# Shivakar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 2 ILRA 482
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-02-06
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 10045 of 2020
- **Bench:** Ajay Bhanot
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shivakar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53003
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Civil Law - Service Law - Backwages
during the period of imprisonment -
Principle of "no work no pay" - Petitioner
was
imprisoned
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018 after a criminal case was
registered
against
him
under
the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by the
Anti-Corruption
Department
on
the
complaint
of
a
private
electricity
consumer.
Criminal
case
was
not
instituted
at
the
behest
of
the
Corporation/employer. By the impugned
order, arrears of salary to the petitioner
for
the
period
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018 were declined on the principle
of "no work no pay." Held: The principle of
"no work no pay" is subject to exception
only in rare instances, such as when an
employer prevents an employee from
discharging duties or creates impediments
thereto. In the instant case, the petitioner
has no lawful entitlement to backwages
during the period of his imprisonment. The
Corporation/employer neither created any
hindrance nor prevented the petitioner
from performing his duties. Granting
backwages in violation of the principle of
"no work no pay" would amount to unjust
enrichment of the petitioner and an unfair
loss to the State exchequer. Prayer for
grant of backwages rejected; however,
the petitioner is entitled to continuity in
service for the said period for the
purposes of pension. (Para 11)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

482 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
impleadment of all the selected candidates
in the writ petition but the Division Bench
has not based its judgment on the above
argument. When the inclusion in the select
list of large number of candidates is on the
basis of an arbitrary or illegal process, the
aggrieved parties can complain and in such
cases necessity of impleadment of each and
every
person
cannot
be
insisted.
Furthermore, when select list contained
names of 2211 candidates, it becomes
unnecessary to implead every candidate in
view of the nature of the challenge, which
was levelled in the writ petition. Moreover,
few
selected
candidates
were
also
impleaded
in
the
writ
petitions
in
representative capacity."

51. The present case is a case of
preparation of seniority list and that too in
a situation where the appellants (original
writ petitioners) did not even know the
marks
obtained
by
them
or
their
proficiency in the examination conducted
by the Commission. The challenge was on
the
ground
that
the Rules
on
the
preparation of seniority list had not been
followed.
There
were
18
private
respondents arrayed to the writ petition.
The original petitioners could not have
known who all would be affected. They had
thus broadly impleaded 18 of such Junior
Engineers who could be adversely affected.
In
matters
relating
to
service
jurisprudence, time and again it has been
held that it is not essential to implead each
and every one who could be affected but if
a section of such affected employees is
impleaded then the interest of all is
represented and protected. In view of the
above, it is well settled that impleadment of
a few of the affected employees would be
sufficient compliance of the principle of
joinder of parties and they could defend the
interest of all affected persons in their
representative capacity. Non-joining of all
the parties cannot be held to be fatal.

84. Accordingly, we do not find any
merit in the preliminary objection raised by
the respondents and the petitioner is having
impleaded
6
respondents
in
the
representative capacity, while impleadment
application of 10 other candidates was duly
allowed and have been heard in the present
writ petition. Non-impleadment of the
remaining
persons,
who
have
been
consequentially promoted, cannot be fatal
to the present writ petition and hence the
objection to the maintainability of the writ
petitions are rejected.

85. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the writ petitions are allowed. The
order dated 09/08/2023, Seniority list dated
06/09/2023 and consequential promotion
orders dated 25/10/2023 are quashed, and
the respondents are directed to treat the
petitioners as having been promoted to the
post of Review Officers with effect from
13/07/2016 and further to grant them
benefit of seniority from the said date. The
respondents are further directed to prepare
a fresh seniority list in light of the
directions issued by this Court and to
further consider the case of petitioners for
promotion in accordance with law.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 482
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ-A No. 10045 of 2020

Shivakar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
2 All. Shivakar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
483
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Akash Khare, Hari Om

Counsel for the Respondents:
Abhishek Srivastava, Baleshwar Chaturvedi,
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Service Law - Backwages
during the period of imprisonment -
Principle of "no work no pay" - Petitioner
was
imprisoned
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018 after a criminal case was
registered
against
him
under
the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, by the
Anti-Corruption
Department
on
the
complaint
of
a
private
electricity
consumer.
Criminal
case
was
not
instituted
at
the
behest
of
the
Corporation/employer. By the impugned
order, arrears of salary to the petitioner
for
the
period
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018 were declined on the principle
of "no work no pay." Held: The principle of
"no work no pay" is subject to exception
only in rare instances, such as when an
employer prevents an employee from
discharging duties or creates impediments
thereto. In the instant case, the petitioner
has no lawful entitlement to backwages
during the period of his imprisonment. The
Corporation/employer neither created any
hindrance nor prevented the petitioner
from performing his duties. Granting
backwages in violation of the principle of
"no work no pay" would amount to unjust
enrichment of the petitioner and an unfair
loss to the State exchequer. Prayer for
grant of backwages rejected; however,
the petitioner is entitled to continuity in
service for the said period for the
purposes of pension. (Para 11)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Reserve Bank of India Vs Bhopal Singh
Panchal 1994 SCC (1) 541

