# Shiv Sewak Kashyap v. Veerendra Singh

- **Citation:** (2024) 4 ILRA 492
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-04-01
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 20193 of 2023
- **Bench:** Ashutosh Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shiv-sewak-kashyap-v-veerendra-singh-51826
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Tenancy Law - U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 21(1)(a) - Release of
premises - Bona fide need claimed - After
the death of applicant/landlord, the heirs
were substituted and application was also
amended by substituting their need for
the shop - Amendment granted at the
appellate stage, how far, would relate
back to the date of filing of the release
application - Held, the reasoning adopted
by the Appellate Authority in reading the
amendment in the release application
retrospectively relying U.P.on the ratio of
the Apex Court's decision reported in 2002
(7) SCC 559 is perfectly justified and does
not suffer from any infirmity - No
illegality
or
perversity
has
been
committed
by
the
learned
Appellate
Authority while passing the order dated
18.10.2023. (Para 9, 20 and 22)
4 All. Shiv Sewak Kashyap Vs. Veerendra Singh
493
B. Tenancy Law - U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Rules, 1972 - Rule 18 - Bar of second
release application - Tenant claimed that
new bona fide need pleaded at appellate
stage would tantamount the application as
second application, which is barred under
Rule 18 - Permissibility - Held, Rule 18
would be attracted only when the first
release application of the landlord has been
rejected on merits and the second Release
Application is filed on the same grounds
within one year of the rejection of the
earlier Release Application - In the case at
hand it is not the case. The Release
Application had not been rejected on merits
or otherwise and as such there is no
question
of
filing
a
second
Release
Application. The amendment made in the
pending release application on the death of
the original release applicant cannot be
contrued to give rise to a second release
application so as to attract Rule 18 (2) of
the Rules. (Para 21)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

492 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cause notice on 05.12.2014, no action had
been taken by the respondent-Bank. Now,
after around eight years, in the year 2022,
again
a
show
cause
notice
dated
08.08.2022 was issued to the petitioner
directing to submit his reply as to why
50% of Rs. 6,47,187/- may not be
recovered from him, but till date, final
decision has not been taken except
detaining the leave encashment and
security amount.

16. In the light of facts of law
discussed hereinabove, this Court is of
the considered view that in lack of
provisions in rules and regulations, after
retirement, no show cause notice or
departmental proceeding can be initiated
against any employee. Further, in case a
show cause notice has been issued by the
department, duly replied by the employee
and no action has been taken for a long
time, it is not open for the department to
issue another show cause notice at a very
belated stage for same cause of action
after.

17. In the present case, under Rules,
1976 and Regulation, 1975, there is no
provision to issue show cause notice or
initiate
departmental
proceeding
after
retirement, therefore, issuance of show
cause notice in lack of provisions is bad
after retirement. Further, first show cause
notice was issued in the year 2014 and for
the same cause of action, another show
cause notice was issued in the year 2022,
which is also not permissible. Therefore, in
view of aforesaid facts and circumstances,
impugned
show
cause
notices
dated
07.11.2014 and 08.08.2022 are bad and
hereby quashed.

18. With the aforesaid observations,
writ petition is allowed.

19. No order as to costs.

20. Respondents are directed to pay
all post-retirement dues, namely; earned
leave encashment, security, etc., along with
interest @ 7% per annum from due date to
the date of actual payment.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 492
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.04.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHUTOSH SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ A No. 20193 of 2023

Shiv Sewak Kashyap ...Petitioner
Versus
Veerendra Singh ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Prakhar Tandon

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Deepak Singh, Ms. Shreya Gupta

