# Shivakar Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 3 ILRA 310
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-03-12
- **Case number:** Writ - A No. 10045 of 2020
- **Bench:** Ajay Bhanot
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shivakar-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53063
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Civil Law - Service Law - Back wages
during the period of imprisonment -
Principle
of
"no
work
no
pay"
-
Petitioner
was
imprisoned
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018
after
a
criminal case was registered against him
under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988,
by
the
Anti-Corruption
Department on the complaint of a
private electricity consumer. Criminal
case was not instituted at the behest of
the
Corporation/employer.
By
the
impugned order, arrears of salary to the
petitioner
for
the
period
from
23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 were declined
on the principle of "no work no pay."
Held: The principle of "no work no pay"
is subject to exception only in rare
instances, such as when an employer
prevents an employee from discharging
duties or creates impediments thereto.
In the instant case, the petitioner has no
lawful entitlement to back wages during
the period of his imprisonment. The
Corporation/employer neither created
any
hindrance
nor
prevented
the
petitioner from performing his duties.
Granting back wages in violation of the
principle of "no work no pay" would
amount to unjust enrichment of the
petitioner and an unfair loss to the State
exchequer. Prayer for grant of back
wages rejected; however, the petitioner
is entitled to continuity in service for the
said period for the purposes of pension.
(Para 11)
Dismissed. (E-5)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

310 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
23. Thus, in view of the facts stated
above, the order impugned dated 28.3.2024
is illegal. The approval granted 30 years
ago, cannot be withdrawn on the ground
that the post was not created by the
Competent Authority.

24. The order impugned dated
28.3.2024 is hereby quashed. The petitioner
is entitled for all consequential benefits.
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 310
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Writ - A No. 10045 of 2020

Shivakar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Akash Khare, Hari Om

Counsel for the Respondents:
Abhishek
Srivastava,
Baleshwar
Chaturvedi,C.S.C.

Civil Law - Service Law - Back wages
during the period of imprisonment -
Principle
of
"no
work
no
pay"
-
Petitioner
was
imprisoned
from
23.01.2015
to
18.12.2018
after
a
criminal case was registered against him
under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988,
by
the
Anti-Corruption
Department on the complaint of a
private electricity consumer. Criminal
case was not instituted at the behest of
the
Corporation/employer.
By
the
impugned order, arrears of salary to the
petitioner
for
the
period
from
23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 were declined
on the principle of "no work no pay."
Held: The principle of "no work no pay"
is subject to exception only in rare
instances, such as when an employer
prevents an employee from discharging
duties or creates impediments thereto.
In the instant case, the petitioner has no
lawful entitlement to back wages during
the period of his imprisonment. The
Corporation/employer neither created
any
hindrance
nor
prevented
the
petitioner from performing his duties.
Granting back wages in violation of the
principle of "no work no pay" would
amount to unjust enrichment of the
petitioner and an unfair loss to the State
exchequer. Prayer for grant of back
wages rejected; however, the petitioner
is entitled to continuity in service for the
said period for the purposes of pension.
(Para 11)
Dismissed. (E-5)
List of Cases cited:
1. Reserve Bank of India Vs Bhopal Singh
Panchal 1994 SCC (1) 541

2.
Ranchhodji
Chaturji
Thakore
Vs
Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity
Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & anr. (1996) 11
SCC 603

3. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC
121

4. Raj Narain Vs U.O.I & ors. (2019) 5 SCC 809

5. Anil Kumar Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors. 2024
(6) ADJ 223

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

Ref:
Civil
Misc.
Correction
Application No.11 of 2025 Heard.

Correction application is allowed.

Necessary
correction
has
been
incorporated in the order dated 06.02.2025.
The correct order shall read as under:
3 All. Shivakar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
311

"1. Heard Shri Akash Khare,
learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel for the respondent No.1State and Shri Abhishek Srivastava, learned
counsel for the respondents No.2 and 3.

2. The petitioner is aggrieved by
the order dated 23.04.2020 declining to pay
arrears of salary to the petitioner for the
period commencing from 23.01.2015 to
18.12.2018. The impugned order records
that the petitioner was imprisoned from
23.01.2015 to 18.12.2018 after a criminal
case was registered against him under
Section 13(1)(b) read with Section 13(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The
F.I.R. was
filed
by
one
S.S.
Chaudhary, Superintendent of Police, Anti
Corruption
Department
against
the
petitioner on the complaint received from a
private electricity consumer. The salary has
been refused on the application of the
principle of "no work no pay".

3. Briefly put the prosecution case
in the F.I.R. was that the petitioner had
demanded bribes for electricity connection
from a consumer. The petitioner was
thereafter confined to jail from 23.01.2015
to 18.12.2018 during the course of the trial.
The petitioner did not discharge his duties
for the aforesaid period of three years.
Admittedly, the criminal case was not
instituted at the behest of the respondentcorporation. The respondent-corporation
who is the employer of the petitioner did
not create any hindrance nor prevented the
petitioner from working on his post. No
departmental proceedings were taken out
against the petitioner by the respondentcorporation/his employer in the said case.

