# Shamsher Singh Died & Ors v. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 8 ILRA 503
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-08-08
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 319 of 2025
- **Bench:** Chandra Kumar Rai
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shamsher-singh-died-ors-v-sukhbeer-singh-ors-53717
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Chetan Chatterjee

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the registered agreement to sale
between plaintiff and defendant was validly
executed.
Whether the plaintiff was always ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Whether the subsequent sale deed executed by
defendant No.1 in favor of defendants 2 to 4
during the pendency of the suit affects the
plaintiff's right to specific performance.
Whether any substantial question of law arises
under Section 100 CPC to admit the second
appeal.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Section 100, Order 41 Rule 31, - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 68, - Specific
Relief Act, 1963 - Section 16(c), 19(b): -
Second appeal
-
filed
by defendants
-
challenging the validity of first appellate court's
judgment - a registered agreement to sale -
executed between plaintiff and defendant -
Plaintiff issued notices for execution of sale deed
- defendant failed to appear - Defendant sold
the land to third parties during pendency of
agreement - Suit for specific performance -
dismissed - civil appeal - the First Appellate
504 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court reversed this finding, concluding that the
agreement was validly executed between the
plaintiff and defendant - second appeal -
challenging the appellate court's judgment as
arbitrary and unsustainable, raising multiple
substantial questions of law, including the
validity of the agreement, evidentiary issues
under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, and
alleged procedural and factual errors by the
appellate court - court held that, - (i) the
exercise of jurisdiction by the first appellate
court is according to the ratio of law laid down
by Hon'ble Apex court in case of Maharaj Singh
- (ii) in view of ratio of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex court on the scope of section
16(c) of the Act, 1963, there is no illegality in
the judgment of first appellate court granting
relief of specific performance of the contract in
the instant matter - (iii) in view of legal
precedents including Aniglase Yohannan v.
Ramlatha (2006), the substantial question of
law as quoted and framed in the memorandum
of second appeal are not involved in the second
appeal - hence, no interference is required
against the judgment and decree - second
appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage.
(Para - 17, 19, 20, 21)
Appeal Dismissed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
Maharaj Singh and Others vs. Karan Singh and
Others (AIR 2024 SC 3328) - Aniglase
Yohannan Versus Ramlatha & others (2006 vol.
2 JCLR 201 (SC).

LIST OF ACTS
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Indian Evidence Act,
1872 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Specific Performance - Agreement to Sale -
Registered
Document
-
Readiness
and
Willingness - Substantial Question of Law - Bona
Fide Purchaser - Trial Court Judgment -
Appellate Court Reversal - Second Appeal - Civil
Appeal.

CASE ARISING FROM
Original Suit No. 408 of 1995 - Civil
Appeal No. 95 of 2022 - allowed by
Additional District Judge, Saharanpur - dated
10.02.2025.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Pramod Kumar
Pandey.
Counsel
for
Respondent(s):
Mr.
Chetan
Chatterjee.

## Text

8 All. Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. Vs. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors.
503

53. The law is very well settled that sale
deed without sale consideration is no sale
deed in the eyes of law. Under Section 25 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agreement
made without consideration is void unless it
falls under specific exceptions. In the present
case, the failure of the Defendant to ensure
payment of 98% of the consideration
invalidates the transaction not only under the
terms of the contract itself but also under the
foundational principles of contract law. The
essential element of consideration, which
underpins any valid contract, was never
fulfilled.

54. In view of above discussions, this
Court finds that the learned Civil Judge,
Senior
Division,
Gorakhpur,
has
appreciated the facts, evidence, and legal
provisions in their correct perspective. The
finding that the sale deed dated June 16,
2003, became ineffective due to the nonpayment of the consideration amount
(dishonor of the cheque for Rs. 45,00,000/-
) as per the explicit condition in the said
deed is based on sound reasoning and
evidence. The consequential relief of
permanent
injunction
granted
to
the
Plaintiff is also fully justified. The grounds
urged by the Appellant in this appeal fail to
demonstrate any illegality, perversity, or
misapplication of law in the impugned
judgment.

55. The first appeal is devoid of merit
and
is
accordingly
dismissed.
The
judgment and order dated March 7, 2006,
passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division,
Gorakhpur, in Original Suit No. 570 of
2004 are hereby affirmed. Parties shall
bear their own costs in this appeal.

