# Shivam Tandon & Anr v. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 555
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-10
- **Case number:** Matters U/A 227 No. 2145 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shivam-tandon-anr-v-hindustan-petroleum-corp-ltd-anr-52143
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 - Sections 11, 27 & 29-A - Petitioners
had filed arbitration application u/s 11 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 for
appointment of Arbitrator - Application
was allowed - Arbitrator framed the issues
- During proceedings, petitioners filed
application u/s 29A before Presiding
officer for extension of time for conclusion
of arbitration proceedings by a further
duration
of
at
least
12
months
-
Application rejected - Impugned order
challenged - Held, the Court can extend
the period of arbitration u/s 29-A (4)
irrespective
of
fact
whether
the
application seeking extension of time has
been
filed
before
expiry
of
period
specified in sub-Section (1) of Section
29-A or after that - Delay in disposal of
application u/s 29- A(4) can't be a reason
for
rejection
of
application
and
Commercial
Court
has
rejected
the
application on considerations which are
not relevant - Hence, impugned order is
unsustainable in law, liable to be set
aside, substitute arbitrator appointed for
completing
arbitration
proceedings.
(Para 3, 8, 38, 41, 45)

Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
555
Section 191 I.P.C., the application under
Section 340 Cr.P.C. is misconceived and the
same is accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 555
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters U/A 227 No. 2145 of 2024

Shivam Tandon & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Sudeep Kumar, Sri Avdhesh Kumar
Pandey, Radhika Varma

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Shikhar Anand, Pushpila Bisht, Sri
Shikhar Anand

Civil Law - Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 - Sections 11, 27 & 29-A - Petitioners
had filed arbitration application u/s 11 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 for
appointment of Arbitrator - Application
was allowed - Arbitrator framed the issues
- During proceedings, petitioners filed
application u/s 29A before Presiding
officer for extension of time for conclusion
of arbitration proceedings by a further
duration
of
at
least
12
months
-
Application rejected - Impugned order
challenged - Held, the Court can extend
the period of arbitration u/s 29-A (4)
irrespective
of
fact
whether
the
application seeking extension of time has
been
filed
before
expiry
of
period
specified in sub-Section (1) of Section
29-A or after that - Delay in disposal of
application u/s 29- A(4) can't be a reason
for
rejection
of
application
and
Commercial
Court
has
rejected
the
application on considerations which are
not relevant - Hence, impugned order is
unsustainable in law, liable to be set
aside, substitute arbitrator appointed for
completing
arbitration
proceedings.
(Para 3, 8, 38, 41, 45)

Petition allowed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Ltd. Vs
Director General of Married Accommodation
Project, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2990

2. Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal Vs Vineeth M.VS, 2023 SCC
OnLine Ker 5151

3. Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. Vs Madhyanchal
Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del
4894

4. Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs Berger
Paints India Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2645

5. ATC Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs BSNL,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7135

6. H. P. Singh Vs G. M. Northern Railways, 2023
SCC OnLine J&K 1255

7. ATS Infrastructure Ltd. & ors. Vs Rasbehari
Traders, O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 91/2023

8. Hiralal Rattanlal Vs St. of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC
216,

9. Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit Vs St. of Mah.,
(2001) 4 SCC 534

10. B. Premanand Vs Mohan Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC
266

11. Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs St. of Assam, (2017)
15 SCC 67

12. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. Vs Axis Bank
Ltd., (2022) 8 SCC 352

13. VS Senthil Balaji Vs St., (2024) 3 SCC 51

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)
556 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. Heard Sri Sudeep Kumar assisted by
Ms. Radhika Varma, and Sri Shresth
Srivastava, Advocates, the learned Counsel
for the petitioners and Ms. Pushpila Bisht,
Advocate, the learned counsel for the
respondents.

2. By means of the instant petition filed
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioners have challenged
validity of the order dated 11.03.2024
passed
by
the
Presiding
Officer,
Commercial Court No.1, Lucknow in Misc.
Case No.305 of 2019 under Section 29-A of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are
that the petitioners had filed Arbitration
Application No.45 of 2017 in this Court
under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act,1996. This Court allowed
the application by means of an order dated
28.02.2018
and
appointed
Sri
Seth
Shailendra Nath Tandon H.J.S. (Retd.) as
the Arbitrator to decide the disputes between
the parties through process of arbitration.

