# Shashwat Agrawal v. State of U.P. & Anr. 442 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2024) 9 ILRA 441
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-09-27
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 19596 of 2024
- **Bench:** Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shashwat-agrawal-v-state-of-u-p-anr-442-indian-law-reports-allahabad-series-52359
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

Lok Adalat-Negotiable Instrument Act-
Section138-Dishonor of cheques issued by the
applicant- applicant entered into a settlement
and agreed to make the payment-an award
was passed by the Lok AdalatLok Adalat
erroneously imposed the conditions no.2 and 3,
which were not there in the compromise. - the
Presiding Officer of a Lok Adalat is not
empowered to include any condition beyond the
compromise/settlement between the parties-an
award passed by the Lok Adalat- can be
challenged only by way of a petition under
Section 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India
and not otherwise- being a decree passed by
civil court- not amenbale to the criminal
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Petition
disposed with directions to St. Legal Services
Authority as well as all the District Legal
Services Authorities. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,824 of 58,223. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39824 for what follows._

9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
441
अपने माता भपता मायके वालों को बताया र्था, भर्सकी पुभि साक्ष्यों से हो
चुकी है। अचानक स्वयं गायब हो र्ाना अपने बच्चे को अनार्थ छोडकि
चले र्ाना, अपने माता भपता को कोई सूचना नहीं देना, यह सिी तथ्य
अभियुक्तगणों द्वािा अपने बचाव में भनभमटत भकये गये है। भववाभहता की
भववाह के सात वषों के िीति अस्विाभवक रूप से दहेर् के भलये
उत्पीभडत किते हुये अस्विाभवक मृत्यु । हत्या। कि अभियुक्त पक्ष द्वािा
उसके शव को साक्ष्य का लोप किने के भलये गायब भकया र्ाना, समस्त
परिभस्र्थभतयों व साक्ष्यों के भवश्लेषण से भसद्ध है। ...... श्रीमान् र्ी अब
तक की तमामी तफ्तीश बयान वादी व बयानात गवाहान व अन्य सबूतों
के आधाि पि मुकदमा उपिोक्त से सम्बभन्धत अभियुक्तगण 1- मृत्युन्र्य
भतवािी पुत्र धुपई भतवािी 2-िाधेश्याम भतवािी पुत्र धुपई भतवािी, 3-िार्ेन्र
भतवािी पुत्र धुपई भतवािी 4 देवेन्र भतविी पुत्र धुपई भतवािी 5-भडम्पल
भतवािी पुत्री घनश्याम भतवािी 6 गायत्री देवी पत्नी घनश्याम भतवािी 7
रोपदी देवी पत्नी देवेन्र भतवािी साभकनान भिसवा सिकािी र्थाना
कोतवाली पडिौना कुशीनगि के भवरूद्ध र्ुमट धािा 498ए, 304बी,
201 आई०पी०सी० व 3/4 डी०पी०ऐक्र् का अपिाध बखूबी साभबत हो
िहा है।"

22. The above referred conclusion is
supported by statements of various witnesses
recorded during long investigation. In the
charge-sheet 25 witnesses were proposed as
prosecution witnesses. Statement of all
proposed witnesses are not enclosed with
present application as well as it has been
recently reiterated by the Supreme Court that
at this stage High Court cannot undertake to
conduct a mini trial or enter into appreciation
of evidence of a particular case, in the case of
Priyanka Jaiswal Vs. State of Jharkhand
and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 685 and
relevant part of it is mentioned hereinafter :-

"13. We say so for reasons more
than one. This Court in catena of
Judgments has consistently held that at the
time of examining the prayer for quashing
of the criminal proceedings, the court
exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction can
neither undertake to conduct a mini trial
nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a
particular
case.
The
correctness
or
otherwise of the allegations made in the
complaint cannot be examined on the
touchstone of the probable defence that the
accused may raise to stave off the
prosecution and any such misadventure by
the Courts resulting in proceedings being
quashed would be set aside. This Court in
the case of Akhil Sharda, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 820 held to the following effect:

"28. Having gone through the
impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court by which the High Court
has set aside the criminal proceedings in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.
P.C., it appears that the High Court has
virtually conducted a mini trial, which as
such is not permissible at this stage and
while deciding the application under
Section 482 Cr. P.C. As observed and held
by this Court in a catena of decisions no
mini trial can be conducted by the High
Court in exercise of powers under Section
482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of
deciding the application under Section 482
Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into
appreciation of evidence of the particular
case being considered.""

