# Shimla Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 1 ILRA 593
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-10-18
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 647 of 2021
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C.J. Piyush Agrawal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shimla-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47624
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Sri Ankit Gaur (State Law Officer)
A. Service law - Constitution of India -
Article 226 - Writ
- Limitation
-
Maintainability - Direction to decide 5
years
belated
appeal
filed
against
dismissal order sought for - Charge of
unauthorized absence of over 678 days -
Writ court was approached after 25
years - Submission of representation,
how far alive the stale claim - Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari's case relied
upon - Held, even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition
under Article 226, yet it should be filed
within a reasonable time - The doctrine
of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to
weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same - The court
should bear in mind that it is exercising
an
extraordinary
and
equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court
at his own leisure or pleasure, the court
would be under legal obligation to
scrutinize whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not -
Even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating
to a stale claim or dead grievance it does
not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
(Para 6 and 8)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-1)

List of cases cited:

## Text

1 All. Shimla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
593
mentioned above, it is not applicable in the
case of the appellant-petitioner.

(24) Relying upon the judgment of
Full Bench of Amal Kishore Singh
(supra), the order passed by the District
Inspector of Schools, wherein it has been
observed that the B.P.Ed., degree is not
recognized for Primary Schools, is perfect.
Consequently, no interference is required in
the impugned order passed by the learned
Single Judge wherein it has been observed
that
the
petitioner
lacks
essential
qualification as prescribed under the Statute
for appointment as Assistant teacher in the
attached school of the Institution inasmuch
as B.P.Ed. Degree is not an alternate
qualification prescribed for B.T.C. etc., he
cannot claim to be qualified.

(25) For all the reasons stated above,
the Special Appeal, being bereft of any
merit, is dismissed.

(26) There shall be no order as to
costs.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 593
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Special Appeal Defective No. 647 of 2021

Shimla Devi ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Lal Chandra Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ankit Gaur (State Law Officer)
A. Service law - Constitution of India -
Article 226 - Writ
- Limitation
-
Maintainability - Direction to decide 5
years
belated
appeal
filed
against
dismissal order sought for - Charge of
unauthorized absence of over 678 days -
Writ court was approached after 25
years - Submission of representation,
how far alive the stale claim - Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari's case relied
upon - Held, even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition
under Article 226, yet it should be filed
within a reasonable time - The doctrine
of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to
weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same - The court
should bear in mind that it is exercising
an
extraordinary
and
equitable
jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it
has a duty to protect the rights of the
citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that
when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court
at his own leisure or pleasure, the court
would be under legal obligation to
scrutinize whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not -
Even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating
to a stale claim or dead grievance it does
not give rise to a fresh cause of action.
(Para 6 and 8)

Special Appeal dismissed. (E-1)

List of cases cited:

1. St. of Uttaranchal & anr. Vs Sri Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari & ors.; 2013 (6) SLR
629

2. U.O.I.& ors. Vs Chaman Rana; 2018(5) SCC
798

3. U.O.I.& ors. Vs C. Girija & ors.; 2019 (3)
SCALE 527

4. Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board & ors. Vs T. T. Murali Babu;
2014 (4) SCC 108
594 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
5. Bal Krishan Vs St. of Pun. & ors.; 2013(2) RSJ
18, (P&H)

6. U.O.I.& ors. Vs M.K. Sarkar; 2010(2) SCC 59

7. Vijay Kumar Kaul & ors. Vs U.O.I.& ors.; 2012
(7) SCC 610

8. Prabhakar Vs Joint Director Sericulture
Department & anr.; (2015) 15 SCC 1

9. St. of Jammu & Kashmir Vs R. K. Zalpuri &
ors.; 2015 (15) SCC 602

10. U.O.I.& ors. Vs Chaman Rana; (2018(5) SCC
798

11. Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corp. Vs Shree Lal Meena; (2019)4 SCC 479

12. Civil Appeal No. 1009 of 2020; Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. & ors. Vs Shyam Kishore Singh
decided on 5.2.2020

13. LPASW No. 192 of 2017; St. of J&K & ors.
Vs S. Bhupinder Singh decided on 30.12.2017

14. LPA No.210 of 2019; Farooq Ahmad Vs St.
of J&K & ors. decided on 21.8.2019

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.)

1. The present intra-court appeal has
been filed against the order dated July 7,
2021 passed by the learned Single Judge
whereby the writ petition filed by the
appellant was dismissed. The appellant
had approached this Court by filing the
writ petition seeking a direction to the
respondents to consider and decide the
appeal dated December 30, 1995 filed by
her late husband, who was dismissed
from service. The writ petition was
dismissed on account of delay and laches.

