# Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2025) 11 ILRA 1336
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-11-27
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 9706 of 2025
- **Bench:** Brij Raj Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shri-kamal-agrawal-m-d-v-state-of-u-p-anr-52749
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

Whether the second applications under Section
482 Cr.P.C. filed by the both applicants are
maintainable after withdrawal of the first
petition.

Whether the summoning order and criminal
proceedings under Section 500 IPC against the
applicants, arising from use of the word
"absconding" in disciplinary notices, should be
quashed.

HEADNOTES
Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section - 200, 202, 362,
482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section -
499, 500 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Section 11, 114, Order XXIII Rule 1(3),
Order XLVII - Two Applications u/Section 482
CrPC - for quashing the impugned order
whereby the application seeking discharge has
been rejected - and for quashing the BW order
and the summoning orders as well as the entire
criminal proceedings - arising out of Complaint
Case - Complaint Case was filed by opposite
party no. 2 against Om Industries (India) Pvt.
Ltd. - alleging defamation under Section 500
IPC on the basis of disciplinary notices using the
word "absconding" - Trial court issued a
summoning order, followed by bailable warrants
- Applicants of both Applications challenged the
proceedings - their first petition was withdrawn
with liberty to seek discharge - but the trial
court rejected the discharge application as not
maintainable - They then filed fresh petitions -
Applicants argued that the dispute was purely
service-related, dues were settled, and the word
"absconding" was used in good faith, protected
under the Seventh Exception to Section 499 IPC
- Opposite party raised preliminary objection
that
the
present
applications
are
not
maintainable being second application - Court,
relying on Muskan Enterprises, Bhisham Lal
Verma, Anil Khadkiwala, Bhajan Lal, and Pepsi
Foods, held that the second petitions were
maintainable, the complaint was maliciously
instituted to settle personal scores, and the use
of "absconding" did not constitute defamation -
consequently,
Applications
are
allowed
-
impugned orders are set aside - entire
proceedings
quashed
against
the
applicants.(Para - 11, 13, 14, 15)
 Application Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED

## Text

_Characters 0–39,463 of 60,662. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39463 for what follows._

1336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the
complainant-appellant
but
this
important fact has been concealed by the
complainant-appellant in his complaint.

37. The injured complainant has
admitted in his cross-examination that
accused-opposite party 3 Atul was also
medically examined meaning thereby that
Atul also sustained injuries in the incident
but this fact has been concealed by the
injured complainant in his complaint as
well as in his examination-in-chief. The
complainant is completely silent on this
aspect in his examination-in-chief. This
fact of accused Atul sustaining injuries
raises suspicion qua the version brought
forward by the complainant-appellant.
Therefore,
the
testimony
of
the
complainant-appellant Sanjay Kumar P.W.-
1, who is the sole injured witness in the
case, has been rightly discredited by Court
below in paragraph-14 of the impugned
judgment.

38. When read as a whole, the
testimony of injured P.W.-1 can be
classified in category of "neither wholly
reliable
nor
wholly
unreliable".
The
testimony of sole injured witness P.W.-1 is
embedded with material contradictions,
severe
infirmities
and
inherent
improbabilities as mentioned above. It
would be extremely hazardous to convict
the accused on the premise of neither
wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable
testimony of injured P.W.-1. The testimony
of sole interested material witness injured
P.W.-1, in absence of corroboration from
any other cogent evidence; when such
testimony is embedded with material
contradictions,
severe
infirmities
and
inherent improbabilities; cannot be made
basis for conviction of accused for offences
alleged. Therefore, reasons recorded by
Court below in support of it's conclusion
that prosecution has failed to establish the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt,
are cogent and valid reasons. Question no.
3 is answered accordingly.

39. In view of the discussion made
above, we do not find any perversity in the
judgment so as to interfere with the
findings returned by Court below. The
conclusion drawn by Court below is the
outcome of due appreciation of evidence on
record. No misreading or omission could be
pointed out by the learned counsel for
appellant. Being the last Court of fact, we
have ourselves evaluated the evidence on
record to find out whether there is any
perversity in the impugned judgment or
Court below has misconstrued any material
evidence. However, we could not gather any
new fact from the record so as to conclude
that the conclusion drawn by Court below is
against the weight of evidence on record. It
thus, cannot be said that only the view
consistent with the guilt of accused is
possible as per the evidence on record. We,
therefore, do not find any good ground to
entertain the present appeal filed under
Section 413 BNSS, which consequently fails
and is, accordingly dismissed.
---------
(2025) 11 ILRA 1336
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.11.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 9706 of 2025
& 9802 of 2025

Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1337
Ishan Baghel, Mohd. Khalid

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A., Abhay Pratap Singh, Priyanka Singh

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the second applications under Section
482 Cr.P.C. filed by the both applicants are
maintainable after withdrawal of the first
petition.