23. In the aforesaid circumstances, I do
not find that there is any ground to quash the
charge-sheet as well as cognizance and
summoning order. Accordingly, present
application is rejected.
---------
(2024) 9 ILRA 441
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.09.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 19596 of 2024

Shashwat Agrawal ...Applicant
 Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties
442 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Applicant:
Anurag Pathak, Harshit Pathak

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Saurabh Kumar

Lok Adalat-Negotiable Instrument Act-
Section138-Dishonor of cheques issued by the
applicant- applicant entered into a settlement
and agreed to make the payment-an award
was passed by the Lok AdalatLok Adalat
erroneously imposed the conditions no.2 and 3,
which were not there in the compromise. - the
Presiding Officer of a Lok Adalat is not
empowered to include any condition beyond the
compromise/settlement between the parties-an
award passed by the Lok Adalat- can be
challenged only by way of a petition under
Section 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India
and not otherwise- being a decree passed by
civil court- not amenbale to the criminal
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Petition
disposed with directions to St. Legal Services
Authority as well as all the District Legal
Services Authorities. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Supreme Court of United St. in Weems Vs U.
S., (1909) 54 LEd 793 (801)
2. Francis Corallie Mullin Vs Administrator AIR
1981 SC 746

3. Ganesh Chandra Bhatt Vs D.M. Almora AIR
1993 All 993

4. Badshah Vs Sou. Urmila Badshah Godse, AIR
2014 SC 869

5. St. of Maha. Vs Dr Praful B. Desai (2003) 4
SCC 601

6. M/s Meters and Instruments Pvt. Ltd.& anr.Vs
Kanchan Mehta AIR 2017 SC 4594

7. Shrimati Rani Gaur Vs St. of U.P. (2023)124
ACC 891 (All)

8. Damodar S. Prabhu Vs Sayed Babalal (2010)
5 SCC 663
9. St. of Punj. & anr. Vs Jalour Singh & ors., AIR
2008 (2) SCC 660

10.
Bharvagi
Construction
Vs
Kothakapu
Muthyam Reddy & ors., AIR 2017 SC 4428

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anish Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anurag Pathak, learned
counsel
for
the
applicant,
Sri
Anil
Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel assisted
by Sri Saurabh Kumar, learned counsel for
the opposite party no.2 and Sri Raj Bahadur
Verma, learned AGA for the State.

2. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking
quashing of the order dated 22.01.2024
passed by the learned Additional Court,
Saharanpur in Complaint Case No. 25882
of 2022, under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the
'N.I.Act').

3. The brief facts of the case are that
the opposite party no.2 has filed a
complaint case under Section 138 of the
N.I. Act for dishonour of three cheques
bearing
cheque
no.
418192
dated
28.06.2022, amounting Rs. 5,00,000/-,
cheque no. 418193 dated 28.06.2022,
amounting Rs. 5,00,000/- and cheque no.
418194 dated 28.06.2022, amounting Rs.
6,72,000/- respectively issued by the
applicant herein, which were paid in terms
of the sale deed executed by the opposite
party no.2 in favour of the applicant herein.
The said cheques were presented for
encashment
and
were
dishonoured.
Thereupon a legal notice dated 19.07.2022
was sent, which was not complied with.
Thereafter a complaint case was filed on
24.08.2022 by the opposite party no.2
under Section 138 of N.I.Act. Subsequently
during the pendency of the aforesaid
9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
443
complaint case, the applicant herein entered
into a settlement with the opposite party
no.2 and agreed to make the entire payment
of the aforesaid cheque amount. A
compromise dated 05.01.2024 has arrived
at between the parties and the applicant has
admitted his liability with regard to the
aforesaid three cheques and has agreed to
make the payment by the 5th of February
2024. In terms of the aforesaid settlement,
the matter was taken up in the Lok Adalat
on 22.01.2024 and the following order was
passed:

"Parties are present along with
their learned counsel.