A. Tenancy Law - U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Section 21(1)(a) - Release of
premises - Bona fide need claimed - After
the death of applicant/landlord, the heirs
were substituted and application was also
amended by substituting their need for
the shop - Amendment granted at the
appellate stage, how far, would relate
back to the date of filing of the release
application - Held, the reasoning adopted
by the Appellate Authority in reading the
amendment in the release application
retrospectively relying U.P.on the ratio of
the Apex Court's decision reported in 2002
(7) SCC 559 is perfectly justified and does
not suffer from any infirmity - No
illegality
or
perversity
has
been
committed
by
the
learned
Appellate
Authority while passing the order dated
18.10.2023. (Para 9, 20 and 22)
4 All. Shiv Sewak Kashyap Vs. Veerendra Singh
493
B. Tenancy Law - U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Rules, 1972 - Rule 18 - Bar of second
release application - Tenant claimed that
new bona fide need pleaded at appellate
stage would tantamount the application as
second application, which is barred under
Rule 18 - Permissibility - Held, Rule 18
would be attracted only when the first
release application of the landlord has been
rejected on merits and the second Release
Application is filed on the same grounds
within one year of the rejection of the
earlier Release Application - In the case at
hand it is not the case. The Release
Application had not been rejected on merits
or otherwise and as such there is no
question
of
filing
a
second
Release
Application. The amendment made in the
pending release application on the death of
the original release applicant cannot be
contrued to give rise to a second release
application so as to attract Rule 18 (2) of
the Rules. (Para 21)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. 2004 (8) SCC 76

2. 2013 (3) ARC 247 (SC)

3. Sumpath Kumar Vs Auja Kannu & ors.; (2002
(7) SCC 559: 2002 SAR (civil) 854 (SC)

4. 2013 (97) ALR 184

5. 1993 U.P.TC 407

6. 1995 U.P.TC 1035

7. AIR 1999 SC 1125

8. AIR 2004 SC 1239

9. 2013 (97) ALR 817 (SC)

10. 2010 (83) ALR 809

11. 2007 (2) ARC 851

12. 2001 SCFBRC 397
13. 1999(6) SCC 222

14. 2019: AHC:19470

15. 2019 (7) ADJ 784

16. 2002 (7) SCC 559

17. 1997 (11) SCC 411

18. 2020 (1) ADJ 766

19. 2002 (7) SCC 559

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashutosh
Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Prakhar Tandon,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms.
Shreya Gupta along with Sri Deepak
Singh, learned counsels for the contesting
plaintiff-respondents.

2. The writ petition at the instance
of the tenant petitioner has been filed
assailing the judgment and order dated
18.10.2023
passed
by
the
learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Court No. 19, Kanpur Nagar in Rent
Appeal No. 80 of 2022 (Virendra Singh
(since deceased) & others vs. Shiv Sewak
Kashyap) whereby and whereunder the
Rent Appeal has been allowed and the
judgment and order dated 01.07.2022
passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil
Judge (Sr. Div.) Kanpur Nagar in Rent
Case No. 02 of 2014 rejecting the release
application under Section 21(1) (a) of the
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has been set
aside and the release application has been
allowed, the petitioner has been directed
to handover the actual physical vacant
possession of the shop in dispute to the
respondent landlords. The respondent
landlords in turn have been directed to
compensate the petitioner with a sum
equivalent to two years rent.
494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. The admitted facts shorn of
unnecessary details essential for deciding
the controversy between the parties is that
the petitioner is a tenant in a shop number
33-A situate on the ground floor of a
building no. 33 Lakhanpur, Kanpur Nagar
at monthly rent of Rs. 400/-. A release
application under Section 21(1)(a) of the
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed by one
Virendra Singh the predecessor in interest
of the respondent no. 1/1 to 1/3 herein
setting up a bona fide need for the shop
under the tenancy of the petitioner. In the
release application, it was averred that the
original landlord of the building no. 33C on
the ground floor of which the shop under
the tenancy of the petitioner is situate was
Smt. Kamla Devi. On the death of Smt.
Kamla Devi the building devolved upon
her 3 sons (respondent Virendra and his
two brothers). A mutual partition took
place amongst the co-owners and the
applicant Virendra Singh became the owner
of the portion under which the shop under
the tenancy fell. It was also averred in the
release
application
that
he
has
superannuated
from
the
U.P.
Power
Corporation, Lucknow on 30.06.2013 and
wants to set up his own business in the
shop under the tenancy of the petitioner. It
was also stated that the rent of the shop is
Rs. 800 per month but the tenant has not
paid rent since August 2013. In Para 9 of
the release application, it was specifically
stated that if the shop is released in his
favour, the same would be utilized for
carrying on business by self and would not
be let out to any third party. It was further
stated that the tenant petitioner is not
carrying on business in the shop in question
and infact is carrying on the business of his
father in another shop.