Whether the summoning order and criminal
proceedings under Section 500 IPC against the
applicants, arising from use of the word
"absconding" in disciplinary notices, should be
quashed.

HEADNOTES
Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section - 200, 202, 362,
482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section -
499, 500 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Section 11, 114, Order XXIII Rule 1(3),
Order XLVII - Two Applications u/Section 482
CrPC - for quashing the impugned order
whereby the application seeking discharge has
been rejected - and for quashing the BW order
and the summoning orders as well as the entire
criminal proceedings - arising out of Complaint
Case - Complaint Case was filed by opposite
party no. 2 against Om Industries (India) Pvt.
Ltd. - alleging defamation under Section 500
IPC on the basis of disciplinary notices using the
word "absconding" - Trial court issued a
summoning order, followed by bailable warrants
- Applicants of both Applications challenged the
proceedings - their first petition was withdrawn
with liberty to seek discharge - but the trial
court rejected the discharge application as not
maintainable - They then filed fresh petitions -
Applicants argued that the dispute was purely
service-related, dues were settled, and the word
"absconding" was used in good faith, protected
under the Seventh Exception to Section 499 IPC
- Opposite party raised preliminary objection
that
the
present
applications
are
not
maintainable being second application - Court,
relying on Muskan Enterprises, Bhisham Lal
Verma, Anil Khadkiwala, Bhajan Lal, and Pepsi
Foods, held that the second petitions were
maintainable, the complaint was maliciously
instituted to settle personal scores, and the use
of "absconding" did not constitute defamation -
consequently,
Applications
are
allowed
-
impugned orders are set aside - entire
proceedings
quashed
against
the
applicants.(Para - 11, 13, 14, 15)
 Application Allowed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
1. Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab (2024
SCC OnLine SC 4107)
2. Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2019) 17 SCC 294
3. Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. (2024) 15
SCC 282
4. M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan (2025
SCC OnLine SC 1498)
5. Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of
Maharashtra (2004) 13 SCC 324
6. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335)
7. Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Judicial Magistrate (1998)
5 SCC 749
8. Prabhanshu Shrivastava v. State of U.P.
(2024 SCC OnLine All 7228)

LIST OF ACTS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Maintainability of second petition - Res judicata
in criminal law - Discharge application in
complaint case - Absconding from duty -
Defamation under Section 500 IPC - Seventh
Exception to Section 499 IPC - Malicious
prosecution - Quashing of proceedings -
Employer-employee dispute.

CASE ARISING FROM
Complaint Case No. 9669 of 2024 (Shadab
Ahmad v. Om Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. &
Others) - Police Station: Gomti Nagar Extension,
District Lucknow - Summoning order dated
17.02.2025 - Bailable warrant dated 18.10.2025
- Order dated 06.09.2025 rejecting discharge
application.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): Shri I.B. Singh, Senior
Advocate assisted by Shri Ishan Baghel,
Counsel for Respondent(s): Sri Rao Narendra
Singh, learned A.G.A.-I, Ms. Priyanka Singh.
1338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh, J.)

1. Since the common question of facts
and law are involved in both the
applications, therefore, with the consent of
the parties, they are being heard and
decided by a common judgement.

2. By means of the applications under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., the Applicant/Kamal
Agrawal of APPLICATION U/s 482 No.
9706 of 2025 and the Applicant/Satya
Prakash Tiwari of APPLICATION U/s
482 No. 9802 of 2025 have prayed for
quashing of the impugned order dated
06.09.2025 passed by learned Civil Judge
(Junior
Division)
F.T.C./Judicial
Magistrate,
Lucknow
(in
short
"trial
Court") in Complaint Case No. 9669 of
2024 (Shadab Ahmad Vs. Om Industries
(India) Pvt. Ltd. And Others), Police
Station - Gomti Nagar Extension, District -
Lucknow whereby the application seeking
discharge has been rejected. Prayer has also
been sought for quashing the impugned
bailable warrant order dated 18.10.2025,
the impugned summoning order dated
17.02.2025 passed in Complaint Case No.
9669 of 2024 as well as entire proceedings
arising out of Complaint Case No. 9669 of
2024.