All pending applications under Order
XLI Rule 27 of CPC, if any, stands
dismissed.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 503
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Second Appeal No. 319 of 2025

Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Sukhbeer Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Ajay Singh Ruhela, Pramod Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Chetan Chatterjee

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the registered agreement to sale
between plaintiff and defendant was validly
executed.
Whether the plaintiff was always ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Whether the subsequent sale deed executed by
defendant No.1 in favor of defendants 2 to 4
during the pendency of the suit affects the
plaintiff's right to specific performance.
Whether any substantial question of law arises
under Section 100 CPC to admit the second
appeal.

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Section 100, Order 41 Rule 31, - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 68, - Specific
Relief Act, 1963 - Section 16(c), 19(b): -
Second appeal
-
filed
by defendants
-
challenging the validity of first appellate court's
judgment - a registered agreement to sale -
executed between plaintiff and defendant -
Plaintiff issued notices for execution of sale deed
- defendant failed to appear - Defendant sold
the land to third parties during pendency of
agreement - Suit for specific performance -
dismissed - civil appeal - the First Appellate
504 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court reversed this finding, concluding that the
agreement was validly executed between the
plaintiff and defendant - second appeal -
challenging the appellate court's judgment as
arbitrary and unsustainable, raising multiple
substantial questions of law, including the
validity of the agreement, evidentiary issues
under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, and
alleged procedural and factual errors by the
appellate court - court held that, - (i) the
exercise of jurisdiction by the first appellate
court is according to the ratio of law laid down
by Hon'ble Apex court in case of Maharaj Singh
- (ii) in view of ratio of law laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex court on the scope of section
16(c) of the Act, 1963, there is no illegality in
the judgment of first appellate court granting
relief of specific performance of the contract in
the instant matter - (iii) in view of legal
precedents including Aniglase Yohannan v.
Ramlatha (2006), the substantial question of
law as quoted and framed in the memorandum
of second appeal are not involved in the second
appeal - hence, no interference is required
against the judgment and decree - second
appeal stands dismissed at the admission stage.
(Para - 17, 19, 20, 21)
Appeal Dismissed. (E-11 )

CASE LAW CITED
Maharaj Singh and Others vs. Karan Singh and
Others (AIR 2024 SC 3328) - Aniglase
Yohannan Versus Ramlatha & others (2006 vol.
2 JCLR 201 (SC).

LIST OF ACTS
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Indian Evidence Act,
1872 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Specific Performance - Agreement to Sale -
Registered
Document
-
Readiness
and
Willingness - Substantial Question of Law - Bona
Fide Purchaser - Trial Court Judgment -
Appellate Court Reversal - Second Appeal - Civil
Appeal.

CASE ARISING FROM
Original Suit No. 408 of 1995 - Civil
Appeal No. 95 of 2022 - allowed by
Additional District Judge, Saharanpur - dated
10.02.2025.
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Mr. Pramod Kumar
Pandey.
Counsel
for
Respondent(s):
Mr.
Chetan
Chatterjee.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Kumar
Rai, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Pramod Kumar Pandey,
learned
counsel
for
the
defendants/
appellants and Mr. Chetan Chatterjee for
the plaintiff- respondent no.1.

2. Brief facts of the case are that
defendant- Shamsher was recorded tenure
holder of khasra No. 192 area 0.749 hectare
situated
in
Village-
Tabar
Ahatmal,
Pargana- Sarsawa, Tehsil- Nakud, District
Saharanpur. A registered agreement to sale
dated 13.6.1994 was alleged to be executed
between defendant- Shamsher Singh and
plaintiff- Sukhbeer Singh in respect to
khasra No. 192 area 0.749 hectare for
execution of sale deed for Rs. 100000/- in
which 55000/- was alleged to be paid as
earnest money and Rs. 45000/- was to be
paid at the time of execution of sale deed.
Plaintiff has issued notice dated 2.6.1995
and 25.6.1995 to defendants fixing date for
execution of sale deed but defendants failed
to
appear
before
the
Sub-Registrar.
Defendant No.1 executed sale deed on
24.6.1995 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to
4 in respect to khasra No. 192. Hence an
original suit No. 408 of 1995 was filed by
plaintiff/
Sukhbeer
Singh
impleading
defendant nos. 1 to 6 for decree of specific
performance and permanent injunction. The
Trial Court vide judgement and decree
dated 15.12.2022 dismissed the plaintiff's
suit. A civil appeal No. 95 of 2022 filed by
plaintiff was allowed by Additional District
Judge,
Saharanpur
setting
aside
the
judgement and decree of Trial Court dated
15.12.2022 and decreed the plaintiff suit.
8 All. Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. Vs. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors.
505
Hence this second appeal on behalf of
defendants for following relief :-

