 cannot be ignored by the
respondent no. 4 as it would amount to
ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court.
He further submits that the jurisdiction of a
civil court can be ousted only by legislation
and not by any administrative order.
Reliance has been placed upon a judgement
of the Supreme Court reported in (2002) 5
570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
SCC 510 (ITI Ltd. Vs. Siemens Public
Communications
Network
Ltd.),
the
relevant paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the
said judgement read as under:

"11. It has been held by this
Court in more than one case that the
jurisdiction of the civil court to which a
right to decide a lis between the parties has
been conferred can only be taken by a
statute in specific terms and such exclusion
of right cannot be easily inferred because
there is always a strong presumption that
the civil courts have the jurisdiction to
decide all questions of civil nature,
therefore, if at all there has to be an
inference the same should be in favour of
the jurisdiction of the court rather than the
exclusion of such jurisdiction and there
being no such exclusion of the Code in
specific terms except to the extent stated
inSection 37(2), we cannot draw an
inference that merely because the Act has
not provided the CPC to be applicable, by
inference it should be held that the Code is
inapplicable. This general principle apart,
this issue is now settled by the judgment of
a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case
ofBhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A.
and Anr. in C.A. No. 6527/2001 -- decided
on 13.3.2002 where in while dealing with a
similar argument arising out of the present
Act, this Court held :

"While examining a particular
provision of a statute to find out whether
the jurisdiction of a Court is ousted or not,
the principle of universal application is
that ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be
ousted unless the very statutory provision
explicitly indicates or even by inferential
conclusion the Court arrives at the same
when such a conclusion is the only
conclusion."

12. In the said view of the matter,
we are in respectful agreement with the
view expressed by this Court in the case of
Nirma Ltd. (supra) and reject the argument
of Mr. Parasaran on this question.

13. We also do not find much
force in the argument of learned counsel
for the appellant based on Section 5of the
Act. It is to be noted that it is under this
Part, namely, Part I of the Act thatSection
37(1)of the Act is found, which provides for
an appeal to a civil court. The term 'Court'
referred to in the said provision is defined
underSection 2(e)of the Act. From the said
definition, it is clear that the appeal is not
to any designated person but to a civil
court. In such a situation, the proceedings
before such court will have to be controlled
by the provisions of the Code, therefore, the
remedy by way of a revision under Section
115 of the Code will not amount to a
judicial intervention not provided for by
Part I of the Act. To put it in other words,
when the Act underSection 37provided for
an appeal to the civil court and the
application of Code not having been
expressly barred, the revisional jurisdiction
of the High Court gets attracted. If that be
so, the bar underSection 5will not be
attracted because conferment of appellate
power on the civil court in Part I of the Act
attracts the provisions of the Code also."

14.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners also submitted that even if an
award of the Lok Adalat is not on the basis
of a conflict between the parties on merit
but
is
based
upon
a
compromise,
nevertheless, it would be equal to and at par
with a decree on compromise and will have
the same binding effect and it is equivalent
to a decree executable to end the litigation
among the parties.

15. We may refer to the observations
of the Supreme Court in paragraph 16 of
the judgment in the case of P.T. Thomas
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
571
Vs. Thomes Job, (2002) 6 SCC 478,
particularly paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27 of the
said judgment wherein the Supreme Court
has held that the award of the Lok Adalat is
final and permanent which is equivalent to
a decree executable bringing and end to the
litigation among the parties. Relevant
paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25,
26 and 27 of the said judgment read as
under:

"16. In our opinion, the award of
the Lok Adalat is fictionally deemed to be
decree of court and therefore the courts
have all the powers in relation thereto as it
has in relation to a decree passed by itself.
This, in our opinion, includes the powers to
extend time in appropriate cases. In our
opinion, the award passed by the Lok
Adalat is the decision of the court itself
though arrived at by the simpler method of
conciliation instead of the process of
arguments in court. The effect is the same.
In this connection, the High Court has
failed to note that by the award what is put
an end to is the appeal in the District Court
and
thereby
the
litigations
between
brothers forever. The view taken by the
High Court, in our view, will totally defeat
the object and purposes of theLegal
Services Authorities Actand render the
decision of the Lok Adalat meaningless.