4. The Arbitrator entered upon the
reference on 05.04.2018, the petitioners
filed his statement of claims on 13.06.2018,
the respondents filed their written statement
on 28.07.2018 and the petitioners filed their
replication on 16.9.2018. The learned
Arbitrator framed the issues on 13.10.2018.
Thereafter, the matter was fixed for
16.11.2018 for evidence of the claimant and
the claimant filed his evidence on the said
date. The petitioners filed an application
under Section 27 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act for summoning some
officers of the respondent Corporation for
their examination.

5. On 25.11.2018, the respondents
filed their evidence and objections against
the petitioners' application under Section 27
of
Arbitration
and
Conciliation
Act.
Thereafter, the matter was fixed for
22.02.2019, on which date, the respondents
sought an adjournment on the ground of
illness of their counsel. It was not opposed
by the petitioners-claimant and the matter
was adjourned and fixed for 02.03.2019. On
02.03.2019, an adjournment was sought on
behalf of the respondents as their counsel
was not available. This too was not opposed
by the claimant and the matter was fixed for
09.03.2019.
On
09.03.2019
also,
an
adjournment was sought on behalf of the
respondents, which was opposed by the
claimant. However, the Arbitrator granted
the adjournment and fixed the matter for
18.03.2019. On 18.03.2019, learned counsel
for both the parties were present but the
matter was postponed without any effective
orders having been passed and the Arbitrator
merely directed the parties to deposit the
secretarial expenses.

6. On 19.04.2019, the Arbitrator
passed an order deciding three applications
- C4, C5 and C-6 filed by the claimant for
summoning some witnesses, some material
evidences and for a direction to the
respondents to produce the witnesses or to
provide complete address of the witnesses
for their examination. The Arbitrator held
that the arbitral tribunal itself had got no
power to summon any witness and if the
claimant wants production of any witness
before the arbitral tribunal, the claimant is
permitted to move the appropriate Court for
summoning of the witnesses or production
of any material or goods.

7. On the next date fixed in the
arbitration proceedings on 05.05.2019, the
Arbitrator recorded in his order that he had
been appointed by means of an order dated
05.04.2018 and had issued notice to the
5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
557
parties on 16.04.2018. One year's time had
expired and the proceedings could not be
completed within the time provided under
Section 29-A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. This Section provides that
the time may be extended either by mutual
consent of both the parties or the Court may
extend the time. Neither the parties had
extended time for adjudication of the dispute
by the Arbitrator by mutual consent, nor was
any order passed by the Court extending the
time period of the Arbitrator available on
record. The Arbitrator fixed 26.05.2019 for
further orders. On 26.05.2019, the Arbitrator
again posted the matter for 05.07.2019 for
further orders. On 05.07.2019, the matter
was posted for 25.07.2019, on which date
the respondents declined to extend the time
for completion of arbitration proceedings.

8. On 18.9.2019, the petitioners filed
an application under Section 29A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
before the Presiding officer, Commercial
Court No.1, Lucknow praying for extension
of time for conclusion of the arbitration
proceedings by a further duration of at least
12 months. The respondents filed objections
against the application for extension of time
on 12.2.2020. The application has been
rejected by means of the impugned order
dated 11.03.2024.

9. The Commercial Court has held that
the period for conclusion of the arbitral
proceedings expired on 06.04.2019 but the
claimant did not make a request before the
Arbitrator for extension of time. The
application for extension of time was filed in
the Court after 5 months and 12 days since
expiry of the period of one year available to
the Arbitrator under Section 29-A of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the
petitioners did not give any explanation for
this delay.

10. The Commercial Court further
observed that a perusal of the record reveals
that the petitioners have filed applications -
C4, C5 and C6, and the Arbitrator had
passed orders on those applications on
19.04.2019 i.e. 13 days after expiry of his
mandate and this order is non-est in law. The
petitioners have filed an application under
Section
27
of
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act before the Commercial
Court on 30.05.2019 (which date is wrongly
mentioned in the impugned order as
26.08.2019),
which
was
filed
after
termination of mandate of the Arbitrator and
the Court had passed an order dated
30.07.2019 on the said application, which
too has been passed after termination of the
mandate of the Arbitrator.

