# Shiv Kumar Patel v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 9 ILRA 571
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-07-28
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 216 of 2022
- **Bench:** Rajesh Bindal, C.J. J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shiv-kumar-patel-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49088
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law Officer), Sri Gyan Bahadur Singh

A. Civil Law - Misdemeanour in Office -
Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 -
Sections 95(1)(g) & 27 - Uttar Pradesh
Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhan, UpPradhan and Members) Inquiry Rules,
1997 - Rule 3 - Uttar Pradesh Panchayat
Raj Rules, 1947- Rule 256, 257 - The
purpose and scope of the provisions of
Sections 95(1)(g) & 27 of the Act of 1947
are distinct and different. Whilst S.95(1)(g)
is directed to ensure removal from office of an
elected Pradhan on one or the other ground
mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Clause (g)
of S.95(1). S.27 is designed to recover money
occasioned on account of loss, waste or
misapplication of money or property belonging
to a Gram Panchayat by a Pradhan, if that loss,
waste, etc. is the direct consequence of the
Pradhan's neglect or misconduct. (Para 9)

It is true that upon the Pradhan demitting
office, proceedings u/s 95(1)(g), if not initiated,
cannot continue as the entire purpose of those
proceedings is to oust the incumbent Pradhan
from office. These proceedings certainly cannot
commence after the Pradhan has already
demitted office. But, the purpose of Section
27 of the Act of 1947 is to recover money
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
belonging to the Gram Panchayat i.e. lost,
wasted
or
misapplied,
as
a
direct
consequence of the Pradhan's neglect or
misconduct while in office. (Para 11)

The learned Judge has exposited the provisions
of S.95(1)(g) and S.27 of the Act of 1947 to
mean that though the two are independent, yet
action must commence u/s 95(1)(g), or for that
matter u/s 27, while the Pradhan holds office in
order to enable proceedings for recovery of the
loss or surcharge to continue after he/she
demits office. In the opinion of the learned
Judge, the Pradhan's end of tenure closes all
chapter of his liability to the Gram Panchayat.
(Para 10)

B. The golden rule is that the words of a
statute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning when the language or
phraseology employed by the legislature is
precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the
intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms,
the same must be given effect to and it is
unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history,
Statement of Objects and Reasons, framework
of the statute, etc. Such an exercise need be
carried
out
only
when
the
words
are
unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. (Para 11)

It is an established principle of statutory
construction, that if the words of a statute
are clear and unmistakable in their import,
they are to be given their ordinary, natural
meaning. This is also called the literal rule
of construction. It dictates attributing
every word in the statute its plain and
simple meaning, grammatically supported.
(Para 11)

The words employed in Section 27(1), "if such
loss,
waste
or
misapplication
is
direct
consequence of his neglect or misconduct while
he was such Pradhan", hold the Pradhan liable
for all loss or waste that he causes to the Gaon
Sabha by acts of misconduct or negligence while
still incumbent. The phraseology of the statute
unmistakably points to loss caused by acts of
negligence or misconduct of the Pradhan while
he was in office. Nothing prevented the
legislature to say while "he is such Pradhan,".
The employment of the word "was" is a singular
pointer to the fixation of liability for past actions
done in office. The provisions of S.27(1) are of
clear import and they clothe the Authorities
under the Act of 1947, with jurisdiction to take
proceedings against the Pradhan for recovery of
loss, caused to the Gram Panchayat's by his/her
neglect or misconduct, after the Pradhan ceases
to hold office. (Para 11, 13)

C. The mere mention of a wrong provision
in the complaint laid, in our opinion,
would not be decisive - An objection on
behalf of the respondents, is that the relief
claimed in the writ petition is limited to a
direction to conclude proceedings u/s 95(1)(g)
of the Act of 1947, which is

## Text

9 All. Shiv Kumar Patel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
571
the decision has to be taken by the State
Government
based
upon
the
recommendation
of
the
committees
constituted under the Government Order.
The State Government could not have gone
beyond the said recommendations in
accepting or rejecting the claim made by
various institutions which has precisely
been done in the present case wherein the
request has been rejected despite there
being a recommendation in favour of the
petitioner. Even otherwise, the case of the
petitioner is squarely covered by the
judgment of this Court in the case of C/M
Ram Daun Ram Raj Pre - Secondary
School and another (supra) decided on
27.02.2019.

