# Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan Revisionist v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 843
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-02-04
- **Case number:** Criminal Revision No. 1306 of 2018
- **Bench:** Anant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/sheebu-shabe-kadar-khan-revisionist-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45737
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law-Indian
Penal
Code,1860-sections 302/34, 120B and
Arms
Act,1959-section
3/25
&
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of
Children)Act,
2000-section
7Arejection-claim of juvenility-conduct
of inquiry is mandatory-trial court
failed to conduct inquiry regarding
determination of age as laid out in
section 7A of the 2000 Act and Rule
12
of
the
2007
Rules-trial court
committed manifest error-hence, the
revision
is
allowed-the
matter
is
844 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
remanded back to trial court to decide
afresh.(Para 5 to 9)

The age determination inquiry contemplated
under J.J. Act and Rules has nothing to do with
an inquiry under any other legislation. There
may be a situation where matriculation
certificate, date of birth certificate from school
first attended and even birth certificate given
by a corporation or a municipal authority, or
panchayat may not be correct, but the Court or
the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee
under J.J. Act is not expected to conduct such
a roving inquiry and to go behind those
certificates t examine correctness of those
documents,kept during normal course
of
business. (Para 7)

Criminal Revision allowed.(E-6)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
843
already commenced against the original
accused and it is in the course of such trial
that materials are disclosed against the
newly
summoned
accused.
Fresh
summoning of an accused will result in
delay of the trial - therefore the degree of
satisfaction for summoning the accused
(original and subsequent) has to be
different.

Question No.V Q.V Does the
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to
persons not named in the FIR or named in
the FIR but not chargesheeted or who
have been discharged?

A. A person not named in the
FIR or a person though named in the FIR
but has not been chargesheeted or a
person who has been discharged can be
summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
provided from the evidence it appears that
such person can be tried along with the
accused already facing trial. However, in
so far as an accused who has been
discharged is concerned the requirement
of ?Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to
be complied with before he can be
summoned afresh.

30. On the basis of above discussions, it
is sufficiently clear that there was evidence of
PW-1
as
statement
recorded
in
his
examination-in-chief supporting the allegation
against the revisionist accused, a named
accused therein along with other accused
persons. The said evidence in terms of Section
319 Cr.P.C. could very well be taken as
evidence to satisfy the trial judge so as to
summon the revisionist for trial along with
other co-accused. The learned trial judge has
committed no error of law, nor any irregularity
while passing the order impugned in this
revision.

31. The revision therefore has no force
and there is no reason to interfere with the
order of Trial Judge dated 31.7.2019 in S.T
No.467/2016, Crime Case No. 299/2016
registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 504,
506, 307 and 302 I.P.C. in Police StationJamo, District-Amethi (State of U.P. Vs.
Shivendra Pratap Singh & Anr.) exercised its
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon
the revisionist, Dipendra Kumar Singh @ Bittu
for trial along with the other accused.

32. With the aforesaid, the present
criminal revision is dismissed.
----------
(2020)02ILR A843

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ANANT KUMAR, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1306 of 2018

Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan
 ...Revisionist
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sandeep Kumar Ojha, Man Mohan Singh,
Maneesh Kumar Singh, Navita Sharma

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
Govt. Advocate, Ravindra Shukla

A.
Criminal
Law-Indian
Penal
Code,1860-sections 302/34, 120B and
Arms
Act,1959-section
3/25
&
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of
Children)Act,
2000-section
7Arejection-claim of juvenility-conduct
of inquiry is mandatory-trial court
failed to conduct inquiry regarding
determination of age as laid out in
section 7A of the 2000 Act and Rule
12
of
the
2007
Rules-trial court
committed manifest error-hence, the
revision
is
allowed-the
matter
is
844 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
remanded back to trial court to decide
afresh.(Para 5 to 9)

The age determination inquiry contemplated
under J.J. Act and Rules has nothing to do with
an inquiry under any other legislation. There
may be a situation where matriculation
certificate, date of birth certificate from school
first attended and even birth certificate given
by a corporation or a municipal authority, or
panchayat may not be correct, but the Court or
the Juvenile Justice Board or the committee
under J.J. Act is not expected to conduct such
a roving inquiry and to go behind those
certificates t examine correctness of those
documents,kept during normal course
of
business. (Para 7)

Criminal Revision allowed.(E-6)

List of cases cited:-

1. Raju Vs. St. Of Haryana,{2019(2) JIC 11
(SC)}

2. Mohd. Yunus Vs. St. Of U.P. & Anr.{2018(3)
JIC 74 (All)}

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anant Kumar, J.)

(1) Counter affidavit filed on behalf
of complainant is taken on record.