11. The Commercial Court held that
the
petitioners'
contention
that
the
proceedings could not be concluded within
time due to non-corporation of the
respondents is not believable in its entirety.
It is correct that the respondents have sought
adjournment on 02.03.2019, 09.03.2019 and
18.03.2019 but the petitioners have not
objected
against
the
requests
for
adjournments, which indicates that they also
intended to cause delay in disposal of the
matter.

12. The Commercial Court held that
time
for
completion
of
arbitration
proceedings can be extended under Section
29-A of the Act even after termination of
mandate of the Arbitrator yet as the
Commercial Court was of the view that the
petitioners themselves have caused delay on
several dates, the application under Section
29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
was liable to be rejected.

13. While assailing the validity of the
aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the
558 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioners submitted that the observations
made by the Commercial Court in the
impugned order that the petitioners did not
oppose the request for adjournment made on
behalf of the respondents indicates that they
intended to cause delay in disposal of the
proceedings and, therefore, the application
under Section 29-A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act is liable to be rejected, is
factually and legally incorrect. The request
for adjournment on 3 dates was made due to
personal difficulties of the learned counsel
for the respondents and in case the learned
counsel for the petitioners were courteous
and did not object against adjournments
sought due to personal difficulties of the
learned counsel for the respondent, this is no
ground to penalize the petitioners by
foreclosing the forum for dispensation of
justice through the process of arbitration.

14. The basic object of any judicial or
quasi-judicial form is to ensure dispensation
of justice and the rules of procedure are
framed to aid the Courts and other
judicial/quasi-judicial fora in ensuring
expeditious disposal of justice. The rules of
procedure
should
not
be
interpreted/implemented in such a manner
as to cause a failure of justice. The endeavor
of the Courts to ensure expeditious disposal
of cases is appreciated but this endeavor to
ensure expedition should not be allowed to
override the basic object of the Courts,
which is to ensure dispensation of justice to
the parties.

15. In the present case, Section 29-A
would be applicable as it existed prior to
amendment by Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act, 2019 (Act 33 of 2019),
which read thus: -

"29-A. Time limit for arbitral
award.- (1) The award shall be made
within a period of twelve months from the
date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the
reference.

Explanation.- For the purpose of
this sub-section, an arbitral tribunal shall be
deemed to have entered upon the reference
on the date on which the arbitrator or all the
arbitrators, as the case may be, have
received notice, in writing, of their
appointment.

(2) If the award is made within a
period of six months from the date the
arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference,
the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to
receive such amount of additional fees as the
parties may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent,
extend the period specified in sub-section
(1) for making award for a further period
not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made
within the period specified in sub-section
(1) or the extended period specified under
sub-section (3), the mandate of the
arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the
Court has, either prior to or after the expiry
of the period so specified, extended the
period:

Provided that while extending the
period under this sub-section, if the court
finds that the proceedings have been
delayed for the reasons attributable to the
arbitral tribunal, then, it may order
reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not
exceeding five per cent for each month of
such delay.

(5) The extension of period
referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the
application of any of the parties and may be
granted only for sufficient cause and on such
terms and conditions as may be imposed by
the court.

(6) While extending the period
referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be
open to the court to substitute one or all of
5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
559
the arbitrators and if one or all of the
arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral
proceedings shall continue from the stage
already reached and on the basis of the
evidence and material already on record,
and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this
section shall be deemed to have received the
said evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s)
being appointed under this section, the
arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be
deemed to be in continuation of the
previously appointed arbitral tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the Court to
impose actual or exemplary costs upon any
of the parties under this section.

(9) An application filed under subsection (5) shall be disposed of by the court
as expeditiously as possible and endeavour
shall be made to dispose of the matter within
a period of sixty days from the date of
service of notice on the opposite party."