28. Thus, for all the reasons recorded
above,
the
impugned
order
dated
16.06.2008 is clearly not sustainable and is
liable to be quashed.

29. Accordingly, the order dated
16.06.2008
is
set-aside.
The
State
Government is directed to take the
petitioner's institution under grant-in-aid in
pursuance to the Government Order dated
07.09.2006 as has been done in the case of
the other eligible institutions who were
applied for being taken under grant-in-aid
in pursuance to the Government Order
dated 07.09.2006. The decision in that
regard shall be taken without fail within a
period of four months from today.

30. The Additional Chief Standing
Counsel is directed to communicate a copy
of this order to the State Government for its
compliance and in accordance with law.

31. With the aforesaid observations
and directions, the writ petition succeeds
and stands allowed.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 571
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Special Appeal No. 216 of 2022

Shiv Kumar Patel ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava, Sri Ajai Kumar
Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Hare Ram Tripathi (S.C.), Sri A.P. Paul(State
Law Officer), Sri Gyan Bahadur Singh

A. Civil Law - Misdemeanour in Office -
Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 -
Sections 95(1)(g) & 27 - Uttar Pradesh
Panchayat Raj (Removal of Pradhan, UpPradhan and Members) Inquiry Rules,
1997 - Rule 3 - Uttar Pradesh Panchayat
Raj Rules, 1947- Rule 256, 257 - The
purpose and scope of the provisions of
Sections 95(1)(g) & 27 of the Act of 1947
are distinct and different. Whilst S.95(1)(g)
is directed to ensure removal from office of an
elected Pradhan on one or the other ground
mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of Clause (g)
of S.95(1). S.27 is designed to recover money
occasioned on account of loss, waste or
misapplication of money or property belonging
to a Gram Panchayat by a Pradhan, if that loss,
waste, etc. is the direct consequence of the
Pradhan's neglect or misconduct. (Para 9)

It is true that upon the Pradhan demitting
office, proceedings u/s 95(1)(g), if not initiated,
cannot continue as the entire purpose of those
proceedings is to oust the incumbent Pradhan
from office. These proceedings certainly cannot
commence after the Pradhan has already
demitted office. But, the purpose of Section
27 of the Act of 1947 is to recover money
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
belonging to the Gram Panchayat i.e. lost,
wasted
or
misapplied,
as
a
direct
consequence of the Pradhan's neglect or
misconduct while in office. (Para 11)

The learned Judge has exposited the provisions
of S.95(1)(g) and S.27 of the Act of 1947 to
mean that though the two are independent, yet
action must commence u/s 95(1)(g), or for that
matter u/s 27, while the Pradhan holds office in
order to enable proceedings for recovery of the
loss or surcharge to continue after he/she
demits office. In the opinion of the learned
Judge, the Pradhan's end of tenure closes all
chapter of his liability to the Gram Panchayat.
(Para 10)

B. The golden rule is that the words of a
statute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning when the language or
phraseology employed by the legislature is
precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims the
intention of the legislature in unequivocal terms,
the same must be given effect to and it is
unnecessary to fall upon the legislative history,
Statement of Objects and Reasons, framework
of the statute, etc. Such an exercise need be
carried
out
only
when
the
words
are
unintelligible, ambiguous or vague. (Para 11)

It is an established principle of statutory
construction, that if the words of a statute
are clear and unmistakable in their import,
they are to be given their ordinary, natural
meaning. This is also called the literal rule
of construction. It dictates attributing
every word in the statute its plain and
simple meaning, grammatically supported.
(Para 11)