4. The release application was
opposed by the tenant petitioner primarily
on the ground that on the own showing of
the landlord respondent no. 1 the building
no. 33C came to their share but the shop of
the petitioner was 33A which came to the
share of other co-owners and as such there
existed no landlord-tenant relationship
between him and the landlords. The tenantpetitioner filed the GST registration of the
shop as also the electricity bills of the shop
to demonstrate that the shop under his
tenancy was numbered 33A.

5. During the pendency of the rent
case before the Prescribed Authority the
landlord
Virendra
Singh
expired
on
11.09.2018 and his heirs and legal
representatives (respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3
herein) were brought on record. Though the
release application was amended but it was
alleged by the tenant petitioner that no
amendment regarding the need of the
substituted
heirs
was
done
and
consequently no need of the shop for the
heirs was claimed. The respondent no. 1/1
however filed an affidavit before the
Prescribed Authority clearly stating that the
premises was required for starting a
cosmetic business.

6. The learned Prescribed Authority
on the materials on record rejected the
release application vide its order dated
01.07.2022. It proceeded to record specific
findings that there existed a relationship of
landlord and tenant between the tenant
petitioner and the landlord respondents.
The Prescribed Authority took note of the
fact that the relationship of landlord and
tenant had not been disputed as was evident
from para 1 of the written statement (paper
no. 14) as also in the evidence affidavit
(paper no. 38A). On the question of bona
fide need the learned Prescribed Authority
taking
note
of
the
fact
that
the
applicant/landlord at whose instance the
4 All. Shiv Sewak Kashyap Vs. Veerendra Singh
495
release application was filed had expired
and the heirs could get themselves
substituted under Section 21(7) of the Act
and press their own need for the premises
under the tenancy relying upon the law
laid down in 2004 (8) SCC 76 and 2013
(3) ARC 247 (SC) came to the conclusion
that though the heirs had got themselves
impleaded in the place of the original
applicant/landlord but did not plead their
bona fide need for the premises under the
tenancy of the petitioner. It also took note
of the fact that the heirs after getting
themselves substituted filed an affidavit
stating that the premises was required for
starting a cosmetic business in the shop in
question but the same could not be
looked into in the absence of any
pleading. It accordingly proceeded to
conclude that there was no bona fide need
of the landlord/respondents for the shop
under the tenancy of the petitioner and
rejected the release application.

7. The landlord/respondents assailed
the order of the Prescribed Authority in
Rent Appeal No. 80 of 2022. At the stage
of the appeal they moved an amendment
application seeking amendment in the
release application which amendment was
allowed on an exparte motion when the
tenant/petitioner did not appear nor filed
any objections to the amendment despite
time having been granted. The tenant
petitioner was however permitted to file
his additional objections.

8.

The
Appellate
Authority
proceeded to frame the following points
& determination for disposal of the
appeal.

i. Whether the provisions of the
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to
the premises in question.

ii.
Whether
the
amendment
allowed at the appellate stage would relate
back or be read from the date being
allowed.

Iii. Whether the need of the
applicants is pressing and bona fide.

iv. Comparative hardship lies in
whose favour.

v.
What
relief
the
appellants/applicant are entitled to.