16. Section 29-A, as amended by
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment)
Act, 2019 (Act 33 of 2019) reads as follows:
-

"29-A. Time limit for arbitral
award.-[(1) The award in matters other
than international commercial arbitration
shall be made by the arbitral tribunal within
a period of twelve months from the date of
completion of pleadings under sub-section
(4) of Section 23:

Provided that the award in the
matter
of
international
commercial
arbitration may be made as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour may be made to
dispose of the matter within a period of
twelve months from the date of completion
of pleadings under sub-section (4) of Section
23.

(2) If the award is made within a
period of six months from the date the
arbitral tribunal enters upon the reference,
the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to
receive such amount of additional fees as the
parties may agree.

(3) The parties may, by consent,
extend the period specified in sub-section
(1) for making award for a further period
not exceeding six months.

(4) If the award is not made within
the period specified in sub-section (1) or the
extended period specified under sub-section
(3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall
terminate unless the court has, either prior
to or after the expiry of the period so
specified, extended the period:

Provided that while extending the
period under this sub-section, if the court
finds that the proceedings have been
delayed for the reasons attributable to the
arbitral tribunal, then, it may order
reduction of fees of arbitrator(s) by not
exceeding five per cent for each month of
such delay:

Provided further that where an
application
under
sub-section
(5)
is
pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall
continue till the disposal of the said
application:

Provided also that the arbitrator
shall be given an opportunity of being heard
before the fees is reduced.

(5) The extension of period
referred to in sub-section (4) may be on the
application of any of the parties and may be
granted only for sufficient cause and on such
terms and conditions as may be imposed by
the court.

(6) While extending the period
referred to in sub-section (4), it shall be
open to the court to substitute one or all of
the arbitrators and if one or all of the
arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral
proceedings shall continue from the stage
already reached and on the basis of the
evidence and material already on record,
560 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this
section shall be deemed to have received the
said evidence and material.

(7) In the event of arbitrator(s)
being appointed under this section, the
arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted shall be
deemed to be in continuation of the
previously appointed arbitral tribunal.

(8) It shall be open to the court to
impose actual or exemplary costs upon any
of the parties under this section.

(9) An application filed under subsection (5) shall be disposed of by the court
as expeditiously as possible and endeavour
shall be made to dispose of the matter within
a period of sixty days from the date of
service of notice on the opposite party."

17. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner submitted that there is no
authoritative pronouncement of this Court
regarding interpretation of Section 29-A (4)
and the High Courts of Delhi, Kerala and
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh have held
that sub-section (4) provides that the Court
is empowered to extend the period for
making the award either prior to or after the
expiry of the said period, whereas Calcutta
High Court has held that Section 29-A(4)
uses the word "extension" for the period
specified under section 29-A(1) or (3) of the
arbitrator's mandate to make the award.
There is a conscious omission of the word
"renewal" or "revival". This would mean
that the continuing mandate of the arbitrator
must form the substratum for an application
to be made for extension of that mandate.

18. As there is a divergence of opinions
of various High Courts on this point, it
would be appropriate to have a look at those
decisions.

19. In Wadia Techno-Engineering
Services Ltd. v. Director General of
Married Accommodation Project, 2023
SCC OnLine Del 2990 decided on
16.05.2023, a Single Judge Bench of Delhi
High Court held that: -

"23.... The provision clearly
provides that the Court may extend the
period even after its expiry. Indeed, the
second proviso provides that the mandate of
the tribunal would continue until the
disposal of such a petition. I see no
justification in the text of the statute, or on a
purposive interpretation thereof, to hold
that the power can only be exercised on an
application filed prior to the expiry of the
mandate."

20. In Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal v.
Vineeth M.V., 2023 SCC OnLine Ker
5151 decided on 13.07.2023, it was held that
"the sub-section (4) provides that the Court
is empowered to extend the period for
making the award either prior to or after the
expiry of the said period. Sub-section (5)
provides that such extension of period may
be on the application of any of the parties
and may be granted only for sufficient cause
and on such terms and conditions as may be
imposed by the Court. Subject to the above,
the time limit specified for arbitral award
can be extended by Court."