"The relief sought by the
Appellant through this Second Appeal
that this Hon'ble Court may graciously
be please to allow the appeal with cost
and Set-a-side the Judgement and order
dated 10.2.2025 and decree dated
17.02.2025
passed
by
Additional
District Judge, Court No.9 Saharanpur
in Civil Appeal No.95 of 2022 (CNR
No. UPSPO101755822022), (Sukhbeer
Singh
Vs.
others),
and
otherwise
Shamsher Singh appellants shall suffer
irreparable loss.

And to pass such further relief
which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and proper in view of the facts and
circumstances of the case in favour of the
appellant."

3. Following substantial question of
law are framed in memo of instant second
appeal:-

1.
Whether,
the
impugned
judgment and order dated 10.02.2025 and
decree dated 17.02.2025 of the Lower
appellate Court are patently illegal and
bad in the eye of law hence the same is
liable to be set aside by this Hon'ble Court
in the interest of justice ?

2.
Whether,
thereafter,
the
evidence was led by the parties on the
issues framed by the trial court, the suit of
the the plaintiff/respondent was dismissed
by
its
judgment
and
order
dated
15.12.2022 and passed the decree dated
16.12.2022 by the lower court and as such
the finding recorded by the lower court is
just, legal, and sustainable in the eye of
law.

3. Whether, feeling aggrieved by
the judgment dated 15.12.2022 and the
decree
dated
16.12.2022,
the
Plaintiff/respondent challenged the same
in the court of the Additional District
Judge Court No.9 Saharanpur. Thereafter
the Learned Lower Appellate Court
without considering finding recorded by
the Lower Court, illegally, and wrongly
passed the judgment and order on
10.02.2025 and decree on 17.02.2025
against the defendant/appellants and set
aside the order of the lower court and
allow the appeal of the plaintiff which is
illegal, arbitrary and cannot legally
sustained?

4. Whether, the Lower appellate
court,
while
passing
the
impugned
judgment and decree, failed to appreciate
the correct facts and circumstances of the
case and the legal questions involved in
the case hence the impugned judgment
and decree passed by the Lower appellate
court
is
illegal,
arbitrary
and
unsustainable under law?

5. Whether, the Lower appellate
Court passed the impugned judgment and
decree on the basis of surmises and
conjectures
ignoring
the
material
available on record hence the same
cannot be sustained under law?

6. Whether, the learned Lower
appellate court without considering the
finding recorded by the lower court
illegally and wrongly allow the appeal of
the plaintiff on 10.02.2025 and set aside
the order dated 15.12.2022 of the lower
court
and
directed
the
appellants/defendants
to
execute
the
registered sale deed of the Arazi/Khasra
No.192 Rakba 0.749 hectare, in favour of
the Plaintiff/respondent after received the
506 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
rest amounts Rs.45,000/-within a period of
two months from the date of order and
prepared the decree according to order
and send the one copy of the aforesaid
order to the lower court, thereafter the
decree was passed on 17.2.2025 according
to the aforesaid judgment and order,
which
are
illegal
arbitrary
and
unsustainable in the eye of law.

7. Whether according to section
68 of Evidence Act, that any evidence is
necessary to be proved by law and it
cannot be utilized one witness is alive and
give the statement at the time of evidence
in the Court , the plaintiff said that two
witnesses of Ikrarnama died and neither
knowledge the name of the writer and as
such the plaintiff is the unsuccessful to
prove the Ikrarnama during the trial of
the Ist Additional Civil Judge (S.D)
Saharanpur, thus on account of the said
facts,
it
is
very
much
clear
the
defendant/Appellant No.1 was not made
any Ikrarnama on 13.4.1994 and neither
take
any
earnest/Bayana
money
of
Rs.55,000/-from the plaintiff, nor made
any Ikrarnama for the sale deed to the
plaintiff after obtained Rs.1,00000/- of the
disputed property and as such the
aforesaid finding recorded by the Learned
Ist
Additional
Civil
Judge
(S.D)
Saharanpur in pursuance of the issue
No.1 is just, legal and according to
evidence on record?