3. A preliminary objection has been
raised by Ms. Priyanka Singh, learned
counsel
for
Opposite
Party
No.2/Complainant
that
the
present
applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are
not maintainable for the reason that the
Applicants had earlier approached this
Court
by
filing
an
application
i.e.
APPLICATION U/s 482 No. 4525 of
2025 in re: OAM Industries (India) Pvt.
Ltd. Thru. Kamal Agarwal and Another
Vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Its Prin. Secy.
Home Sectt. Lko. and Another which was
decided on 28.05.2025 by the co-ordinate
Bench of this Court wherein it is observed
that after arguing for sometime, learned
counsel for the Applicants submits that he
does not want to press this petition and
seeks liberty to move an application for
discharge through counsel before the trial
court and the same may be decided by the
learned trial Court in a time bound manner.
The
co-ordinate
Bench
directed
the
Applicants
to
move
an
appropriate
application for discharge through counsel
before the concerned Court within a period
of fifteen days from date of order and
direction was issued that the trial Court will
take decision within a period of two months
in accordance with law.

4.
Ms.
Priyanka
Singh,
learned
counsel
for
Opposite
Party
No.2/Complainant has further submitted
that the application seeking discharge
preferred by the Applicants was rejected on
the ground that the application seeking
discharge in the complaint case was not
maintainable
that
is
why
discharge
application was rejected.

5. She has further submitted that once
the application seeking discharge was
rejected as not maintainable, it is not open
for the Applicants to move second
application
challenging
the
impugned
summoning order dated 17.02.2025 and the
entire criminal proceedings. She has further
submitted that the Applicants had already
made
aforesaid
prayer
in
the
first
application i.e. APPLICATION U/s 482
No. 4525 of 2025, therefore, the second
application is not maintainable in view of
the law declared by Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S.
Velmurugan, reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1498. She has relied on
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said judgment.
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1339

6. She has further relied on the
judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Bhisham Lal Verma
v. State of U.P., reported in (2024) 15
SCC 282.

7. On the other hand, Shri I.B. Singh,
Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Ishan
Baghel, learned counsel for the Applicants
has submitted that the Applicants had
earlier
filed
the
application
i.e.
APPLICATION U/s 482 No. 4525 of
2025
challenging
the
impugned
summoning order dated 17.02.2025 as well
as entire criminal proceedings arising out
of Complaint Case No. 9669 of 2024, but
the
application
was
withdrawn
after
argument at length and liberty was sought
to move application seeking discharge
before the trial court. However, the
application seeking discharge was rejected
by the trial Court on the ground that the
application for discharge in a complaint
case is not maintainable.

8. He has further submitted that the
Applicants may not be left remediless
because
the
order
dated
28.05.2025
indicates that it has not been passed on
merits, rather the application was dismissed
as withdrawn to pursue the remedy of
seeking discharge.

9. He has further submitted that the
Applicants had espoused the cause before
this Court by filing the first application and
unless the issue is decided, it cannot be said
that the subsequent application will bar the
Applicants to file another application.

10. He has relied upon the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case
of Muskan Enterprises and Another Vs.
State of Punjab and Another, reported in
2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107. He has relied
on paragraphs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16 of the said judgment.

11. He has also relied on the case of
Bhisham Lal Verma (Supra) and has
argued that the second application is
maintainable. Further reliance has also
been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
in
the
case
of
Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (2004) 13 SCC
324.

12. Sri Rao Narendra Singh, learned
A.G.A-I for the State has also submitted
that the present application should be
treated as second application in view of the
fact that earlier the Applicants had
challenged the summoning order dated
17.02.2025 as well as the entire criminal
proceedings. Now, the second application
under
Section
482
Cr.P.C.
is
not
maintainable.

13. He has relied on judgments on
following judgments passed by this Court :-

(I) Nitin Tiwari v. State of U.P.,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine All 146

(II) Shailendra Agrawal And
Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another
(APPLICATION U/S 482 No.24354 of
2023, 2023:AHC:165166)

(III) Ram Shanker Singh Vs.
State of U.P. and Another, reported in
2017 SCC OnLine All 4426

14. Heard Sri I.B.Singh, Senior
Advocate assisted by Sri Ishan Baghel,
learned counsel for the Applicant, Sri Rao
Narendra Singh, learned A.G.A-I for the
State and Ms. Priyanka Singh, learned
counsel
for
Opposite
Party
No.2/Complainant
on
issue
of
maintainability of the instant applications.
1340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. Since the preliminary issue of
maintainability has been raised, therefore,
this Court proceeds to decide the said issue
first on the aforesaid given facts and
circumstances.