21. In Reliance Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 4894 decided on
14.08.2023, another Single Judge Bench of
Delhi High Court held that "in terms of
Section 29A (4) and (5) of the Act, the mandate
of the Arbitrator can be extended by the Court
even after expiry of the time for making of the
arbitral award on sufficient cause being
shown by the party making the application."

22 . However, in Rohan Builders
(India) Pvt. Ltd. versus Berger Paints
5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
561
India Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 2645
decided on 06.09.2023, a Single Judge
Bench of Calcutta High Court held that: -

"43. The
second
proviso
to
section 29-A(4) hence envisages pendency
of an application for extension of the
arbitrator's mandate as opposed to filing of
an application. Therefore, the mandate can
only continue if the application is filed prior
to expiry of the mandate and not thereafter.
The words in section 29-A(4) "...either
prior to or after the expiry of the period so
specified..." is a deeming fiction which
takes shape to ensure that the application is
made during the continuation of the
mandate.

44. Section 29-A(4) uses the word
"extension" for the period specified under
section 29-A(1) or (3) of the arbitrator's
mandate to make the award. There is a
conscious omission of the word "renewal"
or "revival". This would mean that the
continuing mandate of the arbitrator must
form the substratum for an application to be
made for extension of that mandate. If the
framers intended that the application for
extension could be made at any time after
expiry of the mandate, section 29-A(4)
would not have used "terminate" but
"revive" or "renew"."

23. The learned Counsel for the
petitioners informed that a Special Leave
Petition filed against the aforesaid order is
pending before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.

24. In ATC Telecom Infrastructure
(P) Ltd. v. BSNL, 2023 SCC OnLine Del
7135 decided on 06.11.2023, another Single
Judge Bench of Delhi High Court followed
the decision in the case of Wadia TechnoEngineering Services Ltd. (Supra) and
held that: -

"25. Thus,
under
Section
29A(4) of the A&C Act, the termination of
the mandate of the arbitrator(s) is subject to
the decision of the Court which may be
"either prior or after the expiry" of the
specified period. The Court would take a
suitable decision upon a petition under
Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act being filed.
Such a petition can be filed either before
expiry of the period referred to under
Section 29A(1) or Section 29A(3) of the
A&C Act or even thereafter. When the Court
has been specifically empowered to grant
the requisite extension even after expiry of
the specified period, it would not be apposite
to read a proscription in the statutory
provision to the effect that a petition under
Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act [seeking
extension of time] must be filed before
expiry of the specified period and not
thereafter. Such a proscription simply does
not exist in the statute. On the contrary, as
already noticed, the court has been
empowered to grant an extension even after
expiry of the specified period."

25. The Delhi High Court further
held in ATC Telecom Infrastructure (P)
Ltd. (Supra) that: -

"27. The facts of the present case
also illustrate that the dictum laid down
in Rohan Builders (supra) can potentially
thwart, rather than subserve the legislative
intent. In the present case, there is no
controversy that the learned sole Arbitrator
has conducted the arbitral proceedings with
expedition and despatch, and that there is
ample justification for extending the time
period
for
completion
of
arbitral
proceedings and making of the arbitral
award. The order dated 18.09.2023 passed
by the learned sole Arbitrator even records
the consent of the parties in this regard. To
deny extension of time in such a case, only
562 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
because the petition under Section 29A(4) of
the A&C Act came to be filed a few days
after expiry of the period set out in Section
29A(3) of the A&C Act besides being in the
teeth of the language of Section 29A(4) of
the A&C Act, seriously undermines the
efficacy of the arbitral process and also
impinges
on
party
autonomy.
Any
interpretative exercise must therefore avoid
this consequence.

28. For all the above reasons, I
am in respectful disagreement with the
judgment of Rohan Builders (supra). I am
also bound by the view taken by a Coordinate bench of this Court in Wadia
Techno-Engineering Services (supra)."

26. ATC Telecom Infrastructure (P)
Ltd. (Supra) has been followed by Delhi
High Court in ATS Infrastructure Ltd.
and Ors. Vs. Rasbehari Traders, O.M.P.
(T)
(COMM.)
91/2023,
decided
on
17.11.2023. A Special Leave Petition has
been filed against the order and the same is
pending.