8.
Whether
the
P.W-2
Purshottam said that the Ikrarnama has
executed in my presence but I was not
made any signature on Ikrarnama and
DW-2 Rajbal said that the aforesaid
Ikrarnama made for borrow/loan and the
aforesaid Ikrarnama was not made for the
sale of the aforesaid land and the DW-1
Mohar Singh ignore the signature of the
Shamsher
Singh
of
the
Ikrarnama
because Shamsher is illiterate person and
due to said facts, the learned lower court
dismiss the suit which is just, proper and
sustainable in the eye of law?

9. Whether, the plaintiff was
neither issue any notice on 02.06.1995, for
sale
deed
dated
15.06.1995,
and
30.06.1995 to the Shamsher Singh and
nor publish any notice according to Civil
Provision and did not emphasize by the
plaintiff in pursuance of the Section 52 of
the T.P.Act, is barred and as such the
issue No.1,2,3,4,5,6 & 7 have already
decided by the Lower Court is just legal
and issue No.1,2 & 4 decided against the
plaintiff, which is just, proper and
sustainable in the eye of law?

10. Whether, the Learned Lower
Appellate Court without considering the
finding recorded of the lower court and
without setting aside the finding recorded
of the lower court illegally and wrongly
allow the appeal of the plaintiff and set
aside the order dated 15.12.2022 of the
lower
court
and
directed
the
appellants/defendants for registered sale
deed of the disputed property in favour of
the plaintiff within a period of two months
from the date of order, which is unjust,
illegal and unsustainable in the eye of
law?

11. Whether, the judgment and
decree passed by the lower appellate court
without considering the documentary
evidence
adduced
by
the
appellants/defendants are maintainable?

12. Whether the lower appellate
Court was justified in affirming the
perverse finding recorded by the trial
court and as such finding recorded by the
8 All. Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. Vs. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors.
507
lower appeallate court is illegal, arbitrary,
and against the evidence on record??

4. Learned counsel for the appellants
pressed the substantial question of law as
quoted above and submitted that judgement
and decree passed by First Appellate Court
should be set aside. He submitted that
judgement and decree passed by Trial
Court should be maintained as there is no
illegality or infirmity in the judgement and
decree of Trial Court by which the
plaintiff's suit for specific performance has
been dismissed. He placed the provision
contained under Section 68 of the Indian
Evidence Act in support of his argument.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel
for the plaintiff- respondent submitted that
Trial Court has illegally dismissed the
plaintiff's suit. He submitted that Trial
Court has failed to consider the registered
agreement to sale dated 13.6.1994 executed
between plaintiff and defendant in proper
manner but First Appellate Court has
rightly consider the registered agreement to
sale dated 13.6.1994 in holding that
agreement to sale was executed on
13.6.1994 between plaintiff and defendants.
He
further
submitted
that
point
of
determination was properly framed and
decided by First Appellate Court as provided
under Order 41 Rule 31 of Civil Procedure
Code. He submitted that while deciding the
point of determination no.2 finding on
readiness and willingness has been recorded
that plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform his part of contract in pursuance of
agreement to sale dated 13.6.1994. He further
submitted that while deciding the point of
determination no.3 finding has been recorded
that execution of sale deed by defendant
during suit proceeding and after execution of
agreement to sale dated 13.6.1994 will not
give any right, title and interest to vendees.
He submitted that in view of the finding of
fact recorded by First Appellate Court, there
is no scope of interference by this Court
under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code as
no substantial question of law are involved in
this second appeal.

6. I have considered the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the parties
and perused the record.

7. There is no dispute about the fact that
suit for specific performance of contract filed
by plaintiff- respondent no.1 was dismissed
by Trial Court but in appeal the suit was
decreed by First Appellate Court.

8.
In
order
to
appreciate
the
controversy involved in the matter, the
perusal of the issues framed in the suit will
be relevant which are as under:-

"उभय पक्ष के अभभवचनो के आधार पर
भनम्नभिभित वाद भिन्दु भवरभचत भकये

1 क्या प्रभतवादी नं. 1 द्वारा भववाभदत सम्पभि
को िेचने का सौदा वादी के साथ अंकन 1,00,000/- रूपये
में तय भकया गया तथा 55,000/-रूपये ितौर ब्याना प्राप्त
करके इकरारनामा मुहायदा िैय भदनांक 13.6.94 को तहरीर
व तकमीि करके पंजीकृत कराया गया है? यभद हााँ तो उसका
प्रभाव ?