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Muskan Enterprises and Another
(Supra) has observed that the principle of
res judicata, traceable in Section 11 of the
CPC, does neither apply to criminal
proceedings nor is there any provision in
the Cr.P.C. akin to Order XXIII Rule 1(3),
CPC. While Section 114 of the CPC read
with Order XLVII thereof empowers the
civil courts to exercise the power of review,
Section 362, Cr.P.C. bars a review. A close
reading of Sections 482, Cr. P.C. and 115,
CPC would also reflect that the purposes
sought to be achieved by exercising the
high courts' inherent powers, which the
respective procedural laws save, are also at
variance.

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in
the aforesaid case to the extent that the
High Court was unjustified in dismissing
the subsequent petition on the ground that
the appellants had withdrawn the earlier
petition without obtaining leave to file
afresh. Relevant paragraphs of the report
are extracted herein-under :-

"6. Imposition of such condition
by the Sessions Court for deposit of 20% of
the compensation awarded by the trial
magistrate
was
questioned
by
the
appellants before the High Court in a
petition (CRM-M-21715-2023) filed under
Section 482, Cr. P.C.

7.
The
said
petition
was
considered by the High Court on 01st May,
2023, i.e., at a point of time when the
decision of this Court in Surinder Singh
Deswal @ Col. S. S. Deswal v. Virender
Gandhi (2019) 11 SCC 341 was governing
the field on interpretation of Section 148 of
the N.I. Act. The said decision held the
condition for deposit in terms of Section
148, N.I. Act as mandatory.

8. Learned counsel appearing for
the appellants had argued for some time.
However, having found that his arguments
would yield no fruitful result since the High
Court was bound by the ratio of the
decision in Surinder Singh Deswal (supra),
he made a statement that the appellants
would withdraw the petition. Accordingly,
an order was passed to the effect that the
petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.

9. Close on the heels of dismissal
of the said petition of the appellants, as
withdrawn, came the decision of another
coordinate bench of this Court in Jamboo
Bhandari
v.
Madhya
Pradesh
State
Industrial Development Corporation Ltd.
(2023) 10 SCC 446. Upon consideration of
the law laid down in Surinder Singh
Deswal (supra), the bench in Jamboo
Bhandari (supra) proceeded to hold as
follows:-

"6. What is held by this Court is
that a purposive interpretation should be
made of Section 148 of the NI Act. Hence,
normally, Appellate Court will be justified
in imposing the condition of deposit as
provided in Section 148. However, in a
case where the Appellate Court is satisfied
that the condition of deposit of 20% will be
unjust or imposing such a condition will
amount to deprivation of the right of appeal
of the appellant, exception can be made for
the reasons specifically recorded.

7. Therefore, when Appellate
Court considers the prayer under Section
389 of the Cr. P.C. of an accused who has
been convicted for offence under Section
138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the
Appellate Court to consider whether it is an
exceptional case which warrants grant of
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1341
suspension of sentence without imposing
the condition of deposit of 20% of the
fine/compensation
amount.
As
stated
earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the
conclusion that it is an exceptional case,
the reasons for coming to the said
conclusion must be recorded."

10. Having regard to such decision,
the appellants applied afresh under Section
482, Cr. P.C. It is this petition which has
now been dismissed by the High Court by
the impugned order. The sole ground
assigned by the High Court is that since the
earlier petition had been withdrawn
without liberty obtained to apply afresh, the
subsequent petition is not maintainable.

12. The short question emerging
for our decision is whether the High Court
was justified in dismissing the subsequent
petition under section 482, Cr. P.C. for the
reason that it assigned.

13.
Having
considered
the
materials on record as well as the rival
claims, we are of the considered view that
the
High
Court
was
unjustified
in
dismissing the subsequent petition on the
ground that the appellants had withdrawn
the earlier petition without obtaining leave
to file afresh and, therefore, the petition
under consideration was not maintainable.