27. In H. P. Singh v. G. M. Northern
Railways, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 1255
decided on 07.12.2023, the High Court of
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh held that "I
am unable to concur with the view taken by
the Calcutta High Court in Rohan (supra),
as I am also of the opinion that even after
the mandate of the Arbitrator has been
terminated on expiry of the term under subsection (1) or (3) as the case may be, an
application for extending the term/mandate
will be maintainable under sub-section (4)
of section 29A of the Act."

28. The golden rule of interpretation of
statutes is that the words used by the
legislature have to be given their plain and
simple meaning and no other rule of
interpretation is to be applied if there is no
ambiguity in the legislative provision.

29. In Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of
U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that: -

"In
construing
a
statutory
provision, the first and the foremost rule of
construction is the literary construction. All
that we have to see at the very outset is what
does that provision say? If the provision is
unambiguous and if from that provision, the
legislative intent is clear, we need not call
into aid the other rules of construction of
statutes. The other rules of construction of
statutes are called into aid only when the
legislative intention is not clear."

30.

In
Gurudevdatta
VKSSS
Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra, (2001)
4 SCC 534,the Hon'ble supreme clarified
that: -

"26. ...it is a cardinal principle of
interpretation of statute that the words of a
statute must be understood in their natural,
ordinary or popular sense and construed
according to their grammatical meaning,
unless such construction leads to some
absurdity or unless there is something in the
context or in the object of the statute to
suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is
that the words of a statute must prima facie
be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet
another rule of construction that when the
words of the statute are clear, plain and
unambiguous, then the courts are bound to
give effect to that meaning, irrespective of
the consequences. It is said that the words
themselves best declare the intention of the
law-giver. The courts have adhered to the
principle that efforts should be made to give
meaning to each and every word used by the
legislature and it is not a sound principle of
5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
563
construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they
can
have
a
proper
application
in
circumstances
conceivable
within
the
contemplation of the statute."

31. In B. Premanand v. Mohan
Koikal, (2011) 4 SCC 266, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court reiterated that: -

"9. It may be mentioned in this
connection that the first and foremost
principle of interpretation of a statute in
every system of interpretation is the literal
rule of interpretation. The other rules of
interpretation
e.g.
the
mischief
rule,
purposive interpretation, etc. can only be
resorted to when the plain words of a statute
are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible
results or if read literally would nullify the
very object of the statute. Where the words
of a statute are absolutely clear and
unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the
principles of interpretation other than the
literal rule.."

32. In Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State
of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court explained the principles of
interpretation in the following words: -

"67.
While
interpreting
any
statutory provision, it has always been
accepted as a golden rule of interpretation
that the words used by the legislature should
be given their natural meaning. Normally,
the courts should be hesitant to add words
or subtract words from the statutory
provision. An effort should always be made
to read the legislative provision in such a
way that there is no wastage of words and
any construction which makes some words
of the statute redundant should be avoided.
No doubt, if the natural meaning of the
words leads to an interpretation which is
contrary to the objects of the Act or makes
the
provision
unworkable
or
highly
unreasonable and arbitrary, then the courts
either add words or subtract words or read
down the statute, but this should only be
done when there is an ambiguity in the
language used. In my view, there is no
ambiguity in the wording of Section 167(2)
of the Code and, therefore, the wise course
would be to follow the principle laid down
by Patanjali Shastry, C.J. in Aswini Kumar
Ghose v. Arabinda Bose AIR 1952 SC 369,
where he very eloquently held as follows:

"26. ... It is not a sound principle
of construction to brush aside words in a
statute as being inapposite surplusage, if
they can have appropriate application in
circumstances
conceivably
within
the
contemplation of the statute."

In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw
Cotton Co. Ltd. AIR 1955 SC 376, S.R. Das,
J., speaking for this Court, held as follows:

"6. ... The cardinal rule of
construction of statutes is to read the
statutes literally, that is, by giving to the
words used by the legislature their ordinary,
natural and grammatical meaning."

68. External aids of interpretation
are to be used only when the language of the
legislation is ambiguous and admits of two
or more meanings. When the language is
clear or the ambiguity can be resolved under
the more common rules of statutory
interpretation, the court would be reluctant
to look at external aids of statutory
interpretation.