The present complaint has been
filed by the complainant against the
accused in respect of dishonour of
dishonour of following three cheques---

1. Cheque No. 418192 dated 286-2022 for the sum of Rs. 500,000/-

2. Cheque No. 418193 dated 286-2022 for the sum of Rs. 500,000/-

3. Cheque No. 418194 dated 286-2022 for the sum of Rs. 672,000/-

Subsequently the parties entered
into a compromise and thereafter on 05-012074 filed a compromise deed through
paper No. 15-B, stating that they have
settled their dispute to the effect that the
accused has issued following two cheques
in favour of the complainant---

1. Cheque No. 947560 for the
sum of Rs 150,000/- and

2. Cheque No. 947561 for the
sum of Rs. 150,000/-

It has also been agreed that
remaining amount shall be paid positively
by 05-02-2024 Accordingly it is prayed that
the complaint case should be decided in
terms of compromise 15-B.

The aforesaid compromise was
verified by me on 08-01-2024. The present
complaint has been filed against the
accused under Section 138 NI Act. The
offence under Section 138 of NI Act is
compoundable. Therefore the complaint
case is disposed of in terms of aforesaid
compromise as under---

1. That out of the settled amount
the accused has already paid a sum of Rs.
300,000/
through
aforementioned
two
cheques. Remaining settled amount shall be
paid positively by 05-02-2024.

2. On default of payment of the
settled amount as aforesaid the accused will
have to undergo three months simple
imprisonment.

3. On default of payment of amount
in terms of compromise the complainant will
be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% on the
amount due by then, till realisation of entire
amount.

Accordingly
the
complaint
is
decided in terms of compromise 13-8. Let the
file be consigned to record room with the
further direction that on being informed by
the complainant about the default in payment,
the file will be summoned from the record
Room and recovery warrant and NBW will
be issued forthwith against the accused."

4. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits
that
the
Lok
Adalat
has
erroneously imposed the conditons no.2
and 3, which were not there in the
compromise. Therefore, learned counsel for
the applicant states that it was not open for
the Lok Adalat to impose the conditions
no.2 and 3 by admitting the compromise
and disposing of the case on the basis of the
settlement / compromise. Being aggrieved
by the aforesaid order passed by the Lok
Adalat, the instant application has been
filed initially on 07.08.2024, in which this
Court has passed the following order:

"1. Heard Sri Anurag Pathak,
learned counsel for the applicant and Sri
444 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rajeev Kumar Singh, learned AGA for the
State.

2. Learned counsel for the
applicant submits that the applicant is
aggrieved by the order dated 22.1.2024,
whereby the Complaint Case No.25882 of
2022 under Section 138 of N.I. Act was
disposed of in terms of the settlement,
which was duly verified by the trial court
on 8.1.2024. Learned counsel for the
applicant further submits that the trial
court has recorded that the parties are
present along with their learned counsels
and he disputes that neither the applicant
nor his counsel was present before the
court on that date.

3. Further, learned counsel for the
applicant is aggrieved by other two
conditions imposed, which was not part of the
compromise, namely, on default of payment
of the settled amount as aforesaid, the
accused will have to undergo three months of
imprisonment and on default of payment of
amount in terms of the compromise, the
complainant will be entitled to interest at the
rate of 5% of the amount duped by them till
realization of the entire amount.

4. In view thereof, let a report be
called from the Presiding Officer, Additional
Court, Saharanpur with regard to the
material facts specifically the presence of the
parties and the conditions imposed beyond
the compromise.

5. Put up this matter on 21.8.2024,
as fresh."

5. In pursuance to the aforesaid order,
a detailed report has been submitted by the
Presiding
Officer,
Additional
Court,
Saharanpur justifying the imposition of the
conditions in view of various judgments of
the Apex Court and this Court as well.

6. The report submitted by the learned
Magistrate reads as under :

"Please be kind enough to take
notice of the letter dated 30-7-2024
whereby I have been directed to submit my
explanation about the complaint case No.
25882 of 2022 Kanishka Kund Jain vs.
Shaswata Agrawal u/s Section 138 of NI
Act in Lok Adalata held on 22-01-2024.

Special Lok Adalata for NI Act
cases was held on 22-01-2024, when the
aforementioned complainant case was also
decided. The accused has filed a petition
before Hon'ble the High Court challenging
the order on the following grounds---

1. The court has imposed default
clause in case of default in payment of the
settled amount which was not part of the
compromise.

2.
That
neither
the
applicant/accused nor his learned counsel
was present on the date but both have been
shown as present on that date.

So I have been directed to submit
my report with regard to presence of
parties and conditions imposed beyond the
compromise.