14.
The
procedural
laws
governing criminal proceedings and civil
proceedings in our country are quite
dissimilar, though the rule of audi alteram
partem and a procedure that is both fair
and reasonable to both/all parties for
rendering justice are at the heart of both
the Cr. P.C. and the Civil Procedure Code,
1908. The principle of res judicata,
traceable in Section 11 of the CPC, does
neither apply to criminal proceedings nor
is there any provision in the Cr. P.C. akin
to Order XXIII Rule 1(3), CPC. While
Section 114 of the CPC read with Order
XLVII thereof empowers the civil courts to
exercise the power of review, Section 362,
Cr. P.C. bars a review. A close reading of
Sections 482, Cr. P.C. and 115, CPC would
also reflect that the purposes sought to be
achieved by exercising the high courts'
inherent powers, which the respective
procedural laws save, are also at variance.
Prudence and propriety in the decisionmaking process, thus, make it imperative
for the high courts to not confuse the
procedural laws governing criminal and
civil proceedings.

15. The legal position as to
whether a second petition under Section
482, Cr. P.C. would be maintainable or not
is no longer res integra. We may notice a
few decisions of this Court on the point.

16. In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2007) 4 SCC 70, a
decision arising out of the N.I. Act, the
relevant high court had given the party the
liberty to avail any remedy in law, if
available, at the time of withdrawing her
petition under section 482, Cr. P.C. This
Court, observed that the high court would
have the inherent power to decide any
successive petition under section 482 and
that it is not denuded of that power by the
principle of res judicata."

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of
Delhi), reported in (2019) 17 SCC 294 has
also considered the issue of filing the
second application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. and has come to the conclusion if
there is a change in circumstances then,
second application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is maintainable. For the sake of
convenience, paragraphs 7 and 11 of the
report are quoted as under:-

7.
The
complaint
filed
by
Respondent 2 alleges issuance of the
1342 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cheques by the appellant as Director on 152-2001 and 28-2-2001. The appellant in his
reply dated 31-8-2001, to the statutory
notice, had denied answerability in view of
his resignation on 20-1-2001. This fact
does not find mention in the complaint.
There is no allegation in the complaint that
the
cheques
were
post-dated.
Even
otherwise, the appellant had taken a
specific objection in his earlier application
under Section 482 CrPC that he had
resigned from the Company on 20-1-2001
and which had been accepted. From the
tenor of the order of the High Court on the
earlier occasion it does not appear that
Form 32 issued by the Registrar of
Companies was brought on record in
support of the resignation. The High Court
dismissed the quashing application without
considering the contention of the appellant
that he had resigned from the post of the
Director of the Company prior to the
issuance of the cheques and the effect
thereof in the facts and circumstances of
the case. The High Court in the fresh
application under Section 482 CrPC
initially was therefore satisfied to issue
notice in the matter after noticing the Form
32 certificate. Naturally there was a
difference between the earlier application
and the subsequent one, inasmuch as the
statutory Form 32 did not fall for
consideration by the Court earlier. The
factum of resignation is not in dispute
between the parties. The subsequent
application, strictly speaking, therefore
cannot be said to a repeat application
squarely
on
the
same
facts
and
circumstances.

11. The Company, of which the
appellant was a Director, is a partyrespondent in the complaint. The interests
of
the
complainant
are
therefore
adequately protected. In the entirety of the
facts and circumstances of the case, we are
unable to hold that the second application
for quashing of the complaint was not
maintainable
merely
because
of
the
dismissal of the earlier application."

19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bhisham Lal Verma (Supra) has held
that when the first petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. was withdrawn with liberty to
avail remedies, if any, available in law, the
High Court would not be denuded of its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. on being petitioned again and the
principle of res judicata would not stand
attracted. Hon'ble Supreme Court has
further reiterated the law that there can be
no blanket rule that a second petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any
situation and it would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of the individual
case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to
raise one plea after the other, by invoking
the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas
were very much available even at the first
instance. For the sake of convenience,
paragraphs 8, 11 and 12 of the report are
extracted herein-under:-