The words employed in Section 27(1), "if such
loss,
waste
or
misapplication
is
direct
consequence of his neglect or misconduct while
he was such Pradhan", hold the Pradhan liable
for all loss or waste that he causes to the Gaon
Sabha by acts of misconduct or negligence while
still incumbent. The phraseology of the statute
unmistakably points to loss caused by acts of
negligence or misconduct of the Pradhan while
he was in office. Nothing prevented the
legislature to say while "he is such Pradhan,".
The employment of the word "was" is a singular
pointer to the fixation of liability for past actions
done in office. The provisions of S.27(1) are of
clear import and they clothe the Authorities
under the Act of 1947, with jurisdiction to take
proceedings against the Pradhan for recovery of
loss, caused to the Gram Panchayat's by his/her
neglect or misconduct, after the Pradhan ceases
to hold office. (Para 11, 13)

C. The mere mention of a wrong provision
in the complaint laid, in our opinion,
would not be decisive - An objection on
behalf of the respondents, is that the relief
claimed in the writ petition is limited to a
direction to conclude proceedings u/s 95(1)(g)
of the Act of 1947, which is an infructuous
prayer, once respondent no. 3 has demitted
office. The complaint, that has been laid before
the DM, shows on a wholesome reading that it
is about misappropriation of funds of the Gram
Panchayat by respondent no. 3 while in office.
The facts set out in the complaint clearly lend
themselves to initiation of appropriate action u/s
27 of the Act of 1947, though they might also
have formed basis of proceedings, u/s 95(1)(g),
if respondent no. 3 were in office. The
complaint cannot be thrown out on the ground
alone that respondent no. 3 has demitted office,
on the date the complaint was laid before the
District
Magistrate
(DM).
The
competent
Authority, ought to inquire into the complaint
independently u/s 27(1) of the Act of 1947,
ignoring the fact that respondent no. 3 has
demitted office as the Pradhan. Nothing shall be
construed an expression on the merits of the
complaint laid against respondent no. 3. (Para
14)

A writ of mandamus is issued to the District
Magistrate, Prayagraj to consider the complaint
dated 10.05.2021 laid by the writ petitioner,
against respondent no. 3, as one u/s 27 of the
Act of 1947 and proceed with the same in
accordance with law.

Special appeal allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & ors. Vs
Manahbala Jeram Damodar & anr., (2013) 15
SCC 358 (Para 11)

Precedent distinguished:
9 All. Shiv Kumar Patel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
573
1. Indu Devi Vs District Magistrate, Chitrakoot &
ors., 2006 (2) ADJ 552 (DB) (Para 12)

Present special appeal assails judgment
and order dated 18.10.2021, passed by
Hon'ble Single Judge in Writ-C No. 24314
of 2021.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.
& Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This special appeal is directed
against the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 18.10.2021, dismissing the
appellant's writ petition. The petitionerappellant instituted the writ petition, giving
rise to this appeal, asking for the issue of a
writ
of
mandamus
to
the
District
Magistrate, Prayagraj to decide proceedings
under Section 95(1)(g) of the Uttar
Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short, 'the Act
of 1947'), pending before him against
respondent no.3, Chamela Devi, the Village
Pradhan, within some stipulated period of
time as the Court may determine.

2. Shorn of unnecessary details,
Chamela Devi was elected as the Village
Pradyan of Village Shivlal Ka Pura, Post
Gohri, Tehsil Soraon, District Prayagraj in
the elections held in the year 2016. It is the
petitioner-appellant's case that respondent
no.3 committed misfeasance in office
during her tenure. The petitioner-appellant,
who shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the
writ petitioner, instituted a Public Interest
Litigation No. 1944 of 2020, Shiv Kumar
and others v. State of U.P. and others,
seeking
a
direction
to
the
District
Authorities to make an inquiry into those
acts of misfeasance alleged, and cause an
FIR to be lodged for the offence of the
misappropriation and embezzlement of
public moneys. A Division Bench of this
Court vide order dated 08.02.2021 disposed
of the writ petition virtually dismissing it
on the ground of availability of an
efficacious statutory remedy. That remedy
was said to be available under Rule 3 of the
Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of
Pradhan,
Up-Pradhan
and
Members)
Inquiry Rules, 1997 (for short, 'the Rules of
1997'). In fact, the said rules are referable
to the powers available to the State
Government, or on its behalf with the
District Magistrate under Section 95(1)(g)
of the Act of 1947.