2.
Ranchhodji
Chaturji
Thakore
Vs
Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity
Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & anr.(1996) 11
SCC 603

3. Union of India & ors. Vs Jaipal Singh (2004) 1
SCC 121

4. Raj Narain Vs U.O.I. & ors. (2019) 5 SCC 809

5. Anil Kumar Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors. 2024
(6) ADJ 223

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. Heard Shri Akash Khare, learned
counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing
Counsel for the respondent No.1-State and
Shri Abhishek Srivastava, learned counsel
for the respondents No.2 and 3.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by the
order dated 23.04.2020 declining to pay
arrears of salary to the petitioner for the
period commencing from 23.01.2015 to
18.12.2018. The impugned order records
that the petitioner was imprisoned from
23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 after a criminal
case was registered against him under
Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The
F.I.R. was
filed
by
one
S.S.
Chaudhary, Superintendent of Police, Anti
Corruption
Department
against
the
petitioner on the complaint received from a
private electricity consumer. The salary has
been refused on the application of the
principle of "no work no pay".

3. Briefly put the prosecution case in
the F.I.R. was that the petitioner had
demanded bribes for electricity connection
from a consumer. The petitioner was
thereafter confined to jail from 23.01.2015
to 18.12.2018 during the course of the trial.
The petitioner did not discharge his duties
for the aforesaid period of three years.
Admittedly, the criminal case was not
484 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
instituted at the behest of the respondentcorporation. The respondent-corporation
who is the employer of the petitioner did
not create any hindrance nor prevented the
petitioner from working on his post. No
departmental proceedings were taken out
against the petitioner by the respondentcorporation/his employer in the said case.

4. The question that arises for
consideration is that whether the petitioner
who was absent from duties for the
aforesaid period of almost three years and
had rendered no work during the said
period is entitled to backwages and arrears
and whether the principle of "no work no
pay" is liable to be relaxed in the instant
case.

5. The principle of "no work no pay"
is a salutary principle of general application
in service jurisprudence. The principle is
excepted only in rare instances like in the
event an employer prevents an employee
from discharging his duties or creates
impediments in regard thereof.

6. The discussion has the benefit of
authorities in point. The Supreme Court in
Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh
Panchal1 was faced with the issue of grant
of backwages to absentee who was not kept
from his duties by his employer, and held
as under:

"We have already pointed out the
effect of the relevant provisions of
Regulations 39, 46 and 47. The said
regulations read together, leave no manner
of doubt that in case of an employee who is
arrested for an offence, as in the present
case, his period of absence from duty is to
be
treated
as
not
being
beyond
circumstances under his control. In such
circumstances, when he is treated as being
under suspension during the said period, he
is
entitled
to
subsistence
allowance.
However, the subsistence allowance paid to
him is liable to be adjusted against his pay
and allowances if at all he is held to be
entitled to them by the competent authority.
The competent authority while deciding
whether an employee who is suspended in
such circumstances is entitled to his pay
and allowances or not and to what extent, if
any, and whether the period is to be treated
as on duty or on leave, has to take into
consideration the circumstances of each
case. It is only if such employee is
acquitted of all blame and is treated by the
competent authority as being on duty
during the period of suspension that such
employee is entitled to full pay and
allowances for the said period. In other
words, the Regulations vest the power
exclusively in the Bank to treat the period
of such suspension on duty or on leave or
otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be
validly challenged. During this period, the
employee renders no work. He is absent for
reasons of his own involvement in the
misconduct and the Bank is in no way
responsible for keeping him away from his
duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be
saddled with the liability to pay him his
salary and allowances for the period. That
will be against the principle of 'no work, no
pay' and positively inequitable to those who
have to work and earn their pay. As it is,
even during such period, the employee
earns subsistence allowance by virtue of
the Regulations. In the circumstances, the
Bank's
power
in
that
behalf
is
unassailable." (emphasis supplied)

7. The claim of backwages made by an
employee who was involved in a crime in
which he was later acquitted was denied by
the Supreme Court in RanchhodjiChaturji
Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer,
2 All. Shivakar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
485
Gujarat
Electricity
Board,
Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and another2
by holding:

"3. The reinstatement of the
petitioner into the service has already been
ordered by the High Court. The only question
is: whether he is entitled to back wages? It
was his conduct of involving himself in the
crime that was taken into account for his not
being
in
service
of
the
respondent.
Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled
to reinstatement for the reason that his service
was terminated on the basic of the conviction
by operation of proviso to the statutory rules
applicable the situation. The question of back
wages would be considered only if the
respondents have taken action by way of
disciplinary proceeding and the action was
found to be unsustainable in law and he was
unlawfully prevented from discharging the
duties. In that context, his conduct becomes
relevant, Each case requires to be considered
in his own backdrops. In this case, since the
petitioner had involved himself in a crime,
though he was later acquitted, he had
disabled himself from rendering the service
on account of conviction and incarceration in
jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner
is not entitled to payment of back wages. The
learned single judge and the Division Bench
have not committed any error of law
warranting interference."