In this respect my explanation is
as under-

1. Since the impugned order was
passed in Special Lok Adalata held on 2201-2024, therefore according to the Section
21 of "The Legal Services Authorities Act,
1987", the order will be deemed as a
decree. Section 21 of "The Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987", reads as under-

"Section
21---Award
of
Lok
Adalat-

1) Every award of the Lok Adalat
shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil
court or, as the case may be, an order of
any other court and where a compromise
or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok
Adalat in a case referred to it under subsection(1) of section 20, the court-fee paid
in such case shall be refunded in the
9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
445
manner provided under the Court-fees Act,
1870 (7 of 1870).

2) Every award made by a Lok
Adalat shall be final and binding on all the
parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall
lie to any court against the award."

2. Mode and procedure for
execution of decree of a Civil Court has
been prescribed in Chapter II (Section 36
to 74) and Order 21 of Civil Procedure
Code. Relevant provisions are mentioned
as under-

A. Order 21 Rule- 30 Decree for
payment of money. Every decree for the
payment of money, including a decree for
the payment of money as the alternative to
some other relief, may be executed by the
detention in the civil prison of the
judgment-debtor, or by the attachment and
sale of his property, or by both.

B. Section 51---Powers of Court
to enforce execution-Subject to such
conditions and limitations as may be
prescribed,
the
Court
may,
on
the
application of the decree-holder, order
execution of the decree-

a) by delivery of any property
specifically decreed;

b) by attachment and sale or by
the sale without attachment of any
property;

c) by arrest and detention in
prison for such period not exceeding the
period specified in section 58, where arrest
and detention is permissible under that
section

d) by appointing a receiver; or

e) in such other manner as the
nature of the relief granted may require:

Provided that, where the decree
is for the payment of money, execution by
detention in prison shall not be ordered
unless, after giving the judgment-debtor an
opportunity of showing cause why he
should not be committed to prison, the
Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is
satisfied-

a) that the judgment-debtor, with
the object or effect of obstructing or
delaying the execution of the decree-

i. is likely to abscond or leave the
local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court,
or

ii. has, after the institution of the
suit in which the decree was passed,
dishonestly
transferred,
concealed,
or
removed any part of his property, or
committed any other act of bad faith in
relation to his property, or

b) that the judgment-debtor has,
or has had since the date of the decree, the
means to pay the amount of the decree or
some substantial part thereof and refuses
or neglects or has refused or neglected to
pay the same, or

c) that the decree is for a sum for
which the judgment- debtor was bound in a
fiduciary capacity to account.

Explanation-In the calculation of
the means of the

judgment-debtor for the purposes
of clause (b), there shall be left out of
account any property which, by or under
any law or custom having the force of law
for the time being in force, is exempt from
attachment in execution of the decree.

C.
Section
55---Arrest
and
detention-

1) A judgment-debtor may be
arrested in execution of a decree at any
hour and on any day, and shall, as soon as
practicable, be brought before the Court,
and his detention may be in the civil prison
of the district in which the Court ordering
the detention is situate, or, where such civil
prison
does
not
afford
suitable
accommodation, in any other place which
the State Government may appoint for the
detention of persons ordered by the Courts
of such district to be detained:
446 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Provided firstly- that, for the
purpose of making an arrest under this
section, no dwelling-house shall be entered
after sunset and before sunrise:

Provided, secondly- that no outer
door of a dwelling- house shall be broken
open unless such dwelling house is in the
occupancy of the judgment-debtor and he
refuses or in any way prevents access
thereto, but when the officer authorized to
make the arrest has duly gained access to
any dwelling-house, he may break open the
door of any room in which he has reason to
believe the judgment-debtor is to be found:

Provided, thirdly- that, if the
room is in the actual occupancy of a
woman who is not the judgment- debtor
and who according to the customs of the
country does not appear in public, the
officer authorized to make the arrest shall
give notice to her that she is at liberty to
withdraw, and, after allowing a reasonable
time for her to withdraw and giving her
reasonable facility for withdrawing, may
enter the room for the purpose of making
the arrest:

Provided, fourthly- that, where
the decree in execution of which a
judgment-debtor is arrested, is a decree for
the payment of money and the judgment-
debtor pays the amount of the decree and
the costs of the arrest to the officer
arresting him, such officer shall at once
release him.

2) The State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare
that any person or class of persons whose
arrest might be attended with danger or
inconvenience to the public shall not be
liable to arrest in execution of a decree
otherwise than in accordance with such
procedure as may be prescribed by the
State Government in this behalf.