9. The Appellate Authority on the
appreciation of the material on record
returned a finding that the provisions of the
U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable
and the tenant-petitioner failed to prove
otherwise. On the question as to whether
the amendment granted at the appellate
stage would relate back to the date of filing
of the release application the Appellate
Authority ruled that in the absence of any
observation that it would relate from the
date the amendment stood allowed, it
would relate back to the date of the release
application relying upon the ratio of the
decision of the Apex Court reported in
2002 SAR (civil) 854 (SC) Sumpath
Kumar Vs. Auja Kannu and others (2002
(7) SCC 559).

10. On the question of bona fide need
the Appellate Authority took note of the
fact that the original applicant Virendra
Singh who had set up a need of the
premises in question for starting a business
as he had retired from U.P. Power
Corporation expired during the pendency of
the
release
application.
His
legal
representatives
got
substituted
and
amended
the
release
application
by
substituting their need for the shop in
question. The Appellate Authority found
that an affidavit (paper no. 95) was filed by
the landlord respondent 1/1 before the
prescribed
authority.
The
Appellate
496 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Authority further found that in the
objection filed to the evidence affidavit of
the respondent no. 1/1 in the court below
the tenant petitioner had filed his objections
(paper No. 100) and did not controvert the
averments made in para 3 and 4 of the
evidence affidavit (paper no. 95) which
clearly set out the need for starting
cosmetic business in the shop in dispute.
The Appellate Authority relying upon the
ratio of the Case laws 2013 (97) ALR 184,
1993 UPTC 407, 1995 UPTC 1035, AIR
1999 SC 1125 and AIR 2004 SC 1239
being of the view that no useful purpose
would be served to remand the matter back
for
consideration
by
the
Prescribed
Authority afresh as the materials to
evaluate /consider the bona fide need and
comparative hardships of the parties were
very much on record, considered the
materials and returned a finding upholding
the bona fide need on the ground that the
bona fide need of the landlord respondent
1/1 has not been controverted and further
the tenant petitioner cannot dictate the
landlord in what manner he may put to use
the premises relying on the ratio of the
decision of the Apex Court in the Case
reported in 2013 (97) ALR 817 (SC), 2010
(83) ALR 809, 2007 (2) ARC 851, 2001
SCFBRC 397 and 1999(6) SCC 222.

11. On the question of Comparative
hardship, the Appellate Authority found
that besides the shop under his tenancy the
tenant petitioner is possessed with two
other
commercial
accommodations
in
which the tenant/petitioner carrying on his
business while the respondent/landlords
have no other accommodation to carry on
their business. Accordingly the Appellate
Authority
held
that
the
respondent
landlords would suffer greater hardship as
compared to the tenant petitioner if the
shop is not released. Consequently, the
Appellate Authority proceeded to allow the
appeal and the release application.

12. Sri Prakhar Tandon, learned
counsel for the tenant petitioner has
vehemently argued that the order of the
Appellate Authority allowing the appeal of
the landlord respondents suffers from
manifest illegality on the ground that:

I. The appellate authority failed to
decide the question whether the landlord
tenant relationship existed between the
parties before proceeding to consider the
question of bona fide need in the admitted
facts and failed to adhere to the ratio of the
decision reported in 2020 (1) ADJ 766
(Shri Shiv Prakash Vs. ADJ, Court No.
24, Kanpur Nagar & others).

II.
The
Appellate
Authority
proceeded on the erroneous assumption that
the tenanted shop existed in the house No.
33C Lakhnpur, Kanpur Nagar though it
was established that the shop number under
the tenancy of the petitioner was 33A.

III.
The
learned
Prescribed
Authority had returned finding that the
landlord/respondent
though
moved
amendment consequent to the death of the
original landlord applicant but did not
amend the bona fide need, yet the
Appellate Authority proceeded to allow the
appeal and the release application.

IV. The Appellate Authority
committed grave illegality by not affording
opportunity to tenant petitioner to file
evidence in support of his amended
pleadings and relied upon the amended
para of the release application which was
not supported by affidavit in evidence.

