# Shiv Kumar Bajpai v. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 11 ILRA 323
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-11-01
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 25057 of 2008
- **Bench:** Kshitij Shailendra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shiv-kumar-bajpai-v-u-p-s-r-t-c-ors-49451
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Service Law - Departmental Proceedings
- Negligence - Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal (M.A.C.T.) Award - Effect on
Disciplinary Action - Criminal Acquittal -
Estoppel - Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
Sections 17 & 31 - Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Section 168 - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 279 & 304-A.
Petitioner, a bus driver with U.P.S.R.T.C., faced
departmental proceedings for alleged negligence
in a 1995 accident. Despite an inquiry report
finding no guilt, the Regional Manager imposed
punishment based on an M.A.C.T. award
disbelieving
petitioner's
St.ment,
though
U.P.S.R.T.C.'s written St.ment before M.A.C.T.
supported petitioner's non-negligence. Petitioner
was acquitted in a related criminal case under
Sections 279, 304-A I.P.C. Held: M.A.C.T.
findings are limited to fixing compensation
liability and cannot solely justify departmental
punishment.
U.P.S.R.T.C.'s
admission
of
petitioner's
non-negligence
in
M.A.C.T.
proceedings
operates
as
estoppel
under
Sections 17, 31 of the Indian Evidence Act,

## Text

11 All. Shiv Kumar Bajpai Vs. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors.
323

14.

With
the
aforesaid
observations and directions, this petition
stands allowed.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 323
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.11.2023
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Writ A No. 25057 of 2008

Shiv Kumar Bajpai ...Petitioner
Versus
U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Bhanu Bhushan Jauhari, Sri Kuldeep
Singh, Sri Sachindra Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Saxena, S.C.

Service Law - Departmental Proceedings
- Negligence - Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal (M.A.C.T.) Award - Effect on
Disciplinary Action - Criminal Acquittal -
Estoppel - Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
Sections 17 & 31 - Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Section 168 - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 279 & 304-A.
Petitioner, a bus driver with U.P.S.R.T.C., faced
departmental proceedings for alleged negligence
in a 1995 accident. Despite an inquiry report
finding no guilt, the Regional Manager imposed
punishment based on an M.A.C.T. award
disbelieving
petitioner's
St.ment,
though
U.P.S.R.T.C.'s written St.ment before M.A.C.T.
supported petitioner's non-negligence. Petitioner
was acquitted in a related criminal case under
Sections 279, 304-A I.P.C. Held: M.A.C.T.
findings are limited to fixing compensation
liability and cannot solely justify departmental
punishment.
U.P.S.R.T.C.'s
admission
of
petitioner's
non-negligence
in
M.A.C.T.
proceedings
operates
as
estoppel
under
Sections 17, 31 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872.
Criminal
acquittal,
indicating
no
negligence, outweighs M.A.C.T. award for
disciplinary
purposes.
Impugned
orders
quashed; deducted amount to be refunded with
6% interest.

Writ petition allowed.

Case Law Discussed: None specifically cited.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra,
J.)

1. Third supplementary affidavit filed
today is taken on record.

2. Heard Shri Bhanu Bhushan Jauhari,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri A.K.
Saxena, learned counsel for the respondents
and perused the record.

3. The petitioner was Driver of a Bus
run by the Uttar Pradesh State Road
Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as 'the U.P.S.R.T.C.'). An accident took
place
on
15.07.1995
and,
raising
allegations against the petitioner that he
was
negligent
in
driving
the
bus,
departmental proceedings were initiated
against him. At the same time, a Motor
Accident Claim Petition, being Case No.
710 of 1995, was filed by the dependants of
the deceased victim against U.P.S.R.T.C.
before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as 'the M.A.C.T.').
An inquiry report was submitted by the
inquiry officer of U.P.S.R.T.C. in the
departmental proceedings recording no
established guilt of the petitioner, however,
while awarding punishment to him in terms
of deduction of a sum of Rs. 2,11,000/-
from his payables and stoppage of two
increments, the Regional Manager of
U.P.S.R.T.C. placed reliance upon the
judgment/award passed by the M.A.C.T. in
the
aforesaid
compensation
case,
particularly, the statement of the petitioner
324 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
who appeared as a witness on behalf of
U.P.S.R.T.C. before the Tribunal and stated
that accident had not taken place by his
bus. The Tribunal took a view that the said
statement was falsely made and, ultimately,
passed award of compensation against
U.P.S.R.T.C. on 27.01.1998.