17. Section
21of
the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 reads as
follows :-

"21. Award of Lok Adalat.- (1)
Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be
deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court or,
as the case may be, an order of any other
Court and where a compromise or
settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
Adalat in a case referred on it under subsection (1) of Sec.20, the court fee paid in
such cases shall be refunded; in the manner
provided under theCourt Fees Act, 1870 (7
of 1870).

(2) Every award made by a Lok
Adalat shall be final and binding on all the
parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall
lie to any Court against the award.

Section 22reads thus :-

"22. Powers of Lok Adalats.- (1)
The Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of
holding any determination under this Act,
have the same powers as are vested in a
Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a
suit in respect of the following matters,
namely :

(a) the summoning and enforcing
the
attendance
of
any
witness
and
examining him on oath;

(b) the discovery and production
of any document ;

(c) the reception of evidence on
affidavits ;

(d) the requisitioning of any
public record or document or copy of such
record or document from any Court or
Office; and

(e) such other matters as may be
prescribed.

(2) Without prejudice to the
generality of the powers contained in subsection (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the
requisite powers to specify its own
procedure for the determination of any
dispute coming before it.

(3) All Proceedings before a Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be judicial
proceedings within the meaning of Secs.
193, 219 and 228of the Indian Penal
Code(45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalat
shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for the
purpose of Sec. 195 and Chapter XXVI of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2)
of 1974).

18. What is Lok Adalat?
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"The 'Lok Adalat' is an old form
of adjudicating system prevailed in ancient
India and it's validity has not been taken
away even in the modern days too. The
word 'Lok Adalat' means 'People Court'.
This
system
is
based on
Gandhian
Principles. It is one of the components of
ADR system. As the Indian Courts are over
burdened with the backlog of cases and the
regular Courts are to decide the cases
involve a lengthy, expensive and tedious
procedure. The Court takes years together
to settle even petty cases. Lok Adalat ,
therefore provides alternative resolution or
devise for expedious and inexpensive
justice.

In Lok Adalat proceedings there
are no victors and vanquished and, thus, no
rancour.

Experiment of 'Lok Adalat' as an
alternate mode of dispute settlement has
come to be accepted in India, as a viable,
economic, efficient and informal one.

LOK
ADALAT
is
another
alternative to JUDICIAL JUSTICE. This is
a recent strategy for delivering informal,
cheap and expeditious justice to the
common man by way of settling disputes,
which are pending in Courts and also
those, which have not yet reached Courts
by
negotiation,
conciliation
and
by
adopting persuasive, common sense and
human approach to the problems of the
disputants, with the assistance of specially
trained and experienced Members of a
Team of Conciliators."

19. Benefits Under Lok Adalat

1. There is no court fee and if
court fee is already paid the amount will be
refunded if the dispute is settled at Lok
Adalat according to the rules.

2. The basic features of Lok
Adalat are the procedural flexibility and
speedy trial of the disputes. There is no
strict application of procedural laws like
Civil Procedure Code and Evidence Act
while assessing the claim by Lok Adalat.

3. The parties to the dispute can
directly interact with the Judge through
their Counsel which is not possible in
regular Courts of law.

4. The award by the Lok Adalat is
binding on the parties and it has the status
of a decree of a Civil Court and it is non-
appealable which does not causes the delay
in the settlement of disputes finally.

In
view
of
above
facilities
provided by "the Act" Lok Adalats are boon
to the litigating public they can get their
disputes settled fast and free of cost
amicably.

Award of Lok Adalat

20. The Lok Adalat shall proceed
and dispose the cases and arrive at a
compromise or settlement by following the
legal principles, equity and natural justice.
Ultimately the Lok Adalat passes an award,
and every such award shall be deemed to
be a decree of Civil Court or as the case
may be which is final.