"8. On behalf of the petitioner,
Mr Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, learned
Senior Counsel, would argue that a second
petition is maintainable under Section
482CrPC. He relied on the judgment of this
Court in State of W.B. v. Mohan Singh
[State of W.B. v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3
SCC 706 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 156] . Therein,
it was held that a subsequent application
under Section 561-A of the Code of
Criminal
Procedure,
1898,
presently
Section 482CrPC, would be maintainable
in changed circumstances. It was affirmed
that a subsequent application, which is not
a repeat application squarely on the same
facts
and
circumstances,
would
be
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1343
maintainable. To the same effect was the
more recent decision of this Court in Anil
Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil
Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019)
17 SCC 294 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 300] .
Earlier, in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v.
Neeta Bhalla [S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
v. Neeta Bhalla, (2007) 4 SCC 70 : (2007)
2 SCC (Cri) 192 : (2007) 136 Comp Cas
268] , this Court held that when the first
petition under Section 482CrPC was
withdrawn with liberty to avail remedies, if
any, available in law, the High Court
would not be denuded of its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC on
being petitioned again and the principle of
res judicata would not stand attracted.
Again, in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India
[Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 559] , a three-Judge Bench of
this Court observed that dismissal of an
earlier petition under Section 482CrPC
would not bar filing of a subsequent
petition thereunder in case the facts so
justify.

11.
We
are
in
complete
agreement with these observations of the
Madras High Court. Though it is clear that
there can be no blanket rule that a second
petition under Section 482CrPC would not
lie in any situation and it would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the
individual case, it is not open to a person
aggrieved to raise one plea after the other,
by invoking the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482CrPC, though all
such pleas were very much available even
at the first instance. Permitting the filing of
successive
petitions
under
Section
482CrPC ignoring this principle would
enable an ingenious accused to effectively
stall the proceedings against him to suit his
own interest and convenience, by filing one
petition
after
another
under
Section
482CrPC, irrespective of when the cause
therefor arose. Such abuse of process
cannot be permitted.

12. In the case on hand, the filing
of the charge-sheet and the cognizance
thereof by the court concerned were well
before the filing of the first petition under
Section 482CrPC, wherein challenge was
made only to the sanction order. That being
so, the petitioner was not at liberty to again
invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court in relation to the charge-sheet and
the cognizance order at a later point of
time. The impugned order [Bhisham Lal
Verma v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine
All 2290] passed by the Allahabad High
Court holding to this effect is, therefore,
incontrovertible on all counts and does not
warrant interference."

20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of M.C. Ravikumar (Supra) has held that
a second quashing petition under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable and its
maintainability will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. However, the
onus to show that there arose a change in
circumstances warranting entertainment of
a subsequent quashing petition would be on
the person filing the said petition. For the
sake of convenience, paragraphs 4.3 and 13
of the said judgement is quoted below:-

"4.3. It is alleged that after the
receipt of the aforesaid notice, respondent
No. 1 executed a sham sale deed in respect
of the complainant's property situated at
Thanjavur, which was given as security
against the loan amount. On coming to
know of the said fraudulent transaction, the
complainant filed a complaint on 22nd
November, 2011 with the Crime Branch,
Chennai after procuring orders of the High
Court. The said complaint came to be
registered as Crime No. 193 of 2012. The
police filed closure report in the said case
1344 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the same was accepted by Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai
vide order dated 23rd September, 2013.
The revision petition (Criminal Revision
Case (MD) No. 1305 of 2013) filed by the
complainant was dismissed by the High
Court vide order dated 24th October, 2013
and the special leave petition (Special
Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1042 of 2014)
against the said order of the High Court
was dismissed by this Court vide order
dated
7th
January,
2015,
with
an
observation
that
in
the
event,
the
complainant chose to pursue appropriate
remedies, the observations of the High
Court may not prejudice the same. In
pursuance of the said order of this Court,
the complainant filed yet another Criminal
Complaint No. 41 of 2015 before Judicial
Magistrate No. 1, Thanjavur against
respondent No. 1 and the co-accused
persons. However, the quashing petition
(Criminal Original Petition (MD) Nos.
13228 of 2015 and 19634 of 2016) filed by
respondent No. 1 and other co-accused
persons seeking quashing of Criminal
Complaint No. 41 of 2015 was allowed by
the High Court vide order dated 9th
March, 2020.

13. This Court in catena of
judgments has held that it is not open to an
accused person to raise one plea after the
other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC, though all such pleas
were very much available to him even at
the first instance. We may hasten to add
that there is no sweeping rule to the effect
that a second quashing petition under
Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and
its maintainability will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. However,
the onus to show that there arose a change
in circumstances warranting entertainment
of a subsequent quashing petition would be
on the person filing the said petition. In this
regard, we may gainfully refer to the
observations made by this Court in the case
of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1399, which are extracted
below for ready reference:-

11. .... Though it is clear that
there can be no blanket rule that a second
petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would
not lie in any situation and it would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the
individual case, it is not open to a person
aggrieved to raise one plea after the other,
by invoking the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though
all such pleas were very much available
even at the first instance. Permitting the
filing of successive petitions under Section
482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would
enable an ingenious accused to effectively
stall the proceedings against him to suit
his own interest and convenience, by filing
one petition after another under Section
482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the
cause therefor arose. Such abuse of
process cannot be permitted."