3) Where a judgment-debtor is
arrested in execution of a decree for the
payment of money and brought before the
Court, the Court shall inform him that he
may apply to be declared an insolvent, and
that he 1 [may be discharged) if he has not
committed any act of bad faith regarding
the subject of the application and if he
complies with the provisions of the law of
insolvency for the time being in force.

4) Where a judgment-debtor
expresses his intention to apply to be
declared
an
insolvent
and
furnishes
security, to the satisfaction of the Court,
that he will within one month so apply, and
that he will appear, when called upon, in
any proceeding upon the application or
upon the decree in execution of which he
was arrested, the Court may release him
from arrest, and, if he fails so to apply and
to appear, the Court may either direct the
security to be realized or commit him to the
civil prison in execution of the decree.

D. Section 56---Prohibition of
arrest or detention of women in execution
of
decree
for
money-Notwithstanding
anything in this Part, the Court shall not
order the arrest or detention in the civil
prison of a woman in execution of a decree
for the payment of money.

E.
Section
57-Subsistenceallowance-The State Government may fix
scales, graduated according to rank, race
and nationality, of monthly allowances
payable for the subsistence of judgmentdebtors.

F. Section 58-Detention and
release-

1) Every person detained in the
civil prison in execution of a decree shall
be so detained-

a) where the decree is for the
payment of a sum of money exceeding five
thousand rupees for a period not exceeding
three months, and,

b) where the decree is for the
payment of a sum of money exceeding two
9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
447
thousand rupees, but not exceeding five
thousand
rupees,
for
a
period
not
exceeding six weeks.

Provided
that
he
shall
be
released from such detention before the
expiration of said period of detention-

On the amount mentioned in the
warrant for his detention being paid to the
officer-in- charge of civil prison or

On the decree against him being
otherwise fully satisfied, or

On the request of the person on
whose application he has been so detained
or

Iv. On the omission by the person
on whose application he has been so
detained to pay subsistence allowance.

Provided also that he shall not be
released from such detention under clause
II or III, without the order of the court,

1A) For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that no order for
detention of the judgment-debtor in civil
prison in execution of a decree for the
payment of money shall be made, where the
total amount of the decree does not exceed
two thousand rupees.

2) A judgment-debtor released
from detention under this section shall not
merely by reason of his release be
discharged from his debt, but he shall not
be liable to be re-arrested under the decree
in execution of which he was detained in
the civil prison.

3. Thus perusal of the aforesaid
scheme and all provisions it becomes clear
that the term "decree" is not a like a bubble
of water or bed of rose for wrong doers,
instead of it, it is more drastic and
stringent. In case of money decree
exceeding Rs. 5000/, the executing Court
on application of the decree holder may
adopt any one following mode---

1) The Court may execute the
decree by attachment or sale of movable or
immovable properties of the judgment
debtor or

2) The Court may direct civil
imprisonment of the judgment debtor which
shall not exceed three months to be
commenced
only
after
payment
of
subsistence allowance in terms of Section
57 of Civil Procedure Code, or

3) In addition to above Section 51
(e) of Civil Procedure Code confers some
more powers in the form of inherent powers
of the Court when it says that- "In such
other manner as the nature of the relief
granted may require"

4. In this Court nearly 8000/
complaint cases relating to Section 138 of
NI Act are pending. Due to noncooperation of the police the Court despite
striving hard is not able to achieve the
desired results. Due to non- execution of
decree or other processes NBW, summons
or notices, the functioning of the Court has
been paralyzed. Parties ceased to take any
interest to settle the disputes by way of
compromise due to failure of getting the
benefit
of
the
decree
for
want
of
execution/service of processes by the police
or District magistrate. In this respect the
court was compelled to write several letters
to
SSP
Saharanpur
but
in
vain.
Photocopies of some letters are attached
with the report.

5. So in order to combat
gargantuan pendency of complaint cases
under Section 138 of NI Act and the ever
increasing
melancholy
by
expeditious
disposal it became the need of hour to
motivate the parties for settlement by way
of compromise I took recourse to Section
51 (e) of Civil Procedure Code which has
recognized the inherent powers of the
courts, and while exercising the inherent
powers of the Court added default clauses
in the form of imprisonment and interest
and affixed the sample of proposed order in
448 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the notice board of the Court, in the office
and Court-room also. In addition to it
before taking on record any compromise I
always made the parties and their counsels
aware of the proposed order. The same
practice was followed by me in this case
also before verifying the compromise deed
and only when the parties assented to the
proposed order which was passed on 2201-2024 the compromise deed was verified
by me.