69. Gajendragadkar, J., speaking
for this Court in Kanai Lal Sur v.
Paramnidhi Sadhukhan AIR 1957 SC 907,
held :

"6. ... the first and primary rule of
construction is that the intention of the
legislature must be found in the words used
by the legislature itself."
564 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

70. These sound principles of
statutory construction continue to hold the
field. When the natural meaning of the
words is clear and unambiguous, no
external aids should be used."

33. Following the aforesaid judgments
in the cases of Hiralal Rattanlal and B.
Premanand
(Supra),
in
Vidarbha
Industries Power Ltd. v. Axis Bank Ltd.,
(2022) 8 SCC 352, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated that "It is well settled that
the
first
and
foremost
principle
of
interpretation of a statute is the rule of literal
interpretation".

34. In V. Senthil Balaji v. State,
(2024) 3 SCC 51, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court laid down that "When there is no need
for a purposive interpretation and the statute
clearly expresses its intendment, an act of
judicial surgery is best avoided."

35. The unamended Section 29-A(4)
provided that If the award is not made within
the period specified in sub-section (1) or the
extended period specified under sub-section
(3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall
terminate unless the Court has, either prior
to or after the expiry of the period so
specified, extended the period. Even after
amendment of the Section, this sub-section
continues to remain the same.

36. Thus the words used by the
legislature in Section 29-A (4) are clear that
the Court may extend the period either prior
to or after the expiry of the period specified
in sub-section (1) of Section 29-A. Thus it is
clear that the Court may extend the period
for completion of arbitration proceedings
beyond one year even after expiry of the
period and there is no condition that the
Court can extend the period only if an
application in this regard has been made
prior to expiry of the period.

37. When the legislature has not used
any words to restrict the power of the Court
under Section 29-A(4) to be exercised only
in cases where an application under that
provision is filed before expiry of the period
mentioned in Section 29-A(1), it is
impermissible in law to read these words by
implication by applying any principles of
interpretation of Statutes.

38. Therefore, the law is clear that the
Court can extend the period of arbitration
under Section 29-A (4) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 irrespective of
the fact whether the application seeking
extension of time has been filed before
expiry of the period specified in sub-Section
(1) of Section 29-A or after that.

39.
In
the present
case,
the
Commercial Court has rightly held that time
for completion of arbitration proceedings
can be extended under Section 29-A of the
Act even after termination of mandate of the
Arbitrator, yet it denied extension of time
under Section 29-A (4) for the sole reason
that the claimant had not opposed the
requests for adjournment made on the
ground of personal difficulties of the learned
Counsel for the respondent on three
occasions. This approach of the Commercial
Court cannot be appreciated by this Court,
as it has resulted in denial of justice to the
claimant / petitioner. This reason recorded
by the Commercial Court is even factually
incorrect, as the petitioner had not opposed the
requests for adjournment only on two dates, i.e.
22.02.2019 and 02.03.2019. On the third date,
i.e. 09.03.2019, the petitioner had opposed the
respondent's request for adjournment but the
arbitrator had granted the adjournment.
5 All. Shivam Tandon & Anr. Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. & Anr.
565

40. The Commercial Court has also
supported his order by observing that a
period of 4 1⁄2 years was spent in disposal of
the application under Section 29-A (4). It is
relevant to note that Section 29-A(9)
provides that "An application filed under
sub-section (5) shall be disposed of by the
court as expeditiously as possible and
endeavour shall be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of sixty days from the
date of service of notice on the opposite
party". It is the duty of the Court follow this
legislative mandate and the responsibility
for delay in disposal of the application
cannot be entirely fastened on a party - more
particularly when the order does not contain
any factual particulars as to how the
petitioner was responsible for delay in
disposal of the application under Section 29A(4).

41. In any case, the delay in disposal of
the application under Section 29-A(4)
cannot be a reason for rejection of the
application
and
it
appears
that
the
Commercial
Court
has
rejected
the
application on considerations which are not
relevant.

42. In view of the foregoing
discussion, I am of the considered view that
the impugned order dated 11.03.2024
passed
by
the
Presiding
Officer,
Commercial Court No.1, Lucknow in Misc.
Case No.305 of 2019 rejecting the
petitioner's application for extension of time
for completion of arbitration proceedings
under Section 29-A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, is unsustainable in
law.