(Emphasis Supplied)"

21. After going through the records, it
is apparent that the Applicants had earlier
challenged the impugned summoning order
as well as the entire proceedings of
Complaint Case No. 9669 of 2024 in earlier
application i.e. APPLICATION U/s 482
No. 4525 of 2025 before this Court, and
this Court permitted the Applicants to
withdraw the said application and to move
application
seeking
discharge
through
counsel before the trial Court. The
Applicants, in pursuance of the direction
dated 28.05.2025, filed an application
seeking discharge, but the same was
rejected by the trial Court on the ground
that it was not maintainable and seeking
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1345
discharge could not have been heard by the
trial Court in complaint cases. The
Applicants
have
filed
the
present
applications challenging the impugned
summoning order as well as the entire
criminal
proceedings,
which
were
challenged by them earlier. It is evident
that the Applicants were relegated to the
trial Court to avail the remedy of moving
application seeking discharge, however, the
said remedy is legally not maintainable,
therefore, merit of the case was not
decided. The cause which they espoused
was not looked into, and no order on merit
was passed. Since the application seeking
discharge was rejected on the ground of
maintainability,
it
is
a
changed
circumstance, and the second application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is maintainable
in view of the law declared by the Supreme
Court in the case of Muskan Enterprises
and Another (Supra), Anil Khadkiwala
(Supra)
and
Bhisham
Lal
Verma
(Supra). It is held that the present second
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed
is maintainable.

22. Now this Court proceeds to decide
the applications under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
on merits.

23. Brief facts of the case, in nut shell,
are that Applicant/Kamal Agrawal of
APPLICATION U/s 482 No. 9706 of
2025 is the Managing Director (M.D.) of
OAM Industries (India) Private Limited (in
short "Company"), having its registered
office at 880, Haldiram House, Small
Factory Area, Bhandara Road, Nagpur,
Maharashtra. The Company is incorporated
under Companies Act with its Head Office
at Nagpur, Maharashtra. The Company is
manufacturer of different kinds of sweets,
bakery and industrial kitchen products. It
has a chain of restaurants and sweet Shops
throughout
India.
So
far
as
the
Applicant/Satya
Prakash
Tiwari
of
APPLICATION U/s 482 No. 9802 of
2025 is concerned, he is the General
Manager H.R. (G.M.-HR) in the Company.

24. It has been submitted by Shri I.B.
Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri
Ishan Baghel, learned counsel for the
Applicants that the Company and its
directors are both separate entities. In the
complaint, only the Company was made as
an accused through its Managing Director
Shri Kamal Agrawal. The Applicant/Kamal
Agrawal,
Managing
Director
of
the
Company and the Applicant/Satya Prakash
Tiwari, General Manager H.R. were never
made as an accused in the complaint in
their personal capacities, however, the trial
Court has summoned the Applicants in
their personal capacity.

25. It has been further submitted that
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
namely Sri Shadab Ahmad S/o Aziz
Ahmad had been the employee of the
Company and the appointment was given
to the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
with effect from 14.05.2022. The Opposite
Party No. 2/Complainant went on leave
from 23.05.2023 to 29.05.2023 but without
disclosing
the
same
to
the
higher
authorities and without approval of his
leave for the aforesaid period.

26. It has been further submitted that
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
acted to the extent that through one of his
colleagues he managed to mark his
presence in the Office from 23.05.2023 to
29.05.2023. He also committed breach of
trust, submitting false document, misusing
his authority; the Opposite Party No.
2/Complainant was issued a Show Cause
Notice
dated
26.07.2023
was
issued
1346 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
through
Senior
Executive-Human
Resources of the Company and he, vide his
email dated 27.07.2023, sent his reply in a
very casual manner. The Opposite Party
No. 2/Complainant admitted that he was
not having the knowledge of getting the
approval of leave, if taken without prior
approval and, therefore, he marked his
presence from 23.05.2023 to 29.05.2023
through one of his colleagues, manually.
The email dated 27.07.2023 of the
Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant is
extracted herein-under :-

Subject: FW: Show Cause Notice

From:
ankita.gadhikar@haldirams.corm

Date: 8/11/2023, 6:25 PM

To: satya.Hwarl@haldirams.com

fyl

From:
Atif
Ahmad
fravel1989@gmail.com

Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2023
1:12 PM

To:
ankita.gadhikar@haldirams.co

Cc: satya.Hwarl@haldirams.com

Subject: Re: Show Cause Notice

Dear Mam,

It was done by Mistake, I don't
have too much time because of month end
and I am not aware of Zing HR portal, that
time I have already 15 days of PL and I
don't have knowledge how can I mark my
PL In Zing HR.