2. The learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that appellant is an
illiterate lady. Late husband of the
appellant was dismissed from service
illegally
merely
on
account
of
unauthorised absence. The family is
practically starving. The only prayer
made before the learned Single Judge was
for disposal of statutory appeal filed by
her late husband. The prayer being
innocuous, interference of this Court was
required as the appellate authority had
failed to discharge its duty.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for
the appellant, we do not find any error in the
order passed by the learned Single Judge. A
perusal of the impugned order passed by the
learned Single Judge shows that the late
husband of the appellant was dismissed
from service on account of his unauthorised
absence of over 678 days, vide order dated
December 21, 1990. The appeal was stated
to have been filed against the order of
dismissal more than 5 years thereafter on
December 30, 1995 in case the same was
filed at that time. There is nothing on record
to show that the appeal was ever pursued by
the late husband of the appellant till such
time he was alive. The case of the appellant
is that her husband died in the year 1999. It
is also apparent from the record that the
representation dated December 05, 1999
was filed by the appellant to the then Chief
Minister of the State which was followed by
another representation dated August 08,
2018. The aforesaid facts also, even if taken
on their face value, show that late husband
of the appellant and the appellant herself
were moving at their own sweet will and not
pursuing the remedy available to them at the
relevant time. Firstly, there was huge delay
in filing of appeal in case it was filed and
secondly keeping mum for a period of about
25 years before this Court was approached.

4. The learned Single Judge has
dismissed the writ petition on account of
delay and laches.
1 All. Shimla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
595

5. Different facets of issue regarding
delay and laches in filing the petition had
been subject matter of consideration before
Hon'ble the Supreme Court on number of
occasions, wherein it has been consistently
opined that the party can be denied relief if
he sleeps over the matter.

6. In State of Uttaranchal and
another v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari
and
others1,
Hon'ble
the
Supreme Court, while considering the issue
regarding delay and laches and referring to
earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep
the issues alive. A stale or a dead
issue/dispute cannot be got revived even if
such a representation has either been
decided by the authority or got decided by
getting a direction from the court as the
issue regarding delay and laches is to be
decided with reference to original cause of
action and not with reference to any such
order passed. Delay and laches on the part
of a government servant may even deprive
him of the benefit which had been given to
others. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, in a situation of that nature, will not
be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and
vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at
the right juncture and not on expiry of
reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet
it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Such an order promoting a junior should
normally be challenged within a period of
six months or at the most in a year of such
promotion. Though it is not a strict rule, the
courts can always interfere even subsequent
thereto, but relief to a person, who allows
things to happen and then approach the
court and puts forward a stale claim and try
to unsettle settled matters, can certainly be
refused relief on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights
is bound to suffer. An employee who sleeps
like Rip Van Winkle and got up from
slumber at his own leisure, deserves to be
denied the relief on account of delay and
laches. Relevant paragraphs from the
aforesaid judgment are extracted below:-

"13. We have no trace of doubt
that the respondents could have challenged
the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They
chose not to do so for six years and the
junior employee held the promotional post
for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned
counsel for the respondents is that they had
given representations at the relevant time
but the same fell in deaf ears. It is
interesting to note that when the regular
selection took place, they accepted the
position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at
the doors of the tribunal only in 2003. It is
clear as noon day that the cause of action
had arisen for assailing the order when the
junior employee was promoted on ad hoc
basis on 15.11.1983. In C. Jacob v. Director
of Geology and Mining and another, (2008)
10 SCC 115, a two-Judge Bench was
dealing with the concept of representations
and the directions issued by the court or
tribunal to consider the representations and
the
challenge
to
the
said
rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has
expressed thus:-

"Every
representation
to
the
Government for relief, may not be replied
on merits.

Representations
relating
to
matters which have become stale or barred
by limitation, can be rejected on that
ground alone, without examining the merits
of the claim. In regard to representations
596 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unrelated to the Department, thereply may
be only to inform that the matter did not
concern the Department or to inform the
appropriate Department. Representations
with incomplete particulars may be replied
by seeking relevant particulars. The replies
to such representations, cannot furnish a
fresh cause of action or revive a stale or
dead claim."

14. In Union of India and others
v. M. K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, this
Court, after referring to C. Jacob (supra)
has ruled that when a belated representation
in
regard
to
a
"stale"
or
"dead"
issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the
court/tribunal to do so, the date of such
decision cannot be considered as furnishing
a fresh cause of action for reviving the
"dead" issue or time- barred dispute. The
issue of limitation or delay and laches
should be considered with reference to the
original cause of action and not with
reference to the date on which an order is
passed in compliance with a Court's
direction. Neither a court's direction to
consider a representation issued without
examining the merits, nor a decision given
in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and
laches.