3. The writ petitioner on 10.05.2021
moved
a
complaint
to
the
District
Magistrate,
Prayagraj
under
Section
95(1)(g) of the Act of 1947, complaining of
misdemeanour in office against respondent
no.3, involving defalcation of public
money. There was inaction on the District
Magistrate's part to proceed further on the
said complaint. This led the writ petitioner
to move the present petition, seeking a
mandamus in the terms prayed.

4. Before the learned Single Judge, it
was contended by the learned Counsel for
the writ petitioner that where any financial
irregularities have been committed by a
Pradhan, the District Magistrate ought to
deprive her of her financial powers, after
the necessary preliminary inquiry, with the
ceasure of powers continuing until the
Pradhan is exonerated in the final inquiry. It
was also argued before the learned Single
Judge, as would appear from the impugned
judgment, that Section 27 of the Act of
1947 envisages proceedings by way of
surcharge. These proceedings are designed
to recover loss, waste or misappropriation
of money or property belonging to the
Gaon Sabha. The Prescribed Authority has
been entrusted with the duty to fix the
amount of surcharge, which shall be
recovered from the Pradhan or the other
person concerned by the Collector.
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. The State, on the other hand,
contended that respondent no.3 was in
office
as
the Village
Pradhan
until
02.05.2021, and after fresh elections to the
post of Pradhan in the State of Uttar
Pradesh were held in the month of April,
2021, respondent no.3 has been replaced by
another incumbent. It was emphasized that
the complaint moved by the writ petitioner
was on 10.05.2021, that is, after respondent
no.3 had demitted office. As such, the State
or its Authorities, including the District
Magistrate, could not proceed under
Section 95(1)(g) of the Act of 1947, read
with the Rules of 1997. It was, particularly,
argued that it is only in an audit or inquiry
that facts are discovered to show that any
sum of money has been misappropriated,
and, thereupon, proceedings for surcharge
can be initiated against a Pradhan under
Section 27 of the Act of 1947. It was also
contended on behalf of the State that the
writ petitioner had not been able to show
that
any
sum
of
money,
allegedly
embezzled by respondent no.3, on an
inquiry made by the competent Authority,
had been found to be defalcated. The
learned Single Judge, before whom the writ
petition came up, proceeded to formulate
the following question:

"Whether provision of Section 95 (1)
(g) of the Act of 1947, as well as Section 27
and Rules 256 and 257 of the Rules of 1947
are applicable against an ex Pradhan on
the complaint being lodged after he/she
ceased to be a Pradhan"

6. The learned Judge undertook a
survey of the provisions of Section 95(1)(g)
and Section 27 of the Act of 1947, besides
Rules 256 and 257 of the Uttar Pradesh
Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947, framed under
the Act of 1947 (for short, ''the Rules of
1947') that have been extracted in the
impugned judgment. We would only refer
to so much of them as elucidate the point
upon which, according to us, the decision
turns. The learned Judge, on a conjoint
reading of the provisions of Section
95(1)(g) and Section 27 of the Act of 1947
together with Rule 256 of the Rules of
1947, held that though the provisions for
surcharge under Section 27 entitle the State
for recovering money on account of loss,
waste or misuse of any money or property
belonging to the Gaon Sabha, caused by a
misconduct or neglect of the Pradhan,
independent of proceedings under Section
95(1)(g) of the Act, but the powers under
Section 27 can be invoked if proceedings
against the Pradhan, under Section 95(1)(g)
or Section 27, are initiated while the
Pradhan is in office.

7. It has further been held that the Act
and
the
Rules
do
not
envisage
a
contingency, where a Pradhan, whose term
has come to an end, can still have his
conduct inquired into while in office and
recovery made for loss, waste or misuse of
Gaon Sabha money or property under
Section 27. It has also been opined that
launching of fresh proceedings after
expiration of the term of office of the
Pradhan is not permissible under the Act of
1947, as the word used is ''the Pradhan' and
not ''an Ex-Pradhan'. The proviso to Section
27 that saves proceedings for recovery of
money as surcharge on account of loss,
waste or misapplication for a period of 10
years of the occurrence of the loss, waste
etc. is attracted, where the complaint is
made and proceedings initiated during the
Pradhan's tenure, in the learned Judge's
opinion. The proviso to Section 27(1)
would not apply where no proceedings are
initiated while the Pradhan was in office. It
is on all these reasonings that the learned
Judge has dismissed the petition.
9 All. Shiv Kumar Patel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
575