4. The question that arises for
consideration is that whether the petitioner
who was absent from duties for the
aforesaid period of almost three years and
had rendered no work during the said
period is entitled to backwages and arrears
and whether the principle of "no work no
pay" is liable to be relaxed in the instant
case.

5. The principle of "no work no
pay" is a salutary principle of general
application in service jurisprudence. The
principle is excepted only in rare instances
like in the event an employer prevents an
employee from discharging his duties or
creates impediments in regard thereof.

6. The discussion has the benefit of
authorities in point. The Supreme Court in
Reserve Bank of India v. Bhopal Singh
Panchal1 was faced with the issue of grant
of backwages to absentee who was not kept
from his duties by his employer, and held
as under:

 "We have already pointed out the
effect of the relevant provisions of
Regulations 39, 46 and 47. The said
regulations read together, leave no manner
of doubt that in case of an employee who is
arrested for an offence, as in the present
case, his period of absence from duty is to
be
treated
as
not
being
beyond
circumstances under his control. In such
circumstances, when he is treated as being
under suspension during the said period, he
is
entitled
to
subsistence
allowance.
However, the subsistence allowance paid to
him is liable to be adjusted against his pay
and allowances if at all he is held to be
entitled to them by the competent authority.
The competent authority while deciding
whether an employee who is suspended in
such circumstances is entitled to his pay
and allowances or not and to what extent, if
any, and whether the period is to be treated
as on duty or on leave, has to take into
312 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
consideration the circumstances of each
case. It is only if such employee is
acquitted of all blame and is treated by the
competent authority as being on duty
during the period of suspension that such
employee is entitled to full pay and
allowances for the said period. In other
words, the Regulations vest the power
exclusively in the Bank to treat the period
of such suspension on duty or on leave or
otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be
validly challenged. During this period, the
employee renders no work. He is absent for
reasons of his own involvement in the
misconduct and the Bank is in no way
responsible for keeping him away from his
duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be
saddled with the liability to pay him his
salary and allowances for the period. That
will be against the principle of 'no work, no
pay' and positively inequitable to those who
have to work and earn their pay. As it is,
even during such period, the employee
earns subsistence allowance by virtue of
the Regulations. In the circumstances, the
Bank's
power
in
that
behalf
is
unassailable." (emphasis supplied)

7. The claim of backwages made
by an employee who was involved in a
crime in which he was later acquitted was
denied
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
Ranchhodji
Chaturji
Thakore
v.
Superintendent
Engineer,
Gujarat
Electricity
Board,
Himmatnagar
(Gujarat) and another2 by holding:

 "3. The reinstatement of the
petitioner into the service has already been
ordered by the High Court. The only
question is: whether he is entitled to back
wages? It was his conduct of involving
himself in the crime that was taken into
account for his not being in service of the
respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal,
he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason
that his service was terminated on the basic
of the conviction by operation of proviso to
the statutory rules applicable the situation.
The question of back wages would be
considered only if the respondents have
taken action by way of disciplinary
proceeding and the action was found to be
unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully
prevented from discharging the duties. In
that context, his conduct becomes relevant,
Each case requires to be considered in his
own backdrops. In this case, since the
petitioner had involved himself in a crime,
though he was later acquitted, he had
disabled himself from rendering the service
on account of conviction and incarceration
in jail. Under these circumstances, the
petitioner is not entitled to payment of back
wages. The learned single judge and the
Division Bench have not committed any
error of law warranting interference."

8. In Union of India and others v.
Jaipal Singh3 the Supreme Court relying
on the law laid down in Ranchhodji
Chaturji Thakore (supra) declined to
grant backwages to an employee who was
reinstated in service after acquittal on the
footing that the criminal case was not at the
behest of the department:

 "4. On a careful consideration of
the matter and the materials on record,
including the judgment and orders brought
to our notice, we are of the view that it is
well accepted that an order rejecting a
special leave petition at the threshold
without detailed reasons therefore does not
constitute any declaration of law by this
Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per
contra, the decision relied upon for the
appellant is one on merits and for reasons
specifically recorded therefore and operates
as a binding precedent as well. On going
3 All. Shivakar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
313
through the same, we are in respectful
agreement with the view taken in [1996] 11
SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which
ultimately resulted in acquittal of the
person concerned was at the behest or by
department
itself,
perhaps
different
considerations may arise. On the other
hand, if as a citizen the employee or a
public servant got involved in a criminal
case and it after initial conviction by the
trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal
subsequently, the department cannot in any
manner be found fault with for having kept
him out of service, since the law obliges, a
person convicted of an offence to be so
kept out and not to be retained in service.
Consequently, the reasons given in the
decision relied upon, for the appellants are
not only convincing but are in consonance
with reasonableness as well. Though
exception taken to that part of the order
directing
re-instatement
cannot
be
sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated, in service, for the reason that the
earlier discharge was on account of those
criminal proceedings and conviction only,
the appellants are well within their rights to
deny back wages to the respondent for the
period he was not in service. The appellants
cannot be made liable to pay for the period
for which they could not avail of the
services of the respondent. The High Court,
in our view, committed a grave error, in
allowing
back
wages
also,
without
adverting to all such relevant aspects and
considerations. Consequently, the order of
the High Court in so far as it directed
payment of back wages are liable to be and
is hereby set aside."
9. The judgement relied upon by
the learned counsel for the petitioner in Raj
Narain v. Union of India and others4 was
rendered in the factual context where the
departmental enquiry was initiated against
the concerned employee who was also
imprisoned on account of pendency of a
criminal case. The petitioner in that case
was
suspended
in
contemplation
of
disciplinary
proceedings.
Later
departmental enquiry proceedings were
dropped. In that factual context the
backwages for the period of suspension
were claimed and were granted. Raj
Narain (supra) is distinguishable on facts
and not applicable to this case.