V. The Appellate Authority ought
not to have read the amendment in the
release application retrospectively.

VI. The findings of the Appellate
Authority on the question of Comparative
4 All. Shiv Sewak Kashyap Vs. Veerendra Singh
497
hardship and the tenant petitioner having
alternate shops and running his business is
misleading and could not form the basis of
the finding as both shops have different
registration and distinct proprietorships.

VII. The release application of
the landlord respondents would tantamount
to a second release application on new bona
fide need pleaded at the appellate stage and
thus barred under Section 18 of the U.P.
Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972. The
Appellate Authority has not applied its
mind to this aspect of the matter.

13. Per contra, Ms. Shreya Gupta,
learned
counsel
for
the
plaintiff/
respondents has supported the impugned
orders passed by the Appellate Authority
by submitting that the Appellate Authority
has appreciated the materials on record in
the correct perspective and noticed the
errors
committed
by
the
Prescribed
Authority
in
rejecting
the
release
application and has rightly proceeded to set
aside the order, allow the Appeal as also
the Release Application. She submits that
the question of title to the tenanted
premises is not germane for the decision of
the eviction proceedings and what is to be
established is the relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties and the
grounds on which the eviction has been
sought under the rent Act. Reliance has
been placed upon the decision reported in
Neutral Citation No. 2019 :AHC:19470
and 2019 (7) ADJ 784.

14. It is next contended that the
Appellate Authority was perfectly justified
to have treated the Amendment Application
to have related back to the date of the
release application by placing reliance upon
the decision reported in 2002 (7) SCC 559.
It is further contended that after the death
of Virendra Singh the Original Applicant in
the
release
application
the
learned
Prescribed Authority permitted amendment
of the Release Application and the word
'Wadi' wherever occurring in the Release
Application was permitted to be replaced
by the word 'Wadigan'. Thus the need for
the demised property for starting business
was made and there was no necessity to
indicate
what
business
was
to
be
undertaken
in
the
demised property.
Reliance has been placed upon the decision
reported in 1997 (11) SCC 411.

15. I have heard the learned counsels
for the parties and have perused the record
and have also gone through the decisions
cited by the respective counsels in support
of their cases.

16. So far as the submission of
learned counsel for the petitioner as regards
non adherence to the ratio of the decision
reported in 2020 (1) ADJ 766 by the
Appellate Authority is concerned the Court
finds no merit in the submission. The
petitioner has admitted that he is a tenant in
the shop in dispute in the written statement
filed by him (paper no. 14) as also in the
Additional Evidence Affidavit (Paper No.
38-A). The learned Prescribed Authority
also took note of the said admission and
returned a finding that there existed
landlord tenant relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent landlords. It
appears that while contesting the Appeal
the Tenant petitioner did not press this
point in as much as no point of
determination in this regards was framed.
In the opinion of the Court the point cannot
now be agitated before this Court.

17. There is also no merit in the
submission that the Appellate Authority
proceeded on the assumption that the
498 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
demised property existed in House No. 33
C whereas it existed in 33A. The records
particularly
the
Additional
Evidence
affidavit filed by the tenant/ petitioner
before the Prescribed Authority (Paper No.
38A) clearly reveals that the tenancy in
House No. 32 was admitted. Para 1 of the
affidavit
(Paper No. 38A) is being
reproduced hereunder:

"यिहक िपर्थकताज भिन सं०- 33 सी
िखनपुर कानपुरनगर के भूधमखण्ड पर म्स्र्थत
एक दुकान का िैिाधनक हकरायेदार िै, दौरान
विचारण िाद याची भिनस्िामी का देिान्त
हदनांक-11-09-2018 को िो गया िै।"