6. This power of the Court to
adapt itself and interpret the law according
to the changing needs of the society has
been recognized by our Hon'ble the
Constitutional Courts in the followings
cases-

1. The luminous guideline in the
interpretation of a constitutional provision
is provided by the Supreme Court of United
States in Weems v. U. S., (1909) 54 LEd
793 (801)---

"Legislation, both statutory and
constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general
language
should
not,
therefore,
be
necessarily confined to the form that evil
had therefore taken. Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore, a principle, to be
vital, must be capable of wider application
than mischief which gave it birth. This is
peculiarly true of Constitutions. They are,
to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
"designed to approach immortality as
nearly as human institutions can approach
it. "The future is their care, and provisions
for events of good and bad tendencies of
which no prophecy can be made in the
application of a Constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has
been, but of what may be. Under any other
rule a Constitution would indeed be as easy
of application as it would be deficient in
efficacy and power. Its general principles
would have little value, and be converted
by precedent info impotent and lifeless
formulas. Rights declared in the words
might be lost in reality. And this has been
recognized. The meaning and vitality of the
Constitution
have
developed,
against
narrow and restrictive construction.

This principle of interpretation
which
requires
that
a
constitutional
provisions must be construed, not in a
narrow and constricted sense, but in a wide
and liberal manner so as to anticipate and
take account of changing conditions and
purposes
so
that
the
constitutional
provision does not get atrophied or
fossilized but remains flexible enough to
meet the newly emerging problems and
challenges, applied with greater force in
relation to a fundamental right enacted by
the Constitution. The fundamental right to
life which is the most precious human right
and which forms the ark of all other rights
must therefore be interpreted in a broad
and expansive spirit so as to invest, it with
significance and vitality which may endure
for years to come and enhance the dignity
of the individual and the worth of the
human persons." (Francis Corallie Mullin
v. Administrator AIR 1981 SC 746)

2.
Interpretation
of
the
provisions-The Court is supposed to adapt
Itself according to the contemporary needs
of the society- Justice M. Katju while
criticizing the old licensing policy and its
applicability in the then social needs
observed as under-

"37. As a matter of fact, the vast
expansion of the scope of Articles 14, 19
and 21 by the Supreme Court in the last 20
years or so itself proves that our Supreme
Court has adopted the organic (or
dynamic) approach. And this is very
appropriate, since Courts must apply the
law to flesh and blood, and not dry bones.
Today our country is facing gigantic
9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
449
problems, social, economic and political,
and
unless
a
dynamic
and
activist
approach is adopted the judiciary will be
living in an ivory tower unconnected with
reality. (Ganesh Chandra Bhatt vs. DM
Almora AIR 1993 All 993)

3. Badshah v. Sou. Urmila
Badshah Godse, AIR 2014 SC 869. This
case related to standard of proof of legal
marriage in a case under section 125 of the
Code, the Supreme Court made a very
emphatic observation regarding the ambit
and object of the law provided by section
125 of the Code observed as under-

"Thirdly, in such cases, purposive
interpretation needs to be given to the
provisions of Section 125,Cr.P.C. While
dealing with the application of destitute
wife or helpless children or parents under
this provision, the Court is dealing with the
marginalized sections of the society. The
purpose is to achieve "social justice" which
is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in
the Preamble of the Constitution of India.
Preamble to the Constitution of India
clearly signals that we have chosen the
democratic path under rule of law to
achieve the goal of securing for all its
citizens, justice, liberty, equality and
fraternity.
It
specifically
highlights
achieving their social justice. Therefore, it
becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to
advance the cause of the social justice.
While giving interpretation to a particular
provision, the Court is supposed to bridge
the gap between the law and society."