15. From the aforesaid authorities
it is clear as crystal that even if the court or
tribunal
directs
for
consideration
of
representations relating to a stale claim or
dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of
action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly,
a mere submission of representation to the
competent authority does not arrest time. In
Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its
Chairman & Managing Director v. K.
Thangappan and another, (2006) 4 SCC
322, the Court took note of the factual
position and laid down that when nearly for
two
decades
the
respondent-workmen
therein had remained silentmere making of
representations could not justify a belated
approach.

16.
In
State
of
Orissa
v.
Pyarimohan Samantaray, (1977) 3 SCC
396, it has been opined that making of
repeated
representations
is
not
a
satisfactory explanation of delay. The said
principle was reiterated in State of Orissa v.
Arun Kumar Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579.

17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited v. Ghanshyam Dass(2) and others,
(2011) 4 SCC 374, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court reiterated the principle stated
inJagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1977) 6
SCC 538 and proceeded to observe that as
the respondents therein preferred to sleep
over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the
benefit of the order dated 7.7.1992.

18.
In State
of T.
N.
v.
Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137, this
Court, testing the equality clause on the
bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to
grant of service benefit, has ruled thus:-

"... filing of representations alone
would not save the period of limitation.
Delay or laches is a relevant factor for a
court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and/or laches
on the part of a government servant may
deprive him of the benefit which had been
given
to
others.Article
14of
the
Constitution of India would not, in a
situation of that nature, be attracted as it is
well known that law leans in favour of
those who are alert and vigilant."

19. There can be no cavil over the
fact that the claim of promotion is based on
the concept of equality and equitability, but
the said relief has to be claimed within a
reasonable time. The said principle has
been stated inGhulam Rasool Lone v.State
1 All. Shimla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
597
of Jammu and Kashmir and another, (2009)
15 SCC 321.

20. In New Delhi Municipal
Council v. Pan Singh and others, (2007) 9
SCC 278, the Court has opined that though
there is no period of limitation provided for
filing a writ petition underArticle 226of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ
petition should be filed within a reasonable
time. In the said case the respondents had
filed the writ petition after seventeen years
and the court, as stated earlier, took note of
the delay and laches as relevant factors and
set aside the order passed by the High
Court
which
had
exercised
the
discretionary jurisdiction.

21. Presently, sitting in a time
machine, we may refer to a two Judge
Bench decision inP. S. Sadasivasway v.
State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152,
wherein it has been laid down that a person
aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior
over his head should approach the court at
least within six months or at the most a
year of such promotion. It is not that there
is any period of limitation for the Courts to
exercise their powers underArticle 226nor
is it that there can never be a case where
the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after
the passage of a certain length of time, but
it would be a sound and wise exercise of
discretion for the Courts to refuse to
exercise
their
extraordinary
powers
underArticle 226in the case of persons who
do not approach it expeditiously for the
relief and who stand by and allow things to
happen and then approach the court to put
forward stale claims and try to unsettle
settled matters.

22. We are absolutely conscious
that in the case at hand the seniority has not
been disturbed in the promotional cadre
and no promotions may be unsettled. There
may not be unsettlement of the settled
position
but,
a
pregnant
one,
the
respondents chose to sleep like Rip Van
Winkle and got up from their slumber at
their own leisure, for some reason which is
fathomable to them only. But such
fathoming of reasons by oneself is not
countenanced in law. Anyone whosleeps
over his right is bound to suffer. As we
perceive neither the tribunal nor the High
Court has appreciated these aspects in
proper perspective and proceeded on the
base that a junior was promoted and,
therefore, the seniors cannot be denied the
promotion. Remaining oblivious to the
factum of delay and laches and granting
relief is contrary to all settled principles
and even would not remotely attract the
concept of discretion. We may hasten to
add that the same may not be applicable in
all circumstances where certain categories
of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a
stale claim of getting promotional benefits
definitely should not have been entertained
by the tribunal and accepted by the High
Court. True it is, notional promotional
benefits have been granted but the same is
likely to affect the State exchequer regard
being had to the fixation of pay and the
pension. These aspects have not been taken
into consideration. What is urged before us
by the learned counsel for the respondents
is that they should have been equally
treated with Madhav Singh Tadagi. But
equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not after expiry of two
decades. Not for nothing, it has been said
that everything may stop but not the time,
for all are in a way slaves of time. There
may not be any provision providing for
limitation but a grievance relating to
promotion cannot be given a new lease of
life at any point of time."