Award of Lok Adalat shall be
final

21. The Lok Adalat will passes
the award with the consent of the parties,
therefore there is no need either to
reconsider or review the matter again and
again, as the award passed by the Lok
Adalat shall be final. Even as under Section
96(3) of C.P.C. that "no appeal shall lie
from a decree passed by the Court with the
consent of the parties". The award of the
Lok Adalat is an order by the Lok Adalat
under the consent of the parties, and it
shall be deemed to be a decree of the Civil
Court, therefore an appeal shall not lie
from the award of the Lok Adalat as under
Section 96(3) C.P.C.

22. In Punjab National Bank vs.
Lakshmichand Rai reported in AIR 2000
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
573
Madhya Pradesh 301, the High Court held
that

"The provision of the Act shall
prevail in the matter of filing an appeal and
an appeal would not lie under the
provisions of Section 96 C.P.C. Lok Adalat
is
conducted
under
an
independent
enactment and once the award is made by
Lok Adalat the right of appeal shall be
governed by the provisions of theLegal
Services Authorities Actwhen it has been
specifically
barred
under
Provisions
ofSection 21(2), no appeal can be filed
against the award under Sec.96 C.P.C."

The Court further stated that:

"14. It may incidentally be further
seen that eventhe Codeof Civil Procedure
does
not
provide
for
an
appeal
underSection
96(3)against
a
consent
decree. The Code of Civil Procedure also
intends that once a consent decree is
passed by Civil Court finality is attached to
it. Such finality cannot be permitted to be
destroyed, particularly under theLegal
Services Authorities Act, as it would
amount to defeat the very aim and object of
the Act with which it has been enacted,
hence, we hold that the appeal filed is not
maintainable.

23. The High Court of Andhra
Pradesh held that, inBoard of Trustees of
the Port of Visakhapatnam vs. Presiding
Officer,
Permanent,
Lok
Adalat-cumSecretary,
District
Legal
Services
Authority,
Visakhapatnam
and
anotherreported in 2000(5) ALT 577, " The
award is enforceable as a decree and it is
final. In all fours, the endeavour is only to
see that the disputes are narrowed down
and make the final settlement so that the
parties are not again driven to further
litigation or any dispute. Though the award
of a Lok Adalat is not a result of a contest
on merits just as a regular suit by a Court
on a regular suit by a Court on a regular
trial, however, it is as equal and on par
with a decree on compromise and will have
the same binding effect and conclusive just
as the decree passed on the compromises
cannot be challenged in a regular appeal,
the award of the Lok Adalat being akin to
the same, cannot be challenged by any
regular remedies available under law
including
invokingArticle
226of
the
Constitution of India challenging the
correctness of the award on any ground.
Judicial review cannot be invoked in such
awards especially on the grounds as raised
in this writ petition.

24. The award of Lok Adalat is
final and permanent which is equivalent to
a decree executable, and the same is an
ending to the litigation among parties.

25. In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja
Deo vs. The State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC
346, the Constitution Bench held as
follows:

A Judgment by consent or default
is as effective an estoppel between the
parties as a judgment whereby the court
exercises its mind on a contested case.
(South American and Mexican Co.,ex p
Bank of England, (1895) 1 Ch.37 & In re &
Kinch v. Walcott, 1929 AC 482)

"In South American and Mexican
Co., ex p Bank of England, In re (1895) 1
Ch 37 ), it has been held that a judgment by
consent or default is as effective an
estoppel between the parties as a judgment
whereby the Court exercises its mind on a
contested case. Upholding the judgment of
Vaughan Williams,J Lord Herschell said
(Ch page 50) :-

"The truth is, a judgment by
consent is intended to put a stop to
litigation between the parties just as much
as is a judgment which results from the
decision of the Court after the matter has
been fought out to the end. And I think it
would be very mischievous if one were not
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to give a fair and reasonable interpretation
to such judgments, and were to allow
questions that were really involved in the
action to be fought over again in a
subsequent action."

To
the
like
effect
are
the
following observations of the Judicial
Committee in 'Kinch v. Walvott', 1929 AC
482 at p.493:-

"First of all their Lordships are
clear that in relation to this plea of
estoppel it is of no advantage to the
appellant that the order in the libel action
which is said to raise it was a consent
order. For such a purpose an order by
consent , not discharged by mutual
agreement, and remaining unreduced , is
as effective as an order of the Court made
otherwise than by consent and not
discharged on appeal."