18. The Court further finds that the
Release Application under Section 21 (1)
(a) of the UP Act No. 13 of 1972 was filed
in respect of a shop 9x8 feet situate in
House No. 33 C, Jakhanpur, Police StationKalyanpur, Kanpur Nagar, on the ground
floor. The averments made in the release
application clearly states how the building
no. 33 Jakhanpur, Kanpur Nagar, earlier
owned by Shri Shivpal Singh S/o Gurdayal
Singh devolved upon Smt. Kamla Devi and
after her death on 20.06.2007 that part of
the Building No. 33, containing the shop in
question which fell to the share of the
plaintiff/ respondent and was numbered as
33-C and fully described in Schedule A x B
of the Release Application. In para 3 of the
Release Application it was specifically
stated that the shop under the tenancy of
the petitioner has come to the share of the
Release Applicant which is situated on the
main road and the residential portion is
behind the shop in dispute. The averments
in para 3 of the Release Application has not
been specifically denied by the tenant
petitioner. In the wake of the above the
submissions do not merit consideration.

19. In respect of the contention of
learned counsel for the tenant petitioner
that the Appellate Authority did not afford
any opportunity to the tenant petitioner to
file evidence in support of his amended
pleadings and relied upon the amended
para of the release application which was
not supported by affidavit, it is borne out
from the order sheet of the proceedings of
the Rent Appeal which has been brought on
record as Annexure 12 to the writ petition
that the amendment application (paper no.
24-C) dated 30.05.2023 was filed on which
the order was passed to file reply and
01.07.2023 was fixed for its disposal. On
01.07.2023 one more opportunity was
granted to petitioner to file reply and
04.07.2023 was fixed. On 04.07.2023 the
Tenant petitioner did not appear nor filed
reply and the Appeal was directed to
proceed exparte. The amendment was
allowed exparte vide detailed order dated
08.08.2023 taking note of the fact that copy
of the amendment had been served upon
the petitioner on 30.05.2023 but till date no
objections/ reply had been filed. Time was
granted to the tenant petitioner to file
additional written statement by 18.08.2023.
On 18.08.2023 the Appellate Authority
noted that additional reply had not been
filed and after closing the opportunity fixed
the Appeal for arguments on 31.08.2023.
The order dated 18.08.2023 was however
subsequently recalled vide order dated
25.09.2023 and the additional reply of the
petitioner was taken on record. Thereafter
the Appeal was adjourned at the instance of
the Tenant petitioner and final arguments
were advanced on 09.10.2023 and the order
was delivered on 18.10.2023. There was
thus ample time for the tenant petitioner to
file evidence but he choose not to do so and
advanced his arguments. In the opinion of
the Court the tenant petitioner in the above
circumstances cannot insist that time to file
4 All. Shiv Sewak Kashyap Vs. Veerendra Singh
499
evidence was liable to be afforded to him
and the order of the Appellate Authority is
bad on that count.

20. The submissions of learned
counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate
Authority ought not to have read the
amendment in the release application
retrospectively does not merit consideration
and the Court finds that the reasoning
adopted by the Appellate Authority in
reading the amendment in the release
application retrospectively relying upon the
ratio of the Apex Court's decision reported
in 2002 (7) SCC 559 is perfectly justified
and does not suffer from any infirmity.

21. The last submission of learned
counsel for the tenant petitioner that the
release
application
of
the
landlord
respondents would tantamount to a second
release application on new bonafide need
pleaded at the Appellate Stage and thus
barred under Rule 18 of the Rules is
thoroughly misplaced. The Rule 18 of the
Rules in the opinion of the Court would be
attracted only when the first release
application of the landlord has been
rejected on merits and the second Release
Application is filed on the same grounds
within one year of the rejection of the
earlier Release Application. In the case at
hand it is not the case. The Release
Application had not been rejected on merits
or otherwise and as such there is no
question of filing a second Release
Application. The amendment made in the
pending release application on the death of
the original release applicant cannot be
contrued to give rise to a second release
application so as to attract Rule 18 (2) of
the Rules particularly in view of Section 21
(7) of the act which permits the heirs and
legal representatives of the deceased
landlord
to
prosecute
the
release
application further on the basis of their own
need in substitution of the need of the
deceased. The contention is liable to be
rejected
and
is
hereby
rejected
as
misconceived.