7. The aforesaid view was followed
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of
India and others vs Chaman Rana2 and
598 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Union of India and others vs. C. Girija
and others3.

8. In Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board and
others v. T. T. Murali Babu4, Hon'ble the
Supreme Court opined as under:-

"13. First, we shall deal with the
facet of delay.In Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, Amravati and others, AIR
1969 SC 329, the Court referred to the
principle that has been stated by Sir
Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co.
v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram
Farewall, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC
221, which is as follows:-

"Now the doctrine of laches in
Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either
because the party has, by his conduct,
done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it
would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted
in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence
must
be
tried
upon
principles
substantially
equitable.
Two
circumstances, always important in such
cases, are, the length of the delay and the
nature of the acts done during the
interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far
as relates to the remedy."

14. In State of Mahrashtra v.
Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683, while
dealing with exercise of power of the High
Court underArticle 226of the Constitution,
the Court observed that power of the High
Court to be exercised underArticle 226of
the Constitution, if is discretionary, its
exercise must be judicious and reasonable,
admits of no controversy. It isfor that
reason, a person's entitlement for relief
from a High Court underArticle 226of the
Constitution, be it against the State or
anybody else, even if is founded on the
allegation of infringement of his legal right,
has
to
necessarily
depend
upon
unblameworthy conduct of the person
seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant
the discretionary relief to such person in
exercise
of
such
power,
when
he
approaches it with unclean hands or
blameworthy conduct.

15. In State of M. P. and others
etc. etc. vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc.
etc., AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed
that it is well settled that power of the High
Court
to
issue
an
appropriate
writ
underArticle 226of the Constitution is
discretionary and the High Court in
exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily
assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been
further stated therein that if there is
inordinate delay on the part of the
petitioner in filing a petition and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High
Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay
and laches stating that resort to the
extraordinary remedy under the writ
jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to
cause confusion and public inconvenience
and bring in injustice.

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay
and laches should not be lightly brushed
1 All. Shimla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
599
aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of
the same. The court should bear in mind
that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that
when
an
aggrieved
person,
without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the court would be
under legal obligation to scrutinize whether
the lis at a belated stage should be
entertained ornot. Be it noted, delay comes
in
the
way
of
equity.
In
certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate
delay would only invite disaster for the
litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction
on the part of a litigant "a litigant who has
forgotten
the
basic
norms,
namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of
time" and second, law does not permit one
to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does
bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
In the case at hand, though there has been
four years' delay in approaching the court,
yet the writ court chose not to address the
same. It is the duty of the court to
scrutinize whether such enormous delay is
to be ignored without any justification.
That apart, in the present case, such belated
approach gains more significance as the
respondent employee being absolutely
careless to his duty and nurturing a
lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility
had remained unauthorisedly absent on the
pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat
at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does
not foster the cause of justice. On the
contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is
likely to affect others. Such delay may have
impact on others' ripened rights and may
unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability,
may have been treated to have attained
finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons- who
compete with `Kumbhakarna' or for that
matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered
opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone
the writ court should have thrown the
petition overboard at the very threshold."

9. In Bal Krishan vs. State of
Punjab
and
others5,
wherein
the
petitioner, after rendering about 34 years of
service, sought refixation of his pay from
the date he joined service by filing a
petition more than three years after his
retirement, the court dismissed the writ
petition on account of delay and laches
only.

10. The issue regarding decision of a
claim on a direction by the Court on the
representation filed by a writ petitioner was
also considered inUnion of India and
others vs. M.K. Sarkar6, wherein it was
held that the issue of limitation or delay
and laches is to be considered with
reference to original cause of action and not
with reference to an order passed in
compliance to Court's direction. The
Court's direction to consider representation
or a decision given in compliance thereof,
will not extend the limitation or erase the
delay and laches.

11. In Vijay Kumar Kaul and others
vs. Union of India and others7, Hon'ble
the Supreme Court declined relief to the
petitioners who were fence sitters as they
had approached the Court after the issues
raised by other employees were decided.
Relief was declined on account of delay
and laches.
600 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. The issue was further examined in
Prabhakar vs. Joint Director Sericulture
Department and another8. It was a case
under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the
aforesaid case the matter in dispute was
regarding delay in raising the industrial
dispute. The opinion expressed by the
Court was that right not exercised for a
long time is non-existent even if there is no
limitation period prescribed. The litigant
was non-suited on the doctrine of delay and
laches as well as doctrine of acquiescence.
Paragraph 38 of the judgment is extracted
below:-

"38. Likewise, if a party having a
right stands by and sees another acting in a
manner inconsistent with that right and
makes no objection while the act is in
progress he cannot afterwards complain.
This principle is based on the doctrine of
acquiescence implying that in such a case
party who didnot make any objection
acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of
the other party and, therefore, has no right
to complain against that alleged wrong."