(2) Heard learned counsel for the
revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State,
the learned counsel for private opposite
parties and perused the record.

(3) This revision has been filed with
the prayer that this Hon'ble Court may
kindly be pleased to set aside the judgment
and order dated 13.09.2018 passed by
Fourth
Additional
Session
Judge,
Sultanpur passed in Session Trial No.433
of 2014 (State Versus Kamruddin and
others)
by
which
application
for
declaration of juvenile has been rejected
by him arising from Case Crime No.255 of
2014, under Sections 302/34, 120B of
I.P.C. and Section 3/25 Arms Act relating
to Police Station - Dostpur, District -
Sultanpur.

(4) Brief facts relevant for disposal
of this revision are that an application was
moved
for
declaring
the
revisionist
juvenile on the ground that on the date of
occurrence i.e. 14th July, 2014 he was
juvenile as the date of birth of the
revisionist is 20.09.1998, as such on the
date of occurrence, he was 15 years 10
months and 24 days old. In support of the
application, a birth certificate purportedly
issued from Nagar Panchayat, Dostpur,
Sultanpur, has been filed. The trial court
after hearing the counsel for the applicant/
revisionist as well as learned counsel for
the State came to the conclusion that date
of birth of the appellant was got registered
in Nagar Panchayat on 26.04.2017 i.e.
after three years of occurrence, hence the
certificate issued by Nagar Panchayat,
Dostpur is not trustworthy and on this very
ground the said application has been
rejected, hence this revision.

(5) The sole arguments of learned
counsel for the appellant is that as per
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred
to as 'Act, 2000'), Section 7A of the Act,
2000, the inquiry has not been conducted
by the court concerned. Section 7A of the
Act, 2000 provids as under :

"Section 7A in The Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2015

[7A. Procedure to be followed
when claim of juvenility is raised before
any court.--

(1)
Whenever
a
claim
of
juvenility is raised before any court or a
court is of the opinion that an accused
2 All. Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
845
person was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence, the court shall
make an inquiry, take such evidence as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so
as to determine the age of such person,
and shall record a finding whether the
person is a juvenile or a child or not,
stating his age as nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be
raised before any court and it shall be
recognised at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall
be determined in terms of the provisions
contained in this Act and the rules made
thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased
to be so on or before the date of
commencement of this Act.

(2) If the court finds a person to
be a juvenile on the date of commission of
the offence under sub-section (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for
passing appropriate orders and the
sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect.]"

(6) It is further stated that instead of
following to the said provision, the trial
Court has simply held that birth certificate
produced by the applicant/ revisionist is
not trustworthy but the trial court should
have conducted inquiry for the same and
by not conducting such inquiry the trial
Court has committed manifest error, which
required interference by this Court.

(7) In this regard, a case law reported
in [2019 (2) JIC 11 (SC)]; Raju vs. State
of Haryana, has been cited, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"2. The brief facts leading to the
instant appeal are that an FIR was lodged
against the Appellant Raju s/o Rajendar
Singh, and two other persons, viz. Raju s/o
Bhim and Raja @ Raj Kumar s/o Makhsi,
alleging that the three persons had
intercepted the prosecutrix when she was
passing by some fields along with her one
year old brother and had taken her to a
field nearby, whereupon Raju s/o Bhim
and Raja @ Raj Kumar s/o Makhsi
engaged in the gang rape of the
prosecutrix, while the Appellant stood
outside the field. The prosecutrix was aged
fifteen years at the time of the incident,
which occurred on 14.09.2000. The three
accused were convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the
IPC, and sentenced to 10 years' rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/, and
further two months' rigorous imprisonment
in default of payment of fine. Aggrieved
by the same, the three accused appealed to
the High Court.

3. The Appellant, inter alia,
raised the defence before the High Court
that he was aged less than 18 years at the
time of commission of the offence, i.e.
14.09.2000, and hence was entitled to the
benefit of the provisions of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2000 (in short, "the 2000 Act"). The
High Court, however, rejected such
contention and affirmed the conviction of
the three accused, including the Appellant.

4. Aggrieved by the above
judgment, the Appellant filed the instant
appeal, inter alia raising the plea of
juvenility again. The Appellant relied upon
a transfer certificate issued in his favour
by the Dayanand Middle School, Sohna,
Gurgaon which showed his date of birth to
be 12.07.1984. He also relied upon a
certificate issued by the Government
Senior Secondary School (Boys), Sohna
which showed his date of birth to be the
same. It was submitted by the Appellant
before this Court that the certificates in
question prima facie entitled him to claim
the conduct of an inquiry in terms of
846 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Section 7A of the 2000 Act. The Appellant
referred to the decisions of this Court in
Murari Thakur v. State of Bihar, (2009) 16
SCC 256, Dharambir v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344, and Jitendra
Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P.,
(2010) 13 SCC 523.