4. It is contended by Shri Jauhari that
the petitioner was not a party to the Motor
Accidents Claim Petition and, though his
statement was dis-believed by the M.A.C.T.
, the U.P.S.R.T.C., in its written statement
took a clear stand that the petitioner was
not negligent in driving the bus and the
reason behind occurrence of accident was
presence of numerous passengers on the
spot and that when the petitioner stopped
the bus, a passenger, while trying to enter
into it through window, fell down and came
under the left rear tyre of the bus, got
himself injured and was sent for medical
treatment but, ultimately, died. It is further
contended that a criminal case under
Sections 279, 304-A I.P.C. was registered
against the petitioner arising out of same
accident
and
the
Court
of
Judicial
Magistrate-I, Shahjahanpur, by order dated
01.05.2008, acquitted him by recording a
clear finding that the prosecution had failed
to establish his guilt beyond doubt. Further
contention is that after two days from the
date of order of acquittal, the departmental
Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal
on 03.05.2008, however, copy of the
acquittal order could not be filed before the
Appellate Authority as there was no
sufficient time gap between acquittal and
dismissal of appeal.

5. In sum and substance, the
contention is that the petitioner, not being a
party to the Motor Accident Claim Petition,
he did not get opportunity to file an appeal
against the award of Tribunal and, the
U.P.S.R.T.C., on the other hand accepted
the award of compensation and did not
challenge the same before Appellate Court.
The submission is that except the award of
the M.A.C.T., there was no other material
before the U.P.S.R.T.C. to hold the
petitioner guilty and, once, in the criminal
case, the petitioner's guilt has not been
established, the orders impugned cannot
sustain.

6. Shri A.K. Saxena, learned counsel
for U.P.S.R.T.C. submits that the Punishing
Authority has recorded dis-satisfaction
against the inquiry report, inasmuch as,
there was sufficient material before the
Authorities, particularly, the judgment of
M.A.C.T., to form an opinion that the
petitioner was guilty and no contrary view
could be taken by the Department against
order of a Court of law. However, he does
not dispute the fact that the petitioner has
been acquitted in the criminal case by the
Court of Judicial Magistrate after passing
of the first punishment order and before
dismissal of his departmental appeal.

7. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties, I find that merely because the
petitioner
appeared
a
witness
of
U.P.S.R.T.C. in the proceedings before the
M.A.C.T. and a statement was made by him
that accident had not been caused by his
bus and the said statement was disbelieved
by the M.A.C.T., the petitioner, not being a
party to the Claim Petition, had no occasion
to file an appeal against the award.
Apparently
and
significantly,
the
U.P.S.R.T.C. came up before M.A.C.T.
shielding the act of its driver not only by
filing written statement stating that the
petitioner was not negligent in driving the
bus, but also explained the circumstances
under which the accident had taken place
and also produced the petitioner as its own
11 All. Shiv Kumar Bajpai Vs. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors.
325
witness to avoid its liability to pay
compensation
by
denying
accident.
Therefore, U.P.S.R.T.C. could not take a
final contrary view in the departmental
proceedings to the detriment of the interest
of the petitioner. Even otherwise, no
contrary
view
was
taken
in
the
departmental inquiry report which was in
favour of the petitioner. What persuaded
the Authorities to punish the petitioner was
simply and only the judgment of M.A.C.T.

8. Now to examine the effect of
Award passed by M.A.C.T.
on
the
departmental proceedings, I find that there
are two final judgments before this Court,
as on today, one is the award passed by the
M.A.C.T. and the other is the judgment of
acquittal passed by the Court of Criminal
Jurisdiction.

9. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was
enacted as AN ACT TO CONSOLIDATE
AND AMEND LAW RELATING TO
MOTOR VEHICLES and, as per Section
168 of the Act, the Tribunal is empowered
to hold inquiry into the claims arising out
of use of motor vehicles involved in an
accident. The Claims Tribunals function
under the provisions of Act, 1988 and are
competent to award compensation in a
given case of accidental injuries or death.
During the course of exercise of power to
determine appropriate compensation, even
if a finding is arrived at by the Tribunal that
the Driver was negligent in driving the
vehicle, it would be read only for the
purposes of awarding compensation against
the employer and not beyond that and
certainly not in a service matter where the
department proceeds against its own driver
to
award
punishment
on
the
allegation/charge of misconduct. The Court
is of the considered opinion that the scope
of judgment of M.A.C.T. is only to fix the
liability of compensation either upon owner
of the vehicle or the concerned insurance
company, as the case may be. There is no
other scope of that judgment.

10. Insofar as the judgment of
criminal court is concerned, punishment
under Sections 279, 304-A I.P.C. can be
awarded, only when death is caused by
negligence. For a ready reference, Sections
279 and 304-A I.P.C. are reproduced as
under:-

"279. Rash driving of riding on
a public way.- Whoever drives any vehicle,
or rides, on any public way in a manner so
rash or negligent as to endanger human life,
or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both."

304A.
Causing
death
by
negligence.- Whoever causes the death of
any person by doing any rash or negligent
act not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both."

11. In the present case, alleged
negligence on the part of the petitioner was
certainly attributable to driving of bus and
the acquittal order clearly shows that
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
the petitioner beyond doubt i.e. to say that
he was not found negligent in driving the
bus which infact was the stand of
U.P.S.R.T.C. itself before M.A.C.T.

12. As regard the law of admission
and the significance attached to any
admission made during any proceedings,
326 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
reference to Sections 17 and 31 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can be made.
The same are reproduced below:-

"17. Admission defined.-An
admission
is
a
statement,
[oral
or
documentary or contained in electronic
form], which suggests any inference as to
any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which
is made by any of the persons, and under
the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned."

31. Admissions not conclusive
proof, but may estop.- Admissions are not
conclusive proof of the matters admitted,
but they may operate as estoppels under the
provisions hereinafter contained.

13. In view of Section 17 of the Act,
1872, the statement/admission contained in
the written statement filed by U.P.S.R.T.C.
before
M.A.C.T.
would
suggest
an
inference as to "NO NEGLIGENCE" of the
petitioner which was a fact in issue or a
relevant
fact
during
the
course
of
proceedings before the M.A.C.T., and,
though, the said admission may not be
treated to be a conclusive proof, it would
certainly operate as estoppel against
U.P.S.R.T.C.,
the
employer
in
the
departmental
proceedings
judging
allegation/charge of misconduct against the
petitioner. Hence, the U.P.S.R.T.C. is bound
by its admission contained in the written
statement that the driver (petitioner) was
not negligent in driving the bus and, as
such, it cannot use the finding of the
Tribunal alone to hold the petitioner as
guilty of misconduct. In the opinion of the
Court, more strict proof of negligence was
required
to
be
established
by
the
U.P.S.R.T.C. to hold the petitioner as guilty
in departmental proceedings, if, at all, it
was serious to award major or minor
penalty. No such exercise was carried,
rather departmental inquiry report too reads
in favour of the petitioner. In overall
circumstances, if, at all, weight to any
judgment can otherwise be attached, this
Court would give more significance to the
judgment of acquittal of the petitioner in
comparison to the award interpreting his
statement
recorded
before
M.A.C.T.,
particularly when, U.P.S.R.T.C. did not
assail the award but accepted the same as
per its own wisdom and choice. There
being no other material before the Court, I
find that the orders impugned cannot
sustain.

14. The writ petition succeeds and is
allowed. The orders impugned dated
31.05.2007 and 03.05.2008 are hereby
quashed.

15. Since the amount directed to be
deducted under the punishment order has
already been deducted, the respondents are
directed to refund the same to the petitioner
within a period two months from today,
alongwith simple interest @ 6% p.a. from
the date of deduction till the date of
payment.
----------
(2023) 11 ILRA 326
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 31.10.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Application u/s 482 No. 10623 of 2023

Swami Prasad Maurya ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Saurabh Yadava, Divya
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A.