13. The Halsbury's Laws of England
explains delay, latches and acquiescence as
under:

"In determining whether there has
been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's
part; and

(ii) any change of position that
has occurred on the defendant's part.

Acquiescence in this sense does
not mean standing by while the violation of
a right is in progress, but assent after the
violation has been completed and the
claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where,
by his conduct, he has done that which
might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it; or where by his conduct and
neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he
has put the other party in a position in
which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be
asserted. In such cases lapse of time and
delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches."

14. In State of Jammu & Kashmir
vs. R. K. Zalpuri and others9, Hon'ble the
Supreme
Court
considered
the
issue
regarding delay and laches in raising the
dispute before the Court. It was opined that
the issue sought to be raised by the
petitioners therein was not required to be
addressed on merits on account of delay
and laches. The relevant paras thereof are
extracted below:-

"27. The grievance agitated by
the respondent did not deserve to be
addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay
and laches had already visited his claim
like the chill of death which does not spare
anyone even the one who fosters the idea
and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep
to avoid death and eventually proclaim
"Deo gratias - thanks to God".

28. Another aspect needs to be
stated. A writ court while deciding a writ
petition is required to remain alive to the
nature of the claim and the unexplained
delay on the part of the writ petitioner.
Stale claims are not to be adjudicated
unless non-interference would cause grave
injustice. The present case, need less to
emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It
deserves to be thrown overboard at the very
threshold, for the writ petitioner had
accepted the order of dismissal for half a
decade and cultivated the feeling that he
could freeze time and forever remain in the
realm of constant present."
1 All. Ravi Shankar Dwivedi Vs. Union of India & Ors.
601

15. The aforesaid view was followed
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Union of
India and others v. Chaman Rana10.

16. Subsequently, a Constitution
Benchy of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in
Senior
Divisional
Manager,
Life
Insurance Corporation v. Shree Lal
Meena11, considering the principle of delay
and laches, opined as under:-

"36. We may also find that the
appellant remained silent for years together
and that this Court, taking a particular view
subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New
India
Assurance
Company
Limited,
(2011)12 SCC 197 would not entitle stale
claims to be raised on this behalf, like that
of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept
over the matter for almost a little over two
years even after the pronouncemtn of the
judgment.

37. Thus, the endeavour of the
appellant, to approach this Copurt seeking
the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a
misadventure, which is liable to be
rejected, and the appeal is dismissed."

17. Recently, in Bharat Coking Coal
Ltd. And othyers v. Shyam Kishore
Singh12, the issue regarding the delay and
laches, was considered by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court and a petition filed
belatedly, seeking change in the date of
birth in the service record, was dismissed.

18. Reference can also be made to the
Division Bench judgments of the Jammu
and Kashmir High Court in State of
J&K and others v. S. Bhupinder Singh13
and in Farooq Ahmad v. State of J&K
and others14.

19. Keeping in view the authoritative
enunciation of law, as referred to above, the
present Special Appeal challenging the
judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge dated July 07, 2021 whereby
the writ petition seeking a direction to the
respondents to consider and decide the
appeal dated December 30, 1995 filed by
her late husband, who was dismissed from
service way back in the year 1990, was
dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches, deserves to be dismissed.

20. Ordered accordingly.
----------
(2024) 1 ILRA 601
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ-A No. 7342 of 2022

Ravi Shankar Dwivedi ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Mohd. Samiuzzaman Khan, Sonamati Kumari

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Sanjai Singh,Sri Jayesh Pathak

A. Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings
-
Principles
of
Natural
Justice
-
Requirement of Oral Evidence - Petitioner, a
bank employee, charged with embezzlement of
funds from two customers' accounts - Inquiry
Officer held charge proved based solely on
documentary evidence without examining any
witnesses - Disciplinary Authority imposed
compulsory retirement - Held, in disciplinary
proceedings involving major penalties, the
department must prove charges through oral
evidence by examining relevant witnesses,
particularly the complainants, to establish
unauthorized transactions - Failure to examine
witnesses, especially account holders alleging
forged signatures, constitutes a fundamental