2.क्या वादी इकरारनामा मुहायदा िय की
शरायत अनुसार अपने पक्ष में िैनामा कराने के भिये तैयार व
इच्छूक है? यभद हााँ तो प्रभाव?

3.क्या प्रभतवादी नं. 1 के द्वारा प्रभतवादी नं0 2
ता 4 के हक में भकये गये िैनामा धारा 52 टी.पी. एक्ट से
िाभधत है? यभद हााँ तो प्रभाव ?

4. क्या प्रभतवादीगण 5 व 6 के द्वारा दौरान
वाद न्यायािय की भनषेधाज्ञा आदेश भदनांकी 8.10.97 का
508 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
उल्िंघन करके िैनामा कराया गया है और वाद में वभणित
कारणो से शून्य दस्तावेज है ? यभद हााँ तो प्रभाव ?

5. क्या वादी का वाद अल्पमूभल्यंकत है।

6. क्या वादी द्वारा प्रदि न्यायशुल्क अपयािप्त है
?

7. क्या वादी भकसी अनुतोष को प्राप्त करने का
अभधकारी हैं ? "

9. The Trial Court vide judgement and
decree dated 15.12.2022 decided the issues
framed before him and dismissed the suit
recording finding of fact that agreement to sale
dated 13.6.1994 was not executed between
plaintiff and defendant for execution of sale
deed in respect to the plot in question. The
issues relating to readiness and willingness has
been decided against the plaintiff on the ground
that issue relating to execution of agreement to
sale has been decided against the plaintiff. The
issue relating to subsequent execution sale deed
by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant nos. 2
to 4 was decided saying that issue was not
pressed by the parties.

10. In civil appeal filed by plaintiff,
point of determination as provided under
Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C. were framed
which are as under:-

"1-क्या इकरारनामा भदनांभकत 13.06.1994
वैध रूप से सुििीर भसंह व शमशेर भसंह के मध्य भनष्पाभदत
भकया गया है ?

2- क्या अपीिाथी इकरारनामा भदनांभकत
13.06.1994 का अनुपािन करा पाने का भवभधक रूप से
अभधकारी है ?

3- क्या इकरारनामा भदनांभकत 13.06.1994
के पश्चात तथा वाद के दौरान भनष्पाभदत भवक्रय भविेि से
भवभधनुसार क्रेतागण को स्वत्व व अभधकार प्राप्त होते हैं ? "

11. The First Appellate Court has
decided
all
the
three
points
of
determination considering the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the
parties.

12. On the point of determination
No.1, the finding of fact has been recorded
by the First Appellate Court that paper
No.7Ka-1 (registered agreement to sale
dated 13.6.1994) was properly executed
between plaintiff- Sukhbeer Singh and
defendant- Shamsher Singh for sale of the
property in question and the finding
recorded by the Trial Court that there was
no agreement to sale for execution of sale
deed has been set aside.

13. The First Appellate Court while
deciding the point of determination No.2
has
again
considered
the
oral
and
documentary evidences adduced by the
parties and recorded finding of fact that
plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform
the
contract
compliance
of
agreement dated 13.6.1994. The First
Appellate Court while deciding the point of
determination no.2 has properly considered
the notices issued by plaintiff to the effect
that defendant will come before the SubRegistrar for execution of sale deed but
defendant has failed to appear before the
Sub-Registrar.

14. The First Appellate Court while
deciding the point of determination no.3
has taken into consideration the recent
judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court reported
in AIR 2024 Supreme Court 3328
Maharaj Singh and Others Vs Karan
Singh and Others in which it has been held
that in view of Clause (b) of Section 19, the
defendants who are claiming under the sale
deed executed after execution of suit
agreement can be subjected to a decree of
8 All. Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. Vs. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors.
509
specific performance as the suit agreement
can be enforced specifically against such
defendants unless they are bona fide
purchaser without notice of the original
contract.

15. The relevant paragraph No. 23 and
24 of the judgement rendered by Hon'ble
Apex Court in Maharaj Singh (Supra)
will be relevant for perusal which are as
under:-.

