# Shri Dewesh Kumar Ex- Sr. Supervisor M/S Tata Engg. & L. Co. Ltd v. M/S Tata Engineering & Locomitove Co. Ltd. Lko

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 1541
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-21
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 1001398 of 2002
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shri-dewesh-kumar-ex-sr-supervisor-m-s-tata-engg-l-co-ltd-v-m-s-tata-50562
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Order of Dy. Labour Commissioner dated
05.12.2000 rejecting reference under Section
4(K) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Held
to be illegal and arbitrary - Petitioner had
invoked conciliation mechanism after being
dismissed
-
Conciliation
Officer
exceeded
1542 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction by giving finding on merits
instead of submitting a failure report - No
reasons
assigned
in
impugned
order
rejecting reference - Violation of principles of
natural justice - Requirement to record
reasons applies equally to quasi-judicial
administrative actions - Order quashed -
Matter remanded to St. Government to
decide afresh.

Petition allowed.

Key Acts/Provisions:

## Text

8 All. Shri Dewesh Kumar Ex-Sr. Supervisor M/S Tata Engg. & L. Co. Ltd. Vs. M/S Tata
 Engineering & Locomitove Co. Ltd. Lko.
1541
one not already a beneficiary, it could
extend to including the settlor himself. The
wide amplitude of power in the clause
supports such a conclusion. If that be so,
the settlor has reserved to himself the right
to benefit from the wakf property for life by
the simple device of including himself in the
list of beneficiaries or grantees.

"..

23. In the instant case, it is true
that the settlor had not included himself in
the list of beneficiaries and that so long as
he did not do so, he was not entitled to the
benefits enjoyed by the other beneficiaries.
But the power to do so vested in him
absolutely. It was a power which he could
exercise in his absolute discretion. We see
little difference between a case where the
settlor
included
himself
among
the
beneficiaries and left it to the absolute
discretion of the trustees to extend the
benefit of the trust income to him and the
instant case where the settlor had reserved
to himself the right to include his name
among
the
beneficiaries
thereby
automatically entitling himself to the
benefit of the income of the wakf property.
The power to amend the wakf deed so as to
include himself among the beneficiaries is
only an instance of the wide powers
reserved by the settlor to himself. As we
have said the powers under clause 7(e) are
expressed in the widest termst. So long as
the character of the wakf is maintained, it
is open to the settlor to make any
changes"and changes which may directly
benefit him"in the terms and conditions of
the deed. We are of opinion that the settlor
reserved an interest in the wakf property
for life and therefore the case falls within
the scope of section 12. And that would
mean, as was held by the Bombay High
Court in Khatizabai Mohomed Ibrahim v.
Controller of Estate Duty [[1959] 37 I.T.R.
(E.D.) 53 (Bom.).] , that not merely the
interest so reserved but the whole of such
property must be deemed to pass on the
death of the settlor."

12. Since waqif Gulam Ahmad Khan
reserved to himself the absolute right to
amend the waqf deed and made provisions
therein for his maintenance out of the waqf
property therefore it is held that petitioner
cannot claim exemptions from paying
estate duty.

13. In light of the above, this writ
petition is dismissed accordingly.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 1541
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 21.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ-C No. 1001398 of 2002

Shri Dewesh Kumar Ex- Sr. Supervisor
M/S Tata Engg. & L. Co. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
M/S Tata Engineering & Locomitove Co.
Ltd. Lko. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
S. Banerji, Pushpila Bisht, S.P. Mishra,
Suresh Chandra Tiwari, Vivek Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., J.N. Mathur, Mudit Agarwal

Held:
Order of Dy. Labour Commissioner dated
05.12.2000 rejecting reference under Section
4(K) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Held
to be illegal and arbitrary - Petitioner had
invoked conciliation mechanism after being
dismissed
-
Conciliation
Officer
exceeded
1542 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction by giving finding on merits
instead of submitting a failure report - No
reasons
assigned
in
impugned
order
rejecting reference - Violation of principles of
natural justice - Requirement to record
reasons applies equally to quasi-judicial
administrative actions - Order quashed -
Matter remanded to St. Government to
decide afresh.

Petition allowed.