43. The learned counsel for the
respondents has opposed the petition but she
has not seriously disputed the power of the
Court to grant extension of time for
conclusion of arbitral proceedings in the
interest of justice even after expiry of the
mandate of the arbitrator, particularly when
the proceedings had reached an advanced
stage. However, she has submitted that as
the respondents had declined to extend the
mandate of Arbitrator, the respondents
would be apprehensive in getting a fair
hearing before the Arbitrator, whose
mandate they had declined to extend.
Therefore, she requests that in case the
period
for
conclusion
of
arbitration
proceedings is extended under Section 29-A
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, this
court may substitute the Arbitrator. The
learned counsel for the petitioners has no
objection to the aforesaid submissions of the
learned counsel for the respondents.

44. In view of the aforesaid
submissions,
without
going
into
the
reasonableness
of
the
respondent's
apprehension, in view of the consensus
between the learned Counsel for the parties,
it appears to be just to pass an order
substituting the Arbitrator. Both the learned
Counsel agree for appointment of Sri.
Deepak Kumar, H.J.S. (Retd.), resident of
3/310, Vinamra Khand, Gomti Nagar,
Lucknow, as the substitute arbitrator for
completion of the arbitration proceedings.

45. Accordingly, this petition deserves
to be allowed. The impugned order dated
11.03.2024 passed by the Presiding Officer,
Commercial Court No.1, Lucknow in Misc.
Case No.305 of 2019 rejecting the
petitioner's application for extension of time
for completion of arbitration proceedings
under Section 29-A of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 is liable to be set
aside and the application under Section 29A filed by the petitioner before the
Commercial Court deserves to be allowed.
The substitute arbitrator to be appointed by
566 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this Court will complete the arbitration
proceedings between the parties within a
period of one year from the date of first
appearance of the parties before him.

46. The office is directed to obtain
consent of Sri. Deepak Kumar, H.J.S.
(Retd.), resident of 3/310, Vinamra Khand,
Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, for acting as the
Arbitrator for deciding the dispute between
the parties in terms of Schedule VI of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

47. List on 24.05.2024 for further
orders.

----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 566
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 3254 of 2024

Kailash & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Phool Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Sections 307, 506, 34 - The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 200,
202, 204 - As per complaint - Petitioner
no. 1 has been assigned the role of firing
with pistol, while Petitioner no. 2 has
been assigned the role of exhortation -
Allegations have been supported by
St.ments u/s 200, 202 Cr.P.C. - Medical
report is indicative of firearm injuries
- Submission that at the stage of
summoning, the Magistrate is only
required to record a prima facie opinion,
based on material on record, and is not
expected to hold a mini trial or to
examine defence of accused - Scope of
procedure followed by Magistrate - Held,
allegations in complaint have been
found to be supported in the St.ment
made by complainant during the course
of examination and also by St.ments of
witnesses recorded during the course of
inquiry
made
by
Magistrate
-
Summoning order has been passed by
trial court after taking due consideration
of material available on record - Hence,
the order passed by court below doesn't
suffer from any infirmity and also the
revisional court order affirming the
summoning order of Magistrate can't be
faulted, for the same reason. (Para 2, 4,
5, 13)

Petition dismissed. (E-13)

List of Cases cited:

1. S.W. Palanitkar & ors. Vs St. of Bihar & anr.,
(2002) 1 SCC 241

2. Nirmaljit Singh Hoon Vs St. of West Bengal &
anr., (1973) 3 SCC 753

3. Chandra Deo Singh Vs Prokash Chandra Bose,
(1964) 1 SCR 639

4. Smt. Nagawwa Vs Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi & ors., (1976) 3 SCC 736

5.
Nupur
Talwar
Vs
Central
Bureau
of
Investigation & anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465

6. Sanjay Singh & anr. Vs St. of U.P. & anr., 2021
(117) ACC 479

7. Pinkal Singh @ Raghvendra Singh & ors. Vs St.
of U.P. & anr., 2021 (3) ACR 2461

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)