"23. Clause (a) to (c) of Section
19 of the Specific Relief Act read thus:

"19. Relief against parties and
persons
claiming
under
them
by
subsequent title- Except as otherwise
provided
by
this
Chapter,
specific
performance of a contract may be
enforced against-

(a) either party thereto;

(b) any other person claiming
under him by a title arising subsequently
to the contract, except a transferee for
value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of the original
contract;

(c) any person claiming under a
title which, though prior to the contract
and known to the plaintiff, might have
been displaced by the defendant;"

24. In view of clause (b) of
Section 19, the defendants who are
claiming under the sale deeds executed
after the execution of the suit agreement
can be subjected to a decree of specific
performance as the suit agreement can be
enforced
specifically
against
such
defendants unless they are bona fide
purchasers without the notice of the
original contract. When in a given case,
the defendants, who are subsequent
purchasers, fail to prove that they entered
into the sale deed in good faith and
without notice of the suit agreement, in
view of Section 19(b), a decree for specific
performance can be passed against such
defendants. Therefore, in such a case
where Section 19(b) is applicable, under
the decree of specific performance, the
subsequent purchasers can be directed to
execute the sale deed along with the
original vendor. There is no necessary to
pray
for
the
cancellation
of
the
subsequent sale deeds."

16.
The
First
Appellate
Court
considering each and every aspect of the
matter has allowed the civil appeal filed by
plaintiff setting aside the judgement and
decree of Trial Court dated 15.12.2022 and
decreed the plaintiff suit for execution of
sale deed in respect to the khasra No. 192M
area 0.749 hectare.

17. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
First Appellate Court is according to the
ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court in Maharaj Singh (Supra). The
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maharaj
Singh (Supra) has maintained the decree of
specific performance in spite of the fact
that one of the plaintiff has supported the
case of the defendant as well as subsequent
sale deed was executed by defendant. The
exercise of first appellate jurisdiction is in
accordance with the provisions of law
which requires no interference in exercise
of jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil
Procedure Code.

18. The scope of Section 16(c) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 has been
considered in the judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court reported in 2006 (2) JCLR 201
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(SC)
Aniglase
Yohannan
Versus
Ramlatha & Ors. Paragraph Nos. 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 & 14 of the judgment of Hon'ble
Apex Court in which earlier judgment of
Hon'ble Apex Court has been considered
will be relevant for perusal which are as
under :-

"9. In Ardeshir H. Mama v.
Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208, the
Privy Council observed that where the
injured party sued at law for a breach,
going to the root of the contract, he
thereby elected to treat the contract as at
an end himself and as discharged from the
obligations. No further performance by
him was either contemplated or had to be
tendered.
In
a
suit
for
specific
performance on the other hand, he treated
and was required by the Court to treat the
contract as still subsisting. He had in that
suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed,
he was required to prove a continuous
readiness and willingness from the date of
the contract to the time of the hearing, to
perform the contract on his part. Failure
to make good that averment brings with it
and leads to the inevitable dismissal of the
suit. The observations were cited with
approval in Prem Raj v. The D.L.F.
Housing and Construction (Private) Ltd.
and Anr., AIR (1968) SC 1355.

10. The requirements to be
fulfilled for bringing in compliance of the
Section 16(c) of the Act have been
delineated by this Court in several
judgments. Before
dealing
with
the
various judgments it is necessary to set out
the factual position. The agreement for
sale was executed on 15.2.1978 and the
period during which the sale was to be
completed was indicated to be six months.
Undisputedly, immediately after the expiry
of the six months period lawyer's notice
was given calling upon the present
appellant to execute the sale deed. It is
also averred in the plaint that the plaintiff
met the defendant several times and
requested him to execute the sale deed. On
finding inaction in his part, the suit was
filed in September, 1978. This factual
position has been highlighted in the plaint
itself. Learned Single Judge after noticing
the factual position as reflected in the
averments in the plaint came to hold that
the plaint contains essential facts which
lead to inference to plaintiff's readiness
and willingness. Para 3 of the plaint
indicates that the plaintiff was always
ready to get the sale deed prepared after
paying necessary consideration. In para 4
of the plaint reference has been made to
the lawyer's notice calling upon the
defendant to execute the sale deed. In the
said paragraph it has also been described
as to how after the lawyer's notice was
issued plaintiff met the defendant. In para
5 it is averred that defendant is bound to
execute the sale deed on receiving the
balance amount and the plaintiff was
entitled to get the document executed by
the defendant. It is also not in dispute that
the balance amount of the agreed
consideration was deposited in Court
simultaneously to the filing of the suit.
While examining the requirement of
Section 16(c) this Court in Syed Dastagir
v. T.R. Gopalakrishna Settty, [1999] 6
SCC 337 noted as follows:

"So the whole gamut of the issue
raised is, how to construe a plea specially
with reference to Section 16(c) and what
are the obligations which the plaintiff has
to comply with in reference to his plea and
whether the plea of the plaintiff could not
be
construed
to
conform
to
the
requirement of the aforesaid section, or
does this section require specific words to
8 All. Shamsher Singh Died & Ors. Vs. Sukhbeer Singh & Ors.
511
be pleaded that he has performed or has
always been ready and is willing to
perform his part of the contract. In
construing a plea in any pleading, courts
must keep in mind that a plea is not an
expression of art and science but an
expression through words to place fact
and law of one's case for a relief. Such an
expression may be pointed, precise,
sometimes vague but still it could be
gathered what he wants to convey through
only by reading the whole pleading,
depending on the person drafting a plea.
In India most of the pleas are drafted by
counsel hence the aforesaid difference of
pleas which inevitably differ from one to
the other. Thus, to gather true spirit
behind a plea it should be read as a whole.
This
does
not
distract
one
from
performing his obligations as required
under a statute. But to test whether he has
performed his obligations, one has to see
the pith and substance of a plea. Where a
statute requires any fact to be pleaded
then that has to be pleaded may be in any
form. The same plea may be stated by
different persons through different words;
then how could it be constricted to be only in
any particular nomenclature or word.
Unless a statute specifically requires a plea
to be in any particular form, it can be in any
form. No specific phraseology or language
is required to take such a plea. The
language in Section 16(c) does not require
any specific phraseology but only that the
plaintiff must aver that he has performed or
has always been and is willing to perform
his part of the contract. So the compliance
of "readiness and willingness" has to be in
spirit and substance and not in letter and
form. So to insist for a mechanical
production of the exact words of a statute is
to insist for the form rather than the
essence. So the absence of form cannot
dissolve an essence if already pleaded."

11. Again in Motilal Jain v.
Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and Ors., [2000] 6
SCC 420 it was noted as follows:

The other contention which
found favour with the High Court, is that
plaint averments do not show that the
plaintiff was ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract and at any rate
there is no evidence on record to prove it.
Mr. Choudhary developed that contention
placing reliance on the decision in
Varghese case [1969] 2 SCC 539. In that
case, the plaintiff pleaded an oral contract
for sale of the suit property. The
defendant
denied
the
alleged
oral
agreement
and
pleaded
a
different
agreement in regard to which the plaintiff
neither amended his plaint nor filed
subsequent pleading and it was in that
context that this Court pointed out that the
pleading in specific performance should
conform to Forms 47 and 48 of the First
Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure.
That view was followed in Abdul Khader
case (JT 1989 (3) SC527)

However, a different note was
struck by this Court in Chandiok case
[1970] 3 SCC 140 : AIR [1971] SC 1238.
In that case `A' agreed to purchase from
`R' a leasehold plot. `R' was not having
lease of the land in his favour from the
Government nor was he in possession of
the same. `R', however, received earnest
money pursuant to the agreement for sale
which provided that the balance of
consideration would be paid within a
month at the time of the execution of the
registered sale deed. Under the agreement
`R' was under obligation to obtain
permission
and
sanction
from
the
Government
before
the
transfer
of
leasehold plot. `R' did not take any steps to
apply
for
the
sanction
from
the
512 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Government. `A' filed the suit for specific
performance of the contract for sale. One
of the contentions of `R' was that `A' was
not ready and willing to perform his part
of the contract. This Court observed that
readiness and willingness could not be
treated as a straitjacket formula and that
had to be determined from the entirety of
facts and circumstances relevant to the
intention and conduct of the party
concerned. It was held that in the absence
of any material to show that `A' at any
stage was not ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract or that he did not
have the necessary funds for payment
when the sale deed would be executed
after the sanction was obtained, `A' was
entitled
to
a
decree
for
specific
performance of contract.

That decision was relied upon by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Syed
Dastagir case [1999] 6 SCC 337 wherein it
was held that in construing a plea in any
pleading, courts must keep in mind that a
plea is not an expression of art and
science but an expression through words
to place fact and law of one's case for a
relief. It is pointed out that in India most
of the pleas are drafted by counsel and
hence they inevitably differ from one to
the other; thus, to gather the true spirit
behind a plea it should be read as a whole
and to test whether the plaintiff has
performed his obligations, one has to see
the pith and substance of the plea. It was
observed :

"Unless a statute specifically
requires a plea to be in any particular
form, it can be in any form. No specific
phraseology or language is required to
take such a plea. The language in Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 does
not require any specific phraseology but
only that the plaintiff must aver that he
has performed or has always been and is
willing to perform his part of the contract.
So the compliance of `readiness and
willingness' has to be in spirit and
substance and not in letter and form."