The
Supreme
Court
further
observed-

"Of late, in this very direction, it
is emphasized that the Courts have to adopt
different approaches in "social justice
adjudication", which is also known as
"social context adjudication" as mere
"adversarial approach" may not be very
appropriate. There are number of social
justice
legislations
giving
special
protection and benefits to vulnerable
groups in the society. Prof. Madhava
Menon describes it eloquently: "It is,
therefore,
respectfully
submitted
that
"social context judging" is essentially the
application of equality jurisprudence as
evolved by Parliament and the Supreme
Court in myriad situations presented before
courts where unequal parties are pitted in
adversarial proceedings and where courts
are called upon to dispense equal justice.
Apart
from
the
social-
economic
inequalities accentuating the disabilities of
the poor in an unequal fight, the
adversarial process itself operates to the
disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a
situation, the Judge has to be not only
sensitive to the inequalities of parties
involved but also positively inclined to the
weaker party if the imbalance were not to
result in miscarriage of justice. This result
is achieved by what we call social context
judging or social justice adjudication."

It further observed.........

"The law regulates relationships
between people. It prescribes patterns of
behavior. It reflects the values of society.
The role of the Court is to understand the
purpose of law in society and to help the
law achieve its purpose. But the law of a
society is a living organism. It is based on
a given factual and social reality that is
constantly changing. Sometimes change in
law precedes societal change and is even
intended to stimulate it. In most cases,
however, a change in law is the result of a
change in social reality. Indeed, when
social reality changes, the law must change
too. Just as change in social reality is the
law of life, responsiveness to change in
social reality is the life of the law. It can be
said that the history of law is the history of
adapting the law to society's changing
needs. In both Constitutional and statutory
450 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
interpretation, the Court is supposed to
exercise direction in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective
and objective purpose of the law."

Therefore, the Court held---

"Provision of maintenance would
definitely fall in this category which aims at
empowering the destitute and achieving
social justice or equality and dignity of the
Individual. While dealing with cases under
this provision, drift in the approach from
"adversarial" litigation to social context
adjudication
is
the
need
of
the
hour."(Badshah v. Sou. Urmila Badshah
Godse, AIR 2014 SC 869)

4. Ongoing statute---Power to
adapt itself according to the changing
needs of the society or public at large with
the passage of time--Criminal Procedure
Code is an ongoing statute---Supreme
Court while explaining the meaning of
ongoing statute observed that the Criminal
Procedure Code is an ongoing statute, in
the following words---

"In case of an ongoing statute, it
is presumed that the Parliament intended
the Court to apply a construction that
continuously updates its wordings to allow
for changes and is compatible with the
contemporary situation. In paragraph 14 of
the said decision, the Court observed thus-

"14. It must also be remembered
that the Criminal Procedure Code is an
ongoing
statute.
The
principles
of
interpreting an ongoing statute have been
very succinctly set out by the leading jurist
Francis Bennion in his commentaries titled
Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn. p. 617---

"It
is
presumed
Parliament
intends the court to apply to an ongoing
Act a construction that continuously
updates its wordings to allow for changes
since the Act was initially framed. While it
remains law, it has to be treated as always
speaking. This means that in its application
on any day, the language of the Act though
necessarily embedded in its own time, is
nevertheless to be construed in accordance
with the need to treat it as a current law.

In construing an ongoing Act, the
interpreter is to presume that Parliament
intended the Act to be applied at any future
time in such a way as to give effect to the
original
intention.
Accordingly,
the
interpreter is to make allowances for any
relevant changes that have occurred since
the Act's passing, in law, in social
conditions, technology, the meaning of
words and other matters.... That today's
construction involves the supposition that
Parliament was catering long ago for a
state of affairs that did not then exist is no
argument
against
that
construction.
Parliament,
in
the
wording
of
an
enactment,
is
expected
to
anticipate
temporal developments. The drafter will
foresee the future and allow for the
wording.

***An enactment of former days
is thus to be read today, in the light of
dynamic processing received over the
years, with such modification of the current
meaning of its language as will now give
effect to the original legislative intention.
The
reality
and
effect
of
dynamic
processing
provides
the
gradual
adjustment. It is constituted by judicial
interpretation, year in and year out. It also
comprises
processing
by
executive
officials." (State of Maha. vs. Dr Praful B.
Desai (2003) 4 SCC 601)

7. So in order to overcome the burden
of increasing number of cheque bounce
cases, when the police is not complying
with the orders and the wrongdoers are not
willing to pay the cheque amount despite
orders of the court, need of the hour is to
strengthen the hands of judicial officers and
say good-by to traditional approach of
9 All. Shashwat Agrawal Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
451
interpretation and instead of it to adopt
renovative and dynamic approach.