8. Before us, elaborate arguments
were advanced on both sides to assail and
defend the order impugned.

9. We have carefully perused the
record. There is hardly any doubt on facts
here. By the time, the complaint against
respondent no.3 was laid, for whatever
reason, she had demitted office and was no
longer the Pradhan. Nevertheless, the
complaint was about the misconduct or
inaction of respondent no.3 whilst she held
the office of the Gram Pradhan. To our
understanding, the purpose and scope of the
provisions of Section 95(1)(g) and Section
27 of the Act of 1947 are distinct and
different.
Whilst
Section
95(1)(g)
is
directed to ensure removal from office of
an elected Pradhan on one or the other
ground mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (v)
of Clause (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section
95 of the Act of 1947. Section 27 has an
altogether different scope and purpose.
Section 27 is designed to recover money
occasioned on account of loss, waste or
misapplication of money or property
belonging to a Gram Panchayat by a
Pradhan, if that loss, waste, etc. is the direct
consequence of the Pradhan's neglect or
misconduct. In this connection, we consider
it apposite to refer to the provisions of
Section 27 of the Act, which read:

''27. Surcharge.-(1) Every Pradhan or
Up-Pradhan of a [Gram Panchayat] every
member of a [Gram Panchayat] or of a
Joint Committee or any other committee
constituted under this Act and every
Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or Panch of a
Nyaya Panchayat shall be liable to
surcharge
for
the
loss,
waste
or
misapplication of money or property
[belonging to the Gram Panchayat or
Nyaya Panchayat] as the case may be, if
such loss, waste or misapplication is direct
consequence of his neglect or misconduct
while he was such Pradhan, Up-Pradhan,
Member, Sarpanch, Sahayak Sarpanch or
Panch :

Provided that such liability shall cease
to exist after the expiration of ten years
from the occurrence of such loss, waste or
misapplication, or five years from the date
on which the person liable ceases to hold
his office, whichever is later.

(2) The prescribed authority shall fix
the amount of the surcharge according to
the procedure that may be prescribed and
shall certify the amount to the Collector
who shall, on being satisfied that the
amount is due, realise it as if it were an
arrear of land revenue.

(3) Any person aggrieved by the order
of the prescribed authority fixing the
amount of surcharge may, within thirty
days of such order, appeal against the order
to the State Government or such other
appellate authority as may be prescribed.

(4) Where no proceeding for fixation
and realisation of surcharge as specified in
sub-section
(2)
is
taken
the
State
Government may institute a suit for
compensation for such loss, waste or
misapplication, against the person liable for
the same.''

 (emphasis by Court)

10. Now, in a case where no
proceedings of any kind are initiated
against a Pradhan while in office, for
whatever reason, and still, there is a case
with some evidence at hand to show that
loss, waste or misapplication or for that
matter
misappropriation
of
Gram
Panchayat's property has happened on
account of negligence or misconduct of the
Pradhan while he/ she was in office,
nothing can be done to recover such loss,
according to the learned Single Judge. The
learned Judge has exposited the provisions
576 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of Section 95(1)(g) and Section 27 of the
Act of 1947 to mean that though the two
are independent, yet action must commence
under Section 95(1)(g), or for that matter
under Section 27, while the Pradhan holds
office in order to enable proceedings for
recovery of the loss or surcharge to
continue after he/ she demits office. In the
opinion of the learned Judge, the Pradhan's
end of tenure closes all chapter of his
liability to the Gram Panchayat.