Thanks

Shadab"

27. It has been further submitted that
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
discontinued his services with effect from
31.07.2023 without any information to the
Company. the company issued a letter
dated 11.08.2023, wherein it was stated that
he had not reported on duty since
31.07.2023 and without any sanctioned
leave he has absconded from his duties. It
was further mentioned that as to why the
disciplinary action be not initiated against
him and why he is on unauthorized absence
from 31.07.2023 and further, it was
provided that within 72 hours in case he
fails to join the duty it will be presumed
that he has absconded from services and the
Company will be free to terminate his
services.

28. It has been further submitted that
in the month of September 2023, the
Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant sent his
resignation letter through e-mail dated
20.09.2023 at 02:57 p.m.. All the dues of
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant were
duly settled by the Company by paying him
his entire dues, as follows :-

a) July salary

For No. of days worked: ₹
13,321.00

b) Bonus: ₹ 13,480.00

c) Leave encashment of 16 days:
₹ 19,735.00

d) Salary of one month notice: ₹
35,000.00

e)
Deduction
of
advance
received: ₹ 23,000.00

Thus,
total
amount paid
is
₹(81,534-23000) = ₹ 58,534.00

Thus total amount of ₹ 58,534/
was paid to the Opposite Party No.

2/Complainant
vide
cheque
No.
604165 dated 23.09.2023 (H.D.F.C. Bank).
11 All. Shri Kamal Agrawal (M.D.) Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1347

29. It has been further submitted that
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
replied to the aforesaid letter dated
11.08.2023,
vide
his
email
dated.
17.08.2023 at 05:38 p.m.. the Opposite
Party No. 2/Complainant had mentioned
that due to some medical emergency he had
taken leave from 23.05.2023 to 29.05.2023
and further he stated that he had gone on
leave from 01.08.2023 again due to some
medical emergency, therefore, no false
document has been submitted by him nor
any loss occurred to the Company.

30. It has been further submitted that
the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant sent
a legal notice on 20.10.2023 for the
payment of the alleged amount/dues of ₹
1,08,774/-. However, the said legal notice
was specifically denied vide reply dated
25.10.2023 stating that all his dues has
been settled and ₹ 58,534/ was paid to him
as full and final. The Opposite Party No.
2/Complainant again sent legal notice on
22.12.2023 for the payment of alleged
amount/dues of ₹ 38,919/- and medical
expenses of ₹ 72,800/-, amounting to ₹
1,11,719/-. The said legal notice was
specifically
denied
vide
reply
dated
01.01.2024.

31. It has been further submitted that
after the aforesaid developments regarding
grievances of his service dispute, he filed a
complaint on 06.02.2024 before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow based upon
bald
allegation
which
was
never
reported/raised before filing of the said
complaint
case.
After
filing
of
the
complaint and after recording the statement
of the Opposite Party No. 2/Complainant
under
Section
200
Cr.P.C
and
the
statements of his wife/Smt. Ayesha Khan
and sister-in-law/Ms. Humaira Khan under
Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Applicants have
been summoned by the trial Court to face
trial for the offense under Section 500 IPC.

32. It has been further submitted that
two show cause notices dated 26.07.2023
and 11.08.2023 against the Opposite Party
No. 2/Complainant indicate that he was not
reporting on duty since 31.07.2023 and
without authorized leave, he was staying at
his home. He was paid his wages of ₹
58,534,00 through cheque No. 604165
dated
23.09.2023
(H.D.F.C.
Bank).
Thereafter, he had given a legal notice on
20.10.2023 in which he demanded ₹
1,08,774/-. The aforesaid factual aspects
clearly indicate that there is service dispute
between
the
Opposite
Party
No.
2/Complainant and the Company for which
he could have approached appropriate
forum but he has filed a complaint on
wrong legal premises that the word
"Absconding" has been used which is
defamatory.

33.