8. In Union of India and others v.
Jaipal Singh3 the Supreme Court relying
on the law laid down in Ranchhodji
Chaturji Thakore (supra) declined to
grant backwages to an employee who was
reinstated in service after acquittal on the
footing that the criminal case was not at the
behest of the department:

"4. On a careful consideration of
the matter and the materials on record,
including the judgment and orders brought
to our notice, we are of the view that it is
well accepted that an order rejecting a
special leave petition at the threshold
without detailed reasons therefore does not
constitute any declaration of law by this
Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per
contra, the decision relied upon for the
appellant is one on merits and for reasons
specifically recorded therefore and operates
as a binding precedent as well. On going
through the same, we are in respectful
agreement with the view taken in [1996] 11
SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which
ultimately resulted in acquittal of the
person concerned was at the behest or by
department
itself,
perhaps
different
considerations may arise. On the other
hand, if as a citizen the employee or a
public servant got involved in a criminal
case and it after initial conviction by the
trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal
subsequently, the department cannot in any
manner be found fault with for having kept
him out of service, since the law obliges, a
person convicted of an offence to be so
kept out and not to be retained in service.
Consequently, the reasons given in the
decision relied upon, for the appellants are
not only convincing but are in consonance
with reasonableness as well. Though
exception taken to that part of the order
directing
re-instatement
cannot
be
sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated, in service, for the reason that the
earlier discharge was on account of those
criminal proceedings and conviction only,
the appellants are well within their rights to
deny back wages to the respondent for the
period he was not in service. The appellants
cannot be made liable to pay for the period
for which they could not avail of the
services of the respondent. The High Court,
in our view, committed a grave error, in
allowing
back
wages
also,
without
486 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
adverting to all such relevant aspects and
considerations. Consequently, the order of
the High Court in so far as it directed
payment of back wages are liable to be and
is hereby set aside."

9. The judgement relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner in Raj
Narain v. Union of India and others4 was
rendered in the factual context where the
departmental enquiry was initiated against
the concerned employee who was also
imprisoned on account of pendency of a
criminal case. The petitioner in that case
was
suspended
in
contemplation
of
disciplinary
proceedings.
Later
departmental enquiry proceedings were
dropped. In that factual context the
backwages for the period of suspension
were claimed and were granted. Raj
Narain (supra) is distinguishable on facts
and not applicable to this case.

10. Similarly, the judgement rendered
by the learned Single Judge in Anil Kumar
Singh v. State of U.P. and 4 others5
squarely based on the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Raj Narain (supra) and
hence is of no assistance to the petitioner.

11. In the wake of the facts found in
the preceding part of the judgement and
position of law discussed above relaxation
of the principle of "no work no pay" cannot
be countenanced in this case. In fact
granting backwages in the teeth of the
principle of "no work no pay" will lead to
unjust enrichment of the petitioner and
unfair loss to the State exchequer. The
petitioner does not have any lawful
entitlement to the period of any backwages
during the period of his imprisonment.

12. Accordingly, the prayer for grant
of backwages is rejected.

13. There is no infirmity in the
impugned order dated 23.04.2020 to that
extent.

14. However, the petitioner shall be
entitled to continuity in service for the
aforesaid period for purposes of pension.

15. With the aforesaid directions, the
writ petition is finally disposed of.
----------
(2025) 2 ILRA 486
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.02.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Writ-A No. 15433 of 2024

Yudhveer Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ankit Shukla, Vinayak Mithal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Parijat Mishra, Alka Upadhyay, Avneesh
Tripathi, C.S.C., Gagan Mehta, Manish
Tiwari,
Prabhakar
Awasthi,
Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava

A. Service/Education Law - Appointment
- When the selected candidate is placed in
a College, he has no right to change his
placement. (Para 23)

Dr. Sachidanand Sharma was appointed as
permanent Principal on the basis of the
recommendation made by the Commission in
the institution. He resigned from the said post
and Dr. Anjali Mittal, who was senior most
teacher in the institution was appointed as
Officiating Principal. Upon her retirement,
petitioner was given charge of Officiating
Principal on 14.6.2024. After resignation of