11. We find the learned Judge's
reasoning based on the interpretation of
Section 95(1)(g) and Section 27 to be based
on
strained
logic,
if
not
altogether
inexplicable. We have already pointed out
that the purpose of Section 95(1)(g) and
Section 27 is altogether different. It is true
that upon the Pradhan demitting office,
proceedings under Section 95(1)(g), if not
initiated, cannot continue as the entire
purpose of those proceedings is to oust the
incumbent Pradhan from office. These
proceedings certainly cannot commence
after the Pradhan has already demitted
office. But, the purpose of Section 27 of the
Act of 1947 is to recover money belonging
to the Gram Panchayat i.e. lost, wasted or
misapplied, as a direct consequence of the
Pradhan's neglect or misconduct while in
office. We wish to emphasize the words
employed in Section 27(1), "if such loss,
waste
or
misapplication
is
direct
consequence of his neglect or misconduct
while he was such Pradhan,". The import of
the
words
on
a
plain
reading
is
unmistakable. It is to hold the Pradhan
liable for all loss or waste that he causes to
the Gaon Sabha by acts of misconduct or
negligence while still incumbent. The
phraseology of the statute unmistakably
points to loss caused by acts of negligence
or misconduct of the Pradhan while he was
in office. Nothing prevented the legislature
to say while "he is such Pradhan,". The
employment of the word "was" is a singular
pointer to the fixation of liability for past
actions done in office. It is an established
principle of statutory construction, often
called the golden rule, that if the words of a
statute are clear and unmistakable in their
import, they are to be given their ordinary,
natural meaning. This is also called the
literal rule of construction. It dictates
attributing every word in the statute its
plain and simple meaning, grammatically
supported. In this connection, reference
may be made to the decision of the
Supreme Court in Prabhudas Damodar
Kotecha and others v. Manahbala Jeram
Damodar and another, (2013) 15 SCC
358. The golden rule or the principle of
literal construction has been enunciated by
their Lordships thus:

Golden rule

31. The golden rule is that the words
of a statute must prima facie be given their
ordinary meaning when the language or
phraseology employed by the legislature is
precise and plain. This, by itself proclaims
the
intention
of
the
legislature
in
unequivocal terms, the same must be given
effect to and it is unnecessary to fall upon
the legislative history, Statement of Objects
and Reasons, framework of the statute, etc.
Such an exercise need be carried out only
when
the
words
are
unintelligible,
ambiguous or vague.

32. It is trite law that if the words of a
statute
are
themselves
precise
and
unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in
their natural and ordinary sense. The above
principles have been applied by this Court
in several cases, the judgments of which
are reported in Chief Justice of A.P. v.
L.V.A. Dixitulu [(1979) 2 SCC 34 : 1979
9 All. Shiv Kumar Patel Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
577
SCC (L&S) 99] , Kehar Singh v. State
(Delhi Admn.) [(1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988
SCC (Cri) 711 : AIR 1988 SC 1883] ,
District Mining Officer v. Tisco [(2001) 7
SCC 358] , Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit
v. State of Maharashtra [(2001) 4 SCC 534
: AIR 2001 SC 1980] , State of H.P. v.
Pawan Kumar [(2005) 4 SCC 350 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 943] and State of Rajasthan v.
Babu Ram [(2007) 6 SCC 55 : (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 52].

12. The learned Counsel for the writ
petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of
a Division Bench of this Court in Indu Devi
v. District Magistrate, Chitrakoot and
others, 2006 (2) ADJ 552 (DB) to submit
that proceedings under Section 27 of the Act
of 1947 can very well continue after the
Pradhan demits office and these are
independent of proceedings for removal of
the Pradhan under Section 95(1)(g). No
doubt, there are some remarks in Paragraph
No.8 of the report in Indu Devi's (supra)
that seem to support the writ petitioner, but
the decision may not be of much help on the
point, because Indu Devi was a case where
proceedings against the Pradhan commenced
whilst she was in office. The decision there
turned on a different point and the remarks in
Paragraph No.8 of the report are not of much
assistance to the writ petitioner.

13. Nevertheless, in our considered
opinion, the provisions of Section 27(1) are
of clear import and they clothe the
Authorities under the Act of 1947, with
jurisdiction to take proceedings against the
Pradhan for recovery of loss, caused to the
Gram Panchayat's by his/ her neglect or
misconduct, after the Pradhan ceases to hold
office.