22. In view of the above the Court
finds that the learned Prescribed Authority
had committed patent illegality in rejecting
the Release Application of the landlord
respondents. The Appellate Authority,
however on a thorough consideration of all
aspects has found that the need of the
premises under the tenancy of the petitioner
is bonafide, genuine and pressing and has
rightly allowed the Appeal after setting
aside the order of the learned Prescribed
Authority
dated
01.07.2022
and
has
directed the release of the shop in favour of
the landlord respondents. No illegality or
perversity has been committed by the
learned Appellate Authority while passing
the order dated 18.10.2023 warranting any
interference by this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India. The writ
petition is devoid of merits and is
accordingly dismissed.

23. Learned counsel for the tenant
petitioner submits that the petitioner has
been a tenant in the shop in question since
the year 1990 and considering the length of
the tenancy some reasonable time be
granted to vacate the premises. A period of
1 year to vacate has been prayed for.

24. Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned
counsel for the respondent landlords has
opposed the prayer for grant of time to
vacate. She however submits that a period
of 2 months would be sufficient. The Court
has considered the request of the petitioner
for time to vacate and finds that a period of
4 months from today would be more than
sufficient for the petitioner to look for
500 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
alternate accommodation and handover
vacant possession of the shop to the
landlord respondents within 4 months from
today i.e. on or before 31st July, 2024. The
petitioner shall continue to deposit the rent
of the premises @ of Rs. 800/- per month
till the date of handing over of the
possession and shall not sublet the shop or
change its nature.

25. Parties to bear their own costs.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 500
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.04.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ A No. 26538 of 2014

Santosh Kumar Mishra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Namdev, Sri Anand
Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Yashwant Singh (S.C.)

A. Service Law - U.P. Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 1999 - Rule
7(vii)
-
Disciplinary
proceeding
-
Termination - Charge of visiting Bank and
facilitating pensioners for their pension
was leveled against the petitioner, a Peon
- Petitioner denied charges - Inquiry
Officer did not convene any proceedings of
the inquiry, fixing a date, time and venue
-
He
never
called
U.P.on
the
Establishment to produce their evidence -
Effect - Earlier petitioner made complaint
against STO for taking duty of Clerk,
consequently
STO
threatened
for
termination of his services - Relevance -
Held, all the findings have been recorded
on a presumption that the charges, read
together with the documents relied U.P.on
by
the
Establishment,
are
proof
of
themselves
-
If
the
petitioner
was
avoiding appearance before the Inquiry
Officer,
that
did
not
relieve
the
Establishment of the burden to prove the
charges - The kind of procedure the
Inquiry Officer adopted in this case could
never be the lawful procedure to be
followed
in
a
departmental
inquiry,
involving the imposition of a major
penalty. (Para 2, 21, 22, 23 and 27)

Writ petition allowed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P.& ors. Vs Saroj Kumar Sinha;
(2010) 2 SCC 772

2. Roop Singh Negi Vs P.N.B.& ors.; (2009) 2
SCC 570

3. St. of Uttaranchal & ors. Vs Kharak Singh;
2008) 8 SCC 236

4. St. of U.P. & anr. Vs Kishori Lal & anr.; 2018
(9) ADJ 397 (DB)(LB)

5. Smt. Karuna Jaiswal Vs St. of U.P.; 2018 (9)
ADJ 107 (DB)(LB)

6. St. of U.P. Vs Aditya Prasad Srivastava &
anr.; 2017 (2) ADJ 554 (DB)(LB)

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

The petitioner, a Class IV employee, a
Peon in the Establishment of the District
Treasury, Budaun, is aggrieved by an order
dated 31.07.1993 passed by the District
Magistrate,
Budaun,
terminating
his
services after disciplinary proceedings, and
the appellate order dated 13.02.2014,
passed by the Commissioner, Bareilly
Division,
Bareilly,
dismissing
his
departmental appeal and affirming the
order of the District Magistrate.