10.
Similarly,
the
judgement
rendered by the learned Single Judge in
Anil Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and 4
others5 squarely based on the law laid
down by the Supreme Court in Raj Narain
(supra) and hence is of no assistance to the
petitioner.

11. In the wake of the facts found
in the preceding part of the judgement and
position of law discussed above relaxation
of the principle of "no work no pay" cannot
be countenanced in this case. In fact
granting backwages in the teeth of the
principle of "no work no pay" will lead to
unjust enrichment of the petitioner and
unfair loss to the State exchequer. The
petitioner does not have any lawful
entitlement to any backwages during the
period of his imprisonment.

12. Accordingly, the prayer for
grant of backwages is rejected.

13. There is no infirmity in the
impugned order dated 23.04.2020 to that
extent.

14. However, the petitioner shall be
entitled to continuity in service for the
aforesaid period for purposes of pension.

15. With the aforesaid directions,
the writ petition is finally disposed of."
314 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2025) 3 ILRA 314
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.03.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, J.

Sales/Trade Tax Revision No. 10 of 2025
With other connected cases

The Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Up
Lucknow ...Revisionist
Versus
S/S Janki Industries Nai Basti, Bareilly
 ...Opp. Party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Bipin Kumar Pandey, ACSC

Counsel for the Opp. Party:
Rishi Raj Kapoor

Civil Law - The Value Added Tax Act,2003
- Section 13 & 15-Opposite party has not sold
the purchased goods and there was closing
stock-until & unless the last tax period of the
assessment year -during which business has
been discontinued after adjustment of the
tax liability by-passing the assessment order
for such assessment year- if any excess
amount of ITC is left, then only section 15(5)
of the VAT Act will come into play and not
otherwise-
available
ITC
can
only
be
refunded after passing of the assessment
order for that assessment period in which
the
business
was
discontinued
after
adjustment of tax liability-Once the opposite
party - registered dealers, by operation of
law, discontinued its business, it was the
duty cast upon the opposite party dealer to
debit their ITC as contemplated under
section 13(6) of the VAT Act.

Revision allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. M/s Sooraj Kirana Comp. Vs Commissioner
Commercial Tax [Sales/Trade Tax Revision No.
767 of 2013, decided on 28.10.2013]

2. Tractor & Farm Equipment's Ltd. Vs CCE,
Madurai [2015 (320) ELT 357
(Mad.)]

3. Shree Navneet Cotton Co. Vs St. of Guj.
[(2024) 22 CENTAX 51 Guj.],

4. Magma Fincorp Ltd. Vs St. of Telangana
[(2019) 26 GSTL 7 Telangana]

5. Easwaran Brothers India Pvt. Ltd. Vs
Assistant Commissioner (ST) (FAC) Coimbatore
[(2023) 4 Centax 135 (Mad.)]

6. Collector of Central Excise, Pune & ors. Vs
Daichi Karkaria Ltd. & ors.[(1999) 7 SCC 448].

7. Eicher Motors Ltd. & anr. Vs U.O.I.& ors.[AIR
1999 SC 892]

8. Tractor & Farm Equipment Ltd. Vs the
Commissioner of Central Excise [(2014) 11 MAD
CK 103]

9.M/s Magma Fincorp Ltd. Vs St. of Telangana
[AIR Online 2019 TEL 103].

10. Babu Parasu Kaikadi (Dead) through L.R.'s
Vs Babu (Dead) through L.R.'s [(2004) 1 SCC
681]

11. M/s Farooq Agencies Vs Commissioner of
Commercial Tax [Sales/Trade Tax Revision No.
397/2013, decided on 16.07.2013];

12. Filco Trade Centre Pvt. Ltd. Vs U.O.I.[2018
(17)GSTL3 (Guj.)]

13. U.O.I.& Another Vs Filco Trade Centre Pvt.
Ltd. & anr. [(2023) 1 SCC 562]

14. Ratek Pheon Friction Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
Vs Principal Commissioner [2022 (59) GSTL 6
(All.)]

(Delivered by Hon'ble Piyush Agrawal, J.)