14. An objection on behalf of the
respondents, which must be dealt with, is
that the relief claimed in the writ petition is
limited
to
a
direction
to
conclude
proceedings under Section 95(1)(g) of the
Act of 1947, which is an infructuous
prayer, once respondent no.3 has demitted
office. The mere mention of a wrong
provision in the complaint laid, in our
opinion, would not be decisive. The
complaint, that has been laid before the
District Magistrate, a copy of which is
annexed as Annexure No.2 to the writ
petition (Annexure No.7 to the affidavit
filed in support of the Stay Application to
the appeal), shows on a wholesome reading
that it is about misappropriation of funds of
the Gram Panchayat by respondent no.3
while in office. The facts set out in the
complaint clearly lend themselves to
initiation of appropriate action under
Section 27 of the Act of 1947, though they
might
also
have
formed
basis
of
proceedings, under Section 95(1)(g), if
respondent no.3 were in office. We do not
wish to say that the facts stated in the
complaint are true or untrue. All that we
say, is that the complaint cannot be thrown
out on the ground alone that respondent
no.3 has demitted office, on the date the
complaint was laid before the District
Magistrate. In our opinion, the District
Magistrate, or whoever be the competent
Authority, ought to inquire into the
complaint independently under Section
27(1) of the Act of 1947, ignoring the fact
that respondent no.3 has demitted office as
the Pradhan. We emphasize twice over that
nothing said by us shall be construed an
expression on the merits of the complaint
laid against respondent no.3.

15. In the result, this appeal succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned judgment
dated 18.10.2021 passed by the learned
Single Judge is set aside. A writ of
mandamus is issued to the District
578 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Magistrate, Prayagraj to consider the
complaint dated 10.05.2021 laid by the writ
petitioner, against respondent no.3, as one
under Section 27 of the Act of 1947 and
proceed with the same in accordance with
law.
----------
(2022) 9 ILRA 578
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J .

Special Appeal No. 483 of 2022

C/M Madrasa Arbia Azizia Majaharool
Uloom, Maharajganj ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Narendra Kumar Chaturvedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Ray (Addl. C.S.C.), SRI Radha Kant
Ojha(Sr. Adv.), Sri Bhagwan Dutt Pandey

A. Societies Registration Act, 1860 -
Sections 25 (1) & (2) - Election dispute -
Amendment in Bye-Laws of society -
Power of Assistant Registrar, extent of -
Assistant Registrar declared both sets of
elections invalid - Validity challenged -
Held, the issue whether the byLaws were
amended in accordance with Law, or so to
speak, the byLaws of the Society is an
issue that is integral to the dispute about
the validity of elections - There is a
dispute about two rival sets of elections
raised bona fide before the Assistant
Registrar, which ought to have been
referred to the Prescribed Authority. The
dispute
has
within
its
fold
issues
regarding the validity of amendments
made to the byLaws and the electoral
college competent to vote. These issues
would also have to be determined by the
Prescribed Authority and it is within the
province
of
the
Prescribed
Authority
seized of the proceedings under Section
25(1) of the Act to decide the question of
membership of the General Body. (Para 17
and 19)
B. Writ jurisdiction - Court process -
Single Judge decided the writ petition
without calling counter affidavit - No time
sought and counsel chosed to address the
court on merit - Question of jurisdiction,
how far can be decided at admission stage
- Held, the appellant cannot be permitted
to raise a grievance of that kind once
before the learned Single Judge the
appellant chose to address the Court on
merits, sans an affidavit on their behalf.
Even otherwise, most of the papers were
on record of the writ petition and the
issue is essentially about jurisdiction
based on facts, that are sufficiently
available on the existing papers - No
prejudice to the appellant, therefore, has
been demonstrated. (Para 20)
Appeal dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:-
1. C/M Anjuman Kherul Almin Allahganj & anr.
Vs St. of U.P. & ors.; 2013 SCC OnLine All
14353
2. Kisan National Education Trust & ors. Vs
Prescribed Authority (Sub-Divisional Magistrate)
& ors., 2018 SCC OnLine All 6120

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Bindal, C.J.
& Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a respondent's appeal
arising out of a judgment and order passed
by the learned Single Judge allowing the
writ petition.

2. The Committee of Management,
Madrasa Arbia Azizia Majaharool Uloom,
Nichlaul Bazar, District Maharajganj has its
affairs torn by factional war. One faction is
represented by Abid Ali, who claims to be