5.
Keeping
in
mind
such
circumstances and the certificates relied
upon,
this
Court
vide
order
dated
09.08.2012
directed
the
Registrar
(Judicial) of this Court to conduct an
inquiry in respect of the age of the
Appellant in terms of Section 7A of the
2000 Act read with the rules framed
thereunder, and to submit a report to this
Court within four months from the order.

6. This Court received such
report on 07.01.2013, which determined
that the age of the Appellant was 16 years,
2 months and 2 days at the time of
commission of the offence and that he was
thus a juvenile at that time. Thereafter,
arguments were heard and judgement
reserved. However, subsequently, the State
raised the argument that the Court had not
looked into the question of whether the
plea of juvenility as decided by the
Registry of this Court should be given
precedence over the view of the High
Court. By an order dated 25.04.2014, this
Court directed that the appeal be heard
further.
Shri
Siddhartha
Dave
was
subsequently appointed as amicus curiae
to assist the Court.

7. It was submitted by the
learned amicus curiae that the learned
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court had, after
duly calling for records and appreciating
the
material
adduced,
reached
the
conclusion that the Appellant was a
juvenile at the time of commission of the
offence, and there was no reason to deny
the Appellant the benefit of such finding.
Moreover, he submitted that seeing that it
was upon the direction of this Court that
the learned Registrar had conducted the
inquiry under Section 7A of the 2000 Act
and the rules framed thereunder, and had
submitted his report to this Court after
conducting such inquiry in accordance
with law, the report may be treated as
having been made by this Court itself.

8. Heard the learned amicus
curiae and advocate for the State, and
perused the material on record.

9. It is by now well-settled, as
was held in Hari Ram v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, that in
light of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A read with
Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended in
2006, a juvenile who had not completed
eighteen years on the date of commission
of the offence is entitled to the benefit of
the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Mali v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 6 SCC
669; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana,
(2011) 2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State
(NCT) of Delhi (supra); Jitendra Singh @
Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2013) 11 SCC 193). It is equally
wellsettled that the claim of juvenility can
be raised at any stage before any Court by
an accused, including this Court, even
after the final disposal of a case, in terms
of Section 7A of the 2000 Act (see
Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi,
(supra), Abuzar Hossain v. State of West
Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489; Jitendra
Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of UP,
(supra); Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637).

10. In light of the above legal
position, it is evident that the Appellant
would be entitled to the benefit of the 2000
Act if his age is determined to be below 18
years on the date of commission of the
offence. Moreover, it would be irrelevant
that the plea of juvenility was not raised
before the Trial Court, in light of Section
2 All. Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
847
7A. As per the report of the inquiry
conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of
this Court, in this case, the Appellant was
below 18 years of age on the date of
commission of the offence. The only
question before us that needs to be
determined is whether such report may be
given precedence over the contrary view
taken by the High Court, so that the
benefit of the 2000 Act may be given to
the Appellant.

11. Before proceeding further, it
would be useful to refer to Section 7A of
the 2000 Act and Rule 12 of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 (in short, "the 2007 Rules"),
which deal with the making of an inquiry
by the Court in case of a claim of
juvenility. Section 7A of the 2000 Act is
as follows:

"7A. Procedure to be followed
when claim of juvenility is raised before
any court-- (1) Whenever a claim of
juvenility is raised before any court or a
court is of the opinion that an accused
person was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence, the court shall
make an inquiry, take such evidence as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so
as to determine the age of such person, and
shall record a finding whether the person
is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his
age as nearly as may be:

Provided
that
a
claim
of
juvenility may be raised before any court
and it shall be recognised at any stage,
even after final disposal of the case, and
such claim shall be determined in terms of
the provisions contained in this Act and
the rules made thereunder, even if the
juvenile has ceased to be so on or before
the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) If the court finds a person to
be a juvenile on the date of commission of
the offence under subsection (1), it shall
forward the juvenile to the Board for
passing
appropriate
orders
and
the
sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect." (emphasis
supplied)

12. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of
the 2007 Rules states the following
regarding the procedure to be followed for
age determination:

"In every case concerning a child
or juvenile in conflict with law, the age
determination inquiry shall be conducted
by the court or the Board or, as the case
may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining -

(a) (i) the matriculation or
equivalent certificates, if available; and in
the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate
from the school (other than a play school)
first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by
a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of
either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above,
the medical opinion will be sought from a
duly constituted Medical Board, which
will declare the age of the juvenile or
child. In case exact assessment of the age
cannot be done, the Court or the Board or,
as the case may be, the Committee, for the
reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the
child or juvenile by considering his/her
age on lower side within the margin of one
year, and while passing orders in such case
shall, after taking into consideration such
evidence as may be available, or the
medical opinion, as the case may be,
record a finding in respect of his age and
either of the evidence specified in any of
the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the
absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such
848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
child or the juvenile in conflict with law."
(emphasis supplied)

13. It is evident from a perusal of
the above that if any Court, including this
Court, is of the opinion that an accused
person was a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence, or if a claim of
juvenility is raised before it, the Court
must conduct an inquiry regarding the
determination of the age of the accused.
The evidence collected by way of such
inquiry, as is specified in clauses (a)(i),
(ii), and (iii) of Rule 12(3), or in the
absence whereof, clause (b) of the same, is
treated as conclusive proof of the age of
the accused. In such a situation, it would
be clear that such an inquiry conducted by
this Court would be given precedence over
a view of the age of the accused taken by
the High Court. It is relevant to note here
itself that in this case, the High Court
decided
the
issue
merely
upon
an
assessment of the material on record
without
resorting
to
the
procedure
governing inquiries for the determination
of age as laid out in Section 7A of the
2000 Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules.

14. At this point, it is necessary
to briefly discuss the findings of the High
Court in the impugned judgment regarding
the age of the accused to underscore that it
has not conducted the inquiry stipulated as
per Section 7A and Rule 12. Before the
High Court, the Appellant submitted a
report of the Assistant Commissioner of
Police, Bhondsi, Gurgaon to the effect that
his date of birth was 12.07.1984, thereby
claiming the benefit of the 2000 Act. This
plea was rejected on the grounds of failure
to raise the plea of juvenility before the
Trial
court;
nonproduction
of
birth
certificate in spite of an opportunity being
granted to do so; absence of the
Appellant's name in the birth register dated
12.07.1984 and for the years 198384 and
1984-85; non-corroboration of the date of
birth
certificates
issued
by
schools
attended by the Appellant through other
documentary evidence; non-matching of
the name on such certificates (Raj Kumar)
with the name of the Appellant as brought
on record (Raju); and non-corroboration of
the address of the Appellant through such
certificates, which simply stated that the
date of birth of the student named Raj
Kumar was 12.07.1984.

15. The High Court evidently did
not even frame its discussion in terms of
whether the evidence brought on record
was sufficient to conduct an inquiry under
the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules, let alone
order and conduct such an inquiry. On the
contrary, it simply recorded that the
evidence did not go to show that the
Appellant was a juvenile at the time of the
commission of the offence, and proceeded
to affirm the conviction of the Appellant
on merits.

16. Therefore, it is evident that
the only inquiry as stipulated under the
2000 Act and the 2007 Rules was
conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon
the directions of this Court, after the Court
was satisfied upon going through the
school
certificates
adduced
by
the
Appellant that the certificates in question
prima facie entitled him to claim the
conduct of such an inquiry. In such a
situation, the question regarding whether
precedence may be given to the inquiry of
a Registrar (Judicial) of this Court over the
opinion of the High Court regarding the
age of an accused can be restated as
whether such inquiry conducted by the
Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of
this Court, if thereafter affirmed by this
Court, would amount to an inquiry
conducted by this Court itself. If this be
the case, the findings of such inquiry
would prevail over the view taken by the
2 All. Sheebu @ Shabe Kadar Khan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
849
High Court, as is evident from the
preceding discussion.

17. We are of the opinion that the
above question must be answered in the
affirmative. This Court, on previous occasions
as well, has adopted the practice of directing
the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct the inquiry
in terms of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules on
behalf of this Court, and accepted the findings
made therein (see Dharambir v. State (NCT) of
Delhi, (supra). Seeing that the Registrar
(Judicial) is a District Judge serving on
deputation at the Supreme Court, recourse to
his or her assistance in the form of collecting
evidence and arriving at a finding regarding the
claim of juvenility of the person concerned
may be undertaken by this Court in order to
save its judicial time. However, it must be
stressed that the findings in an inquiry
conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) would
not per se prevail upon a contrary view taken
by the High Court. Only after this Court
applies its judicial mind to such report with due
regard to the confines of the procedure
stipulated in Section 7A of the 2000 Act and
Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, and only if it
thereafter confirms the findings in such report
would the same prevail upon a contrary view
taken by the High Court which is not based
upon any such inquiry."