Key Acts/Provisions:

1. U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections
2(z), 4(K), 6(N)

2. Constitution of India - Article 14

Case Law Discussed:

1. Prem Kakkar Vs St. of Har., (1976) 3 SCC 433

2. Siemens Engineering Co. Vs U.O.I., (1976) 2
SCC 981

3. A.K. Kraipak Vs U.O.I., (1969) 2 SCC 262

4. R Vs Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner
ex p. Moore, (1965) 1 QB 456

5. Mahon Vs Air New Zealand Ltd., [1984 AC
648]

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vivek Mishra, learned
counsel for petitioner as well as Sri Mudit
Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent
No. 1 and learned Standing Counsel for
respondent No. 2.

2. The grievance raised by the
petitioner is with regard to order dated
05.12.2000
passed
by
Dy.
Labour
Commissioner, Lucknow Region, Lucknow
thereby declining to refer the dispute raised
by the petitioner for adjudication before the
Labour Court in exercise of powers under
Section 4 (K) of U.P. Industrial disputes
Act, 1947.

3. The facts in brief of the present
case are that petitioner was working with
respondent No. 1 on the post of Supervisor
w.e.f. 1993 and claims to be covered within
the definition of workman as provided
under Section 2(Z) of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.

4. The grievance of the petitioner is
that he was dismissed from service on
04.02.1998 illegally and arbitrarily and in
violation of provisions of Section 6(N) of
the Act of 1947. Being aggrieved by his
dismissal, the petitioner had moved an
application
before
the
Prescribed
Authority/Conciliation
Board
on
15.04.1998. On the basis of the said
application, conciliation proceedings were
initiated and the matter was referred to the
Conciliation Officer.

5. It is submitted that no settlement
was arrived at between the petitioner and
respondent
No.
1
in
conciliation
proceedings and consequently the Assistant
Labour Commissioner by means of order
dated 26.06.1999, it was recorded that there
were
several
allegations
against
the
petitioner
with
regard
to
financial
misappropriation and for being negligent in
discharging of his duties consequent to
which
disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated
and
after
giving
adequate
opportunity of hearing he was dismissed
from service and the Conciliation Officer
recorded that there was no ground on which
he can be reinstated in service. The said
order dated 26.06.1999 has been annexed
by the petitioner in supplementary rejoinder
affidavit as Annexure No. 4. It seems that
the said report of the Conciliation Officer
was sent to the State Government for
8 All. Shri Dewesh Kumar Ex-Sr. Supervisor M/S Tata Engg. & L. Co. Ltd. Vs. M/S Tata
 Engineering & Locomitove Co. Ltd. Lko.
1543
proceedings in terms of Section 4(K) of the
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but by
means order dated 05.12.2000, the Dy.
Labour Commissioner, Lucknow in a very
cryptive manner has stated that the case of
the petitioner has not been found to be
suitable to be referred to the Dy. Labour
Commissioner, Lucknow.

6. Learned counsel for petitioner has
submitted that the said order is illegal and
arbitrary as no reasons have been assigned
for declining to refer the matter for
adjudication to the Labour Court. He
further submits that the petitioner being a
workman and the respondent No. 1 being
an industrial undertaking and the matter
pertaining to the dismissal of the petitioner
is squarely covered under the provisions of
Section 6(N) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and consequently once it is seen that
all the ingredients as stated above are
fulfilled then there is no discretion with the
respondents except the matter referr the
dispute for adjudication before the Labour
Court. Despite repeated opportunities , the
State has not filed any counter affidavit.
The employer, namely Tata Engineering &
Locomotive Company Limited contested
the matter by filing a counter affidavit.

7. It has been submitted that power
under Section 4(K) of the Act of 1947 is an
administrative power and is subjected to
limited judicial scrutiny. It has also been
submitted that the petitioner was a
Supervisor and consequently his claim
would not be entertainable before the
Labour Court inasmuch as he does not fall
in the definition of workman and hence
there is no infirmity in the impugned order
dated 29.08.1990 of the State Government
declining
to
refer
the
matter
for
adjudication to the Labour Court. In
support of his submissions, learned counsel
for has relied upon the judgment of Prem
Kakkar Vs. State of Haryana 1976
(3)SCC 433.

8. I have heard learned counsel for
parties and perused the record.

9. The petitioner claiming himself to
be an workman having been illegally and
arbitrarily dismissed from services by the
respondents on 04.02.1998. He invoked the
provisions of the Act of 1947 and
accordingly conciliation proceedings were
commenced between the petitioner and
respondent
No.
1.
The
conciliation
proceedings
did
not
conclude
in
a
settlement. The Conciliation Officer instead
of forwarding the failure report, proceeded
to pass an order dated 26.06.1999 holding
that the petitioner was not entitled to any
benefits. On the face of it the order dated
26.06.1999 is illegal and arbitrary and
without jurisdiction.