It is thus clear that an averment
of readiness and willingness in the plaint
is not a mathematical formula which
should only be in specific words. If the
averments in the plaint as a whole do
clearly
indicate
the
readiness
and
willingness of the plaintiff to fulfil his part
of the obligations under the contract
which is the subject-matter of the suit, the
fact that they are differently worded will
not militate against the readiness and
willingness of the plaintiff in a suit for
specific performance of contract for sale."

12. Lord Campbell in Cork v.
Ambergate etc. and Railway Co., (1851)
117 ER 1229 observed that in common
sense the meaning of such an averment of
readiness and willingness must be that the
non-completion of the contract was not
the fault of the plaintiffs, and that they
were disposed and able to complete it had
it not been renounced by the defendant.

13. The basic principle behind
Section 16(c) read with Explanation (ii) is
that any person seeking benefit of the
specific performance of contract must
manifest that his conduct has been
blemishless throughout entitling him to
the specific relief. The provision imposes
a personal bar. The Court is to grant
relief on the basis of the conduct of the
person seeking relief. If the pleadings
manifest that the conduct of the plaintiff
entitles him to get the relief on perusal of
the plaint he should not be denied the
relief.
8 All. Ram Giri Vs. Raghuvir Singh & Ors.
513

14. Section 16(c) of the Act
mandates the plaintiff to aver in the plaint
and establish as the fact by evidence
aliunde that he has always been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract.
On considering almost identical fact
situation it was held by this Court in
Surya Narain Upadhyaya v. Ram Roop
Pandey and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 105 that
the plaintiff had substantiated his plea."

19. In view of ratio of law laid down
by Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of
Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act, 1963,
there is no illegality in the judgment of first
appellate Court granting relief of specific
performance of contract in the instant
matter.

20. The substantial question of law as
quoted
above
and
framed
in
the
memorandum of second appeal are not
involved in this second appeal, as such,
second appeal is liable to be dismissed at
admission stage.

21. Considering the entire facts and
circumstances of the case, no interference
is required against the judgement and
decree
dated
10.2.2025
passed
by
Additional District Judge Court No.9
Saharanpur in civil appeal No. 95 of 2022.

22. The second appeal is dismissed at
admission stage.
----------
(2025) 8 ILRA 513
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.08.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA KUMAR RAI, J.

Second Appeal No. 433 of 2022
Ram Giri ...Appellant
Versus
Raghuvir Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr. B. Malik, Mr. Amit Malik

Counsel for the Respondents:
Mr. Rishikesh Tripathi

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the decree for specific performance of
the agreement was rightly granted by the trial
and
appellate
courts,
considering
the
defendant's claim that the agreement was a
loan security, the alleged hardship due to
undervaluation of land, and the plaintiff's
readiness and willingness under Section 16(c)
and Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
order 41, rules 31, - Specific Relief Act,
1963 - Sections 16(c) and 20 - Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 92 - Second
Appeal - preferred by the Defendant-appellants
- assailing the judgment and decree passed by
trial court as well as first appellate court
granting relief of specific performance of
contract - Suit for specific performance of an
agreement to sell of agricultural land - for
consideration of Two lacs sixty thousand rupees
Rs. 2,60,000 - Agreement was executed - two
lacs forty eight thousand was paid as earnest
money and only twelve thousand rupees to be
paid at sale deed execution - Defendant later
claimed that the agreement was only a security
for a loan of two lacs rupees and not a genuine
sale - Plaintiff filed Original Suit for specific
performance - Trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of plaintiff, finding the agreement valid
and plaintiff ready and willing to perform - Civil
Appeal - First Appellate court dismissed the
appeal, affirming trial court's decision - second
appeal - during pendency of second appeal and
in absence of any interim order, the Execution
Court executed the sale deed and delivered the
possession of land to the plaintiff - court finds
that, the defendant argued that the decree was
wrongly granted as the agreement was denied,
the suit was delayed, and the land was
undervalued,
causing
hardship
-
further,