8. Compromise means when both
parties are willing to perform certain act in
a certain manner in other words generally it
is bilateral in nature. But in the following
cases our Hon'ble the Apex Court and
Hon'ble the High Court after having taken
note of the increasing number of cases
recognized the inherent powers of the court
and thus empowered the court to decide the
case even when the adversary was not
ready to accept the proposal---

1. M/s Meters and Instruments
Private Limited and Another vs. Kanchan
Mehta AIR 2017 SC 4594" --In this case
Hon'ble the Apex Court while recognizing
the inherent powers of the court in para 18
(3) observed as under---

"The object of the provision being
primarily compensatory, punitive element
being mainly with the object of enforcing
the compensatory element, compounding at
the initial stage has to be encouraged but is
not debarred at later stage subject to
appropriate compensation as may be found
acceptable to the parties or the Court.
Though compounding requires consent of
both parties, even in absence of such
consent, the Court, in the interests of
justice,
on
being
satisfied
that
the
complainant has been duly compensated,
can in its discretion close the proceedings
and discharge the accused."

2. Shrimati Rani Gaur vs. State of
UP (2023)124 ACC 891 (All) ---While
following the judgment rendered in M/s
Meters and Instruments Private Limited
and Another vs. Kanchan Mehta AIR 2017
SC 4594 observed as under..

"8. I studied both the judgments.
The Supreme Court did not say that the
requirement of consent for compounding
may just be done away with. Instead
widening the compensatory aspect of cases
filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, the Apex Court has carved
out a window in the existing scheme of
things saying that the case can be disposed
of without obtaining direct consent of the
complainant under certain circumstances.
The circumstances included offering an
amount just fair and acceptable which in
the opinion of the court is appropriate for
duly compensating the complainant, That is
under certain circumstances the court can
proceed in absence of direct consent. The
court is empowered to apply its discretion
in terms of provisions of Section 258
Cr.P.C. It may be made clear that this
aspect of the matter is distinct and separate
from compounding of the case where both
the parties agree. The revisional court has
remanded the matter to decide it afresh as
per law laid down in M/s Meters and
Instruments Private Limited and Another
(supra). By the aforesaid judgment the
Apex Court has emphasized that where an
appropriate
amount
has
been
offered/deposited, the trial court may
consider to drop the proceeding. Definitely
the
objections,
if
any,
raised
by
complainant in this regard shall be taken
into
consideration
before
the
court
concerned decides to act upon on the basis
of offer/deposit of appropriate amount as
compensation. A pertinent question may
arise as to criteria to be adopted for
determination of amount of compensation
which may be termed as just, fair and
acceptable. In my opinion, provisions of
section 138 N.I. Act regarding fine may act
as the best guide coupled with all the
peculiar facts and circumstances of each
case
to
determine
the
amount
of
compensation
being
just,
fair
and
acceptable. The court must record its
satisfaction as regard above before it
452 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceeds to finally decide and drop the
proceedings under Section 258 Cr.P.C.
Definitely the court is expected to apply its
mind and judicial discretion when it
proceeds to decide the matter in the light of
M/s Meters and Instruments Private
Limited and Another (supra). The court has
not lost its power of discretion in such
matters. In view of the above i do not find
any cause for interference."

9. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has
always impressed upon the disposal of
cheque bounce cases by way of amicable
settlement. In order to motivate the parties
to settle their disputes at the earliest stages
it has formulated a graded scheme of
imposing costs. In the case of "Damodar S.
Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal (2010) 5 SCC
663" Hon'ble the Supreme Court in para 21
has propounded thus-

21.
With
regard
to
the
progression
of
litigation
in
cheque
bouncing cases, the learned Attorney
General has urged this Court to frame
guidelines for a graded scheme of imposing
costs
on
parties
who
unduly
delay
compounding of the offence. It was
submitted that the requirement of deposit of
the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed
composition, since at present, free and easy
compounding of offences at any stage,
however belated, gives an incentive to the
drawer of the cheque to delay settling the
cases for years. An application for
compounding made after several years not
only results in the system being burdened
but the complainant is also deprived of
effective justice. In view of this submission,
we direct that the following guidelines be
followed

a) That directions can be given
that the Writ of Summons be suitably
modified making it clear to the accused that
he
could
make
an
application
for
compounding of the offences at the first or
second hearing of the case and that if such
an application is made, compounding may
be allowed by the court without imposing
any costs on the accused.