10. The Conciliation Officer has only
to make efforts to see that the dispute
between the employer and the employee is
amicably settled. In case he succeeds then
the same result therein a settlement
between the parties and in case the parties
are unable to arrive at settlement then only
a failure report can be prepared by him and
forwarded
to
the
STate
Government/Prescribed Authority.

11. A perusal of the Act of 1947, It is
clear that there is no provision conferring
him with any powers of adjudication to
determine of the lis between the employer
and the employee. In the present case he
has proceeded to pass an order dated
26.06.1999 delving upon the merits of the
claim made by the workman and returned a
finding that no ground for granting any
relief to the petitioner is made out. Such an
1544 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order cannot be passed by him, taking upon
the lis between the parties.

12. Such an order is without
jurisdiction and in excess of the authority
vested in the Conciliation Officer and
consequently nonest and cannot be relied
upon in any proceedings.

13. The impugned order declining to
refer the matter for adjudication by the Dy.
Labour
Commissioner,
Lucknow
on
05.12.2000 is a cryptic order. No reasons
have been assigned as to why the dispute
raised by the petitioner could not be
referred for adjudication by the Labour
Court.

14. Needless to say that the said order
deprived the petitioner valuable rights for
having this dispute adjudicated by the
Labour Court and by declining to refer the
matter the valuable rights which have been
vested in the petitioner by means of the Act
of 1947 he has been deprived. It was
incumbent upon the respondents to give
adequate reasons for not referring the
matter for adjudication.

15. Reasons, when recorded by an
administrative authority in an order passed
by
it
while
exercising
quasi-judicial
functions, would no doubt facilitate the
exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate
or supervisory authority. But the other
considerations, referred to above, which
have also weighed with this Court in
holding that an administrative authority
must record reasons for its decision, are of
no less significance. These considerations
show that the recording of reasons by an
administrative authority serves a salutary
purpose, namely, it excludes chances of
arbitrariness and ensures a degree of
fairness in the process of decision-making.
The said purpose would apply equally to all
decisions and its application cannot be
confined to decisions which are subject to
appeal, revision or judicial review. In our
opinion, therefore, the requirement that
reasons be recorded should govern the
decisions of an administrative authority
exercising
quasi-judicial
functions
irrespective of the fact whether the decision
is subject to appeal, revision or judicial
review. It may, however, be added that it is
not required that the reasons should be as
elaborate as in the decision of a court of
law. The extent and nature of the reasons
would depend on particular facts and
circumstances. What is necessary is that the
reasons are clear and explicit so as to
indicate that the authority has given due
consideration to the points in controversy.
The need for recording of reasons is greater
in a case where the order is passed at the
original stage.

15. Having considered the rationale
for the requirement to record the reasons
for the decision of an administrative
authority
exercising
quasi-judicial
functions we may now examine the legal
basis for imposing this obligation. While
considering this aspect the Donoughmore
Committee observed that it may well be
argued that there is a third principle of
natural justice, namely, that a party is
entitled to know the reason for the decision,
be it judicial or quasi- judicial. The
Committee expressed the opinion that
"there are some cases where the refusal to
give grounds for a decision may be plainly
unfair; and this may be so, even when the
decision is final and no further proceedings
are open to the disappointed party by way
of appeal or otherwise" and that "where
further
proceedings
are
open
to
a
disappointed party, it is contrary to natural
justice that the silence of the Minister or
8 All. Shri Dewesh Kumar Ex-Sr. Supervisor M/S Tata Engg. & L. Co. Ltd. Vs. M/S Tata
 Engineering & Locomitove Co. Ltd. Lko.
1545
the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive
them of the opportunity". (p. 80) Prof.
H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view
that "natural justice may provide the best
rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is
required by the ordinary man's sense of
justice". (See Wade, Administrative Law,
6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering
Co. case [(1976) 2 SCC 981 : 1976 Supp
SCR 489] Hon'ble Supreme Court has
taken the same view when it observed that
"the rule requiring reasons to be given in
support of an order is, like the principles of
audi alteram partem, a basic principle of
natural justice which must inform every
quasi-judicial
process".
This
decision
proceeds on the basis that the two well
known principles of natural justice, namely
(i) that no man should be a judge in his
own cause, and (ii) that no person should
be judged without a hearing, are not
exhaustive and that in addition to these two
principles there may be rules which seek to
ensure fairness in the process of decisionmaking and can be regarded as part of the
principles of natural justice. This view is in
consonance with the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak v.
Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 :
(1970) 1 SCR 457] wherein it has been
held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272,
para 20)