In view of the said circumstances,
the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that while
disposing of the application of the accused
claiming juvenality, an inquiry under Section
7A of the 2000 Act is mandatory and the
application cannot be disposed of any slip
short manner."

(8) Another case law of this Court cited
on behalf of appellant reported in [2018 (3)
JIC 74 (All)] Mohd. Yunus v. State of U.P. &
Anr., wherein this Court has held as under:

"8. The above provisions shows
that the procedure to be followed under
J.J. Act in conducting an inquiry is the
procedure laid down in the statute itself.
We cannot import other procedure laid
down in the Code of Criminal Procedure
or any other enactment while making
inquiry with regard to the juvenility of a
person. The age determination inquiry
contemplated under J.J. Act and Rules has
nothing to do with an inquiry under any
other legislation. There may be situation
where the entry made in the Matriculation
or equivalent certificates, date of birth
certificate from school first attended and
even
birth
certificate
given
by
a
corporation or a municipal authority, or a
panchayat may not be correct, but the
Court or the Juvenile Justice Board or the
Committee functioning under J.J. Act is
not expected to conduct such a roving
inquiry and to go behind those certificates
to
examine
correctness
of
those
documents, kept during normal course of
business. In Ashwani Kumar Saxena
(supra), it has been observed by the Apex
Court that in this situation, only in cases
where those documents/certificates are
found to be fabricated or manipulated, the
Court, Juvenile Justice Board or the
Committee need to go for medical report
for age determination. In the present case,
the Transfer Certificate of NAS Inter
College, Meerut from where High School
was done by the accused- Asif Saifi is also
available on record which shows that
Neetu Bal Academy, Junior High School
was the earlier school of accused. The T.C.
of Neetu Bal Academy aforesaid is also on
record which shows that accused Asif Saifi
passed out 6th,7th and 8th classes from the
School and in that T.C. also the date of
birth is mentioned as 01.06.2000. In the
case of Parag Bharti (Juvenile) Vs. State of
U.P. Passed in Criminal Appeal no. 486 of
2016 arising out of SLP No. 5893 of 2013,
the Apex Court has considered so many
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decisions including the decision given in
the case of Om Prakash Vs. State of
Rajsthan (Supra) relied upon by the
revisionist and it has been observed that it
is a settled proposition of law that if the
Matriculation or equivalent certificates are
available and there is no other material to
prove the correctness, the date of birth
mentioned in the Matriculation Certificate
has to be treated as a conclusive proof of
the date of birth of the accused.

9. This Court is of the view that
in the situation of present case, there was
no necessity for medical examination of
the accused as the inquiry was confined to
the provisions of J.J. Act and Rules. In
Ashwani Kumar Saxena (supra) the
inquiry was conducted even there was
High School Certificate on record. The
Apex Court has deprecated the procedure
adopted as in the present case by the Court
below . In the facts and circumstances of
the present case, the law cited by learned
Counsel for the revisionist do not help
him.

10. In view of discussions made
above, this Court comes to the conclusion
that the learned Appellate Court has dealt
with the question of juvenility as per the
procedure laid down in the J.J. Act and
Rules and has rightly relied upon the date
of birth mentioned in the High School
Certificate, according to which the accused
Asif Saifi is minor. I find no justifiable
ground for making any interference in the
impugned order.

11. Hence, this revision fails and
is hereby dismissed. "

(9) In view of above, the trial court
has committed manifest error in disposing
of the application of the revisionist without
holding an inquiry as stated above, so the
revision is liable to be allowed.

(10) Accordingly, the revision is
allowed.
Order
impugned
dated
13.09.2018 passed by Fourth Additional
Session
Judge,
Sultanpur
passed
in
Session Trial No.433 of 2014 (State
Versus Kamruddin and others) by which
application for declaration of juvenile has
been rejected by him arising from Case
Crime No.255 of 2014, under Sections
302/34, 120B of I.P.C. and 3/25 Arms Act
relating to Police Station - Dostpur,
District - Sultanpur is set aside and the
matter is remanded back to the trial court
to decide the matter afresh in the lite of
observation made above and conduct an
inquiry under Section 7A of the Act, 2000
after giving opportunity of hearing to the
revisionist.

(11) Since the matter is old one, it is
expected
that
the
inquiry
shall
be
conducted without granting unnecessary
adjournment to either of the parties.
----------
(2020)02ILR A850

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE NARENDRA KUMAR JOHARI, J.

Criminal Revision No. 1451 of 2017

Kuldeep(Minor) ...Revisionist (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Umesh Yadav, Sri Awadhesh Kumar, Sri
Babu Lal Ram, Sri Nayab Ahmad Khan, Sri
Ravindra Sharma

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.