26. The same principle has been
followed by the High Courts in India in a
number of reported decisions. Reference
need only be made to the cases of 'Secy. Of
State v. Ateendranath Das', 63 Cal 550 at
p. 558 (E) ; - ' Bhaishanker v. Moraji', 36
Bom 283 (F) and 'Raja Kumara Venkata
Perumal
Raja
Bahadur',
v.
Thatha
Ramasamy Chetty', 35 Mad 75 (G). In the
Calcutta case after referring to the English
decisions the High Court observed as
follows :

"On this authority it becomes
absolutely clear that the consent order is as
effective as an order passed on contest, not
only with reference to the conclusion
arrived at in the previous suit but also with
regard to every step in the process of
reasoning on which the said conclusion is
founded. When we say "every step in the
reasoning" we mean the findings on the
essential facts on which the judgment or the
ultimate conclusion was founded. In other
words the finding which it was necessary to
arrive at for the purpose of sustaining the
judgment in the particular case will
operate as estoppel by judgment."

27. The Civil Procedure Code
contains the following provisions: Order 23
Rule 3 provides for compromise of suit --
where it is proved to the satisfaction of the
Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly
in part by any lawful agreement or
compromise, written and signed by the
parties. The Court after satisfying itself
about the settlement, it can convert the
settlement into a judgment decree."

16. Shri Manu Khare, learned counsel
has also placed reliance upon a Division
Bench judgement of this court passed in a
bunch
of
first
appeals
decided
on
21.4.2016, the leading case being First
Appeal No. 522 of 2009 (Pradeep Kumar
Vs. State of U.P. and others. The relevant
paragraphs 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39
read as under:

"32. In the facts of this case the
only distinguishing feature pointing out is
that the land of the same village Makanpur
which was acquired under Notification
dated
12.9.1986
was
for
planned
development of Ghaziabad Development
Authority while the land of the same village
Makanpur acquired under Notification
dated 15.3.1988 is for planned Industrial
Development Authority for NOIDA, no
other special reasons have been disclosed
to
us
for
not providing
the
same
compensation as determined by the Court
in the case of Ghaziabad Development
Authority (supra) to the appellants.

33. Another reason for the same
conclusion flows from the intent of Section
28-A of the Land Acquition Act, 1894
which reads as follows:

"28A. Re-determination of the
amount of compensation on the basis of
the award of the court:
9 All. Shamshad Ali & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
575

(1) Where in an award under this
Part, the court allows to the applicant any
amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the Collector under
section II, the persons interested in all the
other land.covered by the same notification
under section 4, sub-section (I) and who
are also aggrieved by the award of the
Collector may, notwithstanding that they
had not made an application to the
Collector under section 18, by written
application to the Collector within Ihree
months from the date of the award of the
court
require
that
the
amount
of
compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the court;

Provided that in computing the
period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made
under Ihis sub-seclion, the day on which
the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award
shall be ex.cluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt
of an application under sub-section (I),
conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all
the persons interested and giving them a
reasonbble opportunity of being heard and
make an award determining the amount of
compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not
accepted the award under sub-section (2)
may,
by
written
application
to
the
Collector, require that the matter be
referred
by
the
Collector
for
the
determination of the court and the
provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far
as may be, apply to such reference as they
apply to a reference under section 18."

34. From a simple reading of the
said section, it is apparently clear that a
farmer, who had not filed any application
against the award of Special Land
Acquisition Officer for making a reference
under Section 18 of the Act, becomes
entitled to grant of compensation at the
higher rate, if the Court awards higher
compensation in respect of the land
covered by the same notification to the
other tenure holders. The farmer is only
required to make an application to the
Collector for re-determination of his
compensation in terms of the order of the
Court.

35. At the very outset, it may be
recorded that we are not holding that
Section 28A of Act 1894 is attracted in the
facts of the case. What we are recording is
that from a reading of Section 28A of Act
1894 what flows is that even in absence of
exemplars and other evidence, higher
compensation can be allowed to a tenure
holder only on the plea that the 'Court' has
enhanced the compensation for others
whose land was acquired under the same
notification.

36.