"The concept of natural justice
has undergone a great deal of change in
recent years. In the past it was thought that
it included just two rules namely :

(i) no one shall be a judge in his
own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria
causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given
against a party without affording him a
reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem).
Very soon thereafter a third rule was
envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial
enquiries must he held in good faith,
without bias and not arbitrarily or
unreasonably. But in the course of years
many more subsidiary rules came to be
added to the rules of natural justice."

16. A similar trend is discernible in
the decisions of English courts wherein it
has been held that natural justice demands
that the decision should be based on some
evidence of probative value. (See : R. v.
Deputy
Industrial
Injuries
Commissioner ex p. Moore [(1965) 1 QB
456 : (1965) 1 All ER 81] ; Mahon v. Air
New Zealand Ltd. [1984 AC 648 : (1984)
3 All ER 201] )

17. The object underlying the rules of
natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of
justice" and secure "fair play in action". As
pointed out earlier the requirement about
recording of reasons for its decision by an
administrative authority exercising quasijudicial functions achieves this object by
excluding chances of arbitrariness and
ensuring a degree of fairness in the process
of decision-making. Keeping in view the
expanding horizon of the principles of
natural justice, we are of the opinion, that
the requirement to record reason can be
regarded as one of the principles of natural
justice which govern exercise of power by
administrative authorities. The rules of
natural justice are not embodied rules. The
extent of their application depends upon the
particular statutory framework whereunder
jurisdiction has been conferred on the
administrative authority. With regard to the
exercise of a particular power by an
administrative authority including exercise
of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the
legislature, while conferring the said
power, may feel that it would not be in the
larger public interest that the reasons for
the order passed by the administrative
1546 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authority be recorded in the order and be
communicated to the aggrieved party and it
may dispense with such a requirement. It
may do so by making an express provision
to that effect as those contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of
U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions
(Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia
whereby the orders passed by certain
specified authorities are excluded from the
ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion
can also arise by necessary implication
from the nature of the subject matter, the
scheme
and
the
provisions
of
the
enactment. The public interest underly-ing
such a provision would outweigh the
salutary purpose served by the requirement
to record the reasons. The said requirement
cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a
case.

18. It is noticed that in absence of
giving any reasons the respondents have
acted in most illegal and arbitrary manner
and in violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.

19. In light of the above, the order
dated 05.12.2000 is quashed. The matter is
remitted to the State Government to pass a
fresh order in accordance with law without
being influenced by the order dated
26.06.1999 passed by the Conciliatory
Authority /Assistant Labour Commissioner,
Lucknow. Considering that the matter is
pending for the last more than two decades,
let an appropriate order be passed by the
State Government within a period of four
weeks from the date a certified copy of this
order is produced before it.

20. With the above observations /
directions, the writ petition is allowed.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 1546
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J.
THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.

Writ-Tax No. 1265 of 2022

M/s Abhay Traders Rajmarg Kuthaund,
Jalaun ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner Commercial Tax , Lko &
Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Aloke Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ankur Agarwal, Sri Ankur
Agarwal, Sri Gopal Verma

(A) Tax Law - The Uttar Pradesh Goods
And Services Tax Act, 2017 - Section 74 -
Determination of tax not paid or short
paid or erroneously refunded or input tax
credit wrongly availed or utilised by
reason of fraud or any wilful misstatement
or suppression of facts - principles of
natural justice can only be met by a show
cause notice - if it contains the necessary
material and the proposed penalty, even if
it's not explicitly mentioned - requirement
can be met if it can be easily discerned
from the reading of the notice.(Para -10)

Dispute over a purchase - notice served - goods
not supplied - Enterprises was a bogus firm -
petitioner was asked to respond to notice -
claim - Input Tax Credit, which petitioner
claimed, was wrongly claimed due to the bogus
supply - court questioned why tax, penalty, and
interest were not imposed on petitioner.(Para -
2)

HELD:-Petitioner relegated to remedy of filing
a reply to the impugned show cause notice as it
outlines the case's foundation, stating that there